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Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War
Curveball answers the crucial question of the Iraq war: How and why was America’s intelligence so catastrophically wrong? In this dramatic and explosive book, award-winning Los Angeles Times reporter Bob Drogin delivers a narrative that takes us to Europe, the Middle East, and deep inside the CIA to find the truth–the truth about the lies and self-deception that led us into a military and political nightmare.
446 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2007
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 47 reviews
January 13, 2016
The ideal with respect to Intelligence is that it is apolitical and focused on developing a useful and accurate picture of the world and its many players, so that governments, individuals, and companies can make well-informed decisions. Intelligence at its best relies on a team of field agents and analysts, plus translators and a lot of experts from specific fields who lend their knowledge and expertise to allow for a more complete understanding of whatever information is brought in from the field. In movies and books and on TV, this is the ideal, and when this system breaks down or someone goes off-script, this deviation is a major part of the plot, because we all generally expect, or at least hope that real life intelligence services try very hard to stick close to the ideal.
Those of us who were old enough to remember the first Gulf War, and everything since, saw the changing narrative as rumors of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq led us closer to a second war with Saddam Hussein. After September 11, 2001, even though it was Afghanistan we launched into war against, many people were already confused enough to think we were fighting Iraq already (again), and it was 'common knowledge' that Saddam had WMD, including weaponized germs like anthrax, that justified our being at war with him. I doubt that most people knew where this information really came from, just as I doubt most people really trust the CIA/FBI/etc. to be honest and open with the public these agencies serve. But even the more skeptical Americans I know may not have realized the extent of the intelligence mess that led us back into Iraq.
This book tells the story of where the WMD information came from that led into the second Gulf War, a lone defector whose story was provided to the CIA third-hand, and whose information morphed with each retelling, as the German and American intelligence agencies played a high stakes game of telephone, or Chinese whispers. And, unlike so many of the fictional CIA characters we see, the real ones were quite happy to run with the politically convenient story they were fed. I can't imagine the intelligence agents in the show NCIS, or Spooks/MI5 accepting elaborate information about a weapons program based solely on interviews by some other country's agents, of a source no one else gets to talk to. For a field where trust is so costly, trusting another country's intelligence that much and using that information to start a war without ever checking the reliability of the sources first seems silly, something a novice thriller-writer would try.
It is easy enough to see, while reading this book, what went wrong in the DIA, CIA and elsewhere with respect to the non-existent WMD in Iraq. It is much harder to see what could be done to prevent such disasters in the future. And, given the reasons this mess happened, I have to wonder if the culture of US Intelligence could ever really allow for reforms that would prevent such disasters from happening again. Many hundreds of thousands of lives were destroyed when a group of German agents and analysts decided to hoard their prize defector, and an entire region that was recovering from decades of violence was pushed back into a cycle of continued violence that continues today. No one person was responsible for the fact that misinformation became the justification for a very real, deadly, and unjust war, but rather the culture of international intelligence and that of US intelligence depends more on appearance than on real integrity. It really doesn't matter so much whether the information we use in developing policy is true or accurate, so long as it doesn't rock the boat or make the certain people or organizations look bad.
I most definitely recommend this book, especially to anyone who is interested in policy or intelligence.
Those of us who were old enough to remember the first Gulf War, and everything since, saw the changing narrative as rumors of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) in Iraq led us closer to a second war with Saddam Hussein. After September 11, 2001, even though it was Afghanistan we launched into war against, many people were already confused enough to think we were fighting Iraq already (again), and it was 'common knowledge' that Saddam had WMD, including weaponized germs like anthrax, that justified our being at war with him. I doubt that most people knew where this information really came from, just as I doubt most people really trust the CIA/FBI/etc. to be honest and open with the public these agencies serve. But even the more skeptical Americans I know may not have realized the extent of the intelligence mess that led us back into Iraq.
This book tells the story of where the WMD information came from that led into the second Gulf War, a lone defector whose story was provided to the CIA third-hand, and whose information morphed with each retelling, as the German and American intelligence agencies played a high stakes game of telephone, or Chinese whispers. And, unlike so many of the fictional CIA characters we see, the real ones were quite happy to run with the politically convenient story they were fed. I can't imagine the intelligence agents in the show NCIS, or Spooks/MI5 accepting elaborate information about a weapons program based solely on interviews by some other country's agents, of a source no one else gets to talk to. For a field where trust is so costly, trusting another country's intelligence that much and using that information to start a war without ever checking the reliability of the sources first seems silly, something a novice thriller-writer would try.
It is easy enough to see, while reading this book, what went wrong in the DIA, CIA and elsewhere with respect to the non-existent WMD in Iraq. It is much harder to see what could be done to prevent such disasters in the future. And, given the reasons this mess happened, I have to wonder if the culture of US Intelligence could ever really allow for reforms that would prevent such disasters from happening again. Many hundreds of thousands of lives were destroyed when a group of German agents and analysts decided to hoard their prize defector, and an entire region that was recovering from decades of violence was pushed back into a cycle of continued violence that continues today. No one person was responsible for the fact that misinformation became the justification for a very real, deadly, and unjust war, but rather the culture of international intelligence and that of US intelligence depends more on appearance than on real integrity. It really doesn't matter so much whether the information we use in developing policy is true or accurate, so long as it doesn't rock the boat or make the certain people or organizations look bad.
I most definitely recommend this book, especially to anyone who is interested in policy or intelligence.
April 10, 2017
Illustrates quite well the dangers of wishful thinking and trying to make evidence fit your conclusions rather than the other way around. The consequences of such self-delusion can spin far out of control.
July 12, 2020
A month prior to the 2nd Iraq war, secretary of state Colin Powell addressed the security council to garner support for the imminent US invasion of Iraq. He displayed charts, maps, satellite imagery and layouts of facilities he alleged were home to Saddam Hussain's mobile production units of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). He waved a vial in front of the chair to show the kind of mechanism the WMDs. He made a comprehensive case, he mentioned the US has solid evidence... and an insider source! A 'chemical engineer who ran the WMD program in those facilities'...
There were some problems with the narrative though. No such factory existed, the satellite images were of a 'seed processing' plant. The other, bigger problem was, his source, the 'chemical engineer' was lying, he was a taxi driver seeking asylum in Germany!
Rafid Ahmed Aljanabi was introduced to the world in Bob Drogin's book titled 'Curveball' - the code name the German intelligence gave him for his dodgy story. When the US invaded Iraq and the US troops were sent to the 'WMD plant' the soldiers found a deserted compound with no sign of any chemical plant. The only part of his story was that he did study Chemical Engineering in Baghdad University but apparently never graduated...
Did the US invade a country on shaky evidence? The author disagrees. On the contrary, he says, the Bush administration found the evidence -however shaky it was- it needed to forward their plan to invade Iraq.
This is one those books that narrate facts but read better than a novel...
There were some problems with the narrative though. No such factory existed, the satellite images were of a 'seed processing' plant. The other, bigger problem was, his source, the 'chemical engineer' was lying, he was a taxi driver seeking asylum in Germany!
Rafid Ahmed Aljanabi was introduced to the world in Bob Drogin's book titled 'Curveball' - the code name the German intelligence gave him for his dodgy story. When the US invaded Iraq and the US troops were sent to the 'WMD plant' the soldiers found a deserted compound with no sign of any chemical plant. The only part of his story was that he did study Chemical Engineering in Baghdad University but apparently never graduated...
Did the US invade a country on shaky evidence? The author disagrees. On the contrary, he says, the Bush administration found the evidence -however shaky it was- it needed to forward their plan to invade Iraq.
This is one those books that narrate facts but read better than a novel...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 28, 2023
Um exemplo de como a análise da CIA pode afetar a política externa
Este livro, assim como a Gália de César, é dividido em três partes. A primeira parte explica como um desertor iraquiano com o nome falso de `Curveball' acabou na Alemanha e como o serviço nacional de inteligência alemão (BND) optou por explorá-lo. A segunda parte diz respeito à forma como a CIA reagiu às alegações de capacidade de guerra biológica iraquiana feitas pela Curveball. A terceira parte diz respeito à busca infrutífera de quaisquer indicadores de armas de destruição em massa (ADM) iraquianas viáveis ou instalações para produzi-las. O livro está muito bem escrito e fornece muitas informações sobre todo o triste caso Curveball. No entanto, uma palavra de advertência é necessária. Seu autor é um repórter, não um agente de inteligência, suas janelas para o mundo secreto da inteligência são fornecidas por informantes que estavam ou estão dentro desse mundo e que, como o próprio Curveball, têm suas próprias agendas. O livro é animado por supostos diálogos e caracterizações pessoais que podem ou não ser precisas. Drogin é um repórter bom demais para não saber disso, mas um escritor bom demais para não incluí-los. Eles acrescentam drama e verossimilhança à sua história.
O livro é uma boa leitura, mas também apóia vários outros relatos sobre a incrível inépcia da Diretoria de Inteligência da CIA. Aparentemente, a equipe de armas de destruição em massa da CIA (WINPAC) tinha (tem?) não tenho ideia de como transformar informações em inteligência. Eles deram o salto lógico de que, como os relatórios em segunda mão dos interrogatórios de Curveball (codinome de série `Hortensia') pareciam internamente consistentes, eles constituíam uma inteligência sólida. Segundo todos os relatos, eles não fizeram nenhum esforço real para verificar ou aprimorar esses relatórios por outros meios e descartaram informações de imagens que não apoiavam as afirmações de Curveball como negação e engano iraquianos. Eles também não fizeram nenhum esforço para considerar se as afirmações de Curveball realmente faziam algum sentido, dada a natureza da utilização de agentes biológicos como armas. No final do jogo, eles forneceram à Bechtel Corporation reproduções do desenho de Curveball do que ele alegou serem instalações de produção móveis (18 Wheeler Trucks) e tiveram a certeza de que sim, elas poderiam ser usadas para esse propósito. O que eles não perguntaram e a Bechtel se voluntariou foi para que mais eles poderiam ser usados e quão prático seria operar caminhões cheios de biotoxinas em estradas notoriamente ruins. Finalmente, eles aparentemente não fizeram nenhum esforço para determinar se o Iraque estava buscando as tecnologias associadas à produção de biotoxinas (por exemplo, tecnologias de contenção, vacinas ou equipamentos de proteção). O Conselho Nacional de Inteligência (NIC), que produziu a infame Estimativa de Inteligência Nacional (NIE) pré-Operação da Liberdade do Iraque, claramente também não sabia a diferença entre informação e inteligência. De fato, esta é uma situação lamentável e provavelmente não melhorará com as reformas cosméticas que foram realizadas pelo Sistema de Inteligência dos EUA desde o 11 de setembro.
Foi alguns dias antes de Curveball admitir que inventou toda a sua história sobre caminhões móveis com armas biológicas usados pelo regime de Saddam Hussein para desenvolver germes para conduzir guerras. Os alemães eram tolos, mas não um grupo tão grande de tolos quanto a comunidade de inteligência dos EUA, especificamente a CIA. Drogin deve se sentir vingado em sua avaliação de toda a questão da credibilidade de Curveball, assim como algumas das personalidades de seu livro que tentaram divulgar a verdade sobre Curveball. Curveball estudou americanos e os leu corretamente. Ele sabia o que fazer para chamar a atenção deles. Ele tocava todo mundo como um violino, mas agora é a hora de ele pagar pela dança. Agora que Curveball se revelou, a saga continua enquanto os alemães o privam de suas vantagens de asilo e os EUA querem que ele seja extraditado para responder por sua fraude. Ele não é totalmente culpado. O governo Bush sabia que sua história era falsa, mas Powell foi criado para ser o bode e proferir o discurso na ONU que ajudou esse órgão a subornar qualquer ação que os EUA tomassem para aliviar a ameaça de qualquer arma de destruição em massa existente nas mãos de um regime despótico hostil. Em sua entrevista de 15 de fevereiro com jornalistas alemães para o Guardian do Reino Unido, Curveball lamentou, não pelas vidas perdidas em combates em seu país, mas pela perda de seu telefone celular e de seu apartamento, que os alemães recuperaram. Os alemães estão revisando seu status em seu programa de proteção a testemunhas e pode-se esperar que eles o expulsem e dêem o exemplo do que acontece quando imigrantes traem sua confiança. Este livro detalha não apenas a fraude de Curveball, mas a arrogância da CIA, que ignorou todo o treinamento e o bom senso para realizar sua fantasia. Seria bom pensar que todos que erraram deliberadamente acabariam pagando por suas transgressões, incluindo Bush. Mas, assim como Nixon se esquivou de sua bala, é bem provável que Bush o faça.
Ainda estamos vivendo isso. No mesmo estilo envolvente de um grande mistério, Curveball revela não apenas quem não sabe, mas também como ele sabe e por que não sabe. Mas, ao contrário de um mistério, Drogin, o autor, imediatamente nos conta a parte de quem não sabe. O resto é história, história real. É a história convincente e imbatível de como um cara muito inteligente, codinome Curveball por seus controladores de inteligência alemães, manipula um sistema e, por fim, se torna um dos argumentos centrais do governo Bush para invadir o Iraque. Se isso fosse ficção, você riria da confusão de especialistas parecida com Clouseau. Mas não é ficção e esses caras são reais e têm títulos, como Secretário de Estado, Presidente dos Estados Unidos, Diretor da CIA... as mesmas pessoas que aparecem na dúzia de outros livros que li e talvez você também tenha sobre a construção, execução e consequências da Guerra do Iraque. Este não é mais um fio invisível que une os outros. Um tópico único, mas crítico, que fornece uma compreensão de como um crime que pode mudar o mundo, mas evitável, pode acontecer. E fiz.
Este livro é de leitura rápida e bem escrito. É ainda melhor agora que sabemos o resto da história. Altamente recomendado.
Este livro, assim como a Gália de César, é dividido em três partes. A primeira parte explica como um desertor iraquiano com o nome falso de `Curveball' acabou na Alemanha e como o serviço nacional de inteligência alemão (BND) optou por explorá-lo. A segunda parte diz respeito à forma como a CIA reagiu às alegações de capacidade de guerra biológica iraquiana feitas pela Curveball. A terceira parte diz respeito à busca infrutífera de quaisquer indicadores de armas de destruição em massa (ADM) iraquianas viáveis ou instalações para produzi-las. O livro está muito bem escrito e fornece muitas informações sobre todo o triste caso Curveball. No entanto, uma palavra de advertência é necessária. Seu autor é um repórter, não um agente de inteligência, suas janelas para o mundo secreto da inteligência são fornecidas por informantes que estavam ou estão dentro desse mundo e que, como o próprio Curveball, têm suas próprias agendas. O livro é animado por supostos diálogos e caracterizações pessoais que podem ou não ser precisas. Drogin é um repórter bom demais para não saber disso, mas um escritor bom demais para não incluí-los. Eles acrescentam drama e verossimilhança à sua história.
O livro é uma boa leitura, mas também apóia vários outros relatos sobre a incrível inépcia da Diretoria de Inteligência da CIA. Aparentemente, a equipe de armas de destruição em massa da CIA (WINPAC) tinha (tem?) não tenho ideia de como transformar informações em inteligência. Eles deram o salto lógico de que, como os relatórios em segunda mão dos interrogatórios de Curveball (codinome de série `Hortensia') pareciam internamente consistentes, eles constituíam uma inteligência sólida. Segundo todos os relatos, eles não fizeram nenhum esforço real para verificar ou aprimorar esses relatórios por outros meios e descartaram informações de imagens que não apoiavam as afirmações de Curveball como negação e engano iraquianos. Eles também não fizeram nenhum esforço para considerar se as afirmações de Curveball realmente faziam algum sentido, dada a natureza da utilização de agentes biológicos como armas. No final do jogo, eles forneceram à Bechtel Corporation reproduções do desenho de Curveball do que ele alegou serem instalações de produção móveis (18 Wheeler Trucks) e tiveram a certeza de que sim, elas poderiam ser usadas para esse propósito. O que eles não perguntaram e a Bechtel se voluntariou foi para que mais eles poderiam ser usados e quão prático seria operar caminhões cheios de biotoxinas em estradas notoriamente ruins. Finalmente, eles aparentemente não fizeram nenhum esforço para determinar se o Iraque estava buscando as tecnologias associadas à produção de biotoxinas (por exemplo, tecnologias de contenção, vacinas ou equipamentos de proteção). O Conselho Nacional de Inteligência (NIC), que produziu a infame Estimativa de Inteligência Nacional (NIE) pré-Operação da Liberdade do Iraque, claramente também não sabia a diferença entre informação e inteligência. De fato, esta é uma situação lamentável e provavelmente não melhorará com as reformas cosméticas que foram realizadas pelo Sistema de Inteligência dos EUA desde o 11 de setembro.
Foi alguns dias antes de Curveball admitir que inventou toda a sua história sobre caminhões móveis com armas biológicas usados pelo regime de Saddam Hussein para desenvolver germes para conduzir guerras. Os alemães eram tolos, mas não um grupo tão grande de tolos quanto a comunidade de inteligência dos EUA, especificamente a CIA. Drogin deve se sentir vingado em sua avaliação de toda a questão da credibilidade de Curveball, assim como algumas das personalidades de seu livro que tentaram divulgar a verdade sobre Curveball. Curveball estudou americanos e os leu corretamente. Ele sabia o que fazer para chamar a atenção deles. Ele tocava todo mundo como um violino, mas agora é a hora de ele pagar pela dança. Agora que Curveball se revelou, a saga continua enquanto os alemães o privam de suas vantagens de asilo e os EUA querem que ele seja extraditado para responder por sua fraude. Ele não é totalmente culpado. O governo Bush sabia que sua história era falsa, mas Powell foi criado para ser o bode e proferir o discurso na ONU que ajudou esse órgão a subornar qualquer ação que os EUA tomassem para aliviar a ameaça de qualquer arma de destruição em massa existente nas mãos de um regime despótico hostil. Em sua entrevista de 15 de fevereiro com jornalistas alemães para o Guardian do Reino Unido, Curveball lamentou, não pelas vidas perdidas em combates em seu país, mas pela perda de seu telefone celular e de seu apartamento, que os alemães recuperaram. Os alemães estão revisando seu status em seu programa de proteção a testemunhas e pode-se esperar que eles o expulsem e dêem o exemplo do que acontece quando imigrantes traem sua confiança. Este livro detalha não apenas a fraude de Curveball, mas a arrogância da CIA, que ignorou todo o treinamento e o bom senso para realizar sua fantasia. Seria bom pensar que todos que erraram deliberadamente acabariam pagando por suas transgressões, incluindo Bush. Mas, assim como Nixon se esquivou de sua bala, é bem provável que Bush o faça.
Ainda estamos vivendo isso. No mesmo estilo envolvente de um grande mistério, Curveball revela não apenas quem não sabe, mas também como ele sabe e por que não sabe. Mas, ao contrário de um mistério, Drogin, o autor, imediatamente nos conta a parte de quem não sabe. O resto é história, história real. É a história convincente e imbatível de como um cara muito inteligente, codinome Curveball por seus controladores de inteligência alemães, manipula um sistema e, por fim, se torna um dos argumentos centrais do governo Bush para invadir o Iraque. Se isso fosse ficção, você riria da confusão de especialistas parecida com Clouseau. Mas não é ficção e esses caras são reais e têm títulos, como Secretário de Estado, Presidente dos Estados Unidos, Diretor da CIA... as mesmas pessoas que aparecem na dúzia de outros livros que li e talvez você também tenha sobre a construção, execução e consequências da Guerra do Iraque. Este não é mais um fio invisível que une os outros. Um tópico único, mas crítico, que fornece uma compreensão de como um crime que pode mudar o mundo, mas evitável, pode acontecer. E fiz.
Este livro é de leitura rápida e bem escrito. É ainda melhor agora que sabemos o resto da história. Altamente recomendado.
May 24, 2009
I have to say I didn't know much about the WMD contreversoy before I read this book, and although this probably only covers a specific proportion I am shocked.
Three main factors came out of this book:
1. It had to be true because it proved them right
2. Give them what they want to hear
3. People hear what they want to hear
When you read through the book, parts in the first 3/4 I could find ammusing, even laugh at, but by time I finished it I was cranky becuase this is not an isolated case and what else that isn't publicised happens that we don't know about.
Those who think America was alone in his monumental piece of "creative" information will see the lin ks between them, the German's and the English, was well as those countries that followed them blindly into war.
And overall the theme of isolation, harrasment and intimidation of those who dared to question, even those who at some point were strong believers, was what did it for me. How can we make sure that we're doing the "right" thing if the people that question it (espcially those with evidence) are treated so poorly.
I recommend that you read it.
SBC: DH pick
Three main factors came out of this book:
1. It had to be true because it proved them right
2. Give them what they want to hear
3. People hear what they want to hear
When you read through the book, parts in the first 3/4 I could find ammusing, even laugh at, but by time I finished it I was cranky becuase this is not an isolated case and what else that isn't publicised happens that we don't know about.
Those who think America was alone in his monumental piece of "creative" information will see the lin ks between them, the German's and the English, was well as those countries that followed them blindly into war.
And overall the theme of isolation, harrasment and intimidation of those who dared to question, even those who at some point were strong believers, was what did it for me. How can we make sure that we're doing the "right" thing if the people that question it (espcially those with evidence) are treated so poorly.
I recommend that you read it.
SBC: DH pick
August 22, 2007
This books reads like novel--a motley crew of CIA spies, foreign intelligence, Iraqi defectors and politicos from all over the world. A fast-paced read that leaves you thinking, as Mark Thomas puts it: 'Curveball is the factual equivalent of Catch 22. It is impossible to read this book and then look at our world leaders without thinking, "F*ck. Oh f*ck. Oh my God, oh f*ck."'
December 16, 2009
Highly recommended to understand how pre-conceived assumptions influence the selection and manipulation of facts.
September 1, 2011
I don't know whether to laugh or cry!!
October 16, 2017
Good account of intelligence failure. More or less ignores the political context, however.
July 4, 2021
Yep,
This is an extremely alarming tale of a situation where analysts go against better judgement to mold a story to fit their needs... in this case to invade Iraq and begin a war. Unfortunately this is information from second hand analysts, intelligence operatives in Germany, so we are not even talking about first hand accounts for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). It is extremely alarming that the information itself was only being relayed by German intelligence during the peak necessity of the required information.
It must have been an even harder blow to go back and realize that the source in question was not even a valid source, not top of his class, fired for sexual innuendos, hard to work for, linked to other false sources, etc. (ohhh and an alcoholic that was continuously updating and molding his stories). Basically a look into his background early on would have showed these red flags and hinted that he was a fabricator but by the time it occurred it was too late. This is a classic case of humans only seeing what they want to see, and disregarding all contrary evidence to those "facts" they wish to believe.
Then of course there is the part where government agencies push people out of their careers when they refuse to hide the truth from the public. That's what gets me, how many peoples jobs and careers are sacrificed just for wanting to tell the truth, even if the truth is hard to swallow. Then again, being humiliated in the public eye can be a hard thing. It's food for thought, but to know that all of the evidence that was used to push the invasion into Iraq came from an unreliable fabricator, well... it's hard to swallow.
This is an extremely alarming tale of a situation where analysts go against better judgement to mold a story to fit their needs... in this case to invade Iraq and begin a war. Unfortunately this is information from second hand analysts, intelligence operatives in Germany, so we are not even talking about first hand accounts for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). It is extremely alarming that the information itself was only being relayed by German intelligence during the peak necessity of the required information.
It must have been an even harder blow to go back and realize that the source in question was not even a valid source, not top of his class, fired for sexual innuendos, hard to work for, linked to other false sources, etc. (ohhh and an alcoholic that was continuously updating and molding his stories). Basically a look into his background early on would have showed these red flags and hinted that he was a fabricator but by the time it occurred it was too late. This is a classic case of humans only seeing what they want to see, and disregarding all contrary evidence to those "facts" they wish to believe.
Then of course there is the part where government agencies push people out of their careers when they refuse to hide the truth from the public. That's what gets me, how many peoples jobs and careers are sacrificed just for wanting to tell the truth, even if the truth is hard to swallow. Then again, being humiliated in the public eye can be a hard thing. It's food for thought, but to know that all of the evidence that was used to push the invasion into Iraq came from an unreliable fabricator, well... it's hard to swallow.
September 6, 2020
The book tells the story of a young chemical engineer seeking political asylum in Munich in 1999 and offers convincing testimony about Saddam Hussein's secret program for the development of weapons of mass destruction. He receives the code name of Curveball and is forgotten until the attacks of 9/11, when Bush decides to invade Iraq. Curveball exposes the complicated coexistence between intelligence agencies, a stubborn president, a confused chancellor, an incompetent CIA director and agents in doubt about his source. The reports are lively and exciting. Curveball looks like an investigative espionage thriller. Fast and attractive, it is a story based on intrigue and counter-information at the highest levels of the American government. In an age of nationalist speeches and statements motivated by political interests.
December 27, 2021
It’s amazing the things you’ll buy in airport bookshops when yr out of things to read. This is the story of 'Curveball', the Iraqi defector who turned out to be the chief source of info that Saddam had bioweapons labs in Iraq – and, as it turned out, a complete liar. Drogin, a Pulitzer-winning journalist for the LA Times, reconstructs how this person went from unconfirmed source to the slam-dunk proof that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. I’d recommend it on a couple of levels – if you choose not to believe a word of it, it’s one of the better (and funnier) spy novels out there. If you believe it’s true, it’s a tale of jaw-dropping incompetence that shows how even the CIA, which we depend on for national security, is subject to bullshit office politics like any other business. Only in this case, thousands of people got killed as a result.
September 29, 2021
This is an utterly fascinating and comprehensive evisceration of the so-called "intelligence" that led to the clusterfuck that was the Iraq War of 2003. You'd think that famous intelligence agency employees would be immune to wilful blindness and biased reporting, but apparently it is not the case. I thoroughly enjoyed this and look forward to reading similar books.
August 14, 2018
Loved it.
August 15, 2019
The most important book no one has ever heard of. A stunning insight into "group think" at the highest level and a sad commentary on the absence of accountability in government.
July 16, 2020
This should be required reading for all up and coming or aspiring intelligence professionals
July 8, 2023
Couldn’t finish it too confusing with all the abbreviations for the different agencies involved
May 24, 2024
A bit niche, but an easy and enjoyable read
October 6, 2023
Une bonne enquêtes sur les faiblesses du renseignement humain et ses limites et des rivalités entre service de différents pays.
e livre, un peu comme La Gaule de César, est divisé en trois parties. La première partie explique comment un transfuge irakien, baptisé « Curveball », s'est retrouvé en Allemagne et comment le service de renseignement national allemand (BND) a choisi de l'exploiter. La deuxième partie concerne la façon dont la CIA a réagi aux affirmations de Curveball sur les capacités irakiennes de guerre biologique. La troisième partie concerne la recherche infructueuse d’indicateurs d’armes de destruction massive (ADM) irakiennes viables ou d’installations permettant de les produire. Le livre est plutôt bien écrit et fournit de nombreuses informations sur toute la triste affaire Curveball. Pourtant, un mot d’avertissement s’impose. Son auteur est un journaliste et non un agent du renseignement, ses fenêtres sur le monde secret du renseignement lui sont fournies par des informateurs qui étaient ou sont à l'intérieur de ce monde et qui, comme Curveball lui-même, ont leurs propres agendas. Le livre est agrémenté de morceaux de dialogues supposés et de caractérisations personnelles qui peuvent être exactes ou non. Drogin est un trop bon journaliste pour ne pas le savoir, mais un trop bon écrivain pour ne pas les inclure. Ils ajoutent du drame et de la vraisemblance à son histoire.
Le livre est une bonne lecture, mais il conforte également un certain nombre d'autres récits sur l'incroyable incompétence de la Direction du renseignement de la CIA. Apparemment, l’équipe ADM de la CIA (WINPAC) n’avait (n’a ?) aucune idée de la façon de transformer l’information en renseignement. Ils ont fait le saut logique en disant que, puisque les rapports de seconde main sur les débriefings de Curveball (nom de code de la série « Hortensia ») semblaient cohérents en interne, ils constituaient des renseignements solides. De toute évidence, ils n'ont fait aucun effort réel pour vérifier ou améliorer ces rapports par d'autres moyens et ont rejeté les informations d'imagerie qui n'étayaient pas les affirmations de Curveball comme un déni et une tromperie irakienne. Ils n’ont également fait aucun effort pour déterminer si les affirmations de Curveball avaient vraiment un sens étant donné la nature de la militarisation des agents biologiques. Tard dans le jeu, ils ont fourni à Bechtel Corporation des reproductions du dessin de Curveball de ce qu'il prétendait être des installations de production mobiles (18Wheeler Trucks) et ont été rassurés que oui, ils pouvaient être utilisés à cette fin. Ce qu’ils n’ont pas demandé et Bechtel s’est porté volontaire, c’est à quoi d’autre pourraient-ils servir et dans quelle mesure serait-il pratique de faire circuler des camions remplis de biotoxines sur une route notoirement mauvaise. Finalement, ils n’ont apparemment fait aucun effort pour déterminer si l’Iraq recherchait les technologies associées à la production de biotoxines (par exemple les technologies de confinement, les vaccins ou les équipements de protection). Le Conseil national du renseignement (NIC) qui a produit la tristement célèbre estimation du renseignement national (NIE) avant l’opération Iraqi Freedom ne connaissait clairement pas non plus la différence entre information et renseignement. Il s’agit en effet d’une situation déplorable et qui ne pourra probablement pas être améliorée par les réformes cosmétiques entreprises par le système de renseignement américain depuis le 11 septembre.
Examen fascinant et exaspérant de la source de l’arnaque aux armes de destruction massive en Irak... Un exemple de la façon dont l’analyse de la CIA peut affecter la politique étrangère
e livre, un peu comme La Gaule de César, est divisé en trois parties. La première partie explique comment un transfuge irakien, baptisé « Curveball », s'est retrouvé en Allemagne et comment le service de renseignement national allemand (BND) a choisi de l'exploiter. La deuxième partie concerne la façon dont la CIA a réagi aux affirmations de Curveball sur les capacités irakiennes de guerre biologique. La troisième partie concerne la recherche infructueuse d’indicateurs d’armes de destruction massive (ADM) irakiennes viables ou d’installations permettant de les produire. Le livre est plutôt bien écrit et fournit de nombreuses informations sur toute la triste affaire Curveball. Pourtant, un mot d’avertissement s’impose. Son auteur est un journaliste et non un agent du renseignement, ses fenêtres sur le monde secret du renseignement lui sont fournies par des informateurs qui étaient ou sont à l'intérieur de ce monde et qui, comme Curveball lui-même, ont leurs propres agendas. Le livre est agrémenté de morceaux de dialogues supposés et de caractérisations personnelles qui peuvent être exactes ou non. Drogin est un trop bon journaliste pour ne pas le savoir, mais un trop bon écrivain pour ne pas les inclure. Ils ajoutent du drame et de la vraisemblance à son histoire.
Le livre est une bonne lecture, mais il conforte également un certain nombre d'autres récits sur l'incroyable incompétence de la Direction du renseignement de la CIA. Apparemment, l’équipe ADM de la CIA (WINPAC) n’avait (n’a ?) aucune idée de la façon de transformer l’information en renseignement. Ils ont fait le saut logique en disant que, puisque les rapports de seconde main sur les débriefings de Curveball (nom de code de la série « Hortensia ») semblaient cohérents en interne, ils constituaient des renseignements solides. De toute évidence, ils n'ont fait aucun effort réel pour vérifier ou améliorer ces rapports par d'autres moyens et ont rejeté les informations d'imagerie qui n'étayaient pas les affirmations de Curveball comme un déni et une tromperie irakienne. Ils n’ont également fait aucun effort pour déterminer si les affirmations de Curveball avaient vraiment un sens étant donné la nature de la militarisation des agents biologiques. Tard dans le jeu, ils ont fourni à Bechtel Corporation des reproductions du dessin de Curveball de ce qu'il prétendait être des installations de production mobiles (18Wheeler Trucks) et ont été rassurés que oui, ils pouvaient être utilisés à cette fin. Ce qu’ils n’ont pas demandé et Bechtel s’est porté volontaire, c’est à quoi d’autre pourraient-ils servir et dans quelle mesure serait-il pratique de faire circuler des camions remplis de biotoxines sur une route notoirement mauvaise. Finalement, ils n’ont apparemment fait aucun effort pour déterminer si l’Iraq recherchait les technologies associées à la production de biotoxines (par exemple les technologies de confinement, les vaccins ou les équipements de protection). Le Conseil national du renseignement (NIC) qui a produit la tristement célèbre estimation du renseignement national (NIE) avant l’opération Iraqi Freedom ne connaissait clairement pas non plus la différence entre information et renseignement. Il s’agit en effet d’une situation déplorable et qui ne pourra probablement pas être améliorée par les réformes cosmétiques entreprises par le système de renseignement américain depuis le 11 septembre.
Examen fascinant et exaspérant de la source de l’arnaque aux armes de destruction massive en Irak... Un exemple de la façon dont l’analyse de la CIA peut affecter la politique étrangère
September 29, 2009
Bob Drogin's "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War" is an examination of the refugee from Iraq, code named "Curveball," who contended that he had been involved in WMD biological warfare research and development. It is also another story of serious mistakes by American intelligence in the run up to the Iraq invasion after 9/11.
In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity.
After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States.
The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported.
Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Also, was he actually the person who, as per the title, "caused a war"? It appears that the Administration had already made up its mind and Curveball's "intelligence" was simply one more argument in favor. Readers must decide if the author accurately makes his case.
In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity.
After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States.
The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported.
Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Also, was he actually the person who, as per the title, "caused a war"? It appears that the Administration had already made up its mind and Curveball's "intelligence" was simply one more argument in favor. Readers must decide if the author accurately makes his case.
October 27, 2014
I think anyone who thinks that the Iraq War was some massive conspiracy should read this, because the inept, backstabbing, glory hunting and lack of oversight shown by some of the biggest intelligence agencies in this book would be to give too much credit to the C.I.A. to think it was all planned that way.
This tells the story of the ‘source’ code-named Curveball, that the US based it intelligence on for the Iraq War, whose ‘iron clad’ story of working in Saddam’s bio-weapons program was basically a lie he concocted on his own.
Defecting to Germany, the Germans thought they hit the jack pot with his detailed plans of biological weapon production. However lack of technical expertise and bitter of the CIA’s contempt for German intelligence services, they never let the Americans question his claims, yet still sent glowing reports of his information back.
The book shows how everyone thought that Iraq had a hidden weapons program, and how Iraq keep getting caught out with these programs all through the 1990’s, that no one believed them when they said they didn't have them. Kind of like a cry wolf situation.
It shows how the even powerful agencies like the CIA can be faulty of ‘group thinking.’
The people, who were sent to search for WMDs after the war, were heavily invested in the idea of Saddam’s chemical weapons, and the realization of the lack of these WMDs shattered many of them personally and professionally.
If there was a cover-up attempt it came later as the CIA tried to hide the fact it got it horribly wrong and tried to cover its back.
An informative account on how the intelligence on Iraq was created by a failed chemical engineer taxi driver lying to the German, used CIA reports on the internet to confirm to the CIA the same reports, which they believed so heavily led to the justification of the Iraq War.
Quite scary that not some dark mustache twirling conspiracy was to blame, but incompetence, an emperor’s new clothes error and massive assumptions based on hearsay, previous Iraqi deception and a lying nobody.
And what do they say assumptions are the mother of?
This tells the story of the ‘source’ code-named Curveball, that the US based it intelligence on for the Iraq War, whose ‘iron clad’ story of working in Saddam’s bio-weapons program was basically a lie he concocted on his own.
Defecting to Germany, the Germans thought they hit the jack pot with his detailed plans of biological weapon production. However lack of technical expertise and bitter of the CIA’s contempt for German intelligence services, they never let the Americans question his claims, yet still sent glowing reports of his information back.
The book shows how everyone thought that Iraq had a hidden weapons program, and how Iraq keep getting caught out with these programs all through the 1990’s, that no one believed them when they said they didn't have them. Kind of like a cry wolf situation.
It shows how the even powerful agencies like the CIA can be faulty of ‘group thinking.’
The people, who were sent to search for WMDs after the war, were heavily invested in the idea of Saddam’s chemical weapons, and the realization of the lack of these WMDs shattered many of them personally and professionally.
If there was a cover-up attempt it came later as the CIA tried to hide the fact it got it horribly wrong and tried to cover its back.
An informative account on how the intelligence on Iraq was created by a failed chemical engineer taxi driver lying to the German, used CIA reports on the internet to confirm to the CIA the same reports, which they believed so heavily led to the justification of the Iraq War.
Quite scary that not some dark mustache twirling conspiracy was to blame, but incompetence, an emperor’s new clothes error and massive assumptions based on hearsay, previous Iraqi deception and a lying nobody.
And what do they say assumptions are the mother of?
July 7, 2012
If you are an American citizen, this book should make you angry. If you are from another country, it will confirm in your mind the incredible amount of stupidity that flows out of Washington DC, particularly at the beginning of the Iraq war.
Curveball is the name of a not-very-bright Iraqi defector to Germany who wove an improbable, inconsistent, and not very believable tale of mobile germ-warfare weapons labs and stockpiles of weapons in Iraq. The Germans wound up not believing his story, and pretty much came to the conclusion that he was mentally unstable. However, the Bush administration, desperate to find a pretext for invading Iraq and most particularly the CIA eagerly swallowed Curveball's tale whole. The interesting thing was the CIA had never even interviewed Curveball in person before assuring Bush and Cheney that indeed this was the real deal.
It didn't help any that the relationship between the CIA and most other intelligence agencies was purely poisonous and not the rosy 'brotherhood against terror' that Bush told the world. The Germans in particular were still smarting over some arrogant high-handed treatment by the Americans a year or two earlier.
The book tells the tale well and completely and makes it plain that many of the people in the CIA were successful in covering their a__es but also many good, capable career intelligence people left in disgust. The last chapter covers a hastily-arranged White House lunch with Bush, Cheney, Rice and the chief 'WMD finder' for the CIA in Iraq. It is plain that even then when everyone else in the world knew the truth, Bush and Cheney were not quite ready to let go of the myth.
I found myself wanting to reach through the pages of the book and crash their heads together and say "...you morons...just how does it feel to completely destroy a sovereign nation and kill so many people for absolutely no reason ?".
Curveball is the name of a not-very-bright Iraqi defector to Germany who wove an improbable, inconsistent, and not very believable tale of mobile germ-warfare weapons labs and stockpiles of weapons in Iraq. The Germans wound up not believing his story, and pretty much came to the conclusion that he was mentally unstable. However, the Bush administration, desperate to find a pretext for invading Iraq and most particularly the CIA eagerly swallowed Curveball's tale whole. The interesting thing was the CIA had never even interviewed Curveball in person before assuring Bush and Cheney that indeed this was the real deal.
It didn't help any that the relationship between the CIA and most other intelligence agencies was purely poisonous and not the rosy 'brotherhood against terror' that Bush told the world. The Germans in particular were still smarting over some arrogant high-handed treatment by the Americans a year or two earlier.
The book tells the tale well and completely and makes it plain that many of the people in the CIA were successful in covering their a__es but also many good, capable career intelligence people left in disgust. The last chapter covers a hastily-arranged White House lunch with Bush, Cheney, Rice and the chief 'WMD finder' for the CIA in Iraq. It is plain that even then when everyone else in the world knew the truth, Bush and Cheney were not quite ready to let go of the myth.
I found myself wanting to reach through the pages of the book and crash their heads together and say "...you morons...just how does it feel to completely destroy a sovereign nation and kill so many people for absolutely no reason ?".
December 11, 2024
What spurred the #invasion of Iraq in 2003?
Some will say it was unfinished business with Saddam Hussein. Some might say that it was #profiteering by certain high-ranking officials. And others might say it was an administration hell-bent on getting their #war on.
Regardless of #reasoning, the rationale that put Colin Powell in the hot seat was Curveball. More specifically, Rafid Ahmed Alwan, an Iraqi #defector whose #fabricated tales about Saddam Hussein's #weapons #programs played a pivotal role in #justifying the war and the hunt for #WMD.
There are five key themes to Bob Drogin's 2007 deep dive into Curveball:
1. Deception and misinformation. Curveball's lies about WMD were accepted and propagated without confirmation by by multiple intelligence agencies, leading to significant geopolitical consequences.
2. Intelligence failures. Drogin highlights the systemic failures within those intelligence agencies - particularly the CIA - and how they failed to confirm Curveball's claims with other sources of intelligence.
3. Political manipulation of intelligence. The book is a cautionary tale of how political agendas can influence intelligence assessments. The Bush administration's eagerness to rationalize the invasion led to the acceptance and manipulation of dubious (at best) intelligence.
4. Critical reasoning. Drogin emphasizes the need for greater critical analysis in intelligence operations, critical to preventing similar abuses in the future. Ultimately, a lot of the blame for the invasion fell at the feet of Powell, who later admitted that he questioned the validity of the intelligence, but wasn't forceful enough in pushing back against it.
5. Consequences of war. The book reflects on the far-reaching impacts of the Iraq War, including the human, political, and social costs. It serves as a dark reminder of the consequences of flawed decision-making.
Great book. It will light a fire in the cynical side of your brain.
Some will say it was unfinished business with Saddam Hussein. Some might say that it was #profiteering by certain high-ranking officials. And others might say it was an administration hell-bent on getting their #war on.
Regardless of #reasoning, the rationale that put Colin Powell in the hot seat was Curveball. More specifically, Rafid Ahmed Alwan, an Iraqi #defector whose #fabricated tales about Saddam Hussein's #weapons #programs played a pivotal role in #justifying the war and the hunt for #WMD.
There are five key themes to Bob Drogin's 2007 deep dive into Curveball:
1. Deception and misinformation. Curveball's lies about WMD were accepted and propagated without confirmation by by multiple intelligence agencies, leading to significant geopolitical consequences.
2. Intelligence failures. Drogin highlights the systemic failures within those intelligence agencies - particularly the CIA - and how they failed to confirm Curveball's claims with other sources of intelligence.
3. Political manipulation of intelligence. The book is a cautionary tale of how political agendas can influence intelligence assessments. The Bush administration's eagerness to rationalize the invasion led to the acceptance and manipulation of dubious (at best) intelligence.
4. Critical reasoning. Drogin emphasizes the need for greater critical analysis in intelligence operations, critical to preventing similar abuses in the future. Ultimately, a lot of the blame for the invasion fell at the feet of Powell, who later admitted that he questioned the validity of the intelligence, but wasn't forceful enough in pushing back against it.
5. Consequences of war. The book reflects on the far-reaching impacts of the Iraq War, including the human, political, and social costs. It serves as a dark reminder of the consequences of flawed decision-making.
Great book. It will light a fire in the cynical side of your brain.
May 29, 2016
All right, so, I have not done a ton of reading on Iraq, possibly because it still feels too close for much objective debate. I would NOT categorize this book as objective (it's very kind to the case officers at CIA), but it IS a very interesting look at a failure of a number of different elements to work together. It is an indictment of the policy-centric bureaucratic sycophancy that drove a major political and military decision: the Iraq invasion.
Now, to be fair, I'm rating this as a must read for people who want to understand how the intelligence world can be spoiled by policy interests. I am sure that opinions will vary, but it came across as well-researched (given the subject matter) - again, NOT unbiased, but still worthwhile. Oh, and it's short!
Consider pairing with "Arrows of the Night" (about Ahmed Chalabi) and/or "Code Name: Johnnie Walker" (about an Iraqi interpreter) for a broader perspective on Iraq.
Now, to be fair, I'm rating this as a must read for people who want to understand how the intelligence world can be spoiled by policy interests. I am sure that opinions will vary, but it came across as well-researched (given the subject matter) - again, NOT unbiased, but still worthwhile. Oh, and it's short!
Consider pairing with "Arrows of the Night" (about Ahmed Chalabi) and/or "Code Name: Johnnie Walker" (about an Iraqi interpreter) for a broader perspective on Iraq.
November 12, 2007
Flat out fantastic. I was a willful ostrach with my head in the sand (in terms of knowing facts about Iraq) but this book is easy to understand, and actually exciting to read. Don't get me wrong...it's yet another horrible blunder of the CIA and our shady government, but it's the most interesting story I've read about Iraq to date. It's all about this Iraqi Chemical Engineer who sought asylum in Germany...and through his fabrications, singlehandedly convinced our government (with Tenent's madness holding the reigns) that Sadaam had WMDs. If I had the ambition and cash flow, I'd start a reading group about this book...it's that good.
July 5, 2012
The book covers the development of the Curveball source, who was one of the primary indicators of WMDs in Iraq, along with the consequences of the intelligence, and the eventual discovery of its unreliability. It is an interesting book, though not incredibly compelling. Still, it does show the failure of our intelligence community in understandable terms. A mistake was made, but it wasn't a dishonest mistake. Worth reading if you have a lot of time, otherwise the payoff probably isn't worth the effort.
January 14, 2008
Have you ever wondered how it was possible for the world's greatest superpower to blunder so badly when it came to intelligence information about WMD's in Iraq? Journalist Bob Drogin attempts to answer this question.
The book tells the story of an Iraqi national codenamed "Curveball" who defected to Germany and the lies he told in order to stay there. It attempts to explain his role in the fiasco.
The book tells the story of an Iraqi national codenamed "Curveball" who defected to Germany and the lies he told in order to stay there. It attempts to explain his role in the fiasco.
July 20, 2013
While written well enough, I confess that this struck me more like a conspiracy theory diatribe with only a cover of documentary. I obviously have no idea about the veracity of the book's content. Whatever the truth, I couldn't find it within myself to bestow any trust in the claims this book makes. There's a hint of the disgruntled ruling the whole story.
I may be entirely wrong and I may be being unfair to the author, but I won't judge world events on such a work.
I may be entirely wrong and I may be being unfair to the author, but I won't judge world events on such a work.
February 7, 2009
I found this book to be very interesting. Definitely worth the read. It demonstrates not only a gross failure on the part of the CIA, but also how human egos, fears, and stubborness can drive what we do, for good or for bad. Government is a tricky thing with its own pressures that make making the right decision sometimes very difficult. Read it.
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