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Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
This introduction looks at the conventional moral thinking about animals. Using examples, analogies and thought-experiments, it reveals the dramatic inconsistency between what people say they believe about animals and how people actually treat them.
280 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 2000
27 people are currently reading
1590 people want to read
About the author
Gary L. Francione
13 books211 followersA prominent and respected philosopher of animal rights law and ethical theory, Gary L. Francione is known for his criticism of animal welfare laws and regulations, his abolitionist theory of animal rights, and his promotion of veganism and nonviolence as the baseline principles of the abolitionist movement. Unlike Peter Singer, Francione maintains that we cannot morally justify using animals under any circumstances, and unlike Tom Regan, Francione's theory applies to all sentient beings, not only to those who have more sophisticated cognitive abilities.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
February 14, 2010
Well, I guess have to give this book 5 stars because the information and philosophy contained in the book is so worthy and is an important addition to the subject of animal rights.
I almost didn’t give it 5 stars though because:
It was a bit of a slog to read, which is a shame because the material is so important. These philosophers are so interesting to hear in lectures or to participate in discussions with them individually or in a group setting, but for reading, their language is dense and dry and not particularly entertaining to read.
I don’t think this author is presenting as unique a philosophy as he claims. I’d already come to the conclusion he promotes: that animals should not be considered property of humans and that as long as they are property there will be no true animal liberation/animal rights. I’m not that brilliant a thinker and I know it’s not just my own interpretation or extrapolation of other animal rights proponents’ writings that led me to that conclusion. It irked me how this author continually put down other thinkers in the field and made himself out to be so unique. It’s just not so. What he has to say is a good addition to the genre but not wholly original at all.
The animals as property issue and the history of philosophy/philosophers’ opinions about animals I did find interesting, although it would have been even more fascinating had the writing been better.
I’m so sick of animal rights advocates putting down other animal rights advocates; there’s so few of us to begin with. No, this author is not consistent either, as some have claimed. He seemed a tad iffy about sentience, making use of medical research gained by animal use/abuse, and issues surrounding companion animals.
One thing that really heartened me was the review of philosophy and seeing how far we’ve come (well how far most of us have come) in our attitudes to animals and their rights. It gave me a bit of hope that maybe most/some of us really will go the rest of the way in our thinking. Unfortunately, I do know a few people who are stuck back a few centuries ago, but I still felt hope from reading this book.
However, the thesis in this book makes perfect sense to me, and I’m glad the material in the book is available. I agree with almost everything the author states, and it’s a worthy addition to animal rights literature. There are a few other books I think are more accessible and that I liked even better, but I’m so glad this book is out there. If readers don’t want to push themselves to read the entire book, in the appendix there’s a 20 questions with answers that is a good introduction to the animal rights theory that’s presented in the book.
I almost didn’t give it 5 stars though because:
It was a bit of a slog to read, which is a shame because the material is so important. These philosophers are so interesting to hear in lectures or to participate in discussions with them individually or in a group setting, but for reading, their language is dense and dry and not particularly entertaining to read.
I don’t think this author is presenting as unique a philosophy as he claims. I’d already come to the conclusion he promotes: that animals should not be considered property of humans and that as long as they are property there will be no true animal liberation/animal rights. I’m not that brilliant a thinker and I know it’s not just my own interpretation or extrapolation of other animal rights proponents’ writings that led me to that conclusion. It irked me how this author continually put down other thinkers in the field and made himself out to be so unique. It’s just not so. What he has to say is a good addition to the genre but not wholly original at all.
The animals as property issue and the history of philosophy/philosophers’ opinions about animals I did find interesting, although it would have been even more fascinating had the writing been better.
I’m so sick of animal rights advocates putting down other animal rights advocates; there’s so few of us to begin with. No, this author is not consistent either, as some have claimed. He seemed a tad iffy about sentience, making use of medical research gained by animal use/abuse, and issues surrounding companion animals.
One thing that really heartened me was the review of philosophy and seeing how far we’ve come (well how far most of us have come) in our attitudes to animals and their rights. It gave me a bit of hope that maybe most/some of us really will go the rest of the way in our thinking. Unfortunately, I do know a few people who are stuck back a few centuries ago, but I still felt hope from reading this book.
However, the thesis in this book makes perfect sense to me, and I’m glad the material in the book is available. I agree with almost everything the author states, and it’s a worthy addition to animal rights literature. There are a few other books I think are more accessible and that I liked even better, but I’m so glad this book is out there. If readers don’t want to push themselves to read the entire book, in the appendix there’s a 20 questions with answers that is a good introduction to the animal rights theory that’s presented in the book.
January 11, 2011
I want to write a longer review of this, but basically: Excellent argument - that the humane treatment principal will always be compromised as long as we regard animals as property - clearly presented. Must read.
November 21, 2022
One of the most important books I've ever read. Every critical thinker should read this book.
March 7, 2015
A must read for anyone who:
- cares about non-human animals and/or
- is concerned with ethics and morality and/or
- values critical thinking and questioning the status quo and/or
- wants to get their facts straight about our uses of animals and/or
- enjoys solid argumentation and a clear writing style.
In short, a must read for everyone!
- cares about non-human animals and/or
- is concerned with ethics and morality and/or
- values critical thinking and questioning the status quo and/or
- wants to get their facts straight about our uses of animals and/or
- enjoys solid argumentation and a clear writing style.
In short, a must read for everyone!
March 31, 2018
Gary Francione outlines his idea of animal rights. This is an interesting treatment of the problem of animal rights and is somewhat different from similar animal rights theorists such as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Carol Adams. There is one fundamental right for animals, and that is the right not to be property. Allowing people to treat animals as property creates a moral schizophrenia. Francione especially wants to attack the idea of “humane treatment” of animals, while allowing us to continue to possess them. So far, argues Francione, animal welfare laws have only improved the situation for animals when this also improves the efficiency of the use of the animal for the human desires.
Francione starts out with the Kantian distinction between treating people as ends, rather than as means to an end. He then says there is no reason not to extend the principle of consideration as an end to animals as well as humans. Since property means that the possession has value only insofar as it is useful to the owner, animal rights implies an end to property rights. He goes on to refute various attempts to denigrate animal rights, such as that animals are really unfeeling robots (Descartes said this), or that God says it’s all right to eat meat, or that we have to eat meat to be healthy, or that animals are fundamentally different from humans in some way, or that utilitarian considerations allow us to mistreat animals.
This book is a little dry and many people will tend to lose interest or want to skip to “the good parts” (whatever you consider this to be). See my comments to his other book Animals as Persons — often his polemical attacks on other writers, or his YouTube videos, are more interesting than his books. I get the impression that Francione is searching his brain, trying to say the same thing over and over again in a slightly different way, struggling to communicate something that (for him) is glaringly obvious: animals are ends in themselves and should not be considered property.
I am not entirely convinced that animals should not sometimes be considered property. Consider for example farm animals used for work anytime before about the 19th century or so, when mechanized agriculture came in. How else were we going to get around, or plow the fields, without farm animals? You could certainly argue that we should, but it’s a bit harder to do so, and we’re drawn towards the idea that in that situation, a vegan diet and humane treatment of work animals (put out to pasture in old age) is the ideal. Of course we have mechanized agriculture today, but right now that depends on fossil fuels, which are depleting and contributing to climate change. Also the question of “pets” / “companion animals” is problematic. Yes, property rights for dogs and cats should not include the right to euthanize them prematurely or mistreat them; but for most people, for most practical purposes, we own our pets.
I also do not think that our despicable treatment of animals can be entirely described in terms of our property rights over them. What about wild animals? By definition they are not owned by humans, but what about when we destroy their habitat? This is now the fate of most animal species on the planet, crowded out by humans and their cows who completely dominate the biosphere, and rapidly going extinct. We don’t own them, we just destroy their habitat. We need something like an idea of peaceful co-existence (or “care,” along the lines of Carol Adams’ ideas) to describe this; just abolishing property rights doesn’t completely eliminate the evil. In fact, it doesn’t eliminate what is arguably the primary evil of our relationship with animals, viewed from an environmental perspective.
Further, I have concerns about the whole idea of “rights” theory in general, for either humans or animals, as a moral philosophy. This requires elaboration in a separate essay, but for me both utilitarianism and rights / Kantian theories are valid, but in different ways, because we don’t always use utilitarian or rights ideas to determine what is right or wrong in a particular case. Most of the time, we don’t think about what’s right or wrong at all; it’s just a gut reaction, thus closer to “rights.” But sometime we have to think about difficult cases, and then usually something like rule-utilitarianism kicks in. Even Francione seems to sometimes use utilitarian-type arguments, as when he argues that “you don’t need meat” and “we don’t need animal experiments or they don’t produce useful results” (as in, e. g., the conclusion to chapter 2 on p.49).
So, I’m not entirely convinced of his central thesis and it’s a bit dry. But I’m giving this four stars anyway, because this is an idea that is important to clarify, and I value clarity over entertainment value, though in a writer ideally you would have both.
Francione starts out with the Kantian distinction between treating people as ends, rather than as means to an end. He then says there is no reason not to extend the principle of consideration as an end to animals as well as humans. Since property means that the possession has value only insofar as it is useful to the owner, animal rights implies an end to property rights. He goes on to refute various attempts to denigrate animal rights, such as that animals are really unfeeling robots (Descartes said this), or that God says it’s all right to eat meat, or that we have to eat meat to be healthy, or that animals are fundamentally different from humans in some way, or that utilitarian considerations allow us to mistreat animals.
This book is a little dry and many people will tend to lose interest or want to skip to “the good parts” (whatever you consider this to be). See my comments to his other book Animals as Persons — often his polemical attacks on other writers, or his YouTube videos, are more interesting than his books. I get the impression that Francione is searching his brain, trying to say the same thing over and over again in a slightly different way, struggling to communicate something that (for him) is glaringly obvious: animals are ends in themselves and should not be considered property.
I am not entirely convinced that animals should not sometimes be considered property. Consider for example farm animals used for work anytime before about the 19th century or so, when mechanized agriculture came in. How else were we going to get around, or plow the fields, without farm animals? You could certainly argue that we should, but it’s a bit harder to do so, and we’re drawn towards the idea that in that situation, a vegan diet and humane treatment of work animals (put out to pasture in old age) is the ideal. Of course we have mechanized agriculture today, but right now that depends on fossil fuels, which are depleting and contributing to climate change. Also the question of “pets” / “companion animals” is problematic. Yes, property rights for dogs and cats should not include the right to euthanize them prematurely or mistreat them; but for most people, for most practical purposes, we own our pets.
I also do not think that our despicable treatment of animals can be entirely described in terms of our property rights over them. What about wild animals? By definition they are not owned by humans, but what about when we destroy their habitat? This is now the fate of most animal species on the planet, crowded out by humans and their cows who completely dominate the biosphere, and rapidly going extinct. We don’t own them, we just destroy their habitat. We need something like an idea of peaceful co-existence (or “care,” along the lines of Carol Adams’ ideas) to describe this; just abolishing property rights doesn’t completely eliminate the evil. In fact, it doesn’t eliminate what is arguably the primary evil of our relationship with animals, viewed from an environmental perspective.
Further, I have concerns about the whole idea of “rights” theory in general, for either humans or animals, as a moral philosophy. This requires elaboration in a separate essay, but for me both utilitarianism and rights / Kantian theories are valid, but in different ways, because we don’t always use utilitarian or rights ideas to determine what is right or wrong in a particular case. Most of the time, we don’t think about what’s right or wrong at all; it’s just a gut reaction, thus closer to “rights.” But sometime we have to think about difficult cases, and then usually something like rule-utilitarianism kicks in. Even Francione seems to sometimes use utilitarian-type arguments, as when he argues that “you don’t need meat” and “we don’t need animal experiments or they don’t produce useful results” (as in, e. g., the conclusion to chapter 2 on p.49).
So, I’m not entirely convinced of his central thesis and it’s a bit dry. But I’m giving this four stars anyway, because this is an idea that is important to clarify, and I value clarity over entertainment value, though in a writer ideally you would have both.
April 5, 2021
Herkesin bu kitabı birgün okumuş olması umuduyla......
April 13, 2024
AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ANIMALS HAVING ‘MORALLY SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS’
Gary Lawrence Francione is Professor of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Lincoln (U.K.)
He wrote in the Introduction to this 2000 book, “we may be said to suffer from a sort of ‘moral schizophrenia’ when it comes to our thinking about animals. We claim to regard animals as having morally significant interests, but we treat them in ways that belie our claims… In this book, we are going to explore the matter of the moral status of animals in an effort to try to understand the disparity that exists between what we say about animals and how we actually treat them. A good starting point is to ask whether there is any conventional wisdom on the subject---any generally accepted intuitions or positions on the moral status of animals that can serve as a focus for our inquiry.” (Pg. xxi-xxii)
He continues, “In this book, I will argue that the animal rights position, which maintains that we ought to abolish and not merely regulate animal use, is supported by sound reasons and valid arguments. And although I do not purport to be able to prove that the animal rights position is true in the same way that a mathematical proposition is true, I will argue that the position ... fits comfortably with the two intuitions that reflect our conventional wisdom about the moral status of animals: that we may prefer humans over animals in situations of true emergency or necessity and that we ought not to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals.” (Pg. xxxvi)
He states, “It we want to take animal interests seriously and give content to our professed rejection of the infliction of unnecessary suffering on animals, we can do so in only one way: by applying the principle of EQUAL CONSIDERATION, or the rule that we must treat likes alike, to animals.” (Pg. xxv)
He argues, “There is no characteristic that serves to distinguish humans from all other animals. Whatever attribute we may think makes all humans ‘special’ and thereby different from other animals is shared by some group of nonhumans. Whatever ‘defect’ we may think makes animals inferior to us is shared by some group of us. In the end, the only difference between them and us is species, and species alone is not a morally relevant criterion for excluding animals from the moral community any more than is race a justification for human slavery or sex a justification for making women the property of their husbands. The use of species to justify the property status of animals is ‘speciesism’ just as the use of race or sex to justify the property status of humans is racism or sexism… we cannot treat animals in ways in which we would not be willing to treat any human… The position that I am proposing in this book is radical in the sense that it would force us to stop using animals in many of the ways that we now take for granted.” (Pg. xxix)
He explains, “the argument that I present differs from [Tom] Regan’s in at least four ways. First, I see no reason to restrict the class of protected animals to those that Regan describes as ‘subjects-of-a-life.’ … Second… I do not share Regan’s position that … death is a greater harm to humans than to animals, or that we are obligated to save one human over a million dogs. In situations of true emergency, we may be justified in saving the human over the animal, but we may also be justified in saving the animal over the human. Third, my argument, unlike Regan’s, focuses on the legal status of animals as property… Fourth, and most important, I argue that the basic right not to be treated as property may be derived directly from the principle of equal consideration and does not require the complicated rights theory upon which Regan relies.” (Pg. xxxiii-xxxiv)
He asserts, “There is… no doubt that most of the animals we exploit are sentient. Although we may not know whether insects are capable of consciously experiencing pain… I may not know whether a dog feels pain in exactly the same way that I do, but then I cannot really know whether another human being feels pain in exactly the same way that I do… I have no doubt that dogs and cats and pigs and chickens are the type of beings who are neurologically and physiologically able to experience pain and to suffer.” (Pg. 6)
He notes, “our most numerically significant use of animals---for food---runs afoul of the moral principle that we all claim to accept: that we should not impose harm on animals if there is a feasible alternative… There is a feasible alternative to our use of animals for food that is every bit as good, if not better … the use of plants.” (Pg. 17)
He points out, "in the past twenty years, there has been an explosion of alternatives to animal tests. These include the use of human cell cultures, cell membranes… protein compounds that resemble the composition of the eye, computer programs that use molecular structure... to predict whether a chemical will produce a toxic effect… These alternatives are much cheaper and faster than the use of animals…” (Pg. 48)
He outlines, “We have two choices---and only two---when it comes to the moral status of animals. We can continue to permit the infliction of suffering on animals for virtually any purpose that provides a benefit to us, including wholly unnecessary purposes… Or we can maintain that animals have morally significant interests in not being subjected to unnecessary suffering… we must justify the necessity of inflicting any suffering on animals.” (Pg. 81)
He asks, “The question remains: why did we not see the implications of the idea that animals were not merely things? Why have we continued to believe that the regulation, and not the abolition, of animal exploitation will suffice to provide for the moral significance of animal interests?... Before we feel too perplexed about our moral schizophrenia about animals, we should consider that Bentham himself believed that we could provide for the moral significance of animal interests while we continued to eat them.” (Pg. 129) Later, he adds, “Bentham did agree that animals were not self-aware and he accepted … that there was a qualitative distinction between humans and animals that allowed us to treat them as things as far as their interests in not suffering were concerned… There are, however, at least two serious flaws in Bentham’s approach. First, the factual assertion that animals… have no self-awareness or interest in continued existence is conceptually problematic. Second, once Bentham accepted that humans and animals were qualitatively dissimilar… he made it impossible for us to treat animal interests as morally dissimilar.” (Pg. 134) He suggests, “If Bentham and [Peter] Singer really did apply the principle of equal consideration to animal interests, they would have to… accord those interests a similar rights-type protection. Such a position would require that we abolish the institution of animal property.” (Pg. 148)
He clarifies, “I was once asked whether I would kill a rat carrying plague that was about to bite me. I responded … that I would kill HIM or anyone else who was carrying a fatal illness and was about to bite me. We are… permitted to defend ourselves from imminent harm presented by other humans.” (Pg. 158)
He concludes, “Our abolition of animal exploitation might be the most effective thing to do to save the planet from the unquestioned environmental devastation caused by animal agriculture… we should abolish animal agriculture because it condemns a good many of our fellow humans to starvation… We would have to forego the unnecessary pleasure of eating animals and having their fat clog our arteries, the fun of watching them being tormented in rodeos or circuses, the excitement of walking in the woods and … wounding them with arrows, and the very questionable science involved in making them addicted to drugs that they would never use except in laboratories… We would finally have to confront our moral schizophrenia about animals… In many ways, our prevailing ways of thinking about animals should make us skeptical about our claim that it is our rationality that distinguishes US from THEM.” (Pg. 166)
In the Q&A Appendix, he acknowledges, “Are insects sentient?... I do not know. But the fact that I do not know exactly where to draw the line… does not relieve me of the obligation to draw the line somewhere or allow me to use animals as I please… I do know that cows, pigs, chickens, chimpanzees, horses, deer, dogs, cats, and mice are sentient. Indeed, it is now widely accepted that fish are sentient.” (Pg. 175-176)
He clarifies, “if we as a society ever really accorded moral significance to animal interests… we would very probably incorporate such a view in criminal laws… But that would not mean that we must punish the killing of an animal by a human in exactly the same way that we punish the killing of a human by a human…” (Pg. 184)
This book will be of great interest to those studying the issue of animal rights, as well as to vegans and vegetarians.
Gary Lawrence Francione is Professor of Law and Philosophy at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and a Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of Lincoln (U.K.)
He wrote in the Introduction to this 2000 book, “we may be said to suffer from a sort of ‘moral schizophrenia’ when it comes to our thinking about animals. We claim to regard animals as having morally significant interests, but we treat them in ways that belie our claims… In this book, we are going to explore the matter of the moral status of animals in an effort to try to understand the disparity that exists between what we say about animals and how we actually treat them. A good starting point is to ask whether there is any conventional wisdom on the subject---any generally accepted intuitions or positions on the moral status of animals that can serve as a focus for our inquiry.” (Pg. xxi-xxii)
He continues, “In this book, I will argue that the animal rights position, which maintains that we ought to abolish and not merely regulate animal use, is supported by sound reasons and valid arguments. And although I do not purport to be able to prove that the animal rights position is true in the same way that a mathematical proposition is true, I will argue that the position ... fits comfortably with the two intuitions that reflect our conventional wisdom about the moral status of animals: that we may prefer humans over animals in situations of true emergency or necessity and that we ought not to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals.” (Pg. xxxvi)
He states, “It we want to take animal interests seriously and give content to our professed rejection of the infliction of unnecessary suffering on animals, we can do so in only one way: by applying the principle of EQUAL CONSIDERATION, or the rule that we must treat likes alike, to animals.” (Pg. xxv)
He argues, “There is no characteristic that serves to distinguish humans from all other animals. Whatever attribute we may think makes all humans ‘special’ and thereby different from other animals is shared by some group of nonhumans. Whatever ‘defect’ we may think makes animals inferior to us is shared by some group of us. In the end, the only difference between them and us is species, and species alone is not a morally relevant criterion for excluding animals from the moral community any more than is race a justification for human slavery or sex a justification for making women the property of their husbands. The use of species to justify the property status of animals is ‘speciesism’ just as the use of race or sex to justify the property status of humans is racism or sexism… we cannot treat animals in ways in which we would not be willing to treat any human… The position that I am proposing in this book is radical in the sense that it would force us to stop using animals in many of the ways that we now take for granted.” (Pg. xxix)
He explains, “the argument that I present differs from [Tom] Regan’s in at least four ways. First, I see no reason to restrict the class of protected animals to those that Regan describes as ‘subjects-of-a-life.’ … Second… I do not share Regan’s position that … death is a greater harm to humans than to animals, or that we are obligated to save one human over a million dogs. In situations of true emergency, we may be justified in saving the human over the animal, but we may also be justified in saving the animal over the human. Third, my argument, unlike Regan’s, focuses on the legal status of animals as property… Fourth, and most important, I argue that the basic right not to be treated as property may be derived directly from the principle of equal consideration and does not require the complicated rights theory upon which Regan relies.” (Pg. xxxiii-xxxiv)
He asserts, “There is… no doubt that most of the animals we exploit are sentient. Although we may not know whether insects are capable of consciously experiencing pain… I may not know whether a dog feels pain in exactly the same way that I do, but then I cannot really know whether another human being feels pain in exactly the same way that I do… I have no doubt that dogs and cats and pigs and chickens are the type of beings who are neurologically and physiologically able to experience pain and to suffer.” (Pg. 6)
He notes, “our most numerically significant use of animals---for food---runs afoul of the moral principle that we all claim to accept: that we should not impose harm on animals if there is a feasible alternative… There is a feasible alternative to our use of animals for food that is every bit as good, if not better … the use of plants.” (Pg. 17)
He points out, "in the past twenty years, there has been an explosion of alternatives to animal tests. These include the use of human cell cultures, cell membranes… protein compounds that resemble the composition of the eye, computer programs that use molecular structure... to predict whether a chemical will produce a toxic effect… These alternatives are much cheaper and faster than the use of animals…” (Pg. 48)
He outlines, “We have two choices---and only two---when it comes to the moral status of animals. We can continue to permit the infliction of suffering on animals for virtually any purpose that provides a benefit to us, including wholly unnecessary purposes… Or we can maintain that animals have morally significant interests in not being subjected to unnecessary suffering… we must justify the necessity of inflicting any suffering on animals.” (Pg. 81)
He asks, “The question remains: why did we not see the implications of the idea that animals were not merely things? Why have we continued to believe that the regulation, and not the abolition, of animal exploitation will suffice to provide for the moral significance of animal interests?... Before we feel too perplexed about our moral schizophrenia about animals, we should consider that Bentham himself believed that we could provide for the moral significance of animal interests while we continued to eat them.” (Pg. 129) Later, he adds, “Bentham did agree that animals were not self-aware and he accepted … that there was a qualitative distinction between humans and animals that allowed us to treat them as things as far as their interests in not suffering were concerned… There are, however, at least two serious flaws in Bentham’s approach. First, the factual assertion that animals… have no self-awareness or interest in continued existence is conceptually problematic. Second, once Bentham accepted that humans and animals were qualitatively dissimilar… he made it impossible for us to treat animal interests as morally dissimilar.” (Pg. 134) He suggests, “If Bentham and [Peter] Singer really did apply the principle of equal consideration to animal interests, they would have to… accord those interests a similar rights-type protection. Such a position would require that we abolish the institution of animal property.” (Pg. 148)
He clarifies, “I was once asked whether I would kill a rat carrying plague that was about to bite me. I responded … that I would kill HIM or anyone else who was carrying a fatal illness and was about to bite me. We are… permitted to defend ourselves from imminent harm presented by other humans.” (Pg. 158)
He concludes, “Our abolition of animal exploitation might be the most effective thing to do to save the planet from the unquestioned environmental devastation caused by animal agriculture… we should abolish animal agriculture because it condemns a good many of our fellow humans to starvation… We would have to forego the unnecessary pleasure of eating animals and having their fat clog our arteries, the fun of watching them being tormented in rodeos or circuses, the excitement of walking in the woods and … wounding them with arrows, and the very questionable science involved in making them addicted to drugs that they would never use except in laboratories… We would finally have to confront our moral schizophrenia about animals… In many ways, our prevailing ways of thinking about animals should make us skeptical about our claim that it is our rationality that distinguishes US from THEM.” (Pg. 166)
In the Q&A Appendix, he acknowledges, “Are insects sentient?... I do not know. But the fact that I do not know exactly where to draw the line… does not relieve me of the obligation to draw the line somewhere or allow me to use animals as I please… I do know that cows, pigs, chickens, chimpanzees, horses, deer, dogs, cats, and mice are sentient. Indeed, it is now widely accepted that fish are sentient.” (Pg. 175-176)
He clarifies, “if we as a society ever really accorded moral significance to animal interests… we would very probably incorporate such a view in criminal laws… But that would not mean that we must punish the killing of an animal by a human in exactly the same way that we punish the killing of a human by a human…” (Pg. 184)
This book will be of great interest to those studying the issue of animal rights, as well as to vegans and vegetarians.
April 4, 2011
i've never read much animal rights literature, mostly because i've never felt like it was relevant to me. a lot of it seems to spend an inordinate amount of time lecturing about the abhorrent conditions of factory farms, which has always been beside the point for me. in any case, at this point i've been vegetarian for long enough that i've internalized my reasons for it pretty thoroughly. but going vegan a couple years ago made me want to reexamine them again, find a way to articulate them more precisely, which is why i picked this up.
his fundamental argument totally resonates with me: humans will never be able to treat animals in a consistently ethical way so long as we consider them to be property, i.e. a resource to be exploited. everything in the book revolves around this - either by presenting examples to elaborate on and support it, or by extrapolating how we would treat animals differently if we changed this basic assumption. this alone made it a completely worthwhile read; i'm thankful to have read it. that said, i wouldn't recommend it to everybody - it gets terribly repetitive in places, stating and restating its arguments over and over, and backing them up with often tedious detail.
his fundamental argument totally resonates with me: humans will never be able to treat animals in a consistently ethical way so long as we consider them to be property, i.e. a resource to be exploited. everything in the book revolves around this - either by presenting examples to elaborate on and support it, or by extrapolating how we would treat animals differently if we changed this basic assumption. this alone made it a completely worthwhile read; i'm thankful to have read it. that said, i wouldn't recommend it to everybody - it gets terribly repetitive in places, stating and restating its arguments over and over, and backing them up with often tedious detail.
May 7, 2010
i learned that: we create impossible situations for non-human animals and act as if all of our interactions were emergency conflict situations in which we must pick the human over the non-human, which is not the reality; that the law, as much as it would like to consider itself secular, is based on Christian-Judeo beliefs; and, in short, that '[i:]n many ways, our prevailing ways of thinking about animals should make us skeptical of our claim that it is our rationality that distinguishes us from them'. An essential book for anyone who wants to understand the nature and root of our f'd up relationship with other animals and make things right.
March 26, 2012
The arguments are clear and compelling, except when the author discusses abortion and insects. He fails to convince me that the unborn (humans) are not sentient and therefore not entitled to equal consideration. I still believe that veganism and the protection of the unborn go together. Francione also fails to put much thought into the possible rights of insects. For both of these issues, I think the precautionary principle needs to be applied: if you're not sure whether the organism is sentient, extend it the benefit of the doubt.
July 5, 2008
I was fortunate to have Gary Francione as a professor in law school. This book was my first introduction to animal rights, and is very accessible to those (like me) with little background or exposure to the subject. It is almost impossible to listen to him and read his books without adopting a vegan lifestyle; however, I am ashamed to say I am very weak and love cheeseburgers too much to give them up.
November 28, 2013
If only I'd read this BEFORE I went to ethics competition where we argued a case regarding the "moral defensibility" of eating meat! Can't get more thorough or rigorous in refuting the logic that carnivores routinely trot out. Makes it very, VERY difficult to indulge one's whims for anything other than a vegan diet.
Read
May 22, 2008Full of compelling research and the basic tennets/arguments for animal rights.
July 13, 2011
Everybody should read this!
January 4, 2022
Brilliantly simple.
I think simplicity is very much required in talking about veganism/animal rights because the ideas put forth are so decisive, there is no reason to blur the dialogue. Francione's determination to not talk about morals is also very clever because the book doesn't promote veganism based on "new" values.
The book starts off with a very simple fact; what we believe about our thoughts on animals and our collective actions towards them have this huge gap. While most people care about animals, most also take part in commodifiying them, killing them, an accept the fact that their life as a food production machine is justified because they like certain flavours.
This contradiction in itself makes non-veganism waaaay more interesting that veganism. Veganism is a simple choice, to change ones actions based on its values. Veganism doesn't promote new values (maybe some) it enforces actions based on these values of kindness, compassion, fraternity and justice. On the other hand, non-vegan lifestyle is not a choice. It is given. We never make a choice between killing animals daily or eating plants. It is a choice that has been made for us by the society we live in. Therefore, the philosophical root for this meaningless terror is more striking than veganism itself, which is a very straightforward lifestyle.
This book doesn't delve into these themes. After being evolved into the strongest predator on planet earth, Humanity created itself religions and our GOD given right to own everything on earth. You can see this even in the modern interpretations of property rights (Locke), earth was created FOR humans just like animals. They are our resource to consume.
Fancione talks less about the sociological and psycological side of non-veganism to explain this irrationality of how our values and actions are so detached from each other. Instead it tries to given an answer based on the legal status of animals.
Since animals are a commodity, they are to be used freely by their masters (all of which are humans). When you commodify any living creature, you destroy their interest. Masters interest dominate the interest of the slave. This breaks the scale since it stops us from thinking about the interest of the commodity. But the commodity is a living, breathing entity and don't want to suffer.
Nothing can be free without having their right of not being a commodity. No right can be talked about without granting two fundamental rights. A right to live and a right to not be a commodity.
Overall, 5 star book for vegans and non-vegans a like. It is simple and to the point.
I think simplicity is very much required in talking about veganism/animal rights because the ideas put forth are so decisive, there is no reason to blur the dialogue. Francione's determination to not talk about morals is also very clever because the book doesn't promote veganism based on "new" values.
The book starts off with a very simple fact; what we believe about our thoughts on animals and our collective actions towards them have this huge gap. While most people care about animals, most also take part in commodifiying them, killing them, an accept the fact that their life as a food production machine is justified because they like certain flavours.
This contradiction in itself makes non-veganism waaaay more interesting that veganism. Veganism is a simple choice, to change ones actions based on its values. Veganism doesn't promote new values (maybe some) it enforces actions based on these values of kindness, compassion, fraternity and justice. On the other hand, non-vegan lifestyle is not a choice. It is given. We never make a choice between killing animals daily or eating plants. It is a choice that has been made for us by the society we live in. Therefore, the philosophical root for this meaningless terror is more striking than veganism itself, which is a very straightforward lifestyle.
This book doesn't delve into these themes. After being evolved into the strongest predator on planet earth, Humanity created itself religions and our GOD given right to own everything on earth. You can see this even in the modern interpretations of property rights (Locke), earth was created FOR humans just like animals. They are our resource to consume.
Fancione talks less about the sociological and psycological side of non-veganism to explain this irrationality of how our values and actions are so detached from each other. Instead it tries to given an answer based on the legal status of animals.
Since animals are a commodity, they are to be used freely by their masters (all of which are humans). When you commodify any living creature, you destroy their interest. Masters interest dominate the interest of the slave. This breaks the scale since it stops us from thinking about the interest of the commodity. But the commodity is a living, breathing entity and don't want to suffer.
Nothing can be free without having their right of not being a commodity. No right can be talked about without granting two fundamental rights. A right to live and a right to not be a commodity.
Overall, 5 star book for vegans and non-vegans a like. It is simple and to the point.
March 30, 2022
Francione is the champion for the Abolitionist Approach to animal rights and his books have been the greatest influence on my own thinking and writing on the topic. This book in particular was the first I read of his and holds a place in my heart.
August 3, 2024
Dili basit evet ama sürekli aynı şeyi tekrarladığı için biraz fazla salağa anlatır gibi geldi ve bitiremedim.
October 3, 2014
I liked this book a lot! It presents many interesting points against the way humans (mis)treat animals, showing the grave inconsistencies between what we believe about animal suffering and our actual actions.
Even though most people agree that inflicting suffering on animals is wrong, they continue to do so (or let others do it in their behalf). Every living being has the right to not suffer, be it fear or pain, and not to be treated as a means to an end. There is the confusion that people think that what animal rights activists claim is the same rights for animals as for humans. The author explains why this is a misunderstanding. The right that is claimed for them is the right not to be treated as property (just like the anti-slavery movements). Animals are not expected to have the right to vote or to drive cars...
The author's main argument is that animals will continue to be treated the way they are being treated as long as human law allows to own them and classifies them as property, because property can never defend itself against the interests of the owner.
I also found interesting the discussions about these extreme situations that most people use when in a debate about animal rights. Those situations are pretty unlikely to happen, and if they do, decisions depend on a lot of things, not just on the reductionist approaches they normally have.
Even though most people agree that inflicting suffering on animals is wrong, they continue to do so (or let others do it in their behalf). Every living being has the right to not suffer, be it fear or pain, and not to be treated as a means to an end. There is the confusion that people think that what animal rights activists claim is the same rights for animals as for humans. The author explains why this is a misunderstanding. The right that is claimed for them is the right not to be treated as property (just like the anti-slavery movements). Animals are not expected to have the right to vote or to drive cars...
The author's main argument is that animals will continue to be treated the way they are being treated as long as human law allows to own them and classifies them as property, because property can never defend itself against the interests of the owner.
I also found interesting the discussions about these extreme situations that most people use when in a debate about animal rights. Those situations are pretty unlikely to happen, and if they do, decisions depend on a lot of things, not just on the reductionist approaches they normally have.
March 27, 2014
This is a great introduction to the theory of animal rights for people who are not familiar with the theory, but I thought many of the author's claims were underdeveloped and were made a little too quickly. For instance, the author does not discuss the positive duties we have to assist nonhuman animals- his theory stops short at negative duties to not harm; however, a good ethicist knows that negative duties do not exhaust the entirety of duties we have to rightholders. Furthermore, the author makes controversial claims, such as the claim that fish and lobster are sentient, without addressing the scientific data (such as the evidence provided by Rose), that contests this claim and without clearly stating the criterion for sentience (and that is the basis of his whole theory!)Since sentience is the basis of moral consideration, for Francione, he needs to better engage the neurological literature and specify where we draw the line in regard to which animals are sentient. Trying to sneak so many animals into the realm of moral considerability confuses his overall argument that grounds rights in sentience.
January 13, 2015
The best, most thorough, well argued, and well researched animal rights book in existence. It puts Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation" to shame and makes Tom Regan's overwhelming "The Case for Animal Rights" look like child's play. Francione, a lawyer and philosopher, is a master of the convincing moral argument.
January 17, 2008
An accessible and engaging primer.
Want to read
March 12, 2008G-Fizzle! The GLF!
April 20, 2014
Very interesting book for those interested in animal rights
June 4, 2022
Most people won’t read this because to answer honestly would make them very uncomfortable.
Read
November 14, 2012fffffffffffffffff
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