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Great Military Disasters: A Historical Survey of Military Incompetence
Book by Regan, Geoffrey
320 pages, Hardcover
First published July 30, 1987
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About the author
Geoffrey Regan
42 books3 followersGeoffrey Regan is an English military historian, former senior school teacher and broadcaster.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 5, 2023
Uno de los libros fundamentales sobre historia militar. Es uno de esos textos que cambian la perspectiva sobre la guerra y ayuda a comprender los miles de vidas que pueden perderse por una mala decisión. Consta de dos partes, la primera es un repaso sistemático a los factores que influyen en la incompetencia militar (O al menos la mayoría de ellos) y una segunda dedicada a revisar una serie de batallas y de campañas que son ejemplo de los desastres que se pueden organizar cuando dichos factores se descontrolan. Tal y como advierte el autor en el prólogo, la mayoría de los ejemplos corresponden al ejército británico, más por la disponibilidad de documentación que por otra cosa, pero creo que lo que aquí se dice se puede aplicar a casi cualquier ejército y guerra.
Un texto imprescindible para todos los interesados en historia militar.
Un texto imprescindible para todos los interesados en historia militar.
May 3, 2014
Really 2 books in one. The first half covers some of the aspects of how warfare can go awry, I'd give this 2 stars. The second half used very specific battles that showed how commanders and command structure collaborate to form disasters. This made the book for me.
November 11, 2021
Dos libros en uno: en la primera parte, el autor hace un análisis exhaustivo de lo que es la incompetencia en el ámbito militar, sus múltiples causas y sus previsibles efectos, todo ello acompañado de multitud de ejemplos. En la segunda parte, el autor desmenuza con todo lujo de detalles unos cuantos casos de "éxito", la mayoría extraídos de la historia del Reino Unido. Sorprende especialmente lo mal parado que sale Winston Churchill, una figura con aura de leyenda e invencibilidad que, según el libro, es mucho menos brillante de lo que parece. Un libro muy entretenido, en ocasiones hilarante y en otras algo lento y repetitivo. La segunda parte habría mejorado mucho con ejemplos más variados y sin tanta profundidad, pero aún así merece la pena leerlo.
January 8, 2025
Military Disasters are Human Disasters
By my reckoning, every military disaster is a human disaster, eleven of which are summarized in this very approachable and highly readable volume. The book was eye opening and should be of interest to anyone with an awareness of military operations as well as hubris, the overstated case for human rationality and sheer incompetence, all of which would be laughable if not so catastrophically disastrous for those involved in this, the most pernicious form of human folly.
The book is partitioned into two parts. In part one, the author elucidates the ingredients of military disaster, viz., The Commanders, The Planers and The Politicians. These constitute the three chapters of part one. Part two of the book then takes the reader through eleven, some major, some minor, all dreadful battles illustrative of the principles from part one. The book is thus subject to selection bias and confirmation bias in that it only includes those battles that confirm the hypothesis presented in part one as to the causes, or general principles, of military disaster. The author of course cannot include an account of all military disasters, the causes of which I think go well beyond those discussed in part one such as the very philosophical premises of the Nation-State itself. The causes listed in part one are those at the tactile or battle level (military incompetence). The deeper philosophical question is the cause of military confrontation in the first place (human incompetence). Any further discussion of this point is beyond scope of this book but still apposite to any discussion of human conflict. Still, the discussion of the causes provided by the author is very help.
Since there is not a ‘look inside’ option with this listing on Amazon or an editorial review, I will simply conclude this review by listing the battle contents for the interested reader. In addition to three main chapters of part one as listed above, here is the list of military disasters covered by the author in part two:
The Expedition to Cadiz (1625)
The Battle of Marston Moor (1644)
Braddock on the Monongahela (1755)
The Commissariat and the Crimean War
The Battle of the Crater (1864)
The Battle of San Juan Hill (1898)
Suvla Bay (1915)
The Admiralty and Convoys (1917)
The Battle of Anual (1921)
The Fall of Singapore (1942)
The Suez Operation (1956)
Included are the author’s notes, a bibliography and an index.
By my reckoning, every military disaster is a human disaster, eleven of which are summarized in this very approachable and highly readable volume. The book was eye opening and should be of interest to anyone with an awareness of military operations as well as hubris, the overstated case for human rationality and sheer incompetence, all of which would be laughable if not so catastrophically disastrous for those involved in this, the most pernicious form of human folly.
The book is partitioned into two parts. In part one, the author elucidates the ingredients of military disaster, viz., The Commanders, The Planers and The Politicians. These constitute the three chapters of part one. Part two of the book then takes the reader through eleven, some major, some minor, all dreadful battles illustrative of the principles from part one. The book is thus subject to selection bias and confirmation bias in that it only includes those battles that confirm the hypothesis presented in part one as to the causes, or general principles, of military disaster. The author of course cannot include an account of all military disasters, the causes of which I think go well beyond those discussed in part one such as the very philosophical premises of the Nation-State itself. The causes listed in part one are those at the tactile or battle level (military incompetence). The deeper philosophical question is the cause of military confrontation in the first place (human incompetence). Any further discussion of this point is beyond scope of this book but still apposite to any discussion of human conflict. Still, the discussion of the causes provided by the author is very help.
Since there is not a ‘look inside’ option with this listing on Amazon or an editorial review, I will simply conclude this review by listing the battle contents for the interested reader. In addition to three main chapters of part one as listed above, here is the list of military disasters covered by the author in part two:
The Expedition to Cadiz (1625)
The Battle of Marston Moor (1644)
Braddock on the Monongahela (1755)
The Commissariat and the Crimean War
The Battle of the Crater (1864)
The Battle of San Juan Hill (1898)
Suvla Bay (1915)
The Admiralty and Convoys (1917)
The Battle of Anual (1921)
The Fall of Singapore (1942)
The Suez Operation (1956)
Included are the author’s notes, a bibliography and an index.
August 7, 2012
al leerlo, queda demostrado que "inteligencia" y "militar" son términos contradictorios
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews