Understanding Philosophy of Science

by James Ladyman

Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible.

In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge and reality might be answered by science, and considers in detail the debate between realists and antirealists about the extent of scientific knowledge. Along the way, central topics in philosophy of science, such as the demarcation of science from non-science, induction, confirmation and falsification, the relationship between theory and observation and relativism are all addressed. Important and complex current debates over underdetermination, inference to the best explaination and the implications of radical theory change are clarified and clearly explained for those new to the subject.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, Textbooks, Physics, 21st Century, Reference

304 pages, Paperback

First published December 20, 2001

Reviews

[WarpDrive · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good and pretty comprehensive introduction to the subject, at undergraduate level.
All main philosophical positions are explored with precision, concise clarity and competence.
All classical issues in traditional philosophy of science (the problem of induction, falsificationism, the demarcation problem, under-determination, theory change, inference to the best explaination, the role of explanation in scientific theories etc.) are treated in a succinct, nuanced and engaging manner.

I agree with the author's sympathy towards scientific realism, although I would have appreciated a much deeper analysis of structural realism, which is only touched at the very end of the book, and which is in my view the most promising position in the light of the findings of contemporary science. On the other hand, I liked the detail with which the author addresses the constructive empiricism challenge of van Fraassen, which I reckon is the most comprehensive and credible criticism of scientific realism, at least of its more naive forms. I also liked how extensively the issue of "pessimistic meta-induction" is discussed in a balanced and comprehensive manner; it is the most critical issue faced by scientific realism, and as such it does deserve a deep analysis.

The author is one of the best modern philosophers of sciences, but like most philosophers he occasionally does show only an approximate (at best) scientific understanding of contemporary science, for example when he implicitly accepts a teleological reading of the least action principle.

Overall, it is a fairly good treatment of the subject at introductory level, fairly balanced and comprehensive, highly accessible and informative.

3.5 stars rounded up to 4.

[Amirsaman · Rating 4 out of 5]

دیوید هیوم مسئله‌ی استقراء را مطرح می‌کند. اگر تا حالا خورشید طلوع می‌کرده، دلیلی نداریم که باور کنیم فردا هم طلوع می‌کند. نظریه‌های علمی هم بر همین طرز استقراء بنا شده‌اند. ضمن این‌که پدیده‌هایی که علت می‌خوانیمشان، می‌تواند صرفا یک مقارنت دائمی باشد.
نمی‌شود مسئله‌ی استقراء را با توصل به خود استقراء حل کرد. یعنی به کسی که به استقراء باور ندارد بگوییم، ببین، استقراء تا حالا جواب داده، پس باز هم می‌دهد!
اما نکته‌ی جالب این است که حتا قیاس هم با قیاس اثبات می‌شود. اگر الف صادق باشد، آنگاه ب صادق است. کسی ممکن است به صدق الف، و این‌که اگر الف آنگاه ب باور داشته باشد، اما بگوید به صدق ب باور ندارد. ما برای مجابش، به صورت دوری فقط مجبوریم بگوییم، ببین، اگر الف، آنگاه ب، حالا الف صادق است، پس ب باید درست باشد... و او بگوید ولی به صدق ب باور ندارد.

دو قرن بعد، پوپر آمد و گفت علم اصلا بر مبنای استقراء نیست. یعنی مهم نیست یک نظریه چه مقدار مصادیق مثبت دارد، بلکه نظریه باید ابطال‌پذیر باشد. یعنی دانشمند مربوطه اعلام کند که اگر فلان رخ نداد، من از نظریه‌ام دست می‌کشم. ویژگی‌ای که روانکاوی‌ و مارکسیسم نداشتند. همچنین نظریه باید مثل فیزیک نیوتون، گسترده باشد و دست به پیش‌بینی‌های بدیع بزند.
اما بنظر می‌رسد برخی اصول ابطال‌ناپذیر، بخشی از معرفت علمی به حساب می‌آیند. مثل اصل بقاء انرژی و قانون دوم ترمودینامیک (آنتروپی هر سیستم بسته همواره افزایش پیدا می‌کند).
ضمنا ابطال‌گرایی خود ابطال‌پذیر نیست. هرچند بنظر پوپر، ابطال‌گرایی نظریه‌ای فلسفی یا منطقی درباره‌ی روش علمی است و نه یک نظریه‌ی علمی.
پوپر همچنین می‌گفت دانشمندان نظریه‌های خود را با الهام از متافیزیک و بسیاری باورهای غیرعلمی ایجاد می‌کنند، و این ایرادی ندارد، مادامی که خود نظریه علمی باشد.

بعد کوهنِ فیزیکدان وارد شد و گفت در تاریخ علم پارادیم دارد کارش را می‌کند تا وقتی که بنیادی‌ترین اصول یک پارادایم دچار اعوجاج شوند و انقلاب یا تغییر پارادایم رخ دهد. مثلا انقلاب کپرنیکی، یا جایگزینی نظریه‌ی فلوژیستون با نظریه‌ی اکسیداسیون در خصوص احتراق‌.
به نظر کوهن علم رشد «انباشتی» ندارد، یعنی تدریجا تغییر نمی‌کند، بلکه جابه‌جایی‌های عمده باعث رشدش می‌شوند.
عوامل روان‌شناختی و جامعه‌شناسی روی دانشمندان برای پذیرش یا رد پارادایم تاثیر می‌گذارند؛ مثلا محافظه‌کار بودن شخص یا قدرت ریسک‌پذیری‌اش. بنابراین بنظر کوهن بر تغییر علمی، قوانین عقلی حاکم نیستند. مثال کوهن این است که هر یک از متفکران با دلایلی کاملا متفاوت برانگیخته شدند تا تصویر کپرنیکی از جهان را بپذیرند. در صورتی که این پارادایم هنوز به طور کامل توسعه نیافته بود و با مسائل حل‌نشده‌ی فراوانی روبه‌رو بود. حتا موارد بسیاری بود که پارادایم قدیمی بهتر می‌توانست تبیینشان کند.

کوهن بر نظریه‌بار تاکید فراوان داشت. یعنی ممکن است تصویر یک مکعب روی کاغذ، دو شکل مختلف را در دو نفر بوجود آورد. بقول هنسون، تعبیر کردن نمی‌تواند از دیدن جدا باشد.
بنابراین آن‌چه دانشمندان ادراک می‌کنند تا اندازه‌ای توسط باورهایشان تعیّن می‌یابد. هنگام غروب، فرد کپرنیکی خورشید را ثابت می‌بیند و افق را در حال بالا آمدن، ولی ستاره‌شناس بطلمیوسی افق را ثابت و خورشید را می‌بیند که پایین می‌رود. (یا مثلا فیزیک‌دانان تا قبل از دیراک، شواهد مبنی بر وجود پوزیترون‌ها را نادیده می‌گرفتند.)
بنظر کوهن «جرم» در نظریه‌ی نیوتونی معنایی متفاوت با «جرم» در نظریه‌ی نسبیت اینشتین دارد. پس واژه‌های علمی همواره معنای دقیق و ثابتی ندارند. لذا طرفداران پارادایم‌های رقیب، در جهان‌های متفاوتی زندگی می‌کنند.

نیمه‌ی دوم کتاب درباره‌ی واقع‌گرایی علمی است، و همان‌طور که مترجم می‌گوید، فهمش به راحتی نیمه‌ی اول کتاب نیست.

[K · Rating 4 out of 5]

That's more like it. I had the pleasure of going through several introductory books for a course in the philosophy of science and I quickly realized that few of them were able to provide a comprehensive overview of the relevant issues. Quite often, I felt that either these books overlooked the important matters, or they made these matters appear as a waste of time given that foundational questions were rarely included. This isn't the case with James Ladyman's book, however. In fact, I'd argue that Ladyman has written an impressive introductory textbook, one that's unapologetically philosophical and that goes well beyond the basics.

Take his discussion on the problem of induction for example. Most authors who wish to provide a basic idea of the problem would simply mention some instance of inductive reasoning and then simply assert that Hume acknowledged that induction cannot be rationally justified. Ladyman on the other hand starts at the beginning by going through Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and then explaining Hume's views on causality - that makes all the difference given that inductive reasoning is grounded on causal relations. Having done that, Ladyman presents the problem in all its glory and sophistication.

Similar tactics are employed throughout the book. Prior to discussing Popper's views on falsification, Ladyman provides a quick overview of the inductivist understanding of the scientific method that preceded him. Moreover, the part on realism and antirealism regarding observable/ unobservable entities does not begin with the logical positivists, but rather with epistemological insights and the realist/ anti-realist debate in the philosophy of perception. Such sophisticated manoeuvres allow Ladyman to emphasize the importance of particular critical positions in the philosophy of science (like the underdetermination problem or Laudan's pessimistic meta-induction, for example), that would lose much of their force if treated lightly.

[Leo Horovitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm too tired to write anything substantial about this right now. It's a good (not great) book about the philosophy of science, at the introductory level but probably presupposing some familiarity with basic philosophical terminology and some understanding of related fields such as logic and epistemology. It is divided into two parts: the first one dealing with the scientific method (inductivism, falsificationism, theories and observations, the underdetermination problem) both also discussing the debate about scientific change, dealing with Kuhn and his "revolutions" and "paradigms" among other things; the second one dealing with scientific realism, its subtleties and variants and its critics. The second part also connects, naturally, to other issues not falling directly under the subject of scientific realism but being relevant in a discussion of it such as: underdetermination (again), theory change (which at least touches upon the issues raised in the earlier chapter on scientific change) and the role of explanation in scientific theories, all discussed in the context of how they are relevant in the debate regarding the viability of scientific realism.

Another thing I should mention is that something that makes it stand out at least a little bit is that each chapter is ended by showing a fragment of an ongoing discussion between two persons (apparently not highly knowledgeable in philosophy, sometimes espousing very naive views, seemingly an attempt to give the novice reader someone to identify with). It is a bit original, but I never felt that these very brief fragments contributed anything to the discussion or the understanding of it. It's a nice introduction to the subject, definitely a good book, but not excellent.

[Sleepless Dreamer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Oh my. I can't believe I'm done with this book. This is a monumental day.

This book came with me to most of my guard duties. This book helped me develop conversations with physics students, with plumbers, with other people from my base. This book helped me avoid awkward conversations with people on the trans siberian railway. This is the book that has sat in my office for two years.

I have been reading this slowly over the last three years, as it wasn't easy for me. The writing was as clear as could be but the pace was much too fast for me. This book means business and man, I do not understand things that quickly.

Ah. I'm done and I swear, I will remember maybe 1/6 of the idea here. This book has a fantastic explanation of Popper and Hume but I got lost in realism and that was it. One day I'll be smart and knowledgeable enough to read this book and understand it all but that day is not today.

What I'm Taking With Me
- I went through so many bookmarks with this book.
- Communism isn't a science because it doesn't have a way to refute it.
- Man, I literally can't remember anything, I'm ashamed of myself

[Mahmood666 · Rating 3 out of 5]

کتاب دو بخش داره :بخش اول روش علمی و بخش دوم واقع گرایی و ضد واقع گرایی. نمره من به بخش اول کتاب پنج امتیازه اما متاسفانه بخش دوم کاملا از ادبیات متفاوتی بهره میبره.بخش دوم کاملا سردرگم و بدون جهت گیریه. این که مطالب ارائه شده در بخش دوم خیلی دشوار تر از بخش اول هستن ، امری روشنه اما به قدری مطالب شلخته و بدون نظم ارائه شدن که خواننده علاقمند و حتی دارای علم به موضوع مطروحه هم نمیتونه دنبالش کنه. متاسفانه من تا فصل ششم کتاب پیش رفتم و چون از اواخر کتاب چیزی دستگیرم نشد رها کردم .نمره کتتب هم بر اساس خواندن این شش فصل از هشت فصل کلی کتابه

[Zahra Dashti · Rating 4 out of 5]

کتاب خوبی بود. البته شاید تدریسش توسط یک استاد خیلی خوب هم در درکش اثر بیشتری داشت.

[Hélio Steven · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a great introduction to the philosophy of science, and it remains quite contemporary even though it's already 16 years old. James Ladyman goes through the main discussions in philosophy of science in a very clear, accessible and engaging way. The book covers the famous problem of induction and of Baconish naive inductivism and the attempted responses to it, as well as Popper's account of the logic of science and its problems, closing the first part, which is about the scientific method, with Kuhn's historical challenge to the rationality of the dynamics of theory change in science.

The second part of the book is dedicated to introduce the still very alive debate between scientific realism and antirealism, and here Ladyman is very wise to break down the different requirements (these are the semantic, metaphysical and epistemological requirements) involved in the scientific realist position, since by making them explicit it's much easier to understand how there are different ways to be a scientific antirealist, not all of which equally plausible. A great feature of the book, in my opinion, is the attention given to a specific kind of antirealism, which is Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. Unlike certain popular types of antirealism, constructive empiricism concedes that science is an epistemically privileged enterprise and that it constitutes a paradigm of rational inquiry, but goes on to deny that we ought to go beyond the empirical adequacy of scientific theories that postulate unobservable entities (e.g., electrons), thus promoting agnosticism about these entities and thereby denying the epistemological requirement of scientific realism. To my mind, van Fraassen is successful in putting a good deal of pressure on realism about unobservables, showing in the process how antirealism can be a perfectly intellectually respectable position to hold after paying close attention to actual scientific practice. One of the most interesting things about the discussion around constructive empiricism in the book is van Fraassen's criticism of abductive reasoning (also known as "inference to the best explanation"), which is a valuable tool for scientific realists. The other problem that was given a more extented attention was the so called "pessimistic meta-induction" against scientific realism, which is one of the most important arguments in the realism x antirealism debate together with the "no-miracles argument", as well as the underdetermination problem. The second part, and along with it the book itself, closes with a very brief overview of structural realism, a pretty recent and increasingly important contender in the debate, and it felt like Ladyman should have extended this section a little more.

As any good introduction, it leaves many problems open and avoids taking sides as much as possible. At the same time, though, Ladyman doesn't shy away from offering his own critical evaluations of some arguments here and there, which isn't a bad thing at all since he manages to keep as much impartiality as possible even then. At the end of every chapter we find a very useful list of further reading suggestions, as well as some somewhat amusing dialogues between two fictional characters, Thomas (who plays the role of a skeptic about scientific rationality and scientific realism; I wouldn't be surprised if the name choice was a clever reference to Kuhn) and Alice (who is committed to the rationality of science and to scientific realism), which have a triple function: the dialogues sum up what was discussed in the chapter and, secondly, give the reader a hint about the problems to be discussed in the following chapter; the third function is more subtle and I'm not sure whether it's easily recognizable: Alice claims certain things that are not explicitly presented in the book's chapters and some of them hint at what Ladyman himself might think about what is the best direction to take relative to a given issue (this was most obvious to me when Alice tells Thomas that maybe the demarcation problem has more to do with the institutional context where scientists trade information and debate ideas than with a set of distinctive procedures and attitudes held by individual scientists). To be sure, I might be completely off here, but by being familiar with some of Ladyman's work I was left with this impression.

The only thing that really bothered about the book is that it ended quite abruptly, like another reviewer has pointed out. A nice summary/conclusion would be in order for a book like that. But anyway, again, the book is an amazing introduction today as it was when originally published. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in getting to know what philosophy of science is about, and it's likely that I will re-read it (if not all, a good portion of it) in the future!

[Zo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the better broad introduction/textbook style books I've read. Does a great job of laying out the terrain of various issues, showing why different positions all deserve consideration, and stimulating one's own thought on the topic at hand. I feel like I have a much better handle of what philosophy of science is all about, and the book successfully makes the topic seem fascinating and worthwhile of study. That being said, I would be curious to read a critique of this books philosophical approach by a scientist who thinks phil of sci isn't a worthwhile enterprise. Part of what I liked about reading this book is how much it made me unsure what to think about the various issues. If I had any leanings it would be towards an IBE account with a kind of weak realism, but I do think there needs to be a psychologizing of practice/epistemology to give us a better account of what is actually going on. Anyway, great introduction for someone looking to learn more about the topic.

[Stinger · Rating 2 out of 5]

Thorough and well organized, Ladyman goes through the challenges to scientific realism methodically. At times, I thought this book might be better labeled "An Apologetic for Scientific Realism." The author does not shirk any challenges to realism, but his bias is clear. I enjoyed the back and forth of the fictional characters who are pro and anti scientific realism; this was a useful and witty literary device. The author ends the book abruptly, seeming to have run out of steam upon the topic which I as the reader shared.

[Marc · Rating 5 out of 5]

A classic textbook on the discipline. It does a good job of covering all the various philosophical positions and challenges to what science can know. It exposes the warts to the ad hoc-ery too. I am nearly finished ...

[Mohammad Sajjad Asghari · Rating 4 out of 5]

این کتاب متشکل از دو بخش کلی است
بخش اول مباحث فلسفه علم در مقام کشف نظریات علمی و بخش دوم مباحث آن در مقام تبیین نظریات علمی، با تأکید بر مباحث واقع‌گرایی و پادواقع‌گرایی است.
توضیح کتاب قابل توجه و روان است. نویسنده به خوبی ارتباطات منطقی و انسجام مباحث را حفظ کرده است. البته گاهی ضعف در ترجمه مشهود است.

[Andrew Langridge · Rating 4 out of 5]

Science is such an important part of our lives, and yet we find it so difficult to explain what gives it it's power. We have so many examples of scientific advance in operation and yet we seem unable to tell something apparently so simple about it; namely whether reality is being uncovered by science or whether it is being constructed. A proper humility is required to approach this debate. Entrenched positions are routinely undermined, and Ladyman's admirable book does plenty of undermining. He sets out the arguments in a fair, lucid and logical style, thereby making a difficult subject seem ever so slightly simpler. Always the mark of a good book.

[Ioannis Savvas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Είναι ίσως το αρτιότερο βιβλίο επιστημολογίας που έχω διαβάσει. Αναλυτικό, απλό, κατατοπιστικό. Τρεις είναι οι παρατηρήσεις μου:

- Ο υποκαθορισμός στις θεωρίες της επιστήμης υποψιάζομαι ότι είναι ένα φιλοσοφικό κατασκεύασμα και εξυπηρετεί μάλλον τον υποκαθορισμό των φιλοσοφικών εννοιών. (Κάπου μάλιστα το υπαινίσσεται και ο ίδιος ο συγγραφέας.)
- Η αναφορά στις νευροεπιστήμες είναι ελάχιστη έως ανύπαρκτη. Η σύλληψη και η ανάπτυξη των επιστημονικών θεωριών δεν μελετάται ποτέ από τη σκοπιά του ανθρώπινου εγκεφάλου και της εξελικτικής του πορείας στην ιστορία.
- Το βιβλίο αναφέρεται σχεδόν αποκλειστικά στη Φυσική. Η αναφορές στη Βιολογία είναι ελάχιστες.

[James Kelly · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good and easy to read introduction to the core issues of the philosophy of science. I picked it up for an online course I am doing and it has helped incredibly. The book covers the methodology of science and issues around it such as the demarcation problem; as well competing theories of the philosophy of science such as induction and falsification. If you are studying it for work or more likely just interested (it's a relatively obscure subject) it is well worth the read.

[Gareth]

An accessible and yet detailed account of the various theories and issues in philosophy of science, ideal for university students and as an introduction for serious laypeople.

Gareth Southwell is a philosopher, writer and illustrator.

[Karina Jade · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very useful in explaining common problems relating to philosophy of science such as induction, underetermination and realism.

[Jibran · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent explanation to philosophy of science.

[Jeff Samuelson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very clear and insightful book. Hopefully the next read, Every thing Must Go will be the same.

[Francois Cloutier · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent introduction to philosophy of science. The author explains clealy the different positions, problems and debates.

[Henrik Haapala · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent philosophy of science textbook for university students!

[Ataul Morshed · Rating 4 out of 5]

not so easy read, but still quite helpful if you reread it.

[Simon Jewell · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wonderfully clear, entertaining and authoritative account of how we think we know what we think we know. It is still worth reading despite needing an update (hence a star taken off) since it was first published in 2002 ( though an update of sorts can be found in Ladyman's entry about Structural Realism in the Stanford encyclopedia).

I read this to address my confusion which resulted from reading authors like Hoffman, Rovelli and Tegmark. I wanted to understand how to interpret and align different perspectives about reality, from Tegmark's, 'reality is mathematical', and Marletto and Deutsch's, 'reality, including knowledge and data, is constructed', to Rovelli's, 'reality is relative'. Tegmark's view that physicists mostly agree about the mathematical descriptions, but not the 'baggage' of verbal explanations, intrigued me, and Ladyman helps to understand why.

The book can be read as a sort of exciting (to me anyway) whodunnit. Ladyman, like Agatha Christie's Poirot at the end of the case, takes the reader through some very tightly phrased logical arguments that one by one eliminate the obvious suspects. In the final few pages he points to the best explanation, which is that reality is real, it's not an illusion, and it is structured, and thankfully, we can know, through science, approximately how.

[Shahed · Rating 5 out of 5]

کتاب را از جهت محتوایی می‌توان به دو بخش مجزا تقسیم کرد: «نخست، که به‌طور مفصل به شرح و بسط و توصیف روش‌های علمی و دیدگاه‌های متفاوت در این مقوله می‌پردازد. مطالب در این بخش به‌طور مبسوط شرح داده شده و برای کسانی که پیش‌زمینه‌ای در فلسفه و سیر و گذار نگاه فلسفه بر علم ندارند مفید فایده خواهد بود.» اما بخش دوم به باور برخی از نقدهای موجود در همین پایگاه چه به زبان فارسی و چه انگلیسی حاوی مطالب پراکنده و بدون ارزشی است. که در این گزاره بنده با این دست از افراد شدیداً مخالفم.
فراموش نکنیم که لیدیمن شدیداً تحت تأثیر آرای رادلف کارناپ فیزیک‌دانی است که به نوشتار در زمینهٔ فلسفهٔ علم می‌پرداخته. شاید به این دلیل است که ارجاعات متعدد به مسائل مربوط به فیزیک و در مقابل مصداق‌آوری‌های فیزیکی در بحث‌های مربوط به واقع‌گرایی برای برخی از خوانندگان ناخوشایند به‌نظر برسد. اما مهم‌ترین نکتهٔ این‌کتاب، این سوال است که ما را در انتهایش با خود تنها می‌گذارد:

ادعای واقعی‌گرایی ساختاری متافیزیکی است یا معرفت‌شناختی؟

در مقایسه با کتاب فلسفهٔ علم رادلف کارناپ این کتاب این حسن را دارد که در اوایل قرن اخیر به چاپ رسیده و سعی بر این بوده که بدون جانب‌داری نوترین نظریات چالش‌برانگیز پیرامون واقع‌گرایی، برساخت‌گرایی و تا حدی پوزیتیویسم/لاادری‌گرایی را در متن جای دهد و در نهایت سوال اشاره‌شده در سطور بالا را در ذهن خواننده متبادر کند.

[Yilmaz Aksoy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bilim felsefesine giriş için oldukça iyi bir kitap. Genel anlamda felsefe bilmeye çok gerek yok ama zararı da olmaz. Konularla, tekniklerle ilgili güzel örnekler verilmiş ve bu da kitabın anlaşılırlığını artırıyor. Bölüm sonlarında iki kişi arasında kurgusal bir tartışma ile örnekler biraz daha gündelik dile indirgenmeye çalışılmış. Bu tartışmaların bazılarını faydalı buldum. Kitap sonlara doğru (1990lar) konular karmaşıklaşıyor. Burada anlatım hala kolay olsa da eski bölümlere yapılan gönderiler "üçüncü bölüm ikinci kısım" şeklinde verildiğinden ve bunları hatırlamak mümkün olmadığından pek faydalı olmuyor açıkçası. Bu alana giriş yapmak isteyenlere bu kitabı tavsiye ederim.

[sadra jan · Rating 5 out of 5]

کتابی پیشرفته در عرصه فلسفه علم که اصلا به تازه کارها توصیه نمیکنم.
سیر مطالب از آسان به سخت چیده شده اما اواخر کتاب به دلیل پیچیدگی و افزوده شدن تمام مولفه هایی که از اول کتاب تا به انجا بحث شده بود، سخت فهمیده میشد.
خلاصه که این کتاب را باید چندبار خواند و با استاد هم خواند اما بسیار با ارزش است. از آن کتاب هایی که هر کلمه اش با دقت انتخاب شده و مطالب خوبی را با دو موضوع اساسی روش علمی و واقع گرایی مطرح میکند.
روش علمی بنا دارد این موضوع را بفهمد که چگونه میتوان به یک نظریه علمی رسید و یا یک نظریه را علمی دانست.
واقع گرایی مخالف جریانی به نام ضد واقع گرایی است که مرز دانایی و مشاهده و ارتباط ایندو را مورد بررسی قرار میدهد.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is an introductory text.
Well, I have no formal instruction in philosophy (neither in philosophy of science) and, after reading this, now I think that (maybe) I am able to understand an introductory test.
Most of examples and considerations are about physics; I guess it is in this field that, coincidentally or not, relevant figures have shared the interest in science as well as in philosophy. Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to extrapolate the examined terms and theories to other (more pragmatical) scenarios like biology or medicine (in case that medicine is a science).

[Charis Wolf · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good overview of different perspectives in philosophy of science. There have been more recent developments that deal more with pluralism and models in science but at this book is an excellent compilation of the historical developments that demonstrate how philosophy of science got to where it is now.

[Abouzar Tamassoki · Rating 4 out of 5]

به نظرم برای مخاطب عامی که قصد آشنا شدن با مباحث فلسفه علم رو داره کتاب بسیار خوبیه و به نسبت چالمرز که بسیار قدیمی و تا حدی غیراستاندارد است، مسائل به روز تر فلسفه علم مثل واقع گرایی ساختاری رو هم تا حدی پوشش داده.

[George · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book consists of 2 parts. The 1st is easy to follow (provided a kind of background). The 2nd one is more difficult. Overall, it was useful for me. I have the impression that certain discussions could be avoided (especially at the end) in order for a non-physicist to be able to follow.