Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin

by Ben Judah

A lively, inside account of Putin’s years of rule and the impending crisis that threatens his tsar-like regime
 
“A beautifully written and very lively study of Russia that argues that the political order created by Vladimir Putin is stagnating—undermined by corruption and a failure to modernise economically.”—Gideon Rachman, Financial Times
 
“Ben Judah, a young freelance writer, paints a more journalistic—and more passionate—picture in Fragile Empire . He shuttles to and fro across Russia’s vast terrain, finding criminals, liars, fascists and crooked politicians, as well as the occasional saintly figure.”— The Economist
 
From Kaliningrad on the Baltic to the Russian Far East, journalist Ben Judah has travelled throughout Russia and the former Soviet republics, conducting extensive interviews with President Vladimir Putin’s friends, foes, and colleagues, government officials, business tycoons, mobsters, and ordinary Russian citizens. Fragile Empire is the fruit of Judah’s thorough a probing assessment of Putin’s rise to power and what it has meant for Russia and her people. Despite a propaganda program intent on maintaining the cliché of stability, Putin’s regime was suddenly confronted in December 2011 by a highly public protest movement that told a different side of the story. Judah argues that Putinism has brought economic growth to Russia but also weaker institutions, and this contradiction leads to instability. The author explores both Putin’s successes and his failed promises, taking into account the impact of a new middle class and a new generation, the Internet, social activism, and globalization on the president’s impending leadership crisis. Can Russia avoid the crisis of Putinism? Judah offers original and up-to-the-minute answers.

Genres: Russia, History, Politics, Nonfiction, Journalism, Biography, Current Affairs

400 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2013

About the author

Ben Judah was born in London. He studied at Oxford University and has travelled widely in Russia and Central Asia. His writing has featured in numerous publications, including the New York Times, the Evening Standard and Standpoint. His first book, Fragile Empire, was published by Yale University Press in 2013.

Reviews

[Mikey B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

The author explains well the rise, and let us call it the beginning of the demise of Vladimir Putin. He delineates that with the collapse of the Soviet empire in the 1990’s Russia went through, in days and months, massive sociological and cultural upheavals. The vast majority of Russians wanted the stability that Putin promised and to some extent implemented.

He did this in a series of steps. First he emasculated the TV media. Television stations in the early 2000’s became state controlled. Significantly the Putin regime ignored the rising internet, so unlike China they did not put up firewalls; this would have grave consequences as the internet in Russia expanded and became an alternative mass media communication network.

The other step taken was to kick out or imprison the oil oligarchs (Mikhail Khodorkovsky being one). The Putin Court wanted to have control and the money that the oil entrepreneurs had. They placed the vast oil industry under state control. With this the state made millions of dollars – and this was not necessarily to the benefit of the Russian people.

So Putin effectively brought the traditional media under control and made lots of money from the oil resources. Also the Kremlin took over appointments of all governors across the wide breadth of Russia. Elections became perfunctory.

Page 125 my book
Under Putin the Russian ruling class has become one of the richest in the world

Up until 2008 Putin was extremely popular with Russians. He did bring stability – inflation was curbed, salaries paid, and many more consumer goods became available. But then came the 2008 recession and Russia was hit hard, more than most countries. And Putin continued to wield power even with Medvedev in “power”. Putin’s early promises of a “dictatorship of law” were looking more vacuous. Russia was becoming more and more a “dictatorship of corruption”. Putin’s United Russia party is now labelled as the “Party of crooks and thieves”.

Page 178 my book
The system is corruption itself
A society where everything has a price [bribe].

Many aspects of Russia are discussed in this book and the author cannot be accused of minimizing personalities and problems. At times it seems like a vendetta.

Here are some of the serious problems he outlines:

The opposition parties are disorganized and anarchic. There is no effective opposition and Putin has succeeded well in characterizing them as fools and delinquents.

There is a vast difference and disconnect between Moscow and the hinterland. In the countryside (38 percent of the population) poverty is at a Third World level. Most of the wealthy live in Moscow.

Drug and alcohol abuse continue to increase.

Russians are becoming increasingly nationalistic and xenophobic. They are resentful of the Muslim migration to the cities.

Putin is giving huge dollar handouts to the Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.

Opposition journalists, electoral candidates, protestors can be physically threatened and sometimes killed.

Ukraine is seen as a province and not as a separate country. As we can see from recent events in March/2014 this is becoming dire.

Russia is being pulled in the West by the E.U. and in the East by a populous and vastly more efficient China.

Putin’s United Russia and the Kremlin is like a medieval court where only loyalty counts. There is no control from below (no elections).


With all the tremendous changes in the last twenty-five years what will Russia be like in ten or twenty years? The Soviet Union discombobulated in the early 1990’s. All this leads to the question of “whither Russia?”

[Jerusalem Demsas · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was a very good overview of the rise and fall of Putin politics. It would have gotten four stars if not for two annoying writing tics:

1. It is not necessary, and is actually a mark of poor writing and lack of faith in your reader's intelligence, to continually attempt to underscore the poverty and failure of the Russian state by comparing it to random statistics re: developing countries. The first couple of times I was like 'OK, I get it' but 75% of the way through the book why are you telling me things like 'corruption in Russia is almost as bad as in African countries!!!' and 'you wouldn't expect these kind of crimes here, only in like Latin America'!!!! No, I expect those crimes in Russia too because you've just spent the last TWO HUNDRED PAGES EXPLAINING TO ME WHY THE RUSSIAN STATE IS FAILING. I'm *shockingly* not surprised that Russia is having those problems as you've JUST EXPLAINED TO ME WHY THAT WOULD BE HAPPENING.

2. Why is it that all of the women you reference are described in terms of the quality of their appearance? Or they're 'shrieking'? Like what? One woman literally was described as having 'come-hither eyes' what?? Who are you? And you refer to some women as hags at the end?

Sigh. These problems really marred what was a pretty thorough and interesting book.

[Steven Z. · Rating 4 out of 5]

As Vladimir Putin denies the Russian presence in the current Ukrainian crisis, but at the same time makes statements that he “could take Kiev in two weeks,” and that the world needs to remember that Russia is a nuclear power one wonders how we got here. President Obama’s threats of further sanctions against Russia seem to accomplish little as European allies do not have the stomach to hit the Russians where it would hurt the most, their energy sector. As Russian troops invaded eastern Ukraine and tilted the conflict in favor of the pro-Russian rebels, the west at last week’s NATO conference in Wales could not bring themselves to use the term invasion or maybe incursion, so I ask again how did we arrive at this impasse? Ben Judah’s 2013 book, FRAGILE EMPIRE is a wonderful guide to understanding recent events in Ukraine and the state of Putin’s Russia domestically. Had Judah published his book a year later he would have found further evidence to buttress his argument that Russia had fallen in and out of love with Putin and what the future may hold for a country that is overly dependent economically, socially, and politically on the price of oil; where corruption is the main tool for Putinism’s survival; and a social fabric that is being torn apart by emigration of many of Russia’s most talented people, a declining longevity rate, and a population that is decreasing each year. Judah who is a superb reporter and political scientist has traveled to most areas of Russia and seems to predict that the weight of Putinism will eventually will lead to its collapse, however the current Ukrainian crisis has improved his popularity among the Russian people as he appeals to Russian nationalism and feeds the paranoia many in Russia feel when compared with the west.

Judah begins his study in explaining Putin’s background and rise to political power, concentrating on his main theme that he has written “a study of Putin’s triumph as a politician and his failure to build a modern state.” (2) Putin was born in post-war Leningrad in 1952 and experienced a childhood of mostly poverty living in a cramped apartment with a communal kitchen and bathroom. At the age of eleven he went to a local KGB office and asked to join and being politely rebuffed he grew obsessed with patriotic spy films and the martial arts. The youthful Putin’s world view was a product of a double disaster. At first he worked for the KGB in Dresden, East Germany, a failed authoritarian state. He followed that experience as a senior official in St. Petersburg, in a failed democracy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the winter of 1992 witnessed fears of hunger that had not existed in urban areas since Stalin’s reign as the Russian GDP had fallen by 44%, deeper than the United States in the 1930s. Judah describes Putin as being from the lost generation of the 1990s. Putin and his contemporaries had grown up under communist indoctrination; its collapse produced “a generation of cynicism as their world view.” “Putin, like millions of Russians who dedicated their lives to the Soviet state, found themselves irrelevant, mocked for having a ‘Soviet mentality;’ those in the KGB were shunned and told they had been the ‘enemy of the people’ all along.” (14) It is from this environment that Putin emerged with St. Petersburg becoming his springboard to power.

According to Judah, the West liked the idea that Boris Yeltsin surrounded himself with young reformers, but in fact he brought the military and FSB into government. Under Gorbachev they made up only 5% of government positions, by 1998 under Yeltsin it had climbed to 46%. (18) Judah describes in detail how during Yeltsin’s reign the oligarchs emerged and ostensibly stole the Russian economy as ordinary Russians were losing their life’s savings. With many feeling Russia was close to collapse the men around Yeltsin needed a protector who could win the next election. This was the Kremlin that Vladimir Putin, then a young, impressive former KGB bureaucrat from St. Petersburg, first started to work in. As Russian oil production declined by 50% and oil prices dropped by 60% state revenues were collapsing resulting in the default of Russian debt at a time when 40% of Russians were below the poverty line. At the same time oligarchs threw money around resulting in an expansion of an urban middle class particularly in Moscow and consumerism that allowed politicians to reach their constituency. A further stress on Yeltsin’s rule was the war in Chechnya as the election of 2000 approached. The invasion of Chechnya catapulted Putin from a nobody into one of the most popular politicians in the country. A series of domestic bombings furthered the need for a strong leader, who in this case was chosen by the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin, who “acted the part of a macho-savior in front of the cameras and his popularity exploded.” (33) Putin was swept into power atop a shaky wave of nationalist fear and economic distress.

Putin’s first term was shaped by Yeltsin’s legacy and the problems he inherited, according to Judah he appeared as a “Sisyphean,” but it was Putin’s luck to take over just as an economic boom took off. His first year in office saw a 10% growth rate thanks to a 75% lower exchange rate that fueled Russian exports and consumer spending. In addition a tax reform program benefited business as did the recovery of the energy sector produced sustained GDP growth of 7% annually through 2008. (40-41) At the same time as liberal economic reform was implemented the Kremlin clamped down on television, what Judah describes as the creation of a “videocracy” that projected Putin as a Russian hero and that Russia could never survive without him. Putin would go to war with media oligarchs who he felt were a threat and by 2008 he controlled 90% of the Russian media. According to Judah television created a cult of Putin as 98% of the population had no satellite or internet by 2008. Telepopulism created a Putin majority and Putin was packaged as the “generous Putin” who paid for the “budgetniki,” people who were reliant on state salaries, pensions, and other benefits. In a country where 53% of the people were on the state payroll in one form or another, Putin’s cult flourished. In the midst of this process Putin turned more authoritarian as he imposed his version of consensus on the oligarchs, particularly in the energy sector, as oligarchs blocked any increase in taxes on oil profits. Putin had little choice if he was to maintain his popularity through social spending as he needed the $2 billion in taxes that the oil oligarchs avoided paying. A further threat to Putin was Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who in 2003 was considered the richest man in Russia. When Khodorokovsky entered politics and railed against the corruption that was built into the Russian economic system (30% of the state budget was lost to corruption). Putin viewed this as a personal threat and imposed his will on all oligarchs, and in particular private oil production would fall from 90% to 45%, and by 2005 83.9% of all oil company profit went to the state. Putin’s message was clear; oligarchs should stay out of politics. Russia saw itself as the northern energy super power and that energy would now be used for geopolitical goals, an effective strategy today as the European countries refuse to risk a Russian energy cut off if they push too hard over the “invasion” of the Ukraine. By 2008 Putin’s “authoritarian project” was in place as all funds that oligarchs had used to oppose Putin where now part of state revenues. Despite Putin’s political success, corruption, terrorism, and bureaucratic incompetence remained.

As described, Judah has done an exceptional job explaining Putin’s origins and how he rose to power. Further, he allows the reader to understand that once in power Putin was able to crush any hope of liberal economic reform or political change. Judah is correct that as long as the energy sector flourished the Russian economy would do well, but if a crisis developed, Russia and Putin would be in trouble. No matter what the short term economic success Russia experienced, the cancer of corruption would dominate the Russian economic model and undermine any successes. 2008 brought a foreign policy success that would rattle the West and be a precursor of current events in the Ukraine. A crisis arose in Russian areas of Georgia that provoked Russian military action. The underlying cause of Russian action as described by John J. Mearsheimer in his new article in Foreign Affairs, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s fault,” is that the United States and Europe by expanding NATO membership to Russia’s doorstep overstepped the bounds that Putin could accept. After the Baltic States gained NATO membership, Georgia and the Ukraine were seen as next. What the West failed to realize is that the birthplace of Stalin, Georgia, and the Ukraine have historically been part of Russia and those areas had been seen as vital since the Tsarist times. Putin’s successful occupation of Georgian territory only enhanced Putin’s reputation and popularity. At the same time Putin decided not to run for reelection and allowed Dimitry Medvedev to assume the presidency. Medvedev grew up in the “Putin political family” and had no other politically meaningful professional experience.” (170) As 2008 was coming to an end it appeared that Putin was in total control of Russia and despite the lack of freedom, he brought the stability that Russians cherished.

That stability was broken in September, 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the United States and the resulting economic ripple that encompassed the world economy. Russia’s situation was exacerbated because of the corruption that permeated Putin’s system. Putin blamed the United States for Russia’s economic plight. By 2009, the Russian economy had contracted by 8.9% as the Russian stock market lost 80% of its value, and oil prices temporarily declined by 70%. (175) Medvedev identified Russia’s structural economic problems but could not do anything to modernize the system. “By 2010 indicators showed that Russia was as corrupt as Papua New Guinea, with property rights of Kenya, as competitive as Sri Lanka.” Russia was a society where everything had a price tag. (177) Medvedev and Putin faced further problems when the government proved incompetent to deal with forest fires outside of Moscow. What became Putin’s “Katrina,” highlighted a government that had “become a vertical of loyalty intertwined with a vertical corruption.” (185) Putin’s sytem removed any incentive to be efficient and the government was unable to implement its policies beyond Moscow as it was over centralized. On September 24, 2011 it was announced that Medvedev would not seek reelection and Putin would return. This would spark a brief period of oppositional demonstrations who labeled Putin’s United Russia party as “the party of crooks and thieves.” Though the slogan may have been accurate the newborn protest movement was “not ready to run into the Kremlin, as it could barely walk. Without structure, without a policy plateform, it was not resistance ready to break through” and demand a recount when Putin was reelected by an inflated vote count of 15-20%. (248)

Judah provides a wonderful portrait of the Russian electorate and the different factions that existed. As Luke Hardin wrote in The Guardian on June 27, 2013 “Moscow isn’t Russia: it is an affluent mega-city disconnected from the impoverished small towns where most Russians live.” Judah feels that there is a degree of condescension in the opposition that helps explain their inability to gain support outside of Moscow. Judah also includes a wonderful chapter entitled, “Moscow the Colonialist” where he describes in detail how Russians residing outside of their capital feel about their government and the lack of state resources that are afforded to them. Putin fought back with a conservative culture war. Having lost the most advanced part of the nation, Putin would direct his energies to winning over the most backward part of the nation. Judah describes Putin’s spending as that of a “Gulf Sheik,” as 53% of the country was on the state payroll as pensioners, state employees, factory workers, war veterans and bureaucrats, he had no choice but to meet their needs. Pensions rose by 10%, $613 billion was allocated for a ten year military program, and another $160 billion worth of giveaways.” (261) The question is how long can Putin maintain such a system when a drop in oil or gas prices could cripple the economy. If one thinks of the current Ukrainian crisis as a vehicle to take people’s attention away from economic issues it makes even more sense. Putin travels all over Russia visiting areas liberal politicians would never have thought of. He has snuffed out “a not-quite revolution,” and sees little support outside Moscow for a move away from his program of economic stability. Judah is correct in stating that the mass consent Putin enjoyed his first two terms as President is gone forever, but as Luke Harding has concluded, “Russians have fallen out of love with Putin but are unpersuaded that the opposition can deliver anything better.” Judah concludes that sooner or later an earthquake may bring down the fragile Kremlin. But then again, it might not happen at all. If one wants to make some sense out of Putin’s reign, Judah’s marvelous work of political science is well worth a look.

[Dorin · Rating 4 out of 5]

I don’t usually read books about Russia because I don’t need to actually, I have lived my life in its shadow, so there is little I have to discover about it. This one came recommended. It is impressive how an author so young, in his early twenties at the time the book was published, and so foreign, could understand Russia so well. The book is well-structured and well-researched, it is topical, but also chronological. It is ambitious, but it delivers what it promises. I would consider it more of an opinion book than a rigorously researched scientific one, but regardless as to how Judah comes to his conclusions, they are correct (as far as I can judge). He is very good at reading the mood inside Russia. He says he has travelled far and wide and has come in contact with thousands of Russians. It shows. Be they a thousand or a hundred Russians, he manages to understand what they think and what they want, ultimately reading between the lines, from what is not said at times, rather from they are comfortable saying.

I will not go into much detail, because Russia is both complicated and simple really. There is an authoritarian regime, with a president/dictator/tsar, a court and a clientele – a plutocracy perhaps –, detached from the people, their wants and needs, reliant on natural resources and the high prices of oil and gas. Although it keeps the illusion of democracy, with many gradually opening their eyes thanks to the internet and capitalism, it has the tools of silencing the voices of dissent. The more people try to speak, the tighter the grip gets. It seems as Russians are doomed to make the same mistakes, to live through the same cycles of history.

Judah analyses Putin’s rise to power up until 2012, when he came back after an intermezzo, and argues that, slow but steady, Russians are falling out of love with him. He does not say when their dissatisfaction will start boiling – he is very cautious in this regard, as time moves slower in Russia due to a number of factors. 10 years after the book was published, with a full-on illegal and unjustified war against Ukraine, the grip on power, on the resources and on the people seems strong still.

For those who want to understand how modern Russia came to be, how many Russias are inside its vastness, how every-day Russians live and think, this book is the right one. I will forgive Judah’s long metaphors and the descriptions of all the cafes he’s had conversations in (not at all times relevant) and will put them down to his young age.

[Rebecka · Rating 4 out of 5]

Impressive book. Not the fastest read out there, but definitely worth your while if you want to understand "the thing" about Putin.

The structure of this book really… makes me feel nervous. As in, if I were to write something like this on a similar topic, I would be panicking and writing stuff simultaneously all over the place and, most likely, end up with chaos, repeating myself endlessly.

The author, however, pulls it off spectacularly.

Every chapter fits in where it is, every story is correctly inserted into every chapter: everything is just so in place! This has the result of making the book pleasant to read, entertaining and - provided you don't know all the details yourself already - almost something of a thriller.

Judah's book is not dry facts combined with more dry facts with a heaping of statistics on top. It's much more personal, much more flowery, making the number of pages rise more than strictly necessary, but also turning this into a non-fiction book you don't need to take a break from because your head is exploding.

The book also opens up a window on the far east, which I found immensely interesting. And, all the statistics presented are actually fascinating. Most often because they show how crazy a country Russia is.

[Mehmet Koç · Rating 4 out of 5]

An excellent 2013-published book on last two decades history of Russian society and politics. In particular, the chapters of 'Moscow is not Russia', 'Moscow the Colonialist' and 'Chinese Nightmares' are outstanding.

[Данило Судин · Rating 5 out of 5]

Моя рецензія, а радше міркування з приводу книги, за посиланням: http://uamoderna.com/blogy/danilo-sud...

[Bonnie_blu · Rating 3 out of 5]

2.5 Stars. Although there are a few valuable nuggets in the book, I feel the majority of the material is questionable. The author states that he interviewed "thousands" of Russians, but only references a handful. In addition, he makes sweeping conclusions (over and over again) without firm foundations. I found the exploration of Putin's childhood interesting, and I agree with the author that Putin is a fearful, deeply insecure man. On the other hand, I cannot agree with the author when he states that a majority of the Russian people resent Putin and want change. It may be true, but I don't feel that the author made a solid case for this assertion, and at least on the surface, it appears that the Russian people love Putin.

Dictators and oligarchs throughout history have used fear, propaganda, and misdirection to maintain rule. It is my opinion that Putin's adventures in Georgia, Sochi, and Ukraine are obvious examples of diverting his people from his deficiencies in governing to remain in power. It may be that with the drop in oil prices, increasing sanctions, and the accelerating recession in Russia, Putin will find his position vulnerable and he will have to flee the country. Only time will tell.

One final comment: the book is in need of serious editing. The text contains numerous grammar and usage errors, is uneven, and wanders off on tangents that have little or nothing to do with the thesis. It was a chore to plow through the 300+ pages.

[Pere · Rating 5 out of 5]

read this book if you want to know what real russian federation looks like today. i was shocked and sad. shocked because this is indeed a very fragile country, and you don't read about it in the news. sad because looks like it is nowhere near changing for good, rather for worse.

[Віталій (Книжкаріум) · Rating 5 out of 5]

Хороша книжка, без надмірного пафосу і з пристойною глибиною аналізу. Корисно почитати, щоб краще зрозуміти як Росія дійшла до такого стану, що, зрештою, весь цей процес був досить логічним і в достатній мірі передбачуваним. Цікаво також було відчути певний дискомфорт від усвідомлення того, що Путін все-таки не "злий демон", а просто некомпетентний бюрократ з бандитського середовища 90-х, з відповідними амбіціями і цінностями, який поставив все на лояльність і особисті зв'язки, що зрештою і довело ситуацію до такого середньовічного піздєца.

Ще окремим фактором цікавості особисто для мене був опис початку становлення цієї системи, який я практично не знав, бо тоді не звертав на це уваги; як події в Росії корелювали з подіями в Україні, загадати той же перший Майдан, який я бачив з середини, але тоді ще зовсім не розумів його міжнародного контексту.

Відмічу також, що Джуда загалом досить добре пише, та й переклад нівроку. Я б порадив.

[Kim Leandersson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting, different from many other book on the topic since this also covers the outside-Moscow perspective. If you want to have a non-western perspective on the protests then this sure is the book for you.

[Vanjr · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating look at modern Russia. I highly recommend.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

A bit repetitive at time, but generally fantastic. Presents unheard of information about a very misunderstood man.

[Dmitry · Rating 3 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Повзрослевшие дети ещё не привыкли
Что никто не откликается в ответ на выкрик
Не туда и не всегда долетает мольба
И входящие сигналы не ловит радар

Неоднозначное впечатление у меня от этой книги или точнее, большой журналистской работе, которая имеет главный недостаток многих журналистских работ – говорить обо всём и одновременно ни о чём конкретно (в книге слишком много тем). Книга воспринимается как очень большая статья принявшая форму книги или как серия больших статей на тему путинской России. Автор постарался передать дух страны, которую построил сначала Ельцин, а потом Путин. Книга начинается с короткого обзора детства и юности Путина, а потом прослеживает его приход во власть, включая само многолетнее правление.

Sobchak's regime operated in a similar manner to the one Putin would one day run. It was outrageously corrupt and incredibly clannish.

То, что «демократ» Собчак был коррумпирован, знают все или почти все, но я бы обратил внимание на вопрос, можно ли быть не коррумпированным, если твой начальник (а возможно и всё его и твоё окружение) коррумпирован?

Berezovsky was by now aggressively trying to persuade Putin to be Yeltsin's heir:
‘I said, “So what do you think?” We were at his dacha, and Putin said, “I don't want to be President … I want to be Berezovsky.”’

Трудно сказать, насколько честным был Путин, но как мне кажется, он стал Березовским, в том смысле, что он получил неограниченный личным бюджет, плюс полную власть в стране. Разве не этого желал Березовский? Да, Березовский понимал, что ему не стать президентом России, но вот что он может влиять на президента, это он ясно понимал и именно к этому стремился. Впрочем, его позиция в качестве владельца телеканала ОРТ ещё раз подчёркивает его стремление заниматься именно политикой, а не чисто бизнесом. В этом смысле Путин, если он подобное действительно заявлял, сказал правду. Более того, он реализовал своё желание.

Большая часть книги посвящается путинской России, т.е. тому, почему была создана такая авторитарная страна, и какую роль в этой стране выполняет народ и его воля/безволие. В данном случаи автор довольно много внимания уделяет внесистемной оппозиции, посвящая целую главу Алексею Навальному. Трудно сказать каково отношение автора к Навальному, но судя по тому, как сильно он акцентировал внимание на «Русском марше», он видел в Навальном довольно неоднозначную персону (отдавая большее предпочтение такой персоне как Чирикова (Chirikova). Впрочем, открыто автор об этом не пишет. На примере с несистемной оппозицией хорошо замечен журналистский стиль автора. Тут тебе и использование различных интервью с разными оппозиционными деятелями, и просто наблюдение за событиями той поры. В принципе, получился неплохой обзор того времени, т.е. подъём внесистемной оппозиции начиная с 2011 года. Наблюдения у автора получились довольно точными, но не актуальными. Впрочем, это сегодня мы знаем, что Эдуард Лимонов оказался «пшиком», но в то время многие его рассматривали как существенную фигуру.

По сути, основанием книги являются интервью с различными политическими акторами, а также с простым народом. Если про политических фигур можно сказать что они отражают в каком-то смысле политику российского государства, то вот интервью с простым народом могут давать неполную картину.

The political technologist turned deputy, Sergei Markov, once admitted to me, in between hollering down the phone denouncing the opposition in a live radio interview: ‘United Russia is not a party, or not yet anyway, it's just a mechanism for controlling people.’

Сергей Марков – главный политолог путинской России, поэтому его откровения особо ценные. Что мы видим тут? По сути, Марков заявил, что партия «Единая Россия» была воссоздана в качестве КПСС ver. 2.0. Но в СССР была только КПСС, а других партий не было, разве нет? Это верно, но не могут же они копировать советскую систему на все 100%. «Единая Россия» больше походит на нынешнюю правящую партию Китая, ибо в нынешнем Китае правящая партия – КПК – имеет 108 мест из 175. Думаю, Путин и его окружение, при создании и модификации партийной системы взяли за образец именно нынешний Китай, а не СССР. Впрочем, не только власть думает о создании иллюзии демократии, но и оппозиция.

Coming together in Rublevka is a social world that pulls in even opposition leaders. We should understand Kremlin factions as many faces of the same court – where some are used to seduce, others to intimidate, some that are masks and others that can only be seen in the mirror. Those in the loose ‘liberal’ faction like to season their speeches with sprinkles of fiscally neoliberal terms, noises about improving human rights and puff about technological innovation. A taste of this talk was on offer at Davos in 2012. Arkady Dvorkovich, a chess-playing and tweeting minister, lamented the ‘oversized and constant pressure from the state’, whilst the influential first deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov noted that the government must ‘heed clear and tough warnings that the situation must be changed’. Yet this liberalism is thin. Their ideal has been the authoritarian modernization practised in Singapore, not the democratic transition in Poland. They want a slow and gradual liberalization on the regime's own terms, as practised in Taiwan, not a sudden and threatening break.

Если вы послушаете, что говорит российская интеллигенция и часть внесистемной оппозиции, то вы обнаружите один и тот же рефрен: «тёмный» народ привёл Путина к власти. Говорится это специально, чтобы снять всякую ответственность за привод Путина окружением Ельцина к власти. Другими словами, российская интеллигенция и часть оппозиции, привела Ельцина к власти в 1996 году вопреки воле народа. И далее Ельцин и его окружение привели Путина к власти в качестве наследника. Чтобы снять с себя всю ответственность за действия Путина, российская интеллигенция на протяжении 25 лет убеждает окружающих, что это не она привела Путина к власти, а что это российский народ выбрал Путина. Это откровенная ложь, разумеется. Но главным является идея, что народ ещё «не созрел» выбирать себе верховную власть. Наследника, т.е. реального правителя России должна выбирать элита, а не народ. Другими словами и окружение Путин, и окружение Ельцина, и российская интеллигенция схожа во мнении, что народ не должен иметь возможности выбирать себе главу государства. Вместо этого выбор должен делать ограниченный круг людей из элиты, после чего, с помощью СМИ, управлять народным волеизъявлением. Именно поэтому так часто можно услышать утверждения как было бы здорово, если бы в России построили политическую систему власти по сингапурской модели. Как же быть в таком случаи с идеологией, партиями и пр., что характеризует современную демократию? Никак. Или так же как в Украине, в которой партия «Слуга народа» является партией Зеленского, а не либеральной или социально-демократической партией. Не являясь знатоком по Казахстану, рискну предположить, что ситуация с политическими партиями в Казахстане примерно такая же, т.е. полное отсутствие партий в Западном (идеологическом) понимании этого слова. Так что, расширив утверждение Маркова можно сказать, что в России нет настоящих идеологических партий, а есть вместо них... кланы, которые с помощью СМИ управляют мнением и умами народа.

Автор довольно точно отметил, что главная или одна из главных причин, почему путинский режим укрепился, является увеличение благосостояния.

The short answer as to why Russians shrugged off creeping authoritarianism is – supermarkets. The long answer is that during the 2000s Russia enjoyed the first period of macro-economic stabilization since the mid-1980s, finally bringing dividends to the masses from de-Sovietization.
<…>
The new middle class was not looking at the Kremlin – but somewhere between apathy and IKEA.

На фоне непрекращающихся экономических проблем в эпоху Ельцина, Путину повезло с ценами на нефть, благодаря чему российские граждане «закрыли глаза» на все авторитарные тенденции путинской власти, начиная с военных конфликтов по всему миру и заканчивая постепенным сужением свобод. Вот только автор не понял, что в России демократии европейского образца никогда и не было. Вся российская демократия насчитывает лишь пару лет с 1991 по 1993 год, когда вместо того чтобы договариваться Ельцин достал пистолет и решил все проблемы силой. Поэтому с моей точки зрения автор не понял главного: нет никакого путинского режима, а есть ельцинско-путинский режим, который появился не в последнюю очередь благодаря предательству демократов и либералов в 90-х и высоким ценам на нефть в 2000-х. Хотя под конец книги автор всё же пришёл к верному выводу, пусть и другим путём.

There is paranoia everywhere and a presence in Putin's office, one whose shadow is so huge it encompasses everything, to the point it cannot be seen. The ghost of Boris Yeltsin. All Putin's career has been about not being Yeltsin. To not be Yeltsin, he had to become Berezovsky, then to become Khodorkovsky. To not be Yeltsin, he had to build the vertical of power. To not be Yeltsin, he exercises, plays hockey and for the cameras even flies with storks. To not be Yeltsin, he controls TV. But he has made a mistake. In consolidating power, his gigantic transfer of assets means he cannot step down. He has become Boris Yeltsin. Putin cannot leave power for fear of arrest. History is inescapably repeating itself. He will inevitably need a protector, either in 2018 or 2024, because any real transfer of power will be a transfer of assets.
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I have an ambiguous impression of this book or, more precisely, of a large journalistic work, which has the main disadvantage of many journalistic works - to talk about everything and, at the same time, about nothing in particular (there are too many topics in the book). The book is perceived as a very large article that took the form of a book or as a series of large articles on Putin's Russia. The author tried to convey the spirit of the country, which was built first by Yeltsin and then by Putin. The book begins with a short overview of Putin's childhood and youth and then traces his rise to power, including his many years of rule.

Sobchak's regime operated in a similar manner to the one Putin would one day run. It was outrageously corrupt and incredibly clannish.

Everyone or almost everyone knows that "Democrat" Sobchak was corrupt, but I would point out the question: is it possible to be non-corrupt if your boss (and possibly his and your entire entourage) is corrupt?

Berezovsky was by now aggressively trying to persuade Putin to be Yeltsin's heir:
‘I said, “So what do you think?” We were at his dacha, and Putin said, “I don't want to be President … I want to be Berezovsky.”’

It's hard to say how honest Putin was, but as I see it, he became Berezovsky, in the sense that he got an unlimited personal budget, plus total power over the country. Isn't that what Berezovsky wanted? Yes, Berezovsky realized that he could not become the president of Russia but that he could influence the president (he clearly understood that), and that is what he was striving for. However, his position as owner of the ORT TV channel once again emphasizes his desire to engage in politics rather than purely business. In this sense, Putin, if he did make such a statement, was telling the truth. What's more, he got his wish.

Much of the book is devoted to Putin's Russia, i.e., why such an authoritarian country was created and what role the people and their will/non-will play in that country. In this case, the author pays quite a lot of attention to the non-systemic opposition, devoting an entire chapter to Alexei Navalny. It is hard to say what the author's attitude toward Navalny is, but, judging by how much he emphasized the Russian March, he saw Navalny as a rather ambiguous person (favoring such a person as Chirikova). However, the author does not write about it openly. In the example of the non-systemic opposition, the author's journalistic style is well noticed. The author uses various interviews with various opposition figures and observes the events of that time. In principle, we got a good overview of that time, i.e., the rise of the non-systemic opposition since 2011. The author's observations turned out to be pretty accurate but not relevant. However, it is today that we know that Eduard Limonov turned out to be a "zilch," but at the time he was seen by many as a significant figure.

In essence, the book is based on interviews with various political actors as well as with ordinary people. While political figures can be said to reflect, in some sense, the politics of the Russian state, interviews with ordinary people can give an incomplete picture.

The political technologist turned deputy, Sergei Markov, once admitted to me, in between hollering down the phone denouncing the opposition in a live radio interview: ‘United Russia is not a party, or not yet anyway, it's just a mechanism for controlling people.’

Sergei Markov is the chief political scientist in Putin's Russia, so his revelations are especially valuable. What do we see here? Essentially, Markov stated that the United Russia party has been recreated as the CPSU ver. 2.0. But in the USSR, there was only the CPSU, and there were no other parties, were there not? That's true, but they can't copy the Soviet system 100%. "United Russia" is more like the current ruling party of China because in current China, the ruling party, the CCP, has 108 seats out of 175. I think that Putin and his entourage, when creating and modifying the party system, took the current China as a model, not the USSR. However, not only the authorities are thinking about creating an illusion of democracy, but also the opposition.

Coming together in Rublevka is a social world that pulls in even opposition leaders. We should understand Kremlin factions as many faces of the same court – where some are used to seduce, others to intimidate, some that are masks and others that can only be seen in the mirror. Those in the loose ‘liberal’ faction like to season their speeches with sprinkles of fiscally neoliberal terms, noises about improving human rights and puff about technological innovation. A taste of this talk was on offer at Davos in 2012. Arkady Dvorkovich, a chess-playing and tweeting minister, lamented the ‘oversized and constant pressure from the state’, whilst the influential first deputy prime minister Igor Shuvalov noted that the government must ‘heed clear and tough warnings that the situation must be changed’. Yet this liberalism is thin. Their ideal has been the authoritarian modernization practised in Singapore, not the democratic transition in Poland. They want a slow and gradual liberalization on the regime's own terms, as practised in Taiwan, not a sudden and threatening break.

If you listen to what the Russian intelligentsia and part of the non-systemic opposition are saying, you will find the same refrain: the "dark" people brought Putin to power. This is said on purpose, in order to remove any responsibility for bringing Putin to power by Yeltsin's entourage. In other words, the Russian intelligentsia and part of the opposition brought Yeltsin to power in 1996 against the will of the people. And then Yeltsin and his entourage brought Putin to power as heir apparent. In order to absolve themselves of all responsibility for Putin's actions, the Russian intelligentsia has been convincing people for 25 years that it was not they who brought Putin to power but that it was the Russian people who chose Putin. This is an outright lie, of course. But the main idea is that the people are not "mature enough" to choose their supreme power. The "heir," i.e., the real ruler of Russia, should be chosen by the elite, not by the people. In other words, Putin's entourage, Yeltsin's entourage, and the Russian intelligentsia all agree that the people should not be able to choose their own head of state. Instead, the choice should be made by a limited circle of people from the elite. That is why one can so often hear statements about how great it would be if Russia were to build a political system of government based on the Singapore model. What about ideology, parties, etc., which characterize modern democracy? Nothing. Or just like in Ukraine, where the party "Servant of the People" is Zelensky's party, not a liberal or social-democratic party. Not being a connoisseur of Kazakhstan, I assume that the situation with political parties in Kazakhstan is approximately the same, i.e., the absence of parties in the Western (ideological) sense of the word. So, extending Markov's statement we can say that in Russia there are no real ideological parties, but, instead, there are ... clans, which, with the help of the media, control the opinions and minds of the people.

The author was quite accurate in pointing out that the main or one of the main reasons why Putin's regime has strengthened is the increase in wealth.

The short answer as to why Russians shrugged off creeping authoritarianism is – supermarkets. The long answer is that during the 2000s Russia enjoyed the first period of macro-economic stabilization since the mid-1980s, finally bringing dividends to the masses from de-Sovietization.
<…>
The new middle class was not looking at the Kremlin – but somewhere between apathy and IKEA.

Against the backdrop of Yeltsin-era relentless economic problems, Putin was lucky with oil prices, thanks to which Russian citizens "turned a blind eye" to all the authoritarian tendencies of Putin's government, from military conflicts around the world to the gradual narrowing of freedoms. Except that, the author did not realize that Russia has never had a European-style democracy. The whole Russian democracy lasted only a couple of years, from 1991 to 1993, when instead of negotiating, Yeltsin pulled out a gun and solved all problems by force. Therefore, from my point of view, the author did not understand the main point: there is no Putin regime, but rather the Yeltsin-Putin regime, which appeared not least due to the betrayal of democrats and liberals in the 90s and high oil prices in the 2000s. At the end of the book, though, the author did come to the right conclusion, albeit in a different way.

There is paranoia everywhere and a presence in Putin's office, one whose shadow is so huge it encompasses everything, to the point it cannot be seen. The ghost of Boris Yeltsin. All Putin's career has been about not being Yeltsin. To not be Yeltsin, he had to become Berezovsky, then to become Khodorkovsky. To not be Yeltsin, he had to
(see the last quote from the Russian version of the review)

[Mary · Rating 3 out of 5]

Great descriptions and interpretations of Russian points of view from outside Moscow and great instruction about Kadyrov vs. Kremlin siloviki (probably germane to Putin's recent disappearance and Nemtsov hit). Author also succeeds at articulating what is missing in Russian political life and prescription for future. Exhaustive travels, daring, honest and fluent. Keen observer. Don't agree with that Russia was out of love with Putin a few years back. Author seems to draw conclusions by talking with people here and there. Not sure I trust that. Then there's the writing. Often baffling. To be fair, he almost certainly drank too much and didn't sleep enough during, at least, the prelude to writing this book. Recommend.

[Rob Mills · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting book that details the state of Russia and it's relationship with Putin. The author talks about a number of first hand conversations, outlines Putin's rise to power, his personality and his strategy to maintain power. I thought the first person stuff about his travels throughout the entire country were additive to making you feel Ben Judah put the time in. He covers a variety of topics (ie. various opposition parties, the caucasus, Pussy Riot, fear of the Chinese. vigilante justice) and treats them all with a skeptical and analytical eye.

[Lina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not being familiar with Russian history beyond what I was taught way back when in a dusty history class, this was a really insightful read! The middle parts were a bit dry but I especially enjoyed the last part of the book where the author travels outside of Moscow to regions of Russia that rarely see anything of Moscow unless it involves installing new state-appointed governors that rule over the regions in more or less corrupt ways. Learning about the different mindsets of Muscovites compared to the people living in the far flung regions was fascinating.

[Anubhav · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quite well written.

One quote on India stood out: "It is clear that the Russians of Siberia do not feel themselves the 'bear' of European imagination, but a tiny nation on an enormous and weakly defended territory atop the teeming masses of Asia. They feel more like a huge Mongolia, a sparsely populated and easily overrun territory inhabited by a backward tribe, towards the new China, than a small India, a fallen-behind peer competitor who smarts at being overtaken."

[Dav · Rating 2 out of 5]

A fascinating story in desperate need of an editor.

Despite its rambling length and disheveled state of editorial disarray, I couldn't stop reading it because Russia is a fascinatingly fucked up self-destructive place. It appears there's no hero anywhere in the country. All the players are flawed in various ways, although perhaps noble in other ways, including Putin.

[Abbey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fantastic interesting read. The author has researched this book first hand travelling to the smallest villages throughout the country. I learnt a lot about the Putin regime and especially it's impact on those outside of Moscow. A book that will make you feel smarter or having read it.

[Robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent - details a lot about what has happened, since the USSR collapsed. Defiantly helps to provide some insight as to what is going on in Russia now. Would give it 5 stars, except it meanders a bit.

[Santiago Romero · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting. Offers a comprehensive view of how Russia first viewed Putin as a savior and progressively has come to see him as the last remanent of Soviet culture and an impediment for the development of a modern Russia

[Jessie Berlin · Rating 4 out of 5]

My rating would be 5 stars, except the author repeats himself a little too much and the flow is a bit scattered.

[Zack · Rating 3 out of 5]

Desperately in need of an editor to tighten it up. It really dragged in places.

I'd be interested to see an update in a bit after the Ukraine situation unfolds more.

[Emma Richler · Rating 4 out of 5]

So very intelligent. Excellent.

[Omar Amer · Rating 5 out of 5]

An extremely well researched book, Ben has proved incredibly brave travelling from one side of Russia to the other asking questions about the current regime.

[Tauno Vürmer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent insight to Russia under Vladimir Putins rule. At times its almost horrifying to read how fragile, mislead and divided whole country and its population is.

[Ashley Owens · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a very interesting description of Russia's recent political history, with the focus on Putin - how he came to power in a unique climate, his successes and his mistakes.

[Jelmer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book about Russia's political situation prior to 2014.

[Nikolay Krylovskiy · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's pretty unbelievable that this was written by a 25-year old, at least to me. I think it's a great snapshot of Putin's Russia, circa 2012.