What do you think?
Rate this book
The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
History remembers the Soviets and the Nazis as bitter enemies whose conflict was the decisive clash of World War II. Yet Hitler and Stalin signed a treaty of nonaggression that lasted for nearly a third of the war, and that is key to understanding why the war evolved—and ended—the way it did.
In The Devils’ Alliance, Roger Moorhouse explains how the two powers—though ideologically opposed—forged a brutally efficient partnership, exchanging raw materials and machinery and orchestrating the division of Poland and the Baltic States. Hundreds of thousands caught between Hitler and Stalin were killed or deported. But ironically, by sharing materiel and technological expertise during the Pact, the Nazis and Soviets made possible a far more bloody and protracted war than would have been otherwise conceivable.
Combining comprehensive research with a gripping narrative, The Devils’ Alliance is the authoritative history of the Nazi-Soviet Pact—and a portrait of the people whose lives were irrevocably altered by the alliance.
In The Devils’ Alliance, Roger Moorhouse explains how the two powers—though ideologically opposed—forged a brutally efficient partnership, exchanging raw materials and machinery and orchestrating the division of Poland and the Baltic States. Hundreds of thousands caught between Hitler and Stalin were killed or deported. But ironically, by sharing materiel and technological expertise during the Pact, the Nazis and Soviets made possible a far more bloody and protracted war than would have been otherwise conceivable.
Combining comprehensive research with a gripping narrative, The Devils’ Alliance is the authoritative history of the Nazi-Soviet Pact—and a portrait of the people whose lives were irrevocably altered by the alliance.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published August 21, 2014
52 people are currently reading
1529 people want to read
About the author
Roger Moorhouse
42 books163 followersLiving the Dream. Historian and author of an international bestseller - "Berlin at War" was #1 in Lithuania :-) - as well as a few other books, such as "Killing Hitler", "The Devils' Alliance" and "First to Fight" - the last of which won the Polish Foreign Ministry History Prize in 2020.
I write mainly about Nazi Germany and wartime Poland, but I fear that might scare some people off, so I'll just call myself a writer of history books.
My current book (published in the UK in August 2023) is "The Forgers", which is the fascinating story of the Ładoś Group - a ring of Polish diplomats and Jewish activists operating out of wartime Switzerland - who were forging Latin American passports to help Jews escape the Holocaust. It is a VERY interesting subject - so I would urge you to get a copy!
I hope you enjoy my books. Any questions or queries or just wholesome praise, do let me know...
I write mainly about Nazi Germany and wartime Poland, but I fear that might scare some people off, so I'll just call myself a writer of history books.
My current book (published in the UK in August 2023) is "The Forgers", which is the fascinating story of the Ładoś Group - a ring of Polish diplomats and Jewish activists operating out of wartime Switzerland - who were forging Latin American passports to help Jews escape the Holocaust. It is a VERY interesting subject - so I would urge you to get a copy!
I hope you enjoy my books. Any questions or queries or just wholesome praise, do let me know...
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 75 reviews
April 10, 2022
“Though it seems that other methods were tried, the NKVD quickly worked out the most effective technique for dealing with the prisoners [captured during the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland]. One by one they were led, arms bound behind their backs to a cellar room with makeshift soundproofing provided by sandbags. Before the prisoner could make sense of his surroundings, he was grasped from both sides by two NKVD men, while a third approached him from behind and fired a single shot into the base of his skull with a German-made pistol, the bullet generally exiting through the victim’s forehead. A skilled executioner, such as Stalin’s ‘favorite,’ Vasily Blokhin, could carry out as many as 250 such executions in a single night. Working at the NKVD jail at Kalinin that spring, Blokhin wore a leather apron and gauntlets to prevent being sullied by his victims’ blood. Immediately afterwards, the bodies of the victims would be loaded onto trucks and driven into the nearby forests for disposal in mass graves, where they would be stacked perhaps twelve deep and limed to speed decomposition…”
- Roger Moorhouse, The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
Though the historiography of the Second World War has been in flux from the moment it ended – a function of the arrival of the Cold War, which made allies enemies, and enemies allies – the modern-day conventional wisdom is that the Soviet Union “won” the war, at least with regard to Nazi Germany.
Whether this is literally true, or provable, or even worth arguing, is outside the scope of Roger Moorhouse’s The Devils’ Alliance. Instead of looking to the end, he is focused on the beginning, asking us to ponder the role the Soviet Union played in starting the war in the first place.
***
Signed on August 23, 1939, the German-Soviet Pact – also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – stunned the world. In an instant, the geopolitical chasm between fascists and communists disappeared, and two apparent arch-enemies – Germany’s Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin – were suddenly on the same side, ruthlessly reordering Eastern Europe. In seven short, anodyne articles, and four secret codicils (all attached as an appendix in the back of the book), the fate of millions of people was irrevocably altered, and the stage set for a cataclysm of near-apocalyptic proportions.
Moorhouse takes the sealing of this agreement as his starting point, describing how two ideologically-opposed countries set aside their “principles” (as far as murderous regimes can be said to have them), held their noses, and – for a time – worked together to advance their own ends. Though not a formal alliance, the pact allowed for the exchange of German technology for Soviet raw materials; gave Hitler protection on his eastern flank, keeping him from a two-front war (an advantage he later discarded); and most tragically, crushed a number of smaller nations between two massive powers that shared a predilection for racial distinctions, mass deportations, and industrial-scaled executions.
***
Though everything starts with the German-Soviet Pact, most of The Devils’ Alliance is concerned with what happens afterwards. The consequences that Moorhouse describes are dire indeed. First came the joint invasion of Poland, kicked off by Hitler, but then opportunistically joined by Stalin, ending with a division of that country that gives real meaning to the phrase: “between a rock and a hard place.”
Subsequently, Stalin – who never stopped squealing about “imperialists” – went about trying to restore the Russian Empire of the Tsars. He started a war with Finland, then annexed Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, resulting in tens of thousands of murders and deportations. Eventually, though, Stalin overreached, especially in Romania, where he began to threaten Germany’s oil supplies. Ultimately, Hitler decided that the German-Soviet Pact had run its course, and Moorhouse ends the The Devils’ Alliance in June 1941, with the massive invasion of the Soviet Union known to history as Operation Barbarossa.
***
In telling this tale of duplicity and woe, Moorhouse smoothly switches between chronological and thematic chapters. Sometimes he narrates events as they unfold, such as in his depictions of the invasions of Poland and Finland. Other times, he takes a deeper look at the issues arising from the actions taken by Hitler, Stalin, and their henchmen. For example, there is a chapter regarding the logically-incoherent dissembling of communists as they tried to rationalize Stalin’s embrace of fascism, another chapter on Great Britain’s response to the looming possibility of having to fight both Germany and the Soviet Union alone, and yet another exploring the economic ramifications of the pact, which is still disputed. (Recently, I read two different accounts of Germany’s invasion of France, one of which believed it was mostly fueled by Soviet oil, and the other asserting that Soviet oil played but a minimal part).
The Devil’s Alliance is just over 300 pages of text, meaning that it crams a lot into a relatively short volume. The upside is that Moorhouse keeps things moving briskly along, giving you the broad outlines, while providing enough well-chosen anecdotes and vignettes to give the narrative texture. The downside, obviously, is that certain topics do not get the in-depth analysis that they probably deserve. For instance, I would have appreciated a more probing inquiry into Hitler’s decision to scrap the pact and fling his legions at the Soviet Union. I have long labored under the belief that Hitler always intended to betray Stalin, but there are some indications here that this might not have been the case. At the least, Moorhouse raises the possibility that if Stalin had turned his attention south, instead of creeping further west, things might have gone differently (but certainly not better).
***
The apostrophizing of The Devils’ Alliance is very telling. This is not about Stalin making a deal with the devil; it’s about two “devils” entering into a compact to crush and conquer and control. This is about two distinctly powerful men for whom human life had no value. People were not people to them. They were impediments to their goals. Some went to concentration camps, others to gulags. Some were simply forced from their homes, while others were enslaved. Some were gassed and their bodies burned, others were shot in the back of the head, their bodies dumped in forests.
In terms of stated genocidal intent and systematic slaughter, Hitler’s Germany remains the chief villain of the Second World War, and rightly so. Still, The Devils’ Alliance is a very good introduction to a much-needed reassessment of the part played by the Soviet Union. It’s no longer enough to simply say that the Soviet Union did the bulk of the fighting and dying against Hitler’s minions, without coming to terms with its responsibility and accountability for setting the whole thing in motion.
- Roger Moorhouse, The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941
Though the historiography of the Second World War has been in flux from the moment it ended – a function of the arrival of the Cold War, which made allies enemies, and enemies allies – the modern-day conventional wisdom is that the Soviet Union “won” the war, at least with regard to Nazi Germany.
Whether this is literally true, or provable, or even worth arguing, is outside the scope of Roger Moorhouse’s The Devils’ Alliance. Instead of looking to the end, he is focused on the beginning, asking us to ponder the role the Soviet Union played in starting the war in the first place.
***
Signed on August 23, 1939, the German-Soviet Pact – also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – stunned the world. In an instant, the geopolitical chasm between fascists and communists disappeared, and two apparent arch-enemies – Germany’s Adolf Hitler and the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin – were suddenly on the same side, ruthlessly reordering Eastern Europe. In seven short, anodyne articles, and four secret codicils (all attached as an appendix in the back of the book), the fate of millions of people was irrevocably altered, and the stage set for a cataclysm of near-apocalyptic proportions.
Moorhouse takes the sealing of this agreement as his starting point, describing how two ideologically-opposed countries set aside their “principles” (as far as murderous regimes can be said to have them), held their noses, and – for a time – worked together to advance their own ends. Though not a formal alliance, the pact allowed for the exchange of German technology for Soviet raw materials; gave Hitler protection on his eastern flank, keeping him from a two-front war (an advantage he later discarded); and most tragically, crushed a number of smaller nations between two massive powers that shared a predilection for racial distinctions, mass deportations, and industrial-scaled executions.
***
Though everything starts with the German-Soviet Pact, most of The Devils’ Alliance is concerned with what happens afterwards. The consequences that Moorhouse describes are dire indeed. First came the joint invasion of Poland, kicked off by Hitler, but then opportunistically joined by Stalin, ending with a division of that country that gives real meaning to the phrase: “between a rock and a hard place.”
Subsequently, Stalin – who never stopped squealing about “imperialists” – went about trying to restore the Russian Empire of the Tsars. He started a war with Finland, then annexed Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, resulting in tens of thousands of murders and deportations. Eventually, though, Stalin overreached, especially in Romania, where he began to threaten Germany’s oil supplies. Ultimately, Hitler decided that the German-Soviet Pact had run its course, and Moorhouse ends the The Devils’ Alliance in June 1941, with the massive invasion of the Soviet Union known to history as Operation Barbarossa.
***
In telling this tale of duplicity and woe, Moorhouse smoothly switches between chronological and thematic chapters. Sometimes he narrates events as they unfold, such as in his depictions of the invasions of Poland and Finland. Other times, he takes a deeper look at the issues arising from the actions taken by Hitler, Stalin, and their henchmen. For example, there is a chapter regarding the logically-incoherent dissembling of communists as they tried to rationalize Stalin’s embrace of fascism, another chapter on Great Britain’s response to the looming possibility of having to fight both Germany and the Soviet Union alone, and yet another exploring the economic ramifications of the pact, which is still disputed. (Recently, I read two different accounts of Germany’s invasion of France, one of which believed it was mostly fueled by Soviet oil, and the other asserting that Soviet oil played but a minimal part).
The Devil’s Alliance is just over 300 pages of text, meaning that it crams a lot into a relatively short volume. The upside is that Moorhouse keeps things moving briskly along, giving you the broad outlines, while providing enough well-chosen anecdotes and vignettes to give the narrative texture. The downside, obviously, is that certain topics do not get the in-depth analysis that they probably deserve. For instance, I would have appreciated a more probing inquiry into Hitler’s decision to scrap the pact and fling his legions at the Soviet Union. I have long labored under the belief that Hitler always intended to betray Stalin, but there are some indications here that this might not have been the case. At the least, Moorhouse raises the possibility that if Stalin had turned his attention south, instead of creeping further west, things might have gone differently (but certainly not better).
***
The apostrophizing of The Devils’ Alliance is very telling. This is not about Stalin making a deal with the devil; it’s about two “devils” entering into a compact to crush and conquer and control. This is about two distinctly powerful men for whom human life had no value. People were not people to them. They were impediments to their goals. Some went to concentration camps, others to gulags. Some were simply forced from their homes, while others were enslaved. Some were gassed and their bodies burned, others were shot in the back of the head, their bodies dumped in forests.
In terms of stated genocidal intent and systematic slaughter, Hitler’s Germany remains the chief villain of the Second World War, and rightly so. Still, The Devils’ Alliance is a very good introduction to a much-needed reassessment of the part played by the Soviet Union. It’s no longer enough to simply say that the Soviet Union did the bulk of the fighting and dying against Hitler’s minions, without coming to terms with its responsibility and accountability for setting the whole thing in motion.
March 2, 2023
In The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse brings the pact of 1939 to the attention of other nations rather than Eastern Europeans, who experienced its consequences.
It's terrifying how a document, less than one page, can change the lives of millions. I'm talking about the secret protocol, the treaty's appendix; the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact itself is a fairly unimpressive document dealing with possible political schemes by the West. According to the secret protocol, the USSR and Germany divided spheres of influence: the USSR got the Baltic states (down to Lithuania), Finland, the eastern part of Poland, and Bessarabia; Germany got a free hand in western Poland.
In a thriller-like fashion, with many dates that organically fit into the text, the author debunks the myths connected with the pact, the foremost exposing Stalin's willingness to let Europe weaken and exhaust itself through imperialist wars. He wasn't merely buying time for the USSR to prepare its army but aimed to acquire financial profit from commercial agreements with Germany (that were signed separately). The USSR got industrial and technological products, like machinery, planes, and a ship, and Germany received raw materials and foodstuffs to lessen the consequences of the ongoing war with Britain.
I recommend the book as definitive historical research about the pact and the politics surrounding it. Roger Moorhouse successfully blends economic as well as political developments into an engaging, memorable narrative. If I could, I would have read the book in one sitting.
It's terrifying how a document, less than one page, can change the lives of millions. I'm talking about the secret protocol, the treaty's appendix; the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact itself is a fairly unimpressive document dealing with possible political schemes by the West. According to the secret protocol, the USSR and Germany divided spheres of influence: the USSR got the Baltic states (down to Lithuania), Finland, the eastern part of Poland, and Bessarabia; Germany got a free hand in western Poland.
In a thriller-like fashion, with many dates that organically fit into the text, the author debunks the myths connected with the pact, the foremost exposing Stalin's willingness to let Europe weaken and exhaust itself through imperialist wars. He wasn't merely buying time for the USSR to prepare its army but aimed to acquire financial profit from commercial agreements with Germany (that were signed separately). The USSR got industrial and technological products, like machinery, planes, and a ship, and Germany received raw materials and foodstuffs to lessen the consequences of the ongoing war with Britain.
I recommend the book as definitive historical research about the pact and the politics surrounding it. Roger Moorhouse successfully blends economic as well as political developments into an engaging, memorable narrative. If I could, I would have read the book in one sitting.
June 1, 2024
There may be flaws in this book, it is not as great as Timothy Snyder's Bloodlines (which was the first book that pointed out that the extravagant death total for the Soviet in WWII was vastly boosted by the dead of the Baltic States, extensive parts of the Poland, as well as other bits pieces of land from Romania, etc. that the Soviet Union had conquered and a lot of their dead were caused not by German but Soviet troops) but then Snyder's book is in a class by itself.
The fate of Poland and it's fate under the utterly nasty, revolting, grotesquely hypocritical Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (although no longer a state secret as it was under communism it is still a subject which Russians are sent to prison for mentioning in any kind of honest way) is not well enough known and it is a story that needs telling, again and again until the facts of the horror what happened (as a prelude to years if not decades of misery) are at least remembered with a fraction of the consciousness that events like Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain receive.
Mr. Moorhouse is a fine historian and this very readable account offers up alot information and insights with a deft hand. A book well worth reading for anyone interested in WWII.
The fate of Poland and it's fate under the utterly nasty, revolting, grotesquely hypocritical Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (although no longer a state secret as it was under communism it is still a subject which Russians are sent to prison for mentioning in any kind of honest way) is not well enough known and it is a story that needs telling, again and again until the facts of the horror what happened (as a prelude to years if not decades of misery) are at least remembered with a fraction of the consciousness that events like Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain receive.
Mr. Moorhouse is a fine historian and this very readable account offers up alot information and insights with a deft hand. A book well worth reading for anyone interested in WWII.
November 19, 2016
The Devil's Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941 by Roger Moorhouse, is a book outlining the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR, which marked the dividing of Eastern Europe between those two powers. The book looks at the early days of the treaty, including the meeting of Ribbentrop (the foreign minister of Nazi Germany) and his counterpart in the USSR, Molotov. A semi-journalistic approach is taken in the book, looking at diary entries and letters of those who took part in the treaty, and those who endured its consequences, being analyzed in some detail.
Frankly, this book was not enjoyable to me. The journalistic approach made the book readable, but offered little in the way of substance to its contents. The major issue with this book, then, is Moorhouse's lack of "journalistic integrity." He is sneeringly and insultingly belittling to the actors in this pact, characterizing them as bloodthirsty and greedy imperialists selling out their ideals. When one writes thee words from the British Isles, a certain irony begins to take form, and Roger Moorhouse of Buckinghamshire, England seems to miss this irony.
Don't mistake me. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR were bloodthirsty imperialists. But Moorhouse offers little insight into the depths of each state, their reasoning's or their strategies. He posits that both dictators were of the same ilk, and were intimately fascinated with each others brutality and character. He offers this as one of the main reasons for the treaty. He seems to take the stance that his is some new tract of study, which is absurd in itself.
The book also focuses on Operation Barbarossa, the collapse of the Pact and the invasion of the USSR by Germany in 1941. Although this is an interesting place to end, he offers 50+ pages to this, and in a book with only 350 or so pages of content, it cuts back from what could have been a greater analysis of the treaty, its impact, provisions, strategies, provisos, and so on. As you can probably see, this book felt shallow in content and did not offer a degree of academic integrity that I found acceptable. Also, the source list was awful. There were no in text citations, which I feel are essential in any history text worth its salt.
So was it all bad? No. This book had redeemable qualities. It was highly readable with its journalistic style. It offered interesting insight into cabinet members and diplomats that are often overlooked for the greater personalities in the WWII conflict. And it is a book I feel needs to be written. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the subsequent cooperation between two ideological enemies is an area little explored and overlooked even in this crowded genre of historical non-fiction. All in all, I would hesitate to recommend this book. It is a serviceable historical non-fiction book, but offers little that is new, fresh or exciting. The content is interesting but shallow. The sourcing is poorly done... There are many more interesting books, and many better books that document Soviet or Nazi atrocities. In a crowded genre, this one can probably be skipped.
Frankly, this book was not enjoyable to me. The journalistic approach made the book readable, but offered little in the way of substance to its contents. The major issue with this book, then, is Moorhouse's lack of "journalistic integrity." He is sneeringly and insultingly belittling to the actors in this pact, characterizing them as bloodthirsty and greedy imperialists selling out their ideals. When one writes thee words from the British Isles, a certain irony begins to take form, and Roger Moorhouse of Buckinghamshire, England seems to miss this irony.
Don't mistake me. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR were bloodthirsty imperialists. But Moorhouse offers little insight into the depths of each state, their reasoning's or their strategies. He posits that both dictators were of the same ilk, and were intimately fascinated with each others brutality and character. He offers this as one of the main reasons for the treaty. He seems to take the stance that his is some new tract of study, which is absurd in itself.
The book also focuses on Operation Barbarossa, the collapse of the Pact and the invasion of the USSR by Germany in 1941. Although this is an interesting place to end, he offers 50+ pages to this, and in a book with only 350 or so pages of content, it cuts back from what could have been a greater analysis of the treaty, its impact, provisions, strategies, provisos, and so on. As you can probably see, this book felt shallow in content and did not offer a degree of academic integrity that I found acceptable. Also, the source list was awful. There were no in text citations, which I feel are essential in any history text worth its salt.
So was it all bad? No. This book had redeemable qualities. It was highly readable with its journalistic style. It offered interesting insight into cabinet members and diplomats that are often overlooked for the greater personalities in the WWII conflict. And it is a book I feel needs to be written. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the subsequent cooperation between two ideological enemies is an area little explored and overlooked even in this crowded genre of historical non-fiction. All in all, I would hesitate to recommend this book. It is a serviceable historical non-fiction book, but offers little that is new, fresh or exciting. The content is interesting but shallow. The sourcing is poorly done... There are many more interesting books, and many better books that document Soviet or Nazi atrocities. In a crowded genre, this one can probably be skipped.
August 26, 2014
The Devil’s Alliance – Forgotten by Many but not the Few
On 23rd August 1939 in the presence of Stalin his Foreign Minister Molotov signed a pact with the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and at the same time carved up the future of Eastern Europe between them. When I was taught history at school the pact was nothing more than a footnote in history quickly glossed over and forgotten.
As one of the Polish Diaspora my family was deeply affected by this pact even more so the 17th September 1939 when the Red Army crossed the Polish Border on the same day the Polish government had to escape via Romania in to exile. My grandfather was captured by the Nazis that day (he managed to escape and fight in France 1940 and on into Britain), my great Grandmother saw her husband for the last time that day, he was a police officer, she later found that other families were murdered at Katyn. 13th April 1940 she was arrested at 2am by the NKVD for having a husband who was a Police Officer and a son as a Polish Soldier was an enemy combatant. She was transported by the NKVD on a cattle truck, before the Nazis had used them in the Holocaust, along with thousands of other Polish enemies of the state to hard labour camps. 75% of her fellow Poles on that Journey did not survive the transportation. She was released in 1946 and was not allowed to return home to Skałat but was sent to Krakow to make her home, minus her now exiled son & nephew, her murdered brothers and her missing husband. Like many Polish families we lost more via the Russians than the damage of the German war effort brought to Poland.
Over the years I have heard so many excuses by so many Historians that Stalin made the pact so that he could make sure the Soviet Union was ready for war. Poppycock and in the Devil’s Alliance Roger Moorhouse shines a light on this dark episode of history and debunks a lot of the Soviet and their western communist supporters lies, which continue to this day. Moorhouse has already had this excellent piece of work attacked by various left wing historians. For them the lie continues and while they espouse their trash it will continue.
As Moorhouse notes in The Devil’s Alliance both Hitler and Stalin were form the same totalitarian feather and that even though they may have seemed different they were a lot closer in character of leadership than they would ever admit. Behind the spin of the apologists Moorhouse notes that Nazi and Soviet regimes during the life of this pact worked closely and traded secrets and blueprints, technology as well as raw materials. One just has to point out the oil wells in Ukraine as an example.
As The Devil’s Alliance reminds us the pact facilitated the invasion of Poland and during the later stages of that invasion the Nazis were wondering when the Soviets would enter to split the Polish Army. The Pact also has had a long lasting effect on the map of Europe as many of the borders there still remain, for Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and large swathes of Eastern Central Europe.
It is right and correct that Roger Moorhouse shines a light in this long forgotten by many episode of history. For those who do not know what really went on at that time really need to have a good read of Chapter 6 “Oiling the Wheels of War” which is an very illuminating chapter that in my case annoyed me at the closeness of the Alliance greasing those wheels of war. While Britain and France were dealing with the phoney war things were quite different in the East.
The Devil’s Alliance is a well written well researched history that has been crying out to be revealed to those in the west and this book does that. Roger Moorhouse has had access to some brilliant primary source material as well as an excellent bibliography. This is a book for all those who are bored of all the rehashed stories of the period and introduces them to the forgotten pact and the tragedy that it brought to Eastern Europe who for many the war did not end until 1989.
Brilliant read buy it borrow it and tell people about this book as it deserves a wide audience.
On 23rd August 1939 in the presence of Stalin his Foreign Minister Molotov signed a pact with the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and at the same time carved up the future of Eastern Europe between them. When I was taught history at school the pact was nothing more than a footnote in history quickly glossed over and forgotten.
As one of the Polish Diaspora my family was deeply affected by this pact even more so the 17th September 1939 when the Red Army crossed the Polish Border on the same day the Polish government had to escape via Romania in to exile. My grandfather was captured by the Nazis that day (he managed to escape and fight in France 1940 and on into Britain), my great Grandmother saw her husband for the last time that day, he was a police officer, she later found that other families were murdered at Katyn. 13th April 1940 she was arrested at 2am by the NKVD for having a husband who was a Police Officer and a son as a Polish Soldier was an enemy combatant. She was transported by the NKVD on a cattle truck, before the Nazis had used them in the Holocaust, along with thousands of other Polish enemies of the state to hard labour camps. 75% of her fellow Poles on that Journey did not survive the transportation. She was released in 1946 and was not allowed to return home to Skałat but was sent to Krakow to make her home, minus her now exiled son & nephew, her murdered brothers and her missing husband. Like many Polish families we lost more via the Russians than the damage of the German war effort brought to Poland.
Over the years I have heard so many excuses by so many Historians that Stalin made the pact so that he could make sure the Soviet Union was ready for war. Poppycock and in the Devil’s Alliance Roger Moorhouse shines a light on this dark episode of history and debunks a lot of the Soviet and their western communist supporters lies, which continue to this day. Moorhouse has already had this excellent piece of work attacked by various left wing historians. For them the lie continues and while they espouse their trash it will continue.
As Moorhouse notes in The Devil’s Alliance both Hitler and Stalin were form the same totalitarian feather and that even though they may have seemed different they were a lot closer in character of leadership than they would ever admit. Behind the spin of the apologists Moorhouse notes that Nazi and Soviet regimes during the life of this pact worked closely and traded secrets and blueprints, technology as well as raw materials. One just has to point out the oil wells in Ukraine as an example.
As The Devil’s Alliance reminds us the pact facilitated the invasion of Poland and during the later stages of that invasion the Nazis were wondering when the Soviets would enter to split the Polish Army. The Pact also has had a long lasting effect on the map of Europe as many of the borders there still remain, for Poland, the Baltic States, Finland and large swathes of Eastern Central Europe.
It is right and correct that Roger Moorhouse shines a light in this long forgotten by many episode of history. For those who do not know what really went on at that time really need to have a good read of Chapter 6 “Oiling the Wheels of War” which is an very illuminating chapter that in my case annoyed me at the closeness of the Alliance greasing those wheels of war. While Britain and France were dealing with the phoney war things were quite different in the East.
The Devil’s Alliance is a well written well researched history that has been crying out to be revealed to those in the west and this book does that. Roger Moorhouse has had access to some brilliant primary source material as well as an excellent bibliography. This is a book for all those who are bored of all the rehashed stories of the period and introduces them to the forgotten pact and the tragedy that it brought to Eastern Europe who for many the war did not end until 1989.
Brilliant read buy it borrow it and tell people about this book as it deserves a wide audience.
May 16, 2018
A less than perfect study of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. The economical dimension is most interesting, but discussed with less interest than the chronicle of mutually comitted mass atrocities. These ride the tailcoats of Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin and would benefit from a little Eastern European antropology as Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen have done for German society. The final chapter covering the first week of Operation Barbarossa feels padded, making the book as a whole fall short.
On the other hand, the interpretation of the pact's significance by Stalin, Hitler, Churchill and their peoples is well done throughout, with attention to details like British plans for bombing the Ploesti oilfields (making use of the recent The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945) and a lively use of eyewitness accounts for such occassions as Molotov's autumn 1940 visit to Berlin.
There is room for a collection of thematic chapters on this subject running to a few hundred pages more.
On the other hand, the interpretation of the pact's significance by Stalin, Hitler, Churchill and their peoples is well done throughout, with attention to details like British plans for bombing the Ploesti oilfields (making use of the recent The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945) and a lively use of eyewitness accounts for such occassions as Molotov's autumn 1940 visit to Berlin.
There is room for a collection of thematic chapters on this subject running to a few hundred pages more.
August 3, 2025
Актуален и умерен преглед на един от най-спорните периоди в историята на ХХ век - август 1939 - юни 1941 г., или годините на пакта "Рибентроп-Молотов". От доста време и особено след отварянето (за малко) на съветските архиви историците в свободните държави (там, където няма специални държавни комисии, които да утвърждават историческата истина) се опитват да оценят трезво сложните и политически неудобни за мнозина месеци на "приятелство" между Хитлер и Сталин.
Позицията на Мурхауз стои еднакво далеч както от "Ледоразбивачът" на Суворов, така и от разните противоложни по знак метаморфози на тезата за "Сталин-миротвореца", поддържани от официалната съветско-руска историография. И днес по конференции и публични лекции, дори у нас, може да наблюдавате историци, познавачи и общественици как се хващат за гушите, щом се повдигне въпросът за това готвил ли се е Сталин да нападне Хитлер преди самият той да стори това, изпреварвайки го. Мурхауз, осланяйки се на наличните към момента данни и изследвнаия, по-скоро клони към виждането, че и двамата диктатори извличат облаги от пакта от 1939 г., макар и в по-дългосрочен план да разглеждат челния сблъсък помежду си като неизбежен. Хитлер, воден от смесица от идеологически предубеждения и геополитически доктрини, изпреварва събитията и атакува, преди да е приключил войната си на Запад, решение, което в крайна сметка се оказва грешно. Дали и кога Сталин се е готвил да нападне е трудно да се докаже. Архивните материали отново не са достъпни, а публичните сведения (спомени, речи, прокламации, статии във вестници и др.) могат да се тълкуват и в двете посоки.
Това, което обаче остава скрито зад сянката на спорове от типа "кой-кого" и "кога" е трябвало да нападне, е сравнително успешното икономическо и донякъде външнополитическо сътрудничество (предвид идеологическия багаж) между Третия райх и СССР поне до есента 1940 г. Разпределянето на сферите на влияние на Балканите ще се окаже големия препъни камък в отношенията между двете граничещи сили. Почти до самия 22 юни обаче влаковете със суровини и техника пътуват ежедневно в двете посоки, а Полша и Прибалтика са разделени чинно според постигнатите преди това договорености. Съюзът е неудобен от идеологическа гледна точка, но Гьобелс и съветските му колеги-пропагандисти са заставени да спрат с враждебната реторика. Много неудобен се оказва съюзът и за Коминтерна, начело с Димитров, който се вижда принуден да обвини за войната от 1939 г. Англия, Франция и самата Полша!
Именно този сравнително ползотворен ход на отношенията между Третия райх и СССР след Пакта "Рибентроп - Молотов" не стои добре в съветската и днешната руска историографии. Как да признаеш, че си бил съюзник, макар и за кратко, с демонизирания от теб (преди 1939 и след 1941 г.) нацистски дявол? Днес този въпрос отново е по-скоро политически, отколкото историографски. Прозорецът, отворен от Борис Елцин, отдавна е затръшнат, а архивите - засекретени или пък направо прочистени.
На български имаме достъпен 5-томен труд, посветен на темата, от вече покойния проф. Пламен Цветков, който съм започнал, но все още не бих могъл да коментирам.
Позицията на Мурхауз стои еднакво далеч както от "Ледоразбивачът" на Суворов, така и от разните противоложни по знак метаморфози на тезата за "Сталин-миротвореца", поддържани от официалната съветско-руска историография. И днес по конференции и публични лекции, дори у нас, може да наблюдавате историци, познавачи и общественици как се хващат за гушите, щом се повдигне въпросът за това готвил ли се е Сталин да нападне Хитлер преди самият той да стори това, изпреварвайки го. Мурхауз, осланяйки се на наличните към момента данни и изследвнаия, по-скоро клони към виждането, че и двамата диктатори извличат облаги от пакта от 1939 г., макар и в по-дългосрочен план да разглеждат челния сблъсък помежду си като неизбежен. Хитлер, воден от смесица от идеологически предубеждения и геополитически доктрини, изпреварва събитията и атакува, преди да е приключил войната си на Запад, решение, което в крайна сметка се оказва грешно. Дали и кога Сталин се е готвил да нападне е трудно да се докаже. Архивните материали отново не са достъпни, а публичните сведения (спомени, речи, прокламации, статии във вестници и др.) могат да се тълкуват и в двете посоки.
Това, което обаче остава скрито зад сянката на спорове от типа "кой-кого" и "кога" е трябвало да нападне, е сравнително успешното икономическо и донякъде външнополитическо сътрудничество (предвид идеологическия багаж) между Третия райх и СССР поне до есента 1940 г. Разпределянето на сферите на влияние на Балканите ще се окаже големия препъни камък в отношенията между двете граничещи сили. Почти до самия 22 юни обаче влаковете със суровини и техника пътуват ежедневно в двете посоки, а Полша и Прибалтика са разделени чинно според постигнатите преди това договорености. Съюзът е неудобен от идеологическа гледна точка, но Гьобелс и съветските му колеги-пропагандисти са заставени да спрат с враждебната реторика. Много неудобен се оказва съюзът и за Коминтерна, начело с Димитров, който се вижда принуден да обвини за войната от 1939 г. Англия, Франция и самата Полша!
Именно този сравнително ползотворен ход на отношенията между Третия райх и СССР след Пакта "Рибентроп - Молотов" не стои добре в съветската и днешната руска историографии. Как да признаеш, че си бил съюзник, макар и за кратко, с демонизирания от теб (преди 1939 и след 1941 г.) нацистски дявол? Днес този въпрос отново е по-скоро политически, отколкото историографски. Прозорецът, отворен от Борис Елцин, отдавна е затръшнат, а архивите - засекретени или пък направо прочистени.
На български имаме достъпен 5-томен труд, посветен на темата, от вече покойния проф. Пламен Цветков, който съм започнал, но все още не бих могъл да коментирам.
August 31, 2020
A very detailed history on an important, but underappreciated, era during WWII. Mr. Moorhouse details the two years when the Nazi's and Soviets were "allies" in a way that makes the partnership come to life and gives a better picture of what was happening in Eastern Europe between 1939 and 1941. A superb piece of history.
October 18, 2014
Excellent, one of the best books I've read this year. Essential for anyone with an interest in WW2 and post-WW2 history and politics. Can't recommend highly enough.
May 15, 2021
L'objet de cet ouvrage est l'alliance entre l'URSS de Staline et l'Allemagne nationale-socialiste d'Adolphe Hitler, dont firent les frais plusieurs pays de la mer Baltique et de la mer Noire, qui fut la cause du déclanchement de la seconde guerre mondiale, et qui se termina par l'attaque de l'Allemagne contre l'ancien allié devenu voisin.
J'ai été surpris, et même un peu inquiet par le début de l'ouvrage, quand l'auteur prend son lecteur pour un ignorant à qui il va découvrir un pacte secret dont il n'a certainement jamais entendu parler. En France en tout cas, la seconde guerre mondiale est enseignée, et il ne me semble pas que le pacte germanosoviétique soit censuré. Il me semblerait également encore plus loufoque qu'il soit passé sous silence outre-Manche, alors même que l'histoire de ce conflit est là-bas une véritable passion nationale. Fort heureusement, ces premières ombres s'estompent par la suite, et l'auteur s'explique à la fin l'ouvrage de ce prolégomène étrange en exposant tout la tradition qui a minimisé l'importance de ce pacte.
Globalement, l'ouvrage est agréable à lire et plutôt instructif, non seulement par la présence de tableaux vivants de rencontres entre les protagonistes importants de ce drame, mais aussi par l'exposé des relations commerciales, scientifiques et politiques entretenues par les deux puissances, et les tracasseries qu'elles s'infligeaient mutuellement. Il est édifiant de constater que l'Allemagne et la Russie se sont littéralement armées l'une contre l'autre. Les impacts en Angleterre du développement de ces relations sur la vie politique intérieur son également piquants, les cajoleries des deux dictateurs obligeant certains sympathisants communistes à d'intéressantes palinodies.
Pour autant, le livre n'est pas sans défauts : j'aurais aimé par exemple qu'il s'étende un peu plus sur la politique de Litvinov, le prédécesseur de Molotov, et qu'il approfondisse un peu plus l'histoire des relations germanosoviétiques lesquelles remontent au voyage en train plombé de Lénine, mais cela aurait peut-être trop débordé de l'objet principal de l'ouvrage qui est de montrer - comme si c'était nécessaire - que l'URSS de Staline n'est pas exempt de reproches.
J'ai été surpris, et même un peu inquiet par le début de l'ouvrage, quand l'auteur prend son lecteur pour un ignorant à qui il va découvrir un pacte secret dont il n'a certainement jamais entendu parler. En France en tout cas, la seconde guerre mondiale est enseignée, et il ne me semble pas que le pacte germanosoviétique soit censuré. Il me semblerait également encore plus loufoque qu'il soit passé sous silence outre-Manche, alors même que l'histoire de ce conflit est là-bas une véritable passion nationale. Fort heureusement, ces premières ombres s'estompent par la suite, et l'auteur s'explique à la fin l'ouvrage de ce prolégomène étrange en exposant tout la tradition qui a minimisé l'importance de ce pacte.
Globalement, l'ouvrage est agréable à lire et plutôt instructif, non seulement par la présence de tableaux vivants de rencontres entre les protagonistes importants de ce drame, mais aussi par l'exposé des relations commerciales, scientifiques et politiques entretenues par les deux puissances, et les tracasseries qu'elles s'infligeaient mutuellement. Il est édifiant de constater que l'Allemagne et la Russie se sont littéralement armées l'une contre l'autre. Les impacts en Angleterre du développement de ces relations sur la vie politique intérieur son également piquants, les cajoleries des deux dictateurs obligeant certains sympathisants communistes à d'intéressantes palinodies.
Pour autant, le livre n'est pas sans défauts : j'aurais aimé par exemple qu'il s'étende un peu plus sur la politique de Litvinov, le prédécesseur de Molotov, et qu'il approfondisse un peu plus l'histoire des relations germanosoviétiques lesquelles remontent au voyage en train plombé de Lénine, mais cela aurait peut-être trop débordé de l'objet principal de l'ouvrage qui est de montrer - comme si c'était nécessaire - que l'URSS de Staline n'est pas exempt de reproches.
March 29, 2016
I saw the author give a talk on the book which provided a great introduction to the Nazi-Soviet pact (non-aggression treaty) that lasted for 22 months from 23-AUG-1939 until Operation Barbarossa (Germany's codename for the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22-JUN-1941).
It is incredibly researched and detailed going over why and how it came about. Stalin was really looking for Hitler to attack the capitalist west including England. The Germans had a shortage of raw materials which Russia had a lot of. Economics was the key. Germany even provided hardware to the Russians.
Then there was the invasion of Poland. First by the Germans on 01-SEP-1939 and then the Russians on 17-SEP-1939. Poland was then shared with Germany owning the west and Russia the east. Hitler and Stalin would never meet.
If you have any interest in the Second World War then this book is for you.
It is incredibly researched and detailed going over why and how it came about. Stalin was really looking for Hitler to attack the capitalist west including England. The Germans had a shortage of raw materials which Russia had a lot of. Economics was the key. Germany even provided hardware to the Russians.
Then there was the invasion of Poland. First by the Germans on 01-SEP-1939 and then the Russians on 17-SEP-1939. Poland was then shared with Germany owning the west and Russia the east. Hitler and Stalin would never meet.
If you have any interest in the Second World War then this book is for you.
December 27, 2020
A good account of what was happening during the years when WWII was raging already, but the 'Great Patriotic War' had not yet begun, before 22 June 1941; for us growing up in the Soviet Union, that was the beginning of the war; we knew very little of the joint Hitler-Stalin effort to subdue various European zones and work together. The book was translated into Russian and published this year, to much bickering and derision from the unbelievers — something that I personally find very hard to believe.
May 19, 2025
Moorhouse’s clear, concise, workmanlike study of a subject that will probably be superficially familiar to readers of WWII histories, often mentioned, but rarely explained or explicated to any significant degree.
Along the way the author busts myths, assumptions and commonly held beliefs concerning the pact between Hitler & Stalin (who incidentally never met in person). He also takes care to not repeat, retell or regurgitate what he knows his readers must already be familiar with.
The fact that Moorhouse covers a little known subject imbedded in an area of history that has been more written about than any other, ought not lead the prospective reader to believe that this is in any regard a specialist tome, or that any prior knowledge is required to get full benefit and enjoyment from reading or listening to the book.
Any reader who has a passing interest in the Second World War and related matters will find Roger Moorhouse’s valuable contribution to the literature most interesting and well worth his attention.
Along the way the author busts myths, assumptions and commonly held beliefs concerning the pact between Hitler & Stalin (who incidentally never met in person). He also takes care to not repeat, retell or regurgitate what he knows his readers must already be familiar with.
The fact that Moorhouse covers a little known subject imbedded in an area of history that has been more written about than any other, ought not lead the prospective reader to believe that this is in any regard a specialist tome, or that any prior knowledge is required to get full benefit and enjoyment from reading or listening to the book.
Any reader who has a passing interest in the Second World War and related matters will find Roger Moorhouse’s valuable contribution to the literature most interesting and well worth his attention.
August 9, 2022
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Вы никогда не спрашивали себя, почему в России принято такое понятие как «Великая Отечественная Война»? Почему Россия не примет общеупотребительное наименование – Вторая Мировая Война? В чём причина, что Россия отделяет себя от всех остальных стран? Для России/СССР была какая-то особая, своя война в тот период? Я думаю, да, у России/СССР была своя война, почти никак не пересекающаяся с той войной, которую вели страны антигитлеровской коалиции. Именно поэтому в России намеренно создаётся ощущение, что с Гитлером воевал только СССР и только он один является победителем в этой войне. Все остальные страны, играли крайне незначительную роль. Можно сказать, они лишь имитировали военную деятельность, в то время как СССР вёл реальную войну. Именно такое ощущение складывается, если посмотреть, что показывает российское государственное телевидение и что говорят высшие руководители нынешней России, особенно на 9 мая.
Когда-то очень давно, когда я заканчивал школу, я сказал своим изумлённым одноклассникам, что не признаю Великую Отечественную Войну, т.е. что лично для меня существует только Первая Мировая война и Вторая Мировая война. Никакой Великой Отечественной не существует в моём представлении. С этой позицией я остаюсь и поныне. Написал же я такое большое введение к рецензии только по тому, что как мне кажется, причиной, почему в России существует Великая Отечественная, но не существует Второй Мировой, основывается именно на тех событиях, о чём повествует книга. Ведь если Россия признает, что на самом деле существует только Вторая Мировая Война, то, как ей объяснить собственному населению, что с 1939 по 1941 гг., СССР был союзником Гитлера? Да, можно сказать, что это была «великая сталинская стратегия» и что-то подобное, но проблема состоит в том, что никакая отговорка, никакая версия не сработает, ибо благодаря Интернету у людей появилась возможность проверить, что же произошло на самом деле. А произошло в первые дни войны гитлеровской Германии с СССР, вот что: Красная Армия была смята в считанные дни, враг с лёгкостью захватывал город за городом и, как писали многие политики и дипломаты на Западе, падение Москвы было неизбежно. Если бы Сталин пошёл на этот пакт только чтобы оттянуть время нападения на СССР, то он бы явно позаботился об обороне, он воздвиг бы за это время мощнейшие сооружения и в целом подготовился к войне. Другими словами, Красная Армия не терпела бы настолько сильные поражения. Вам скажет любой человек, который хоть немного занимается военной стратегией, что для обороны нужно МЕНЬШЕ людей, чем для нападения. У СССР были, в связи с этим, реальные преимущества. И как СССР в 1941 году им воспользовался? Ответ можно узнать также из этой книги в самых последних главах.
Да, автор пишет, что этот пакт повлиял и на гитлеровскую Германию и на СССР, в том смысле, что СССР получил станки и военное оборудование, которое позволило СССР переломить ход войны, когда в бой пустили танки Т-34, которые были собраны благодаря немецким станкам (или что-то типа этого). Что касается гитлеровской Германии, то ни нефть, поступающая из СССР ни пищевая продукция, не стали таким ключевым фактором, каким стало военное оборудование, поставляемое из Германии в СССР, согласно заключённому пакту. Так что, исходя из книги, можно сделать вывод, что пакт мог сыграть роль в разгроме гитлеровской армии. Мог, но по факту, не стал таким. Как я написал, проблема первых дней войны хорошо показывает, что Сталин, по существу, проспал войну. И если вы прочитаете книгу, вы поймёте, что главным лузером, неудачником всей книги, по мнению автора, является не советское правительство, не коммунисты СССР и не высшая советская верхушка, которая видела все приготовления Гитлера к войне с СССР и которая постоянно докладывала Сталину о готовящейся войне. Главной причиной, главным лузером, главным неудачником, который проспал всё, является только один единственный человек - Сталин. Именно благодаря Сталину СССР настолько сильно пострадал от этой войны, именно благодаря Сталину Красная Армия была бита в первые дни войны 1941 года и только на Сталина нужно возложить все неудачи и все провалы, связанные с войной, ибо это он отказывался верить в предстоящую войну. Другими словами, именно благодаря Сталину эта война и случилась. Я более чем уверен, и книга это подтверждает, что если бы у руля страны стоял любой другой человек, никакой Второй Мировой войны просто НЕ СЛУЧИЛОСЬ БЫ. Думаю, не я один кто сделает такой вывод, прочтя эту книгу, ибо никакой другой вывод, помимо этого, сделать и не возможно.
Я не буду перечислять все те отвратительные и кровавые вещи, что творили гитлеровский и сталинский режим на оккупированных территориях согласно подписанному пакту, ибо это было и отвратительно и об этом знают и так все, кто хоть немного читал по поводу Второй Мировой войны. Тут не может быть НИКАКИХ оправданий. И лично меня мало волнует, что там делали немцы, ибо для этого есть нынешнее немецкое общество, которое уже дало свою оценку происходившим событиям. Меня волнует, что в нынешней России эту резню, которую организовал СССР, воспринимают как нечто нормально. Это, безусловно, позор моей страны и позор моего народа, который останется с ним навсегда.
Have you ever asked yourself why Russia adopts such a concept as "The Great Patriotic War"? Why doesn't Russia adopt the common name, World War II? What is the reason Russia separates itself from all other countries? Was there some special, different war for Russia/USSR in that period? I think, yes, Russia/USSR had its own war, almost no overlap with the war fought by the anti-Hitler coalition countries. That's why in Russia there is a deliberate perception that only USSR fought against Hitler and that they alone were the victors in this war. All other countries played an extremely insignificant role. We can say they only imitated military activity while the Soviet Union fought a real war. This is exactly the feeling one gets if one looks at what Russian state television shows and what the top leaders of today's Russia say, especially on May 9.
A long time ago, when I was finishing school, I told my astonished classmates that I did not recognize the Great Patriotic War, that is, that for me, there was only World War I and World War II. No Great Patriotic War exists in my mind. This is the position I maintain to this day. I wrote such a large introduction to the review only because it seems to me the reason why the Great Patriotic War exists in Russia, but not World War II is based on the events the book describes. After all, if Russia admits that only World War II actually exists, how can it explain to its own population that from 1939 to 1941, the USSR was Hitler's ally? Yes, you can say that it was "the great Stalinist strategy" or something like that, but the problem is that any excuse, any version will not work because, thanks to the Internet, people have the opportunity to check what really happened. And what happened in the early days of Hitler's Germany's war with the Soviet Union is this: The Red Army was crushed in a matter of days, the enemy easily captured city after city, and, as many politicians and diplomats in the West wrote, the fall of Moscow was inevitable. If Stalin had accepted this pact only to delay the attack on the USSR, he would clearly have taken care of the defense; he would have erected in the meantime the most powerful structures and generally prepared for war. In other words, the Red Army would not have suffered such severe defeats. Anyone with even a modicum of military strategy will tell you that it takes fewer men to defend than it does to attack. The USSR had, in this regard, real advantages, and how did the USSR take advantage of it in 1941? The answer can also be found in the very last chapters of this book.
Yes, the author writes that this pact influenced both Hitler's Germany and the USSR, in the sense that the USSR received machine tools and military equipment, which allowed the USSR to turn the tide of the war, when T-34 tanks, which were assembled thanks to German machine tools (or something like that), were put into combat. As for Hitler's Germany, neither oil coming from the USSR nor food products were such a key factor as the military equipment supplied from Germany to the USSR under the pact. So, based on the book, we can conclude that the pact could have played a role in the defeat of Hitler's army. It could have, but in fact, it did not. As I wrote, the problem of the first days of the war shows well that Stalin essentially slept through the war. And if you read the book, you will realize that the main loser, the loser of the whole book, according to the author, is not the Soviet government, not the Communists of the USSR, and not the higher Soviet top brass, who saw all Hitler's preparations for war with the USSR and who constantly reported to Stalin about the impending war. The main reason, the main loser, the main loser who overslept everything, is only one man - Stalin. It is thanks to Stalin that the USSR suffered so much from this war, it is thanks to Stalin that the Red Army was beaten in the first days of the war in 1941 and only Stalin should be blamed for all the failures and failures associated with the war because it was he who refused to believe in the coming war. In other words, it was thanks to Stalin that this war happened. I am more than sure, and the book confirms it, that if any other man had been at the helm of the country, no World War II would HAVE happened. I think I am not the only one who will draw such a conclusion after reading this book because it is impossible to draw any other conclusion than that.
I will not list all the disgusting and bloody things Hitler and Stalin's regime did in the occupied territories according to the signed pact, because it was disgusting, and everyone who has read at least a little bit about World War II knows that. There can be NO excuses. And personally, I don't care much about what the Germans did there because there is the current German society, which has already given its assessment of the events that took place. What worries me is that in present-day Russia this massacre, which was organized by the USSR, is perceived as something normal. It is certainly a disgrace to my country and a disgrace to my people that will remain with them forever.
Вы никогда не спрашивали себя, почему в России принято такое понятие как «Великая Отечественная Война»? Почему Россия не примет общеупотребительное наименование – Вторая Мировая Война? В чём причина, что Россия отделяет себя от всех остальных стран? Для России/СССР была какая-то особая, своя война в тот период? Я думаю, да, у России/СССР была своя война, почти никак не пересекающаяся с той войной, которую вели страны антигитлеровской коалиции. Именно поэтому в России намеренно создаётся ощущение, что с Гитлером воевал только СССР и только он один является победителем в этой войне. Все остальные страны, играли крайне незначительную роль. Можно сказать, они лишь имитировали военную деятельность, в то время как СССР вёл реальную войну. Именно такое ощущение складывается, если посмотреть, что показывает российское государственное телевидение и что говорят высшие руководители нынешней России, особенно на 9 мая.
Когда-то очень давно, когда я заканчивал школу, я сказал своим изумлённым одноклассникам, что не признаю Великую Отечественную Войну, т.е. что лично для меня существует только Первая Мировая война и Вторая Мировая война. Никакой Великой Отечественной не существует в моём представлении. С этой позицией я остаюсь и поныне. Написал же я такое большое введение к рецензии только по тому, что как мне кажется, причиной, почему в России существует Великая Отечественная, но не существует Второй Мировой, основывается именно на тех событиях, о чём повествует книга. Ведь если Россия признает, что на самом деле существует только Вторая Мировая Война, то, как ей объяснить собственному населению, что с 1939 по 1941 гг., СССР был союзником Гитлера? Да, можно сказать, что это была «великая сталинская стратегия» и что-то подобное, но проблема состоит в том, что никакая отговорка, никакая версия не сработает, ибо благодаря Интернету у людей появилась возможность проверить, что же произошло на самом деле. А произошло в первые дни войны гитлеровской Германии с СССР, вот что: Красная Армия была смята в считанные дни, враг с лёгкостью захватывал город за городом и, как писали многие политики и дипломаты на Западе, падение Москвы было неизбежно. Если бы Сталин пошёл на этот пакт только чтобы оттянуть время нападения на СССР, то он бы явно позаботился об обороне, он воздвиг бы за это время мощнейшие сооружения и в целом подготовился к войне. Другими словами, Красная Армия не терпела бы настолько сильные поражения. Вам скажет любой человек, который хоть немного занимается военной стратегией, что для обороны нужно МЕНЬШЕ людей, чем для нападения. У СССР были, в связи с этим, реальные преимущества. И как СССР в 1941 году им воспользовался? Ответ можно узнать также из этой книги в самых последних главах.
Да, автор пишет, что этот пакт повлиял и на гитлеровскую Германию и на СССР, в том смысле, что СССР получил станки и военное оборудование, которое позволило СССР переломить ход войны, когда в бой пустили танки Т-34, которые были собраны благодаря немецким станкам (или что-то типа этого). Что касается гитлеровской Германии, то ни нефть, поступающая из СССР ни пищевая продукция, не стали таким ключевым фактором, каким стало военное оборудование, поставляемое из Германии в СССР, согласно заключённому пакту. Так что, исходя из книги, можно сделать вывод, что пакт мог сыграть роль в разгроме гитлеровской армии. Мог, но по факту, не стал таким. Как я написал, проблема первых дней войны хорошо показывает, что Сталин, по существу, проспал войну. И если вы прочитаете книгу, вы поймёте, что главным лузером, неудачником всей книги, по мнению автора, является не советское правительство, не коммунисты СССР и не высшая советская верхушка, которая видела все приготовления Гитлера к войне с СССР и которая постоянно докладывала Сталину о готовящейся войне. Главной причиной, главным лузером, главным неудачником, который проспал всё, является только один единственный человек - Сталин. Именно благодаря Сталину СССР настолько сильно пострадал от этой войны, именно благодаря Сталину Красная Армия была бита в первые дни войны 1941 года и только на Сталина нужно возложить все неудачи и все провалы, связанные с войной, ибо это он отказывался верить в предстоящую войну. Другими словами, именно благодаря Сталину эта война и случилась. Я более чем уверен, и книга это подтверждает, что если бы у руля страны стоял любой другой человек, никакой Второй Мировой войны просто НЕ СЛУЧИЛОСЬ БЫ. Думаю, не я один кто сделает такой вывод, прочтя эту книгу, ибо никакой другой вывод, помимо этого, сделать и не возможно.
Я не буду перечислять все те отвратительные и кровавые вещи, что творили гитлеровский и сталинский режим на оккупированных территориях согласно подписанному пакту, ибо это было и отвратительно и об этом знают и так все, кто хоть немного читал по поводу Второй Мировой войны. Тут не может быть НИКАКИХ оправданий. И лично меня мало волнует, что там делали немцы, ибо для этого есть нынешнее немецкое общество, которое уже дало свою оценку происходившим событиям. Меня волнует, что в нынешней России эту резню, которую организовал СССР, воспринимают как нечто нормально. Это, безусловно, позор моей страны и позор моего народа, который останется с ним навсегда.
Have you ever asked yourself why Russia adopts such a concept as "The Great Patriotic War"? Why doesn't Russia adopt the common name, World War II? What is the reason Russia separates itself from all other countries? Was there some special, different war for Russia/USSR in that period? I think, yes, Russia/USSR had its own war, almost no overlap with the war fought by the anti-Hitler coalition countries. That's why in Russia there is a deliberate perception that only USSR fought against Hitler and that they alone were the victors in this war. All other countries played an extremely insignificant role. We can say they only imitated military activity while the Soviet Union fought a real war. This is exactly the feeling one gets if one looks at what Russian state television shows and what the top leaders of today's Russia say, especially on May 9.
A long time ago, when I was finishing school, I told my astonished classmates that I did not recognize the Great Patriotic War, that is, that for me, there was only World War I and World War II. No Great Patriotic War exists in my mind. This is the position I maintain to this day. I wrote such a large introduction to the review only because it seems to me the reason why the Great Patriotic War exists in Russia, but not World War II is based on the events the book describes. After all, if Russia admits that only World War II actually exists, how can it explain to its own population that from 1939 to 1941, the USSR was Hitler's ally? Yes, you can say that it was "the great Stalinist strategy" or something like that, but the problem is that any excuse, any version will not work because, thanks to the Internet, people have the opportunity to check what really happened. And what happened in the early days of Hitler's Germany's war with the Soviet Union is this: The Red Army was crushed in a matter of days, the enemy easily captured city after city, and, as many politicians and diplomats in the West wrote, the fall of Moscow was inevitable. If Stalin had accepted this pact only to delay the attack on the USSR, he would clearly have taken care of the defense; he would have erected in the meantime the most powerful structures and generally prepared for war. In other words, the Red Army would not have suffered such severe defeats. Anyone with even a modicum of military strategy will tell you that it takes fewer men to defend than it does to attack. The USSR had, in this regard, real advantages, and how did the USSR take advantage of it in 1941? The answer can also be found in the very last chapters of this book.
Yes, the author writes that this pact influenced both Hitler's Germany and the USSR, in the sense that the USSR received machine tools and military equipment, which allowed the USSR to turn the tide of the war, when T-34 tanks, which were assembled thanks to German machine tools (or something like that), were put into combat. As for Hitler's Germany, neither oil coming from the USSR nor food products were such a key factor as the military equipment supplied from Germany to the USSR under the pact. So, based on the book, we can conclude that the pact could have played a role in the defeat of Hitler's army. It could have, but in fact, it did not. As I wrote, the problem of the first days of the war shows well that Stalin essentially slept through the war. And if you read the book, you will realize that the main loser, the loser of the whole book, according to the author, is not the Soviet government, not the Communists of the USSR, and not the higher Soviet top brass, who saw all Hitler's preparations for war with the USSR and who constantly reported to Stalin about the impending war. The main reason, the main loser, the main loser who overslept everything, is only one man - Stalin. It is thanks to Stalin that the USSR suffered so much from this war, it is thanks to Stalin that the Red Army was beaten in the first days of the war in 1941 and only Stalin should be blamed for all the failures and failures associated with the war because it was he who refused to believe in the coming war. In other words, it was thanks to Stalin that this war happened. I am more than sure, and the book confirms it, that if any other man had been at the helm of the country, no World War II would HAVE happened. I think I am not the only one who will draw such a conclusion after reading this book because it is impossible to draw any other conclusion than that.
I will not list all the disgusting and bloody things Hitler and Stalin's regime did in the occupied territories according to the signed pact, because it was disgusting, and everyone who has read at least a little bit about World War II knows that. There can be NO excuses. And personally, I don't care much about what the Germans did there because there is the current German society, which has already given its assessment of the events that took place. What worries me is that in present-day Russia this massacre, which was organized by the USSR, is perceived as something normal. It is certainly a disgrace to my country and a disgrace to my people that will remain with them forever.
June 16, 2021
Цитаты из книги:
"Пакт с Гитлером оставил несмываемое пятно на мировом коммунизме – вроде тех, какими его еще запачкают советское вторжение в Венгрию в 1956 году и подавление Пражской весны в 1968-м."
"в советских трудовых лагерях уровень смертности был выше, чем в гитлеровских концлагерях."
"если преступления Гитлера широко известны и хорошо задокументированы – их обсуждают в СМИ, изучают в школьных и университетских программах по всему миру, – то преступления Сталина едва ли являются частью общественного сознания. По сути, Гитлер и Сталин были птицами одного тоталитарного полета, и нацистско-советский пакт вовсе не был какой-то аномалией: скорее в нем можно усмотреть симптом человеконенавистничества, общего для обоих диктаторов."
"Шестьдесят дивизий, насчитывавших 2500 танков и больше миллиона солдат, начали наступать на территорию Польши из Силезии на юго-западе, из Померании на северо-западе и из Восточной Пруссии на севере. Немцы значительно превосходили поляков и бронетанковыми силами, и вооружением, потому на всех фронтах они быстро брали верх над противником."
"Согласно самому всеохватному исследованию, в одном только сентябре 1939 года немецкие военные казнили более двенадцати тысяч польских граждан"
"из приблизительно ста тысяч поляков, которых НКВД арестовал на территории оккупированной Польши за уголовные преступления; половину из них отправили в ГУЛАГ"
"Польше появилась мрачная шутка о том, что аббревиатура НКВД (по-польски NKWD) расшифровывается как Ne wiadomo Kiedy Wróce˛ do Domu («Неизвестно, Когда Вернусь Домой») "
"Всего в Катынской трагедии погибли такой смертью не менее 21 768 польских узников,"
"Красная армия по-прежнему переживала своего рода кризис. Она еще не оправилась от убийственных чисток, которым ее подвергли в середине 1930-х годов и в результате которых было потеряно более 85% командного состава, она страдала от плохого руководства, неправильного режима подготовки и низкого боевого духа."
"германо-советская торговля пережила в течение 1940 года мощный рост: советский экспорт в Германию за тот год оценивался приблизительно в 404 миллиона рейхсмарок, а германский экспорт в СССР – в 242 миллиона рейхсмарок. Если взглянуть на германскую торговую статистику за 1940 год, можно заметить, что во втором полугодии объем экспорта в Советский Союз составлял более 60% от общих ежемесячных показателей."
"Доля германского импорта составила 31% от совокупного импорта 1940 года, а в экспортной торговле произошел кратковременный резкий подъем: экспорт нефти удвоился, зерна – увеличился в пять раз, а совокупный объем экспорта вырос на 250%. В 1940 году почти 53% совокупного экспорта СССР предназначалось для нацистской Германии."
"обошлось Германии очень дорого – настолько дорого, что Гитлер даже запретил публиковать данные об отправке товаров в СССР"
"ответственность за массовое убийство в Катыни лежит именно на НКВД"
"Пакт с Гитлером оставил несмываемое пятно на мировом коммунизме – вроде тех, какими его еще запачкают советское вторжение в Венгрию в 1956 году и подавление Пражской весны в 1968-м."
"в советских трудовых лагерях уровень смертности был выше, чем в гитлеровских концлагерях."
"если преступления Гитлера широко известны и хорошо задокументированы – их обсуждают в СМИ, изучают в школьных и университетских программах по всему миру, – то преступления Сталина едва ли являются частью общественного сознания. По сути, Гитлер и Сталин были птицами одного тоталитарного полета, и нацистско-советский пакт вовсе не был какой-то аномалией: скорее в нем можно усмотреть симптом человеконенавистничества, общего для обоих диктаторов."
"Шестьдесят дивизий, насчитывавших 2500 танков и больше миллиона солдат, начали наступать на территорию Польши из Силезии на юго-западе, из Померании на северо-западе и из Восточной Пруссии на севере. Немцы значительно превосходили поляков и бронетанковыми силами, и вооружением, потому на всех фронтах они быстро брали верх над противником."
"Согласно самому всеохватному исследованию, в одном только сентябре 1939 года немецкие военные казнили более двенадцати тысяч польских граждан"
"из приблизительно ста тысяч поляков, которых НКВД арестовал на территории оккупированной Польши за уголовные преступления; половину из них отправили в ГУЛАГ"
"Польше появилась мрачная шутка о том, что аббревиатура НКВД (по-польски NKWD) расшифровывается как Ne wiadomo Kiedy Wróce˛ do Domu («Неизвестно, Когда Вернусь Домой») "
"Всего в Катынской трагедии погибли такой смертью не менее 21 768 польских узников,"
"Красная армия по-прежнему переживала своего рода кризис. Она еще не оправилась от убийственных чисток, которым ее подвергли в середине 1930-х годов и в результате которых было потеряно более 85% командного состава, она страдала от плохого руководства, неправильного режима подготовки и низкого боевого духа."
"германо-советская торговля пережила в течение 1940 года мощный рост: советский экспорт в Германию за тот год оценивался приблизительно в 404 миллиона рейхсмарок, а германский экспорт в СССР – в 242 миллиона рейхсмарок. Если взглянуть на германскую торговую статистику за 1940 год, можно заметить, что во втором полугодии объем экспорта в Советский Союз составлял более 60% от общих ежемесячных показателей."
"Доля германского импорта составила 31% от совокупного импорта 1940 года, а в экспортной торговле произошел кратковременный резкий подъем: экспорт нефти удвоился, зерна – увеличился в пять раз, а совокупный объем экспорта вырос на 250%. В 1940 году почти 53% совокупного экспорта СССР предназначалось для нацистской Германии."
"обошлось Германии очень дорого – настолько дорого, что Гитлер даже запретил публиковать данные об отправке товаров в СССР"
"ответственность за массовое убийство в Катыни лежит именно на НКВД"
May 14, 2025
This book examines the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, signed on August 23rd 1939, through a compelling and well-sourced narrative. The author presents the political backdrop to the agreement, the events during the 22 months it lasted, and the mosaic of reactions it triggered. He explores not only the pact’s content with its commercial cooperation and secret protocols but also how it was perceived and spun by both Nazi and Soviet regimes, their people, their propaganda machines, and the wider international community. Particularly striking is the exploration of the ideological gymnastics of communist parties around the world as they scrambled to align with Comintern instructions, shifting from anti-fascist to neutral, or even cooperative with the Nazis, while remaining officially anti-Western. The book brings to life a chapter of history that is usually mentioned only marginally and in passing, revealing its deeper significance with clarity and force.
Seeking to exploit Nazi aggression for his own ends, Stalin was not an unwilling or passive party. He was far more proactive. The Nazis and Soviets traded secrets, technologies, blueprints, and raw materials, each oiling the wheels of the other's war machine. One of the most striking features of the book is its emphasis on the chilling and remarkable symmetry between Nazi and Soviet actions in their respective occupied zones. Both engaged in mass deportations, though the Soviet deportations were far more extensive, displacing millions from Poland, the Baltics, and the Soviet-occupied parts of Romania, spreading them into the Soviet interior and tearing apart countless families. Both regimes systematically dismantled the political leadership of the Polish state as they carved it up and consumed it from both ends, committing widespread atrocities. The Soviets, for instance, were responsible for the Katyn Forest massacre, among other brutal campaigns. What stands out is how closely their behavior mirrored each other’s: the Nazis acted on racial ideology to eliminate those they perceived as racial enemies, while the Soviets targeted groups for the sake of liquidating their class enemies.
Early in the campaign both sides even cooperated, for example: sharing intelligence about Polish troop movements, coordinating the new borders..etc.
For 22 months, the two most infamous dictators of 20th-century Europe stood side by side (almost a third of the war's entire duration) dividing up Europe and demonstrating a grotesque symmetry in the process. The same pattern appeared later as the Soviets absorbed the Baltic states militarily, coinciding almost exactly with the Nazi blitz in the West. While German tanks rolled through Paris, Soviet tanks entered Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius.
The author presents the events with clarity and precision, laying them out in a compelling and accessible way. The book is deeply insightful, highly informative, and well balanced as it dispels common myths, ambiguities, and often misunderstood aspects surrounding the Nazi–Soviet Pact. I found within its pages a nuanced take on what is usually reduced to oversimplified narratives. I highly recommend this one, even to those who might not initially be interested, as I wasn’t at first. It turned out to be a thoroughly informative, thought-provoking, and compelling read.
Rating: 4/5
Seeking to exploit Nazi aggression for his own ends, Stalin was not an unwilling or passive party. He was far more proactive. The Nazis and Soviets traded secrets, technologies, blueprints, and raw materials, each oiling the wheels of the other's war machine. One of the most striking features of the book is its emphasis on the chilling and remarkable symmetry between Nazi and Soviet actions in their respective occupied zones. Both engaged in mass deportations, though the Soviet deportations were far more extensive, displacing millions from Poland, the Baltics, and the Soviet-occupied parts of Romania, spreading them into the Soviet interior and tearing apart countless families. Both regimes systematically dismantled the political leadership of the Polish state as they carved it up and consumed it from both ends, committing widespread atrocities. The Soviets, for instance, were responsible for the Katyn Forest massacre, among other brutal campaigns. What stands out is how closely their behavior mirrored each other’s: the Nazis acted on racial ideology to eliminate those they perceived as racial enemies, while the Soviets targeted groups for the sake of liquidating their class enemies.
Early in the campaign both sides even cooperated, for example: sharing intelligence about Polish troop movements, coordinating the new borders..etc.
For 22 months, the two most infamous dictators of 20th-century Europe stood side by side (almost a third of the war's entire duration) dividing up Europe and demonstrating a grotesque symmetry in the process. The same pattern appeared later as the Soviets absorbed the Baltic states militarily, coinciding almost exactly with the Nazi blitz in the West. While German tanks rolled through Paris, Soviet tanks entered Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius.
The author presents the events with clarity and precision, laying them out in a compelling and accessible way. The book is deeply insightful, highly informative, and well balanced as it dispels common myths, ambiguities, and often misunderstood aspects surrounding the Nazi–Soviet Pact. I found within its pages a nuanced take on what is usually reduced to oversimplified narratives. I highly recommend this one, even to those who might not initially be interested, as I wasn’t at first. It turned out to be a thoroughly informative, thought-provoking, and compelling read.
Rating: 4/5
February 4, 2016
On August 23rd, 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union shocked the world by entering into a nonaggression pact. They were not merely neighbors and rival powers ruled by domineering men who loathed one another: their respective ideologies viewed the other as the chief menace to civilization. Yet now, the fists which shook in anger were now extended in friendship, and Europe seemed doomed. Within weeks of the pact's signing, German and Soviet armies had both swept into Poland, igniting the Second World War. The Devils' Alliance is an admirable history of a marriage of convenience, recording why it happened, its effect on the beginning of the war its reception among the party faithful and a horrified Europe, and the breakup that saved civilization. The Devils' Alliance exposes the cynicism of the agreement, and the very nature of the totalitarian state.
Since its creation at the end of the Great War, the Soviet Union had been a European pariah, with a special enmity existing between it and the Nazi state after it came to power. The party line of Nazism was expressly anti-Soviet, viewing Bolshevism as a conspiracy; fears of communist takeovers were very life of National Socialism, birthing it and giving it strength. The Soviets were no less contemptuous of the counterrevolutionary Nazis, scoffing at their worship of nation and race. Ultimately, however, each had more in common where it mattered than not. They were the continental outlaws who rejected the political and economic systems of free Europe; both were totalitarian regimes in which the State reigned supreme, with every institution which might have softened or sapped its control either broken or rendered subservient. To regard Nazism and Communism as opposites on a left-right spectrum is inaccurate, for both supported state command of the economy: they merely disagreed on who should be in control. Each man, Hitler and Stalin, had ambition, and for a time found his 'enemy' an ally to pursue them with. One hand washed the other. Between them, Russia and Germany divided eastern Europe, each invading Poland in turn, and each seizing a third of Scandinavia. Russia needed help continuing to industrialize; Germany needed raw materials. The fact that each state had more in common than not is born out by their identical treatment of the Polish, with shootings and deportations fleeing the arrival of the conquests. Poles fleeing from Nazi occupation passed their countrymen fleeing from Soviet occupation, each wondering if the other was not crazy.
The same reaction could be had from communists and Nazi sympathizers the world over. Overnight, Stalin and Hitler's seemingly impulsive decision to play nice translated into movies in both countries being pulled for demonizing the other; for years the party faithful had been schooled in the evils of the other, and now they were instructed and propagandized to regard the other as a brother-in-arms against western liberalism. Some, sheepishly followed, like the American communist party answering to Moscow; other fellow travelers began experiencing cognitive dissonance. How could the ideals of the party -- Nazi or Communist -- be taken seriously if it made concordance with the adversary so easily? No doubt Moscow's turnabout demands influenced George Orwell: Eurasia has always been at peace with Eastasia? The communists ranks in particular would be thinned in Britain and France as people reacted to the absurdity. Once the tree of diplomacy had stopped producing fruit, of course, Hitler would have Barbarossa hew it down. Successive chats failed to convince the Soviets to stop looking at the Balkans so hungrily, and to go bother British India instead, and since the west had by and large been reduced as a threat, who was left to destroy but the Bolshevik menace? Enter the panzers rolling into the Soviet Union fueled by Russian oil, attacking tanks produced with German industrial expertise. The world breathed a sigh of relief, from a Britain who was no longer the sole object of Nazi malice, to Germany's fellow Axis members who found Joe and Adolf a very odd couple. Ultimately, the divorce made in heaven would lead to the downfall of Hitler's regime, as a rebuffed Joe had to pitch woo with the Allies instead.
Juvenile history books may count the Soviet Union among the Allies, but the postwar conflict between the west and Stalin was not a tragic falling-out between brothers. When Britain stood alone, the Nazi knife at her neck, "Uncle Joe" yawned and admired his new takings. Nazism and Bolshevism were houses alike in infamy, both responsible for murder at industrial proportions in the millions, and both intent on spreading the gospel of death throughout the world. They were gangsters who agreed to stop shooting one another long enough to take care of their mutual enemies, but happily human malice is a two-edged sword, and evil ever self-destructs. Devils' Alliance is an utterly fascinating history of realpolitik, which extends not only to the two titular monsters but to the Allies as well. It would have been easy for Churchill to be contemptuous of the Soviet plea for help, and when he urged Parliament to send such relief in resources as it could afford, he did so not to expand Britain's own power, but in recognition that Hitler waged war not just on Stalin and his army, but on the innocent Russian populace, whose livelihood and lives would be destroyed by the battle between the beasts. The Devils' Alliance is an excellent take on one of the most dangerous periods in European history. and stir readers to reflect on how much contemporary politics is driven not by idealism, but the pure lust for greater power. How many devilish alliances have been crafted between the west and the warren of woeful powers in the middle east?
Since its creation at the end of the Great War, the Soviet Union had been a European pariah, with a special enmity existing between it and the Nazi state after it came to power. The party line of Nazism was expressly anti-Soviet, viewing Bolshevism as a conspiracy; fears of communist takeovers were very life of National Socialism, birthing it and giving it strength. The Soviets were no less contemptuous of the counterrevolutionary Nazis, scoffing at their worship of nation and race. Ultimately, however, each had more in common where it mattered than not. They were the continental outlaws who rejected the political and economic systems of free Europe; both were totalitarian regimes in which the State reigned supreme, with every institution which might have softened or sapped its control either broken or rendered subservient. To regard Nazism and Communism as opposites on a left-right spectrum is inaccurate, for both supported state command of the economy: they merely disagreed on who should be in control. Each man, Hitler and Stalin, had ambition, and for a time found his 'enemy' an ally to pursue them with. One hand washed the other. Between them, Russia and Germany divided eastern Europe, each invading Poland in turn, and each seizing a third of Scandinavia. Russia needed help continuing to industrialize; Germany needed raw materials. The fact that each state had more in common than not is born out by their identical treatment of the Polish, with shootings and deportations fleeing the arrival of the conquests. Poles fleeing from Nazi occupation passed their countrymen fleeing from Soviet occupation, each wondering if the other was not crazy.
The same reaction could be had from communists and Nazi sympathizers the world over. Overnight, Stalin and Hitler's seemingly impulsive decision to play nice translated into movies in both countries being pulled for demonizing the other; for years the party faithful had been schooled in the evils of the other, and now they were instructed and propagandized to regard the other as a brother-in-arms against western liberalism. Some, sheepishly followed, like the American communist party answering to Moscow; other fellow travelers began experiencing cognitive dissonance. How could the ideals of the party -- Nazi or Communist -- be taken seriously if it made concordance with the adversary so easily? No doubt Moscow's turnabout demands influenced George Orwell: Eurasia has always been at peace with Eastasia? The communists ranks in particular would be thinned in Britain and France as people reacted to the absurdity. Once the tree of diplomacy had stopped producing fruit, of course, Hitler would have Barbarossa hew it down. Successive chats failed to convince the Soviets to stop looking at the Balkans so hungrily, and to go bother British India instead, and since the west had by and large been reduced as a threat, who was left to destroy but the Bolshevik menace? Enter the panzers rolling into the Soviet Union fueled by Russian oil, attacking tanks produced with German industrial expertise. The world breathed a sigh of relief, from a Britain who was no longer the sole object of Nazi malice, to Germany's fellow Axis members who found Joe and Adolf a very odd couple. Ultimately, the divorce made in heaven would lead to the downfall of Hitler's regime, as a rebuffed Joe had to pitch woo with the Allies instead.
Juvenile history books may count the Soviet Union among the Allies, but the postwar conflict between the west and Stalin was not a tragic falling-out between brothers. When Britain stood alone, the Nazi knife at her neck, "Uncle Joe" yawned and admired his new takings. Nazism and Bolshevism were houses alike in infamy, both responsible for murder at industrial proportions in the millions, and both intent on spreading the gospel of death throughout the world. They were gangsters who agreed to stop shooting one another long enough to take care of their mutual enemies, but happily human malice is a two-edged sword, and evil ever self-destructs. Devils' Alliance is an utterly fascinating history of realpolitik, which extends not only to the two titular monsters but to the Allies as well. It would have been easy for Churchill to be contemptuous of the Soviet plea for help, and when he urged Parliament to send such relief in resources as it could afford, he did so not to expand Britain's own power, but in recognition that Hitler waged war not just on Stalin and his army, but on the innocent Russian populace, whose livelihood and lives would be destroyed by the battle between the beasts. The Devils' Alliance is an excellent take on one of the most dangerous periods in European history. and stir readers to reflect on how much contemporary politics is driven not by idealism, but the pure lust for greater power. How many devilish alliances have been crafted between the west and the warren of woeful powers in the middle east?
February 26, 2022
A good time to examine one of the root causes of many years of Soviet/Russian political and military dominance of Eastern Europe. I read this book last year after seeing a tremendous bargain on my Kindle. Well worth the price, with a pretty good overview of what became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that remains so very controversial to this day.
Author Roger Moorhouse has an entire book to focus on the treaty, how it was arrived at, and the politics involved in the run up to the actual treaty signing. I thought he did a good job, but I expected a little bit more on the treaty, and how the treaty ended up being utilized by each side in advance of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In light of Hitler’s long history of invective towards Soviet Russia many have just assumed that the German violation of the treaty was baked into the German ideological cake. I have never believed that, although Hitler’s writings made clear his desire to conquer lands to the East. Was there something in the post treaty interactions that led Hitler to his invasion decision beyond ideology?
In all matters of World War II a reliance on William Shirer can help to more fully understand some of the details involved. In this case Shirer’s “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” still is an outstanding help in understanding Hitler and Stalins motivations, and gives us some great details on the treaty interactions after signing. After the Hitler takeover of rump Czechoslovakia (a truly terrible story by itself) the German dictator set his sights on new territorial demands to be made on Poland: The status of Danzig, and the German desire for a extra-territorial “corridor” through Poland to connect East Prussia to Danzig and Germany proper. The western powers, having had their eyes opened by Hitler’s duplicity on the Czech issue, now determined to draw a red line on potential German aggression against the Polish state. When both Britain and France issued “guarantees” to protect the Polish borders Adolph Hitler found himself in a predicament. The British and French made diplomatic efforts to secure Soviet participation in a common front against Germany, but these efforts were so ineffectual as to be counter-productive. The Polish government’s refusal to accede to transit rights for the Red Army to move onto Polish soil to meet an aggression by Germany sealed the fate of any common front against Germany that would include Soviet Russia. With Hitler intent on invading Poland by a date certain he began to entertain the concept of a rapprochement with Russia that would allow him, militarily, to finish off Poland and then turn West. Hitler was in a hurry, and Stalin liked what Hitler had to offer, which was the fate of several states, including Poland, that would now fall into the Soviet “sphere of influence.”
German outreach to the Soviets was reciprocated slowly, but eventually German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop ended up in Moscow to finalize the non-aggression treaty, along with the “secret protocols’”that have been the subject of so much discussion, and denial, by Soviet and Russian governments.
Josef Stalin was a tough and notoriously difficult negotiating partner in the best of circumstances. When he understood the imperative to Germany of concluding a non-aggression treaty in short order he drove an especially difficult bargain.
“Discussion swiftly moved to the essence of the Nazi-Soviet arrangement, the so-called secret protocol by which both parties were to divide the spoils of their collaboration. The initiative came from the Soviet side. Realizing that Hitler was impatient to proceed with his invasion plans for Poland, Stalin sought to extract the maximum possible territorial concession. “Alongside this agreement,” he announced, “there will be an additional agreement that we will not publish anywhere else,” adding that he wanted a clear delineation of “spheres of interest” in central and eastern Europe. Taking his cue, Ribbentrop made his opening offer. “The Führer accepts,” he said, “that the eastern part of Poland and Bessarabia as well as Finland, Estonia and Latvia, up to the river Dvina, will all fall within the Soviet sphere of influence.” This was exceedingly generous, but Stalin was not satisfied and demanded all of Latvia. Ribbentrop stalled. Although he had been given the authority to agree to terms as was necessary, he utilized the negotiating trick of breaking off talks to refer a question to a higher authority. Replying that he could not accede to the Soviet demand for Latvia without consulting Hitler, he asked that the meeting be adjourned while a call was made to Germany.”
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
Hitler, after consulting a map, quickly acceded to Latvia falling into the Soviet “sphere.” The conclusion of the treaty was a source of great relief to Hitler, who now felt free from the potential of a two-front war. The Germans launched their invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and achieved rapid military success. In light of that success Josef Stalin, looking to get his share of the spoils, invaded Poland from the East. This action, regardless of historical revisionism, was one of the most cynical acts of the war.
At 3 a.m. that morning the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski, was summoned to the Kremlin, where he was presented with a note from the Soviet government outlining the grounds for its intervention. As if to emphasize the impossibility of Poland’s predicament, the note itself had been drawn up jointly by the Soviets and the German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg. It claimed, “The Polish government has disintegrated,” and “the Polish state no longer exists.” Given this apparent collapse, it went on, “the Soviet government cannot remain indifferent at a time when brothers of the same blood, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, residing on the Polish territory have been abandoned to their fate.” Consequently, the Red Army had been ordered to “cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.” By “Western Ukraine” and “Western Byelorussia,” the note meant eastern Poland.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
At this key point the non-aggression pact appeared to be working to further the interests of the Soviets and Germans, but there were the seeds of tension nonetheless. The Germans dutifully turned over Polish territory to the Soviets in accordance with their treaty obligations, and Poland was effectively dismembered. But it was not only Hitler who had large territorial ambitions. Josef Stalin, with attention focused on Hitler, began to make demands on his peaceful neighbors that fell into his “sphere of influence.” Estonia was first, but not the last. The Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter was greeted in Moscow by Molotov, with an assist from Stalin, who made it quite clear that unless a “mutual assistance” pact was concluded there would be ominous repercussions for Estonia.
In response to Selter’s protestations of his country’s innocence in the affair, Molotov called upon Stalin himself to join the discussion. The Soviet leader showed his avuncular side upon entering the room soon after, joking with the Estonians, but he quickly got down to business. Once apprised of the essentials, he stated ominously, “What is there to argue about? Our proposal stands and that must be understood.” What passed for negotiations continued for the next couple hours, the Soviets insisting on placing 35,000 Red Army troops in Estonia to “protect order” and demanding a base in Tallinn itself, and the Estonians desperately trying to resist while sticking to the diplomatic niceties that their opponents had long since abandoned. Browbeaten, berated, and bullied, the Estonian delegates returned the following day having decided that they had no choice but to yield. Yet, with Ribbentrop waiting in the wings, they were again met with additional demands and the threat that “other possibilities” existed for ensuring Soviet security. The mutual assistance pact was finally signed at midnight on September 28 and ratified by the Estonian president a week later. Nominally, the treaty obliged both parties to respect each other’s independence; yet, by allowing for the establishment of Soviet military bases on Estonian soil, it fatally undermined Estonian sovereignty. Estonia was effectively at Stalin’s mercy.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
Hitler had used similar tactics in his meetings with unfortunate Presidents and Foreign Ministers of target countries, but Josef Stalin needed no lessons on this score. Similar tactics were used against Latvia and Lithuania, with Stalin effectively gobbling up the Baltic states. Those states appealed to Germany for help, but Hitler turned a deaf ear to their pleas. Despite that fact the Germans were not entirely comfortable with Stalin’s aggressive moves.
Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, himself born in Tallinn, was clear on the potential consequences, confiding to his diary, “If the Russians now march into the Baltic States, then the Baltic Sea will be strategically lost to us. Moscow will be more powerful than ever.”
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
In addition to the geopolitical issues there existed a heavy Germanic population in the Baltics that brought political pressure to bear on Hitler. (Yes, Hitler was concerned with German public opinion.) Stalin was not quite done, issuing an ultimatum to Romania over the province of Bessarabia, which Stalin occupied shortly thereafter. He occupied a bit more than the Germans had bargained away in the treaty, and was coming perilously close to Romanian oil fields which were essential for fueling the Nazi war machine. Hitler was appalled, and took measures to protect those oil fields, and what was left of Romania itself. The tension with Soviet Russia had begun, and although Hitler always had an attack on the Soviet Union on the German menu of military options it is my belief that the tensions that started with Romania would ultimately lead Hitler to decide that hostilities with Russia could not be avoided. The Molotov visit to Berlin to discuss some of these issues, in which he directly challenged Hitler in a face to face meeting over Romania, as well as German use of Finland for troop transit, and how to properly divide the geographic spoils of war, did not go well. Hitler’s not so veiled warning to Molotov during that discussion showed that Ribbentrop was not the only dense Foreign Minister in the room. In discussing the status of Finland Hitler, in stark terms, warned Molotov that there must not be a war launched in the Baltics, describing such a possibility as having the potential to create a heavy strain on Soviet-German relations that could have “unforeseen consequences.”
Moorhouse gives us detail on the brutality of the Polish invasion by both Hitler and Stalin, and of the difficulty Stalin had in explaining the pact to communists all over the world, who detested Hitler.
In light of the Soviet aggression against Poland and the Baltic states the question has arisen as to how Stalin got a pass on his actions while the West determined to stop German aggression. The answer is simply that the British and French identified Germany as the greater threat, and took steps to “keep the Soviet Union in play,” refusing to extend the guarantee of Polish borders to potential aggression by the Soviet Union.
Although Whitehall was aware that, in the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Poles might be reckoning with a Soviet invasion as well as a Nazi one, the guarantee was not extended to include aggression by Moscow. The British Foreign Office viewed the pact as a fundamentally unnatural arrangement, and so—expecting it to prove temporary—was unwilling to close off a potentially vital link to the USSR by prematurely making her an enemy. Thus, though the treaty mentioned only aggression by an unspecified “European Power,” it was appended by a secret protocol, similarly signed by both parties, which provided clarity. By “European Power,” the protocol explained, the signatory parties understood “Germany,” and in the event of aggression by any other power, they resolved only to “consult together” on their response.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
The Devil’s pact ended badly for both Germany and the Soviet Union, with Hitler launching his invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. But as the world deals today with a revanchist Russia it is clear that the territorial demands of Russia are influenced by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and its secret protocols. Utilization of the Stalin methodology of dealing with weaker neighboring states is still part of the Russian playbook, as evidenced by the brutal invasion of Ukraine. This book is not new but brings back a truly terrible point in history. We should never forget the lessons of that period.
Author Roger Moorhouse has an entire book to focus on the treaty, how it was arrived at, and the politics involved in the run up to the actual treaty signing. I thought he did a good job, but I expected a little bit more on the treaty, and how the treaty ended up being utilized by each side in advance of the German invasion of the Soviet Union. In light of Hitler’s long history of invective towards Soviet Russia many have just assumed that the German violation of the treaty was baked into the German ideological cake. I have never believed that, although Hitler’s writings made clear his desire to conquer lands to the East. Was there something in the post treaty interactions that led Hitler to his invasion decision beyond ideology?
In all matters of World War II a reliance on William Shirer can help to more fully understand some of the details involved. In this case Shirer’s “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich” still is an outstanding help in understanding Hitler and Stalins motivations, and gives us some great details on the treaty interactions after signing. After the Hitler takeover of rump Czechoslovakia (a truly terrible story by itself) the German dictator set his sights on new territorial demands to be made on Poland: The status of Danzig, and the German desire for a extra-territorial “corridor” through Poland to connect East Prussia to Danzig and Germany proper. The western powers, having had their eyes opened by Hitler’s duplicity on the Czech issue, now determined to draw a red line on potential German aggression against the Polish state. When both Britain and France issued “guarantees” to protect the Polish borders Adolph Hitler found himself in a predicament. The British and French made diplomatic efforts to secure Soviet participation in a common front against Germany, but these efforts were so ineffectual as to be counter-productive. The Polish government’s refusal to accede to transit rights for the Red Army to move onto Polish soil to meet an aggression by Germany sealed the fate of any common front against Germany that would include Soviet Russia. With Hitler intent on invading Poland by a date certain he began to entertain the concept of a rapprochement with Russia that would allow him, militarily, to finish off Poland and then turn West. Hitler was in a hurry, and Stalin liked what Hitler had to offer, which was the fate of several states, including Poland, that would now fall into the Soviet “sphere of influence.”
German outreach to the Soviets was reciprocated slowly, but eventually German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop ended up in Moscow to finalize the non-aggression treaty, along with the “secret protocols’”that have been the subject of so much discussion, and denial, by Soviet and Russian governments.
Josef Stalin was a tough and notoriously difficult negotiating partner in the best of circumstances. When he understood the imperative to Germany of concluding a non-aggression treaty in short order he drove an especially difficult bargain.
“Discussion swiftly moved to the essence of the Nazi-Soviet arrangement, the so-called secret protocol by which both parties were to divide the spoils of their collaboration. The initiative came from the Soviet side. Realizing that Hitler was impatient to proceed with his invasion plans for Poland, Stalin sought to extract the maximum possible territorial concession. “Alongside this agreement,” he announced, “there will be an additional agreement that we will not publish anywhere else,” adding that he wanted a clear delineation of “spheres of interest” in central and eastern Europe. Taking his cue, Ribbentrop made his opening offer. “The Führer accepts,” he said, “that the eastern part of Poland and Bessarabia as well as Finland, Estonia and Latvia, up to the river Dvina, will all fall within the Soviet sphere of influence.” This was exceedingly generous, but Stalin was not satisfied and demanded all of Latvia. Ribbentrop stalled. Although he had been given the authority to agree to terms as was necessary, he utilized the negotiating trick of breaking off talks to refer a question to a higher authority. Replying that he could not accede to the Soviet demand for Latvia without consulting Hitler, he asked that the meeting be adjourned while a call was made to Germany.”
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
Hitler, after consulting a map, quickly acceded to Latvia falling into the Soviet “sphere.” The conclusion of the treaty was a source of great relief to Hitler, who now felt free from the potential of a two-front war. The Germans launched their invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and achieved rapid military success. In light of that success Josef Stalin, looking to get his share of the spoils, invaded Poland from the East. This action, regardless of historical revisionism, was one of the most cynical acts of the war.
At 3 a.m. that morning the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski, was summoned to the Kremlin, where he was presented with a note from the Soviet government outlining the grounds for its intervention. As if to emphasize the impossibility of Poland’s predicament, the note itself had been drawn up jointly by the Soviets and the German ambassador in Moscow, Friedrich-Werner von der Schulenburg. It claimed, “The Polish government has disintegrated,” and “the Polish state no longer exists.” Given this apparent collapse, it went on, “the Soviet government cannot remain indifferent at a time when brothers of the same blood, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians, residing on the Polish territory have been abandoned to their fate.” Consequently, the Red Army had been ordered to “cross the border and take under their protection the lives and property of the inhabitants of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.” By “Western Ukraine” and “Western Byelorussia,” the note meant eastern Poland.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
At this key point the non-aggression pact appeared to be working to further the interests of the Soviets and Germans, but there were the seeds of tension nonetheless. The Germans dutifully turned over Polish territory to the Soviets in accordance with their treaty obligations, and Poland was effectively dismembered. But it was not only Hitler who had large territorial ambitions. Josef Stalin, with attention focused on Hitler, began to make demands on his peaceful neighbors that fell into his “sphere of influence.” Estonia was first, but not the last. The Estonian Foreign Minister Karl Selter was greeted in Moscow by Molotov, with an assist from Stalin, who made it quite clear that unless a “mutual assistance” pact was concluded there would be ominous repercussions for Estonia.
In response to Selter’s protestations of his country’s innocence in the affair, Molotov called upon Stalin himself to join the discussion. The Soviet leader showed his avuncular side upon entering the room soon after, joking with the Estonians, but he quickly got down to business. Once apprised of the essentials, he stated ominously, “What is there to argue about? Our proposal stands and that must be understood.” What passed for negotiations continued for the next couple hours, the Soviets insisting on placing 35,000 Red Army troops in Estonia to “protect order” and demanding a base in Tallinn itself, and the Estonians desperately trying to resist while sticking to the diplomatic niceties that their opponents had long since abandoned. Browbeaten, berated, and bullied, the Estonian delegates returned the following day having decided that they had no choice but to yield. Yet, with Ribbentrop waiting in the wings, they were again met with additional demands and the threat that “other possibilities” existed for ensuring Soviet security. The mutual assistance pact was finally signed at midnight on September 28 and ratified by the Estonian president a week later. Nominally, the treaty obliged both parties to respect each other’s independence; yet, by allowing for the establishment of Soviet military bases on Estonian soil, it fatally undermined Estonian sovereignty. Estonia was effectively at Stalin’s mercy.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
Hitler had used similar tactics in his meetings with unfortunate Presidents and Foreign Ministers of target countries, but Josef Stalin needed no lessons on this score. Similar tactics were used against Latvia and Lithuania, with Stalin effectively gobbling up the Baltic states. Those states appealed to Germany for help, but Hitler turned a deaf ear to their pleas. Despite that fact the Germans were not entirely comfortable with Stalin’s aggressive moves.
Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg, himself born in Tallinn, was clear on the potential consequences, confiding to his diary, “If the Russians now march into the Baltic States, then the Baltic Sea will be strategically lost to us. Moscow will be more powerful than ever.”
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
In addition to the geopolitical issues there existed a heavy Germanic population in the Baltics that brought political pressure to bear on Hitler. (Yes, Hitler was concerned with German public opinion.) Stalin was not quite done, issuing an ultimatum to Romania over the province of Bessarabia, which Stalin occupied shortly thereafter. He occupied a bit more than the Germans had bargained away in the treaty, and was coming perilously close to Romanian oil fields which were essential for fueling the Nazi war machine. Hitler was appalled, and took measures to protect those oil fields, and what was left of Romania itself. The tension with Soviet Russia had begun, and although Hitler always had an attack on the Soviet Union on the German menu of military options it is my belief that the tensions that started with Romania would ultimately lead Hitler to decide that hostilities with Russia could not be avoided. The Molotov visit to Berlin to discuss some of these issues, in which he directly challenged Hitler in a face to face meeting over Romania, as well as German use of Finland for troop transit, and how to properly divide the geographic spoils of war, did not go well. Hitler’s not so veiled warning to Molotov during that discussion showed that Ribbentrop was not the only dense Foreign Minister in the room. In discussing the status of Finland Hitler, in stark terms, warned Molotov that there must not be a war launched in the Baltics, describing such a possibility as having the potential to create a heavy strain on Soviet-German relations that could have “unforeseen consequences.”
Moorhouse gives us detail on the brutality of the Polish invasion by both Hitler and Stalin, and of the difficulty Stalin had in explaining the pact to communists all over the world, who detested Hitler.
In light of the Soviet aggression against Poland and the Baltic states the question has arisen as to how Stalin got a pass on his actions while the West determined to stop German aggression. The answer is simply that the British and French identified Germany as the greater threat, and took steps to “keep the Soviet Union in play,” refusing to extend the guarantee of Polish borders to potential aggression by the Soviet Union.
Although Whitehall was aware that, in the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the Poles might be reckoning with a Soviet invasion as well as a Nazi one, the guarantee was not extended to include aggression by Moscow. The British Foreign Office viewed the pact as a fundamentally unnatural arrangement, and so—expecting it to prove temporary—was unwilling to close off a potentially vital link to the USSR by prematurely making her an enemy. Thus, though the treaty mentioned only aggression by an unspecified “European Power,” it was appended by a secret protocol, similarly signed by both parties, which provided clarity. By “European Power,” the protocol explained, the signatory parties understood “Germany,” and in the event of aggression by any other power, they resolved only to “consult together” on their response.
Moorhouse, Roger. The Devils' Alliance . Basic Books. Kindle Edition.
The Devil’s pact ended badly for both Germany and the Soviet Union, with Hitler launching his invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. But as the world deals today with a revanchist Russia it is clear that the territorial demands of Russia are influenced by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and its secret protocols. Utilization of the Stalin methodology of dealing with weaker neighboring states is still part of the Russian playbook, as evidenced by the brutal invasion of Ukraine. This book is not new but brings back a truly terrible point in history. We should never forget the lessons of that period.
March 6, 2025
Polecam bardzo 👍
January 11, 2019
Moorhouse takes an often-overlooked subject and makes it accessible for the lay person and historian alike. Full of engrossing details from the main participants and incredibly well-researched. Highly recommend.
Full review here: http://bestofww2.blogspot.com/2019/01...
Full review here: http://bestofww2.blogspot.com/2019/01...
May 18, 2017
Please give my review on Amazon a helpful vote - https://www.amazon.com/review/R1NM9JX...
The Soviet Union and Communism have received an amazing pass with respect to their complicity in starting World War II. In Rolf Hochhuth's bloated whale of a play, [[ASIN:0802142427 The Deputy (Black cat book)]], Hochhuth has a character condemn the Pope for not siding with Russia over Germany. Hochhuth has his character, Father Riccardo, ask:
"Riccardo: Permit me, Your Eminence - the moral right, surely, is on the Russian side, without a doubt. They are waging a just war! They were attacked, their country devastated, their people carried off, slaughtered. If they are threatening Europe now, the blame is only Hitler's."
As propaganda, this is excellent; as history, it is a nauseating oversimplification that misses the fact that the Nazi versus Communist war was a war between thieves, robbers, murderers and thugs.
This excellent book by Roger Moorhous sheds rare light on the Stalin-Hitler Pact, aka the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which reoriented the official positions of the two totalitarianisms, which had involved mutual animosity, into a mutually advantageous trading relationship. The roll-out of this changed position confused the populations of the two nations, who had previously been trained into believing that the opposing ideology was the incarnation of evil.
The advantage of the treaty was clear. The treaty removed the threat at Germany's back, so that it was free to go to war with the western powers of Britain and France, particularly after the treaty had divided Poland up between the Nazi and Communist powers. Germany struck first, but Russia did not waste a lot of time before making sure that it took possession of its territorial claims in Poland. Moorhous describes the extent of Communist-Nazi cooperation in Poland, with Germany handing over cities to the Russians according to their treaty obligation. Moorhous also describes the nauseating similarity with which the conquerors administered their respective Polish territories. Moorhous exactingly describes the atrocities committed by both powers on their conquered Polish peoples.
The Soviet Union used the treaty as an opportunity to absorb the Baltic states and Bessarabia into the Soviet Union. It also launches a war against Finland for the same purpose, which was initially repulsed with great losses to the Communists. Ultimately, the Soviet Union prevailed with more men and better tactics.
The Soviet Union's real hope was that Germany and the western powers would find themselves in an interminable war like the prior war that it could exploit.Hitler dashed those hopes with his quick victory over France.
For its part, Germany's need was for raw material for its industry. It hoped to obtain those resources through trade deals with Russia. Communists being Communists, Russia stalled its negotiations and cheated on its obligations, except when Stalin panicked about his need for German peace. For its part, it seems that Russia did very well in its dealings by obtaining trade secrets and models of advanced technology, and, in one case, a partially constructed battleship in the Bismarck class.
In many ways, this book makes a nice complement to Timothy Snyder's [[ASIN:B00B3M3VE6 Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin]]. Snyder explains the logic of Hitler's move against Russia, to wit, the need to secure a continental supply of resources in order to sustain Germany against the blockade of resources that England could impose. Moorhous points out the maddening way that Russia threatened Germany with its arbitrary actions concerning providing Germany with the resources it needed. Could more enthusiastic contract-fulfillment by Russia have prevented Operation Barbarossa? Probably not, as Moorhous points out, Hitler was having "buyer's regret" when he observed the Soviet Union extending its hegemony to the Baltic states and Bessarabia. The incorporation of Romanian Bessarabia into the Soviet Union, in particular, was considered to be evidence of Stalin's duplicity.
This book is a fascinating look at a little-discussed but vastly important aspect of twentieth century history, particularly an aspect that continued to play a role throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
The Soviet Union and Communism have received an amazing pass with respect to their complicity in starting World War II. In Rolf Hochhuth's bloated whale of a play, [[ASIN:0802142427 The Deputy (Black cat book)]], Hochhuth has a character condemn the Pope for not siding with Russia over Germany. Hochhuth has his character, Father Riccardo, ask:
"Riccardo: Permit me, Your Eminence - the moral right, surely, is on the Russian side, without a doubt. They are waging a just war! They were attacked, their country devastated, their people carried off, slaughtered. If they are threatening Europe now, the blame is only Hitler's."
As propaganda, this is excellent; as history, it is a nauseating oversimplification that misses the fact that the Nazi versus Communist war was a war between thieves, robbers, murderers and thugs.
This excellent book by Roger Moorhous sheds rare light on the Stalin-Hitler Pact, aka the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which reoriented the official positions of the two totalitarianisms, which had involved mutual animosity, into a mutually advantageous trading relationship. The roll-out of this changed position confused the populations of the two nations, who had previously been trained into believing that the opposing ideology was the incarnation of evil.
The advantage of the treaty was clear. The treaty removed the threat at Germany's back, so that it was free to go to war with the western powers of Britain and France, particularly after the treaty had divided Poland up between the Nazi and Communist powers. Germany struck first, but Russia did not waste a lot of time before making sure that it took possession of its territorial claims in Poland. Moorhous describes the extent of Communist-Nazi cooperation in Poland, with Germany handing over cities to the Russians according to their treaty obligation. Moorhous also describes the nauseating similarity with which the conquerors administered their respective Polish territories. Moorhous exactingly describes the atrocities committed by both powers on their conquered Polish peoples.
The Soviet Union used the treaty as an opportunity to absorb the Baltic states and Bessarabia into the Soviet Union. It also launches a war against Finland for the same purpose, which was initially repulsed with great losses to the Communists. Ultimately, the Soviet Union prevailed with more men and better tactics.
The Soviet Union's real hope was that Germany and the western powers would find themselves in an interminable war like the prior war that it could exploit.Hitler dashed those hopes with his quick victory over France.
For its part, Germany's need was for raw material for its industry. It hoped to obtain those resources through trade deals with Russia. Communists being Communists, Russia stalled its negotiations and cheated on its obligations, except when Stalin panicked about his need for German peace. For its part, it seems that Russia did very well in its dealings by obtaining trade secrets and models of advanced technology, and, in one case, a partially constructed battleship in the Bismarck class.
In many ways, this book makes a nice complement to Timothy Snyder's [[ASIN:B00B3M3VE6 Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin]]. Snyder explains the logic of Hitler's move against Russia, to wit, the need to secure a continental supply of resources in order to sustain Germany against the blockade of resources that England could impose. Moorhous points out the maddening way that Russia threatened Germany with its arbitrary actions concerning providing Germany with the resources it needed. Could more enthusiastic contract-fulfillment by Russia have prevented Operation Barbarossa? Probably not, as Moorhous points out, Hitler was having "buyer's regret" when he observed the Soviet Union extending its hegemony to the Baltic states and Bessarabia. The incorporation of Romanian Bessarabia into the Soviet Union, in particular, was considered to be evidence of Stalin's duplicity.
This book is a fascinating look at a little-discussed but vastly important aspect of twentieth century history, particularly an aspect that continued to play a role throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
January 20, 2020
An excellent, absorbing study. Roger Moorhouse’s prose simply bowls along, and - astonishingly when you think that we’re talking about a brief history of a 1940s pact between two alien nations – I almost found myself reacting in the same way as one does to a whodunit page-turner: you really do find yourself wanting to keep on reading, just to find out what happened next. One or two reviews have baulked at this journalistic/semi-populist use of language, but I disagree quite firmly. The fact that the history books we all read at school were mostly boring in their presentation does not mean they should all be. And this isn’t.
Beyond that, its content is quite important in 2020, at a time when President Putin’s Russia is busily trying to airbrush Russia’s involvement with Hitler. With every day that passes Stalin is reinvented a little more as hard done-by and as a victim of circumstance: it is no bad thing to have such a detailed account as this (amazingly so at times, but the archive references invariably back RM up), of what a single-minded monster the man was!
If I have any qualms about the content, it is probably around Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 to reinvigorate the Soviet-German treaty. I do not want to exaggerate this as we are probably only talking about a handful of discordant adjectives and a couple of unexpected sentences, a tiny shred of an entire book. But these few words relate to the key turning point in Soviet-Nazi relations, so they kind of matter.
For example, on the subject of Hitler’s suggesting that it might be desirable if he and Stalin were to meet he says, “Hitler may well have been attempting to employ Ribbentrop’s trick of appealing to the very top to ease difficult negotiations”.
Further on, he talks of “Molotov’s questions raining down and Hitler ducking them as best he could”.
In both cases – I doubt it. There are a few more too, including a reference to Hitler “flapping his eyelids” at Stalin – my favourite image perhaps, but somehow language like this doesn’t quite fit quite the character of the Hitler we all know.
Still, if this is the closest I can get to a criticism it only serves to underline what an excellent book it is. Well worth reading, to set the record of that period straight.
Beyond that, its content is quite important in 2020, at a time when President Putin’s Russia is busily trying to airbrush Russia’s involvement with Hitler. With every day that passes Stalin is reinvented a little more as hard done-by and as a victim of circumstance: it is no bad thing to have such a detailed account as this (amazingly so at times, but the archive references invariably back RM up), of what a single-minded monster the man was!
If I have any qualms about the content, it is probably around Molotov’s visit to Berlin in November 1940 to reinvigorate the Soviet-German treaty. I do not want to exaggerate this as we are probably only talking about a handful of discordant adjectives and a couple of unexpected sentences, a tiny shred of an entire book. But these few words relate to the key turning point in Soviet-Nazi relations, so they kind of matter.
For example, on the subject of Hitler’s suggesting that it might be desirable if he and Stalin were to meet he says, “Hitler may well have been attempting to employ Ribbentrop’s trick of appealing to the very top to ease difficult negotiations”.
Further on, he talks of “Molotov’s questions raining down and Hitler ducking them as best he could”.
In both cases – I doubt it. There are a few more too, including a reference to Hitler “flapping his eyelids” at Stalin – my favourite image perhaps, but somehow language like this doesn’t quite fit quite the character of the Hitler we all know.
Still, if this is the closest I can get to a criticism it only serves to underline what an excellent book it is. Well worth reading, to set the record of that period straight.
February 8, 2020
I just finished reading Roger Moorhouse's The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941.
While I have been eyeing Moorhouse's more recent work, First to Fight, on the invasion of Poland in 1939, I thought this was a timelier work, in light of the aggressive historical revisionism being pushed by Putin and his government.
I can recommend this book, it's both informative, and reads well. The basic mechanics and drivers for the Pact are familiar to the readers of this page. Stalin clearly went into it with his eyes wide open, and neither party shied away from a hard-edged, cynical foreign policy.
According to Moorhouse, Stalin was still surprised at the initial run-away successes of the Wehrmacht in 1939-40. All the other divisions of the secret protocol went as would be expected, with the Soviet Union swallowing the Baltic states and Bessarabia (now Moldova). Interesting he did so in early summer 1940, while the Germans were preoccupied with France. He also snapped up Northern Bukovina from Romania, which did cause a lot of consternation among the German leadership since it was not on the menu.
It's worth noting that this agreement caused a lot of cognitive dissonance for both sides. It caused the Soviets and other communist parties to have to do ideological twists and turns that came hard. For the Germans, they were very uncomfortable with abandoning the Baltics, and turning a blind eye on the Soviet attack on Finland.
Economically it's worth noting that it was not the unalloyed windfall for Germany, as the Soviets ran hot and cold with the implementation and deliveries. Stalin clearly played good cop/bad cop with that lever. However as Barbarossa approached, he was very worried about provoking the Germans, and they were then forthcoming with shipments.
The post-history of the Pact is quite interesting. The allies were able to get a copy of the secret protocol (partitioning eastern Europe), on captured microfilm in the German archives, which was made public in the Nuremberg trials. The Soviets vehemently denied its existence until 1989, when they came clean under Gorbachev. Since then they have backtracked under Putin starting in 2009, arguing how they were forced to do it out of defensive considerations (i.e. the West made us do it). I believe in part to preserve unsullied the victory of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht.
While I have been eyeing Moorhouse's more recent work, First to Fight, on the invasion of Poland in 1939, I thought this was a timelier work, in light of the aggressive historical revisionism being pushed by Putin and his government.
I can recommend this book, it's both informative, and reads well. The basic mechanics and drivers for the Pact are familiar to the readers of this page. Stalin clearly went into it with his eyes wide open, and neither party shied away from a hard-edged, cynical foreign policy.
According to Moorhouse, Stalin was still surprised at the initial run-away successes of the Wehrmacht in 1939-40. All the other divisions of the secret protocol went as would be expected, with the Soviet Union swallowing the Baltic states and Bessarabia (now Moldova). Interesting he did so in early summer 1940, while the Germans were preoccupied with France. He also snapped up Northern Bukovina from Romania, which did cause a lot of consternation among the German leadership since it was not on the menu.
It's worth noting that this agreement caused a lot of cognitive dissonance for both sides. It caused the Soviets and other communist parties to have to do ideological twists and turns that came hard. For the Germans, they were very uncomfortable with abandoning the Baltics, and turning a blind eye on the Soviet attack on Finland.
Economically it's worth noting that it was not the unalloyed windfall for Germany, as the Soviets ran hot and cold with the implementation and deliveries. Stalin clearly played good cop/bad cop with that lever. However as Barbarossa approached, he was very worried about provoking the Germans, and they were then forthcoming with shipments.
The post-history of the Pact is quite interesting. The allies were able to get a copy of the secret protocol (partitioning eastern Europe), on captured microfilm in the German archives, which was made public in the Nuremberg trials. The Soviets vehemently denied its existence until 1989, when they came clean under Gorbachev. Since then they have backtracked under Putin starting in 2009, arguing how they were forced to do it out of defensive considerations (i.e. the West made us do it). I believe in part to preserve unsullied the victory of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht.
January 9, 2015
I was slightly underwhelmed by this book to be honest. It clocks in rather modestly at just over 300 pages, of which 40 or so are devoted to a very brief precis of the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, much of which really falls outside the scope of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Of more interest is the lasting legacy of the pact, particularly in the Baltic States, but again this is dealt with rather perfunctorily in the epilogue. The body of the book consists of an informative discussion of the economic collaboration between the USSR and Germany brought on by the pact, and a somewhat laboured discussion of the socio-political aspects of the treaty. Much of this last felt somewhat redundant and overplayed; forty-plus years on from the publication of Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago it is commonly accepted that Stalin's regime was every bit as brutal as Hitler's, yet the author sets forward his argument as if it were somehow revelatory to reveal it as such. However, the debunking of the conventional, Soviet propagated view of the pact as a purely defensive maneovre on Stalin's part is handled much more deftly. All in all, the book is something of a mixed bag then, though it is undoubtedly an important work in raising the profile of an aspect of Second World War history that has all too often been downplayed and glossed over.
June 4, 2023
This is magnificently and forensically written examination of one of the pivotal - and least known - events of World War Two. Moorhouse presents us with an unattractive cast of characters - Hitler, seeking a cynical advantage by allaying himself with his sworn foe; Stalin, turning his back on the Soviet Union’s stance of opposing fascism, to enable the USSR to expand; ordinary Communists seeking to perform intellectual gymnastics to conform to the impact of the Pact - all of whom contort themselves for the duration of the Pact. The misfortune of the bystanders is palpable - the Poles, their country invades from two directions, and the Baltic States gobbled up greedily and mercilessly by Stalin’s USSR.
One is left bemused and depressed by these events, and is left with the horrible understanding that Soviet Communism and Hitler’s Nazism were in the final analysis very comfortable bedfellows, whose regimes purveyed similar suffering to those unfortunate to have to live under them.
One is left bemused and depressed by these events, and is left with the horrible understanding that Soviet Communism and Hitler’s Nazism were in the final analysis very comfortable bedfellows, whose regimes purveyed similar suffering to those unfortunate to have to live under them.
August 7, 2024
Absolutely first class history! This little known chapter in the story of the Second World War is given its due by Moorhouse. The modern idea, originally fuelled by Soviet propaganda, that the brave Russian people sacrificed selflessly to defeat Hitler while the West dithered is exposed as nonsense. Stalin climbed into bed with Hitler and the Nazis early on and enabled and supplied Hitler's war of aggression against the France and Britain, hoping they would all exhaust each other and the USSR could walk over all of them. The whole story is told by Moorhouse in clear prose, and from all sides. I especially appreciated his telling of the sad story of the Baltic states before, during and after the war, and how they suffered under the boots of Stalin, Hitler and the post-war USSR in succession. Front line combat, back room diplomacy, espionage and economics are all explored. Thoroughly enjoyable!
November 17, 2020
I listened to an audiobook, not a paper book. I listened to some chapters several times, because I was interested in the details. I recommend the book to all those who study history or just want to understand the situation between the USSR and Germany on the eve and at the beginning of World War II. The set of historical facts and memories of the participants of those events gives a fairly complete picture of what was happening at that time. The great thing is that the book as if does not contain the author's point of view, it allows the reader to make up his own opinion.
April 29, 2019
The Nazi-Soviet pact, also known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact after its architects, is undoubtably one of History’s most notorious marriages of convenience. Roger Moorhouse, a historian specializing in German history, throws new light on the 22 month lasting pact which had diabolical consequences for the peoples of those Nations who were the subject of its secret protocols to divide Eastern Europe up into spheres of influence. From the Baltic to the Black Sea, millions of Poles, Finns, Slavs, Jews, Romanians and citizens of the Baltic countries were to endure war, deportation, ethnic cleansing and genocide as a consequence of the nefarious plans agreed in Berlin and Moscow.
The pact and its importance has been overlooked by history as it does not fit in with the victory narrative of the Allies - in Russia, WW2 is remembered as the ultimate triumph of Soviet Communism over Fascism, and to remind Russians that they were once best buddies with the Fascist beasts is to sully the immense suffering and sacrifice of the Soviet people. In the West the history of the Allied struggle emphasizes the comradeship of the alliance against Hitler; to equate Uncle Joe as an enemy as great as Hitler, as he indeed once was, rather spoils this myth.
The truth is that Hitler and Stalin - National Socialism and Soviet Communism - were flip sides of the same Totalitarian coin, making entire sense of the pact between the 2 seemingly strange bedfellows. The underlying principles of their respective ideologies were to be discarded much as one rides a tram to where one wants to get off but no further. Moorhouse’ examination of the motives for the ‘marriage’ are at the core of his work. For Hitler, whose pet virulent hate was the Judeo-Bolshevism he saw as responsible for Germany’s humiliation at the end of World War 1, the motivation for holding his nose to deal with the Bolsheviks was to secure his back as he defeated the Western Allies and to render a British naval blockade ineffective. For Stalin it was to buy time to modernize his forces and secure German technological transfer and economic benefits. The consequences for those caught in the crossfire were dire as the Soviets purged populations in their zone of influence for reasons of class ideology, with the Nazis doing similar in their sphere based on race ideology. Ultimately though it was not ideology that undid the pact, but rather the Geopolitical and strategic strains on the relationship. The previously convenient marriage had outlived its convenience as the spouses’ came to despise each other, and it was the Germans who were ready to move first with the preemptive strike.
Although Moorhouse’ work doesn’t open up new theories or present new evidence on the pact, his is a comprehensive bringing to light of the origins of the pact, how it was negotiated, how it operated, the responses to it from the Allies and It’s consequences for Eastern Europe. He also nicely sets the unraveling of the pact - and the unleashing of Operation Barbarossa - as the focal point which would lead to the colossal end game for the War, the defeat of Nazism and everything that has since followed in European history.
The pact and its importance has been overlooked by history as it does not fit in with the victory narrative of the Allies - in Russia, WW2 is remembered as the ultimate triumph of Soviet Communism over Fascism, and to remind Russians that they were once best buddies with the Fascist beasts is to sully the immense suffering and sacrifice of the Soviet people. In the West the history of the Allied struggle emphasizes the comradeship of the alliance against Hitler; to equate Uncle Joe as an enemy as great as Hitler, as he indeed once was, rather spoils this myth.
The truth is that Hitler and Stalin - National Socialism and Soviet Communism - were flip sides of the same Totalitarian coin, making entire sense of the pact between the 2 seemingly strange bedfellows. The underlying principles of their respective ideologies were to be discarded much as one rides a tram to where one wants to get off but no further. Moorhouse’ examination of the motives for the ‘marriage’ are at the core of his work. For Hitler, whose pet virulent hate was the Judeo-Bolshevism he saw as responsible for Germany’s humiliation at the end of World War 1, the motivation for holding his nose to deal with the Bolsheviks was to secure his back as he defeated the Western Allies and to render a British naval blockade ineffective. For Stalin it was to buy time to modernize his forces and secure German technological transfer and economic benefits. The consequences for those caught in the crossfire were dire as the Soviets purged populations in their zone of influence for reasons of class ideology, with the Nazis doing similar in their sphere based on race ideology. Ultimately though it was not ideology that undid the pact, but rather the Geopolitical and strategic strains on the relationship. The previously convenient marriage had outlived its convenience as the spouses’ came to despise each other, and it was the Germans who were ready to move first with the preemptive strike.
Although Moorhouse’ work doesn’t open up new theories or present new evidence on the pact, his is a comprehensive bringing to light of the origins of the pact, how it was negotiated, how it operated, the responses to it from the Allies and It’s consequences for Eastern Europe. He also nicely sets the unraveling of the pact - and the unleashing of Operation Barbarossa - as the focal point which would lead to the colossal end game for the War, the defeat of Nazism and everything that has since followed in European history.
November 22, 2014
A description of events around Molotov-Ribbentrof Pact signed in August 1939 and which led to partition of Poland the following month. The author covers the events following the pact till the attack on Russia in 1941.
More detailed description follows.
SIGNING THE PACT
On 31st of March 1939 the British government extended a guarantee to Poland to aid her in case of any action threatening its independence. Hitler was furious. His advisers suggested talks with Russia. In the meantime Stalin replaced his foreign commissar Litvinov (who was a Jew) with Molotov.
On 14th of August a combined British and French delegation arrived in Moscow, headed by Admiral Drax and General Doumenc. As they were not foreign minsters, they lacked the authority to undertake serious material negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviet defence commissar Marshal Voroshilov received them. The final meeting on August 21st ended the discussions without any results.
In the meantime, in mid-July 1939 high-level discussions between Germans and Russians started in Berlin. On August 20 Berlin and Moscow signed a Commercial Agreement. Russians committed to supplying 180M RM of raw materials and Germans120M RM of industrial goods.
On 20th, Hitler sent a telegram to Stalin asking to receive Ribbentrop to finalise their discussions. On 23rd of August 1939 German delegation under the foreign minister Ribbentrop landed in Moscow. Russians were keen to bring an end to German support for the Japanese military campaign against Red Army in the Far East. Germans. Stalin did not know at the time that his troops would win within the next ten days.
Both delegations worked throughout the day and the pact was ready to be signed in the early hours of 24th of August.
RUSSIAN OCCUPATION
On 17th of September Russians crossed Polish border. In total there were only about 40 clashes between Poles and Soviets. One of these was the Battle of Szack on September 28, in which a small town of Szack was liberated from Soviet control by the Polish forces. Another was the Battle of Grodno, where general Olszyna-Wilczynski held up the Soviet advance for two days and inflicted heavy losses on Soviets. When captured he as executed by Soviets.
On 18th of September the first contact between the local German commander, General Guderian and his Russian counterpart, General Krivoshein was made in Brest.
Russians organised four major deportations from eastern Poland – in February, April and June 1940 and June 1941. It covered around 1 million Polish citizens.
BALTIC STATES
Ribbentrop visited Moscow again on 27th of September 1939. While there, he come across the Estonian foreign minister Karl Selter as he was leaving a meeting with Molotov. Molotov was concerned about implications of the recent incident when the Polish submarine escaped internment in Tallinn harbour. He was interested in setting a possible military base in Tallinn. When Selter returned to Moscow on September 27th, Molotov linked the Orzel episode with the Soviet merchantman Metallist in the Baltic. With Stalin they demanded placing 35,000 Red Army troops in Estonia. The Estonian had to agree to that and signed on 28th the mutual assistance pact.
A week after the Estonian treaty, a similar pact was forced on Latvia. It was signed by the Latvian foreign minister, Vilhems Munters.
With Lithuania the mutual assistance pact was signed on 10th of October. Russians handed over Wilno to Lithuanian control.
Early in October, the Finns were invited to Moscow to discuss “political questions”. They were led by Juho Paasikivi. Russians asked to extend the border in the Karelian Isthmus, close to Leningrad, and to lease the port of Hanko for 30 years. The discussions continued for over month without much progress.
On 26th of November 1939, a Soviet border post in Karelia came under artillery and 4 Russian guards were killed. In fact this was done by NKVD. Russians declared free from their previous obligations and attacked Finns.
Finns fought bravely and in January 1940 Stalin recalled marshal Voroshilov and replaced him with Marshal Timoshenko. Russian assault began on 1st of February 1940. After ten days of intense fighting Finns were forced to withdraw to a secondary line of fortifications. By the end of the month Finns were no longer able to resist.
The Finnish delegations went to Moscow on 7th of March. Stalin offered the terms. Part of Karelia was ceded to Moscow. Further territorial losses occurred in Arctic North and East. Port Hanko was leased to Russians. The treaty was signed on 12 March. 25 thousand Finns were killed over 100 days of fighting. The Soviet toll was over 200,000.
While Germans were invading France, Molotov presented Lithuanian government with a set of demands, including arrest of two cabinet ministers and entry on unspecified Russian troops. On June 15 as the government in Vilnius collapsed, the Red Army invaded Lithuania.
On the same day Russians staged provocation and killed five Latvian border guards. On 16th of June Russians entered Riga. The government got arrested.
Within a month across all three Baltic States, parliamentary elections were called. Only approved candidates were permitted. Once the new parliaments were installed, their first act was to petition Moscow to join USSR.
FOLLOWING THE PACT
In February 1940 both sides renewed their commercial discussions and committed to around 800M RM of business.
On November 12, 1940 Molotov arrived in Berlin. Germans were not happy with the Russian deliveries of raw materials and annexation of territory beyond the line agreed in August 1939 (Bessarabia). Hitler wanted Russia out of Europe and presented his vision of dividing the world with Germans taking Central Africa, Italians the North Africa and Russians south of Asia, especially India from the British. The Soviet Union could join the Tripartite Pact (with Germans, Italians and Japanese).
Late in 1940 an obscure International Danubian Commission was called in Galati, Romania. With Russians considering themselves a “Danubian power” they sent a delegation led by Molotov’s deputy – Arkady Sobolev. Russians demanded mooring rights on the Danube delta and joint Russo-Rumanian administration of the area.
The Danubian Commission conference finally collapsed on December 17. The very next morning Hitler issued his Directive No. 21 to prepare to crush Russia.
On 29th of December Stalin was told that Hitler gave order to declare war in March 1941.
Since the mid-1920s, the USSR had been constructing a network of fortified defences along its western border, known as the “Stalin Line”. With its western border moving, a new network was begun from Lithuania, eastern Poland to the mouth of Danube in Bessarabia, named the “Molotov Line”.
On January 10, 1941 a new German-Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement was signed in Moscow.
More detailed description follows.
SIGNING THE PACT
On 31st of March 1939 the British government extended a guarantee to Poland to aid her in case of any action threatening its independence. Hitler was furious. His advisers suggested talks with Russia. In the meantime Stalin replaced his foreign commissar Litvinov (who was a Jew) with Molotov.
On 14th of August a combined British and French delegation arrived in Moscow, headed by Admiral Drax and General Doumenc. As they were not foreign minsters, they lacked the authority to undertake serious material negotiations with the Soviets. The Soviet defence commissar Marshal Voroshilov received them. The final meeting on August 21st ended the discussions without any results.
In the meantime, in mid-July 1939 high-level discussions between Germans and Russians started in Berlin. On August 20 Berlin and Moscow signed a Commercial Agreement. Russians committed to supplying 180M RM of raw materials and Germans120M RM of industrial goods.
On 20th, Hitler sent a telegram to Stalin asking to receive Ribbentrop to finalise their discussions. On 23rd of August 1939 German delegation under the foreign minister Ribbentrop landed in Moscow. Russians were keen to bring an end to German support for the Japanese military campaign against Red Army in the Far East. Germans. Stalin did not know at the time that his troops would win within the next ten days.
Both delegations worked throughout the day and the pact was ready to be signed in the early hours of 24th of August.
RUSSIAN OCCUPATION
On 17th of September Russians crossed Polish border. In total there were only about 40 clashes between Poles and Soviets. One of these was the Battle of Szack on September 28, in which a small town of Szack was liberated from Soviet control by the Polish forces. Another was the Battle of Grodno, where general Olszyna-Wilczynski held up the Soviet advance for two days and inflicted heavy losses on Soviets. When captured he as executed by Soviets.
On 18th of September the first contact between the local German commander, General Guderian and his Russian counterpart, General Krivoshein was made in Brest.
Russians organised four major deportations from eastern Poland – in February, April and June 1940 and June 1941. It covered around 1 million Polish citizens.
BALTIC STATES
Ribbentrop visited Moscow again on 27th of September 1939. While there, he come across the Estonian foreign minister Karl Selter as he was leaving a meeting with Molotov. Molotov was concerned about implications of the recent incident when the Polish submarine escaped internment in Tallinn harbour. He was interested in setting a possible military base in Tallinn. When Selter returned to Moscow on September 27th, Molotov linked the Orzel episode with the Soviet merchantman Metallist in the Baltic. With Stalin they demanded placing 35,000 Red Army troops in Estonia. The Estonian had to agree to that and signed on 28th the mutual assistance pact.
A week after the Estonian treaty, a similar pact was forced on Latvia. It was signed by the Latvian foreign minister, Vilhems Munters.
With Lithuania the mutual assistance pact was signed on 10th of October. Russians handed over Wilno to Lithuanian control.
Early in October, the Finns were invited to Moscow to discuss “political questions”. They were led by Juho Paasikivi. Russians asked to extend the border in the Karelian Isthmus, close to Leningrad, and to lease the port of Hanko for 30 years. The discussions continued for over month without much progress.
On 26th of November 1939, a Soviet border post in Karelia came under artillery and 4 Russian guards were killed. In fact this was done by NKVD. Russians declared free from their previous obligations and attacked Finns.
Finns fought bravely and in January 1940 Stalin recalled marshal Voroshilov and replaced him with Marshal Timoshenko. Russian assault began on 1st of February 1940. After ten days of intense fighting Finns were forced to withdraw to a secondary line of fortifications. By the end of the month Finns were no longer able to resist.
The Finnish delegations went to Moscow on 7th of March. Stalin offered the terms. Part of Karelia was ceded to Moscow. Further territorial losses occurred in Arctic North and East. Port Hanko was leased to Russians. The treaty was signed on 12 March. 25 thousand Finns were killed over 100 days of fighting. The Soviet toll was over 200,000.
While Germans were invading France, Molotov presented Lithuanian government with a set of demands, including arrest of two cabinet ministers and entry on unspecified Russian troops. On June 15 as the government in Vilnius collapsed, the Red Army invaded Lithuania.
On the same day Russians staged provocation and killed five Latvian border guards. On 16th of June Russians entered Riga. The government got arrested.
Within a month across all three Baltic States, parliamentary elections were called. Only approved candidates were permitted. Once the new parliaments were installed, their first act was to petition Moscow to join USSR.
FOLLOWING THE PACT
In February 1940 both sides renewed their commercial discussions and committed to around 800M RM of business.
On November 12, 1940 Molotov arrived in Berlin. Germans were not happy with the Russian deliveries of raw materials and annexation of territory beyond the line agreed in August 1939 (Bessarabia). Hitler wanted Russia out of Europe and presented his vision of dividing the world with Germans taking Central Africa, Italians the North Africa and Russians south of Asia, especially India from the British. The Soviet Union could join the Tripartite Pact (with Germans, Italians and Japanese).
Late in 1940 an obscure International Danubian Commission was called in Galati, Romania. With Russians considering themselves a “Danubian power” they sent a delegation led by Molotov’s deputy – Arkady Sobolev. Russians demanded mooring rights on the Danube delta and joint Russo-Rumanian administration of the area.
The Danubian Commission conference finally collapsed on December 17. The very next morning Hitler issued his Directive No. 21 to prepare to crush Russia.
On 29th of December Stalin was told that Hitler gave order to declare war in March 1941.
Since the mid-1920s, the USSR had been constructing a network of fortified defences along its western border, known as the “Stalin Line”. With its western border moving, a new network was begun from Lithuania, eastern Poland to the mouth of Danube in Bessarabia, named the “Molotov Line”.
On January 10, 1941 a new German-Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement was signed in Moscow.
April 3, 2018
Man påminns kraftigt om att man inte bara bör försöka veta hur historien var utan också se upp vem som har makt över historieskrivningen. Jag tror jag nog trott på Stalins efterversion av orsaker tidigare, och inte riktigt insett hur mycket sida vid sida de var och hur mycket hjälp Nazi-Tyskland fick av Sovjetunionen under pakttiden.
Det är också intressant att se hur olika historiens spår kunde utvecklat sig (man är ju ofta fast i det som hände måste hända), från när Italiens utrikesminister Ciano 1939 försökte övertala Mussolini att han var den naturliga ledaren i korståget mot Tyskland (!!), till att de allierade tänkte slå till mot Tysklands råvaruleverantör Sovjetunionen (Baku) eller Hitlers försök att få Sovjetunionen mer på sin sida (front mot Storbritanniens välde, mer råvaruleveranser).
De två revolutionära diktaturerna hade onekligen många beröringspunkter, framförallt givetvis i sitt motstånd mot de västliga demokratierna men likheterna hur de behandlar sina olika delar av det våldtagna Polen är skrämmande. Samma gripanden, massdeportationer och massavrättningar även om den tyska givetvis är mer etnisk och den ryska mer politisk.
Hitler hade enorm nytta av pakten, framförallt som ryggskydd men också med hjälp av de västliga kommunisternas spridande av defaitism och sabotage mot motståndsviljan. Det arbetades även aktivt för att USA inte skulle blanda sig i kriget, givetvis med organisationer som hade namn som "Amerikansk förbundet för fred och demokrati" och liknande.
Läs och bli lite paff. Välskriven.
Det är också intressant att se hur olika historiens spår kunde utvecklat sig (man är ju ofta fast i det som hände måste hända), från när Italiens utrikesminister Ciano 1939 försökte övertala Mussolini att han var den naturliga ledaren i korståget mot Tyskland (!!), till att de allierade tänkte slå till mot Tysklands råvaruleverantör Sovjetunionen (Baku) eller Hitlers försök att få Sovjetunionen mer på sin sida (front mot Storbritanniens välde, mer råvaruleveranser).
De två revolutionära diktaturerna hade onekligen många beröringspunkter, framförallt givetvis i sitt motstånd mot de västliga demokratierna men likheterna hur de behandlar sina olika delar av det våldtagna Polen är skrämmande. Samma gripanden, massdeportationer och massavrättningar även om den tyska givetvis är mer etnisk och den ryska mer politisk.
Hitler hade enorm nytta av pakten, framförallt som ryggskydd men också med hjälp av de västliga kommunisternas spridande av defaitism och sabotage mot motståndsviljan. Det arbetades även aktivt för att USA inte skulle blanda sig i kriget, givetvis med organisationer som hade namn som "Amerikansk förbundet för fred och demokrati" och liknande.
Läs och bli lite paff. Välskriven.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 75 reviews