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Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology
This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought-experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling institutions.
This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought-experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling institutions. The essays are grouped into four sections: Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality; The Nature of Theory in Psychology; Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience; and Free Will and Personhood.
This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will. Using careful arguments and ingenious thought-experiments, the author exposes familiar preconceptions and hobbling institutions. The essays are grouped into four sections: Intentional Explanation and Attributions of Mentality; The Nature of Theory in Psychology; Objects of Consciousness and the Nature of Experience; and Free Will and Personhood.
377 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1978
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2039 people want to read
About the author
Daniel C. Dennett
80 books3,043 followersDaniel Clement Dennett III was a prominent philosopher whose research centered on philosophy of mind, science, and biology, particularly as they relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He was the co-director of the Center for Cognitive Studies and the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. Dennett was a noted atheist, avid sailor, and advocate of the Brights movement.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
Dennett received his B.A. in philosophy from Harvard University in 1963, where he was a student of W.V.O. Quine. In 1965, he received his D.Phil. from Christ Church, Oxford, where he studied under the ordinary language philosopher Gilbert Ryle.
Dennett gave the John Locke lectures at the University of Oxford in 1983, the Gavin David Young Lectures at Adelaide, Australia, in 1985, and the Tanner Lecture at Michigan in 1986, among many others. In 2001 he was awarded the Jean Nicod Prize, giving the Jean Nicod Lectures in Paris. He has received two Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fulbright Fellowship, and a Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987. He was the co-founder (1985) and co-director of the Curricular Software Studio at Tufts University, and has helped to design museum exhibits on computers for the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Science in Boston, and the Computer Museum in Boston. He was a Humanist Laureate of the International Academy of Humanism and a Fellow of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
July 20, 2014
Not an enjoyable read at all. It suffers from serious academia-oriented writing with a dash of its time period to make it even more stale. Don't get me wrong, there are some important ideas in here, but it is so not reader friendly. Combine that with how old the material is now and I couldn't recommend it as a read unless one were doing specific research on the topic and just had to include it for the sake of completeness.
April 17, 2025
Delightful set of essays, well organized into a cohesive whole.
Section 2 (on theory in psychology) was a standout: many of the insights feel fresh, even today, some 40 years after these essays were collected. Most notably, Essay 5 (why the law of effect will not go away) persuasively argues that learning (in both its cognitivistic and behavioristic variants) is just a continuous extension of the basic principles underlying natural selection. Just as evolutions proceeds by selective forces acting on random genetic variation, learning proceeds by selective forces (e.g., reinforcement, error backpropagation) acting on random variation in behavior or mental representations. Its a truly elegant, unifying insight that i think hasn’t been given enough credit in modern psychological theorizing.
Section 4 (free will and personhood) was strong as well, and a great close to the collection—cleaning up many of the loose questions of moral responsibility and ethical obligation that inevitably arise when you take seriously the possibility that we are nothing more than mere matter acting according to the laws of physics.
Sections 1 (intentional explanations and attributions of memory) and 3 (objects of consciousness and the nature of experience) were compelling in their own right, but felt something like lesser versions of arguments better developed elsewhere.
Section 2 (on theory in psychology) was a standout: many of the insights feel fresh, even today, some 40 years after these essays were collected. Most notably, Essay 5 (why the law of effect will not go away) persuasively argues that learning (in both its cognitivistic and behavioristic variants) is just a continuous extension of the basic principles underlying natural selection. Just as evolutions proceeds by selective forces acting on random genetic variation, learning proceeds by selective forces (e.g., reinforcement, error backpropagation) acting on random variation in behavior or mental representations. Its a truly elegant, unifying insight that i think hasn’t been given enough credit in modern psychological theorizing.
Section 4 (free will and personhood) was strong as well, and a great close to the collection—cleaning up many of the loose questions of moral responsibility and ethical obligation that inevitably arise when you take seriously the possibility that we are nothing more than mere matter acting according to the laws of physics.
Sections 1 (intentional explanations and attributions of memory) and 3 (objects of consciousness and the nature of experience) were compelling in their own right, but felt something like lesser versions of arguments better developed elsewhere.
July 24, 2019
Wonderful and fascinating collection of essays. My thoughts aren't in order enough to engage much with Dennett's "conclusions" here -- I would really need to sit down with each chapter and go through it slowly -- but that doesn't diminish my praise. His writing about the nature of cognitive processes, and how we talk about psychology & consciousness, is always careful, entertaining, thoughtful, and reflects a deep understanding of what philosophy can/should do in light of science and the way language works. Many of these essays are difficult to follow at times, but I think that is the nature of the subject matter. Dennett does a better job of making these questions accessible than any other writer I've read (and I think that reflects his understanding, not because he is simplifying things, though maybe that is because I don't properly understand other writers!). The whole book is great, particularly the sections on pain, mental images (why we should treating them as intentionalistic objects in a phenomenological sense), consciousness, and decision making/choice/creativity (enjoyed his use of the Valery model). I wish I understood some of the comments on Fodor/Ryle/Skinner better, and am still not clear on exactly what he is advocating for as the project of psychology + cognitive science. The ending chapters that took on more moral questions were all interesting and well-articulated, though I felt like they were potentially the most open to objection. Having now read two of his books I am fairly convinced I want to read all of them.
April 10, 2023
Dennett is my favourite contemporary philosopher. And, of course, in a case like this, it is hard to say whether I like him because I agree with him on a large number of issues or whether I actually formed my opinions because of him. (See his How to change your mind.)
He is witty, knows the subject and is sure to come up with fresh ideas and new metaphors. On the other hand I understand that many people think he is a bit too witty. And surely he lost a lot of credit by publishing a book called Consciousness Explained that people quite generally thought did no such thing. (I also do not like that book but for different reasons.)
I had never read this particular book before. It is from 1978 and it shows. (Use of pronouns). Some of the essays seem really dated and he even manages to present some really boring stuff here. E.g. Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness
On the other hand you will find plenty of great stuff, sometimes hidden in footnotes. Like the quip that the expression c-fibers has lost its empirical anchor in neuroscience and is used as a philosopher’s wild-card for whatever event turns out to be identical with pain. (193)
Or this one: “It has seemed important to many people to claim that computers cannot in principle duplicate various human feats, activities happenings. Such aprioristic claims, we have learned, have an embarrassing history of subsequent falsification.” (190)
This is as true today as it was then.
And I just love this one (a propos the concept of pain): Real Chateau Latour has to have been made in a particular place in a particular way by particular people.... (Real vodka, on the other hand, can be made from just about anything, anywhere, by anybody.)” – You can have a complete seminar on this.
And talking about actual content. Sabine Hossenfelder should maybe read On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want to get an idea how determinism and free will might be compatible.
But I want to say a few words on his essay Skinner Skinned (... too witty) to give an example of where I think Dennett was on the wrong track.
Skinner (and behaviourism) is today more or less forgotten. But in 1978 he was obviously thought of being worth fencing with although, as Dennett says, “psychologists just don’t find behaviorism very reinforcing these days“. (53)
Skinner was of the opinion, that mentalistic explanations were not helpful, were unscientific.
As Dennett wonderfully summarizes: “mental” means “internal” means “inferred” means “onobservable” means “private” means “virtus dormitiva” means “demons” means “superstition”. (58)
And he quotes Skinner (from Beyond Freedom and Dignity) with this beautiful statement: ‘“Science does not dehumanize man; it de-homuncalizes him...”’ (58)
The basic argument of Dennett is that intentionalism is capable of explaining things that behaviorism cannot. It is an application of his “stances“ theory. There are different ways to explain the same thing. You can argue from the design, from physics from intention. And he is right with this, of course. You can say that a chess playing computer “wants” to avoid chess mate and “therefore” moves its king to a different field. (And if you not prepared to say so you cannot say that a computer can multiply, because it can only add, it cannot add because it can only open and close tiny switches etc.)
But this, I think, does not affect Skinners basic argument, that mentalism is not an explanation.
Here is the thought experiment by Dennett: Imagine we have two “self-learning” chess-programs. Now, suppose, he says, we let them play against each other without recording the games. And then we discover that their game has improved. This is a remarkable prediction of machine learning, but then he goes wrong, because he says: “It must be possible in principle to determine mathematically what these evolved programs are now...” (68) He thinks we could, in principle, take the computers apart, figuring out what their programs were in that way. No. We could not.
Now, he says, the intentionalist can predict the next move of the improved computer. (Right, but a prediction is not an explanation.) Skinner on the other hand, must deduce that the “computer during the night must have been ‘reinforced’...”. (69)
This is right, but it is not an argument against behaviourism but one in favor of behaviourism. And the recent advance in AI just confirms Skinner. The AI learns by reinforcement. (It had never occurred to me before that in AI they do use the behaviourist’s term reinforcement!) And there is no mentalistic explanation on top of this.
Another argument Dennett uses is this one. Suppose you were held up and asked to hand over your wallet. This has never happened before and cannot have been “reinforced”. And still, you hand over the wallet. (On the contrary, Dennett says, the reinforced thing to do, would be to apologize.) Dennett says that only the mentalistic approach works. I want to save my skin, I believe I am threatened. Etc.
But here is the test. I asked ChatGPT: If you were a human and were held up and asked for your wallet, what would you do?
Here is (part of) the answer:
1. Stay calm: It's natural to feel scared or anxious in such a situation, but try to stay as calm as possible. Avoid making any sudden movements or showing signs of resistance that may escalate the situation.
2. Comply with the demands: If the perpetrator asks for your wallet or other belongings, it's generally best to comply. Material possessions can be replaced, but your life and safety are paramount.
So, where is the wanting here? Where is the believing? It is all the rational reaction of a language model without mind, trained by reinforcement. And there is no principal reason why the reaction of a human should have any other grounds.
He is witty, knows the subject and is sure to come up with fresh ideas and new metaphors. On the other hand I understand that many people think he is a bit too witty. And surely he lost a lot of credit by publishing a book called Consciousness Explained that people quite generally thought did no such thing. (I also do not like that book but for different reasons.)
I had never read this particular book before. It is from 1978 and it shows. (Use of pronouns). Some of the essays seem really dated and he even manages to present some really boring stuff here. E.g. Towards a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness
On the other hand you will find plenty of great stuff, sometimes hidden in footnotes. Like the quip that the expression c-fibers has lost its empirical anchor in neuroscience and is used as a philosopher’s wild-card for whatever event turns out to be identical with pain. (193)
Or this one: “It has seemed important to many people to claim that computers cannot in principle duplicate various human feats, activities happenings. Such aprioristic claims, we have learned, have an embarrassing history of subsequent falsification.” (190)
This is as true today as it was then.
And I just love this one (a propos the concept of pain): Real Chateau Latour has to have been made in a particular place in a particular way by particular people.... (Real vodka, on the other hand, can be made from just about anything, anywhere, by anybody.)” – You can have a complete seminar on this.
And talking about actual content. Sabine Hossenfelder should maybe read On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want to get an idea how determinism and free will might be compatible.
But I want to say a few words on his essay Skinner Skinned (... too witty) to give an example of where I think Dennett was on the wrong track.
Skinner (and behaviourism) is today more or less forgotten. But in 1978 he was obviously thought of being worth fencing with although, as Dennett says, “psychologists just don’t find behaviorism very reinforcing these days“. (53)
Skinner was of the opinion, that mentalistic explanations were not helpful, were unscientific.
As Dennett wonderfully summarizes: “mental” means “internal” means “inferred” means “onobservable” means “private” means “virtus dormitiva” means “demons” means “superstition”. (58)
And he quotes Skinner (from Beyond Freedom and Dignity) with this beautiful statement: ‘“Science does not dehumanize man; it de-homuncalizes him...”’ (58)
The basic argument of Dennett is that intentionalism is capable of explaining things that behaviorism cannot. It is an application of his “stances“ theory. There are different ways to explain the same thing. You can argue from the design, from physics from intention. And he is right with this, of course. You can say that a chess playing computer “wants” to avoid chess mate and “therefore” moves its king to a different field. (And if you not prepared to say so you cannot say that a computer can multiply, because it can only add, it cannot add because it can only open and close tiny switches etc.)
But this, I think, does not affect Skinners basic argument, that mentalism is not an explanation.
Here is the thought experiment by Dennett: Imagine we have two “self-learning” chess-programs. Now, suppose, he says, we let them play against each other without recording the games. And then we discover that their game has improved. This is a remarkable prediction of machine learning, but then he goes wrong, because he says: “It must be possible in principle to determine mathematically what these evolved programs are now...” (68) He thinks we could, in principle, take the computers apart, figuring out what their programs were in that way. No. We could not.
Now, he says, the intentionalist can predict the next move of the improved computer. (Right, but a prediction is not an explanation.) Skinner on the other hand, must deduce that the “computer during the night must have been ‘reinforced’...”. (69)
This is right, but it is not an argument against behaviourism but one in favor of behaviourism. And the recent advance in AI just confirms Skinner. The AI learns by reinforcement. (It had never occurred to me before that in AI they do use the behaviourist’s term reinforcement!) And there is no mentalistic explanation on top of this.
Another argument Dennett uses is this one. Suppose you were held up and asked to hand over your wallet. This has never happened before and cannot have been “reinforced”. And still, you hand over the wallet. (On the contrary, Dennett says, the reinforced thing to do, would be to apologize.) Dennett says that only the mentalistic approach works. I want to save my skin, I believe I am threatened. Etc.
But here is the test. I asked ChatGPT: If you were a human and were held up and asked for your wallet, what would you do?
Here is (part of) the answer:
1. Stay calm: It's natural to feel scared or anxious in such a situation, but try to stay as calm as possible. Avoid making any sudden movements or showing signs of resistance that may escalate the situation.
2. Comply with the demands: If the perpetrator asks for your wallet or other belongings, it's generally best to comply. Material possessions can be replaced, but your life and safety are paramount.
So, where is the wanting here? Where is the believing? It is all the rational reaction of a language model without mind, trained by reinforcement. And there is no principal reason why the reaction of a human should have any other grounds.
May 16, 2013
Sometimes our mind sees what is hidden for eyes,but it's not always sensitive.We must learn to avoid imagination for eyes and create reality for mind!
July 20, 2024
The late Daniel Dennett is justly famous. This popular collection of essays puts to shame the joyless writing of so many professional philosophers. And his ability to draw on various scientific disciplines remains the hallmark of good practice in Cognitive Science.
To appreciate all this, you can start with the essay on Behaviourism’s most famous proponent (“Skinner skinned”), and see for yourself just how balanced and thoughtful Dennett’s criticisms are. Chp-7, likewise, does a great job of demonstrating his penetrating observations about Psychology and related fields. And the final chapter (“Where Am I?”) was a delight to read, even if it does not advance any substantive thesis.
Of course, Dennett benefited from a privileged education. And his many public appearances, in my opinion, lack the force of his writings. But if the cognitive sciences programme is to progress at all, we have a solid guiding track in Daniel Dennett’s œuvre, with his characteristic intellectual honesty and his naturalistic take on problems in philosophy.
Hopefully, this will help usher in a more mature field, with mutually constraining discoveries and hypotheses from the multiple sub-disciplines — and take us beyond the current age of fruitless but every-growing theories and models.
© Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0
To appreciate all this, you can start with the essay on Behaviourism’s most famous proponent (“Skinner skinned”), and see for yourself just how balanced and thoughtful Dennett’s criticisms are. Chp-7, likewise, does a great job of demonstrating his penetrating observations about Psychology and related fields. And the final chapter (“Where Am I?”) was a delight to read, even if it does not advance any substantive thesis.
Of course, Dennett benefited from a privileged education. And his many public appearances, in my opinion, lack the force of his writings. But if the cognitive sciences programme is to progress at all, we have a solid guiding track in Daniel Dennett’s œuvre, with his characteristic intellectual honesty and his naturalistic take on problems in philosophy.
Hopefully, this will help usher in a more mature field, with mutually constraining discoveries and hypotheses from the multiple sub-disciplines — and take us beyond the current age of fruitless but every-growing theories and models.
© Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0
August 1, 2024
After reading Thomas Nagel's classic essay, "What is it like to be a bat?", this was the book that turned me onto philosophy of mind. Dennett's a brilliant philosopher, well-read in science, and an engaging writer. "Brainstorms" (perfect title!) is a very good introduction to Dennett's wide-ranging and creative work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The last essay in the book ("Where am I?") is a delicious dessert! I heard him present it in person at a philosophy conference at UNC Chapel Hill in 1980 or '81. It ended with a standing ovation from a room full of philosophers (presumably not an everyday occurrence).
March 30, 2020
Some hard papers by Dennett here. I love Dennett's writing style and his critical thoughts. He does have a tendency for run-on sentences and paragraphs, but the thoughts he presents are nuanced and well-considered. I wonder how much time he took to write this collection. This helped me with writing my Philosophy IA.
January 1, 2019
Titolo assai fuorviante...
June 18, 2015
This book has some worthy insights, and is good for understanding the popular psych view from the era it was written in, and has some nice insights on the author's psychological worldview on the nature of dreams, although I wouldn't recommend it to anybody generally--maybe for some specific academic purposes. Still, it is a better love-story than Twilight.
Read
January 22, 2010supplanted by Consciousness Explained and other more recent work
Read
November 8, 2011I can't remember much of it but have since come across so many references to Dennett that I have to re-read it.
May 9, 2012
Collection of papers from the 60s/70s, shows some progression from "Content & Consciousness" and deals with new theories from Fodor and others. Also reviews then-fading influence of Skinner and Ryle.
December 20, 2013
As with most essay collections, this is a mixed bag. I found the most interesting to be chapters 1, 4, 5 and most of part IV.
October 8, 2014
Daniel Dennet's second book is a collection of essays on consciousness, free will, the possibility of artificial intelligence and other subjects. Good as always.
November 23, 2014
This book is filled with Dennett's essays and wrapped in Edward Gorey.
This really happened.
This really happened.
March 4, 2011
interesting....
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews