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Operation Wrath of God: The Secret History of European Intelligence and Mossad's Assassination Campaign
In this unprecedented history of intelligence cooperation during the Cold War, Aviva Guttmann uncovers the key role of European intelligence agencies in facilitating Mossad's Operation Wrath of God. She reveals how, in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre, Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorism were hunted and killed by Mossad with active European cooperation. Through unique access to unredacted documents in the Club de Berne archive, she shows how a secret coalition of intelligence agencies supplied Mossad with information about Palestinians on a colossal scale and tacitly supported Israeli covert actions on European soil. These agencies helped to anticipate and thwart a number of Palestinian terrorist plots, including some revealed here for the first time. This extraordinary book reconstructs the hidden world of international intelligence, showing how this parallel order enabled state relations to be pursued independently of official foreign policy constraints or public scrutiny.
350 pages, Hardcover
First published August 7, 2025
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August 6, 2025
I am grateful to NetGalley for providing an advance copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
This book immediately attracted my attention when I noticed it on NetGalley. I applaud the author, an academic at a British university, and others involved in bringing book to publication. An historical analysis, with newly available data, about the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Massacre. To write and publish a largely balanced and constructive book on this topic is to be commended given that views on Israel are so entrenched and polarised while the discourse emanating from University campuses is often intolerant, sometimes antisemitic, frequently unchallenged. Too often opposing or nuanced views are silenced.
The context is the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics, where Middle-Eastern terrorists attacked, killed and kidnapped Israeli athletes, ultimately leading to the death of all eleven hostages. Those terrorists not killed in the failed rescue attempt were tried, found guilty and jailed in West Germany to be released a few years later as part of another hostage negotiation.
The basis of this book comes from the author gaining access to previously unreleased contemporaneous records of an informal group of Intelligence agencies who participated in sharing information and analysis regarding terrorism. In particular terror operations either in planning, carried out or aborted, in Europe and beyond during the 1970s. This informal group, known as Kilowatt was part of a larger Intelligence sharing entity known as the Club de Berne. Formed in 1969 and consisting at the time of eight European Intelligence agencies plus the United States and Israel.
The first two parts of the book describes the Munich Massacre and the aftermath where the Israeli Intelligence agency, Mossad, implemented Operation Wrath of God to eliminate ten targets who directly planned or participated in the atrocity. The objective was to prevent those responsible from carrying out further terror attacks and to deter others by sending a clear message there would be repercussions for any future activities. Understandably there may have been an element of vengeance to the operation as well.
The author provides a largely clinical and objective description of what happened to each target of Mossad. She also provides pertinent political background information such as recounting the Israeli Prime Minister’s edict. Golda Meir insisted on seeing a clear case made for each target identified. Furthermore, as the targets were often in Europe, in countries largely friendly to Israel at the time, she demanded that innocent bystanders or family members were not to be hurt.
“Prime Minister Meir gave very clear instructions that Operation Wrath of God should ‘not harm a hair’ on a European citizen’s head.”
The author makes the case that Mossad indeed operated within these constraints, apart from one well-known incident that is discussed in some detail. Surprisingly the author later refers to:
“…Mossad’s bloodbath on the streets of Europe…”
which is a contrast to the dispassionate tone generally employed throughout the book and actually the opposite of what the author describes.
Much of the author’s analysis comes from the shared correspondence of the Kilowatt partners as well as the previously published accounts of Mossad Operations. It is the new access to Kilowatt material that provides additional insights. The material seems to be mostly real-time or at least unfiltered and unverified, shared very soon after becoming available. More detailed material is also shared alongside responses to requests by a particular Intelligence agency, and details of follow-up police investigations of terrorist activity.
New insights from this Kilowatt intelligence is often related to the individual terrorists involved, their activities, their methods, accomplices and so on.
It is posited that Kilowatt members were wilfully ignorant of the likelihood that Mossad or some other Israeli organisation was responsible for the deaths of terrorists in Europe. Although there were conflicts between the various terrorist groups I find it difficult to believe the European Intelligence agencies did not suspect Mossad were involved in the sudden deaths of people already implicated or at least suspected of being involved in terrorism. Apart from one terrible case of misidentification, the Kilowatt data strengthens the case that Mossad targeted active terrorists. The author is clear on this:
“…most targets …were deeply involved in terrorist activities and most of them were indeed actively planning future operations.”
The third part of the book is slightly less objective and presents a somewhat critical commentary on Mossad and the Kilowatt members. This part describes the killing of an innocent man in the Norwegian town of Lillehammer, due to misidentification by Mossad. Kilowatt sharing continued after this terrible accident even though Mossad were exposed as being responsible. The repercussions are presented in some detail, as well as an assessment of the overall Wrath of God operation. It is suggested that Kilowatt members were complicit in Mossad operations in Europe. Further discussion is also presented on the wider issue of Intelligence agencies sharing information for the common good.
The author repeatedly presents the case that the total combined intelligence and assessment of all Kilowatt members, was far superior to that of any one member. Undoubtedly this benefited the fight against terrorism in Europe and elsewhere during the 1970s. The issue of Intelligence agencies having autonomy and in some sense being independent of Government is a key theme explored by the author; both in the historical, present day and future context. The author makes her views clear. To paraphrase, Intelligence sharing is not necessarily a good thing. Given the historical analysis and narrative presented in the first two parts of the book, the author’s conclusions are not entirely convincing. This does not diminish the book. Indeed it encourages the reader to pause and form their own view from what they already know, have read in this book and other sources.
Considering lessons for the present, when European Governments are lining up to distance themselves from Israel, one cannot help but think there may be implications to Intelligence sharing within Europe and beyond. Mossad and other Israeli intelligence agencies may have had their reputations damaged due to the recent events, but to diminish existing relationship will not make Western Europe or anywhere else in the world a safer place.
This is a useful book to read on several levels, mostly scholarly and academic, but also for anyone with an interest in recent history and the current conflicts and tensions we see in the world today. It is written with largely objective language and a balanced tone. Readers may or may not agree with the authors conclusions. And that is fine. Discussion, diversity of opinion and freedom of speech and opinions should be encouraged. More than that, they should be cherished and protected.
Beyond the Munich Massacre, this book provides new insights on issues related to security and intelligences as well as international relations. Given that terrorism still happens throughout Europe and elsewhere, there may be parallels to the actions of Intelligence agencies today, not only related to sharing of data and analysis. Perhaps more importantly recognising and accepting certain countries have long-standing, shared fundamental values and therefore common objectives with regard to security. One might conclude that these values and objectives are rightly ‘above’ politics and therefore Intelligence agencies should be given some latitude in their actions. Surely this is preferred to a blind obedience to essentially transient political masters pandering to often small but vocal and election-deciding voters.
This is certainly one of those books that will stay with the reader for a long time, promoting thought, reflection and perhaps encouraging a more nuanced view of the world and a better understanding of how our Intelligence agencies operate.
I wish the author great success with publication of this book. It deserves a wide readership and hopefully it will promote healthy and constructive debate.
This book immediately attracted my attention when I noticed it on NetGalley. I applaud the author, an academic at a British university, and others involved in bringing book to publication. An historical analysis, with newly available data, about the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Massacre. To write and publish a largely balanced and constructive book on this topic is to be commended given that views on Israel are so entrenched and polarised while the discourse emanating from University campuses is often intolerant, sometimes antisemitic, frequently unchallenged. Too often opposing or nuanced views are silenced.
The context is the aftermath of the 1972 Munich Olympics, where Middle-Eastern terrorists attacked, killed and kidnapped Israeli athletes, ultimately leading to the death of all eleven hostages. Those terrorists not killed in the failed rescue attempt were tried, found guilty and jailed in West Germany to be released a few years later as part of another hostage negotiation.
The basis of this book comes from the author gaining access to previously unreleased contemporaneous records of an informal group of Intelligence agencies who participated in sharing information and analysis regarding terrorism. In particular terror operations either in planning, carried out or aborted, in Europe and beyond during the 1970s. This informal group, known as Kilowatt was part of a larger Intelligence sharing entity known as the Club de Berne. Formed in 1969 and consisting at the time of eight European Intelligence agencies plus the United States and Israel.
The first two parts of the book describes the Munich Massacre and the aftermath where the Israeli Intelligence agency, Mossad, implemented Operation Wrath of God to eliminate ten targets who directly planned or participated in the atrocity. The objective was to prevent those responsible from carrying out further terror attacks and to deter others by sending a clear message there would be repercussions for any future activities. Understandably there may have been an element of vengeance to the operation as well.
The author provides a largely clinical and objective description of what happened to each target of Mossad. She also provides pertinent political background information such as recounting the Israeli Prime Minister’s edict. Golda Meir insisted on seeing a clear case made for each target identified. Furthermore, as the targets were often in Europe, in countries largely friendly to Israel at the time, she demanded that innocent bystanders or family members were not to be hurt.
“Prime Minister Meir gave very clear instructions that Operation Wrath of God should ‘not harm a hair’ on a European citizen’s head.”
The author makes the case that Mossad indeed operated within these constraints, apart from one well-known incident that is discussed in some detail. Surprisingly the author later refers to:
“…Mossad’s bloodbath on the streets of Europe…”
which is a contrast to the dispassionate tone generally employed throughout the book and actually the opposite of what the author describes.
Much of the author’s analysis comes from the shared correspondence of the Kilowatt partners as well as the previously published accounts of Mossad Operations. It is the new access to Kilowatt material that provides additional insights. The material seems to be mostly real-time or at least unfiltered and unverified, shared very soon after becoming available. More detailed material is also shared alongside responses to requests by a particular Intelligence agency, and details of follow-up police investigations of terrorist activity.
New insights from this Kilowatt intelligence is often related to the individual terrorists involved, their activities, their methods, accomplices and so on.
It is posited that Kilowatt members were wilfully ignorant of the likelihood that Mossad or some other Israeli organisation was responsible for the deaths of terrorists in Europe. Although there were conflicts between the various terrorist groups I find it difficult to believe the European Intelligence agencies did not suspect Mossad were involved in the sudden deaths of people already implicated or at least suspected of being involved in terrorism. Apart from one terrible case of misidentification, the Kilowatt data strengthens the case that Mossad targeted active terrorists. The author is clear on this:
“…most targets …were deeply involved in terrorist activities and most of them were indeed actively planning future operations.”
The third part of the book is slightly less objective and presents a somewhat critical commentary on Mossad and the Kilowatt members. This part describes the killing of an innocent man in the Norwegian town of Lillehammer, due to misidentification by Mossad. Kilowatt sharing continued after this terrible accident even though Mossad were exposed as being responsible. The repercussions are presented in some detail, as well as an assessment of the overall Wrath of God operation. It is suggested that Kilowatt members were complicit in Mossad operations in Europe. Further discussion is also presented on the wider issue of Intelligence agencies sharing information for the common good.
The author repeatedly presents the case that the total combined intelligence and assessment of all Kilowatt members, was far superior to that of any one member. Undoubtedly this benefited the fight against terrorism in Europe and elsewhere during the 1970s. The issue of Intelligence agencies having autonomy and in some sense being independent of Government is a key theme explored by the author; both in the historical, present day and future context. The author makes her views clear. To paraphrase, Intelligence sharing is not necessarily a good thing. Given the historical analysis and narrative presented in the first two parts of the book, the author’s conclusions are not entirely convincing. This does not diminish the book. Indeed it encourages the reader to pause and form their own view from what they already know, have read in this book and other sources.
Considering lessons for the present, when European Governments are lining up to distance themselves from Israel, one cannot help but think there may be implications to Intelligence sharing within Europe and beyond. Mossad and other Israeli intelligence agencies may have had their reputations damaged due to the recent events, but to diminish existing relationship will not make Western Europe or anywhere else in the world a safer place.
This is a useful book to read on several levels, mostly scholarly and academic, but also for anyone with an interest in recent history and the current conflicts and tensions we see in the world today. It is written with largely objective language and a balanced tone. Readers may or may not agree with the authors conclusions. And that is fine. Discussion, diversity of opinion and freedom of speech and opinions should be encouraged. More than that, they should be cherished and protected.
Beyond the Munich Massacre, this book provides new insights on issues related to security and intelligences as well as international relations. Given that terrorism still happens throughout Europe and elsewhere, there may be parallels to the actions of Intelligence agencies today, not only related to sharing of data and analysis. Perhaps more importantly recognising and accepting certain countries have long-standing, shared fundamental values and therefore common objectives with regard to security. One might conclude that these values and objectives are rightly ‘above’ politics and therefore Intelligence agencies should be given some latitude in their actions. Surely this is preferred to a blind obedience to essentially transient political masters pandering to often small but vocal and election-deciding voters.
This is certainly one of those books that will stay with the reader for a long time, promoting thought, reflection and perhaps encouraging a more nuanced view of the world and a better understanding of how our Intelligence agencies operate.
I wish the author great success with publication of this book. It deserves a wide readership and hopefully it will promote healthy and constructive debate.
July 30, 2025
Operation Wrath of God, by Aviva Guttmann, is an account of Israel's assassination campaign based largely on Club de Berne archives of secret communications between intelligence agencies of a number of countries.
This story is told in an engaging manner without leaving out the minute details that connect the dots. Her research in the archives is used to flesh out, to either support or refute, what had been assumed previously. The completely new information is both fascinating and, to any thoughtful reader, concerning.
If assassination by a government is an acceptable form of punishment, without any trial or sentence, then how does one draw the line between which instances it can be used and when a more civilized form of criminal punishment be used? For the governments giving support through secret channels that also purport to be governments "of the people" (and I don't mean just the US but any government that claims to be a democracy), how do you justify telling your people you're opposed to either extrajudicial murder or allowing murderers to operate within your own borders but allow your intelligence community to do the opposite? These and many more questions come to mind and they aren't based on this one single campaign but on the moral and ethical position all of these countries took. But then, as is evident in our current situation, these countries are all morally and ethically bankrupt, from "targeted murder" to genocide, they will rationalize whatever serves their goal of power and unwarranted feeling of superiority. If countries are going to do this, they certainly have lost the reasonable ability to criticize those being oppressed for resorting to such acts. So we're all terrorists now, though the terrorist "experts" like to draw the line at nation-states vs other groups. So the same acts serving the same purpose of terrorizing is okay if a government does it but terrorism if an oppressed people do it. And there you have our current screwed up world.
Reviewed from a copy made available by the publisher via NetGalley.
This story is told in an engaging manner without leaving out the minute details that connect the dots. Her research in the archives is used to flesh out, to either support or refute, what had been assumed previously. The completely new information is both fascinating and, to any thoughtful reader, concerning.
If assassination by a government is an acceptable form of punishment, without any trial or sentence, then how does one draw the line between which instances it can be used and when a more civilized form of criminal punishment be used? For the governments giving support through secret channels that also purport to be governments "of the people" (and I don't mean just the US but any government that claims to be a democracy), how do you justify telling your people you're opposed to either extrajudicial murder or allowing murderers to operate within your own borders but allow your intelligence community to do the opposite? These and many more questions come to mind and they aren't based on this one single campaign but on the moral and ethical position all of these countries took. But then, as is evident in our current situation, these countries are all morally and ethically bankrupt, from "targeted murder" to genocide, they will rationalize whatever serves their goal of power and unwarranted feeling of superiority. If countries are going to do this, they certainly have lost the reasonable ability to criticize those being oppressed for resorting to such acts. So we're all terrorists now, though the terrorist "experts" like to draw the line at nation-states vs other groups. So the same acts serving the same purpose of terrorizing is okay if a government does it but terrorism if an oppressed people do it. And there you have our current screwed up world.
Reviewed from a copy made available by the publisher via NetGalley.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews