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The Enemy At the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe
Major historian Andrew Wheatcroft reveals the full story behind four centuries of Ottoman incursions into the heartlands of Europe.
In 1683, two empires — the Ottoman, based in Constantinople, and the Habsburg dynasty in Vienna — came face to face in the culmination of a 250-year-old struggle for power at the Great Siege of Vienna. Within the city walls, the choice of resistance over surrender to the largest army ever assembled by the Turks created an all-or-nothing scenario: every last survivor would be enslaved or ruthlessly slaughtered.
Although it was their most famous attack, the 1683 siege was the historical culmination of the Turks’ sustained attempt to march westwards and finally obtain the city they had long called “The Golden Apple.” Their defeat was to mark the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
With Turkey now seeking to re-orient itself towards the West and with a new generation of politicians exploiting the residual tensions between East and West, The Enemy at the Gate provides a timely and masterful account of this most complex and epic of conflicts.
In 1683, two empires — the Ottoman, based in Constantinople, and the Habsburg dynasty in Vienna — came face to face in the culmination of a 250-year-old struggle for power at the Great Siege of Vienna. Within the city walls, the choice of resistance over surrender to the largest army ever assembled by the Turks created an all-or-nothing scenario: every last survivor would be enslaved or ruthlessly slaughtered.
Although it was their most famous attack, the 1683 siege was the historical culmination of the Turks’ sustained attempt to march westwards and finally obtain the city they had long called “The Golden Apple.” Their defeat was to mark the beginning of the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
With Turkey now seeking to re-orient itself towards the West and with a new generation of politicians exploiting the residual tensions between East and West, The Enemy at the Gate provides a timely and masterful account of this most complex and epic of conflicts.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published August 31, 2009
128 people are currently reading
2567 people want to read
About the author
Andrew Wheatcroft
40 books32 followersAndrew Wheatcroftis Professor of International Publishing and Communication and Director of the Centre for Publishing Studies at the University of Stirling. He is the author ofInfidels,The Habsburgs, andThe Ottomans, and has been researching the material for The Enemy at the Gatefor more than twenty years.
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November 20, 2023
“For thirty-seven days ten thousand men battled over the narrow strip of ground separating the Lobl and the Burg bastions [defending Vienna]. From early August the old moat, now an empty ditch between the outer and inner lines of defense, was the key to the city’s survival. Day by day the soldiers on the wall looked down on the spider’s web of Ottoman diggings, and watched as the earth itself seemed to move inexorably forward. Piles of loose soil, like vast worm casts, continued to rise on each side of the half-hidden entrenchments. Soon these mounds towered above the sheer walls of the ravelin, so that Ottoman gunners and musketeers could fire down into the shallow trenches dug by defenders atop the battered fortification. As the Turkish bombardment intensified, the Hapsburg infantry dug deeper, throwing up their own earthen ramparts for protection against the continual gunfire. The grim battle was waged with spade and shovel…”
- Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Hapsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe
The Ottoman Empire was one of the great empires to have ever existed in history. Though it does not have the same cachet in the west as the British or Roman Empires, it ranks among them by any measure. It lasted some six-hundred years, encompassed significant parts of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa, and reshaped the world in numerous ways.
The thing about empires, though, is that they tend to weaken as they achieve success. Distant lands become harder to administer. Newly-conquered peoples may rise up in rebellion. Greater lengths have to be taken to reassert control.
In 1682, Sultan Mehmed IV – the leader of the Ottoman Empire – and his Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, hit upon a plan to demonstrate their might, boost the morale of their subjects, and readjust the outer borders of their realm: they would seize Vienna, the center of the Hapsburg Dynasty.
The following year, the armies of Sultan Mehmed IV collided with the forces of King Leopold on the walls of Vienna.
That’s the story told in Andrew Wheatcroft’s short and punchy The Enemy at the Gate.
***
The Siege of Vienna did not mark the beginning or end of the Ottoman Empire. Occurring in 1683, it’s somewhat in the middle. The practical effect for readers is that you’re jumping into a very specific point of a much larger tale.
Wheatcroft tries to alleviate some of the contextual issues with an introductory chapter that broadly – and I mean very broadly – tries to summarize the situation. In this, he is only partly successful, mainly because he provides not only objective facts, but subjective impressions that can be distracting. Ultimately, it’s probably not necessary to have a previously-acquired working knowledge of the Ottomans, but it’s helpful.
***
Once the table-setting is complete, The Enemy at the Gate proceeds chronologically. The story proper begins in 1682, prior to the siege, and keeps going even after the King of Poland and the Duke of Lorraine forced the Ottomans to retreat. Post-siege chapters cover Hapsburg attempts to bring Hungary under its control, including the capture of Buda in 1686.
Wheatcroft does a really good job of introducing all the major players, divining their intentions and motivations – even when it requires a bit of speculation – and explaining the operational environment. He is especially fascinated with the Ottoman side, and spends a good deal of time on its political structure, culture and traditions, and warmaking process. Wheatcroft has an undeniable enthusiasm for this material, and he is clearly delighted – for instance – to discuss the light cavalry capabilities of the Tartars, or the unit structure of the janissaries. He also pushes back forcefully on the western stereotype of the Ottoman Empire – especially prevalent in the 19th and early 20th centuries – as the “sick man of Europe.”
The Hapsburgs, of course, are not neglected, though Wheatcroft has fewer positive things to say about them. A non-contiguous, patchwork empire with sometimes tenuous authority, they nevertheless were able to pull things together – after a fashion – when the Turkish legions appeared. To take one example, Wheatcroft notes that the Ottomans had more soldiers classifiable as “elite.” European troops – and their generals – though not as capable on an individual level, had certain tactical aptitudes gained from the long experience of the Thirty Years’ War. This included better formations, and the capacity of commanders to move those formations efficaciously around on the battlefield.
***
In the acknowledgments section, Wheatcroft notes that he has been researching The Enemy at the Gate for twenty years. At certain points, this is very apparent, and he seems to be trying to cram a lot of detail into a volume that is only 268 pages of text. The addition of extraneous elements, along with a certain amount of repetitiveness, does slow the pace a bit.
However, once the siege begins, The Enemy at the Gate really engaged me. There appears to be a dearth of primary sources from which to draw, which requires Wheatcroft to work a little harder in the storytelling department. To that end, he does an excellent job combining the first person accounts with detailed descriptions of tactics, siege-craft, and the capabilities of the various military forces. For example, Wheatcroft exhaustively covers the Turkish sappers who built tunnels beneath Vienna’s walls, which were then packed with explosives.
One huge irritation is the map situation. Specifically, there is no dedicated map of Vienna and its defenses. This is glaring, especially in light of Wheatcroft’s close descriptions of the different bastions, revetments, moats, and gates. In order to follow, I had to pull up a map on my phone, which is never a good thing, since books and phones are natural enemies.
***
The Enemy at the Gate was published in 2008, during the rough midpoint of America’s misguided invasion of Iraq. I note this because Wheatcroft makes a concerted effort to tamp down on the “holy war” aspects of the Ottoman invasion. Indeed, he closes the book with a chapter reflecting on the relationships between Europeans and Ottomans, and Christians and Muslims, on the borderlands where East and West met and intermingled. He attempts to disentangle on-the-ground realities – which are always individualized and complicated – from later propaganda and nationalist myths, which created unshakeable binaries.
That’s not to say that Wheatcroft tries to sanitize or soft pedal the Ottoman invasion of Austria. Quite to the contrary, The Enemy at the Gate can at time seem a catalogue of horrors that goes far beyond the thousands of battlefield deaths. There were sacked cities, the massacre of noncombatants, the sexual assault of women, and the enslavement of captives.
The point, though – at least as I can see it – is that the dreadful consequences of warfare don’t need to be exponentially compounded by divisive – and potentially false – memories that ensure the survival of vicious hatreds long after the last actual participant has died.
- Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Hapsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe
The Ottoman Empire was one of the great empires to have ever existed in history. Though it does not have the same cachet in the west as the British or Roman Empires, it ranks among them by any measure. It lasted some six-hundred years, encompassed significant parts of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa, and reshaped the world in numerous ways.
The thing about empires, though, is that they tend to weaken as they achieve success. Distant lands become harder to administer. Newly-conquered peoples may rise up in rebellion. Greater lengths have to be taken to reassert control.
In 1682, Sultan Mehmed IV – the leader of the Ottoman Empire – and his Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, hit upon a plan to demonstrate their might, boost the morale of their subjects, and readjust the outer borders of their realm: they would seize Vienna, the center of the Hapsburg Dynasty.
The following year, the armies of Sultan Mehmed IV collided with the forces of King Leopold on the walls of Vienna.
That’s the story told in Andrew Wheatcroft’s short and punchy The Enemy at the Gate.
***
The Siege of Vienna did not mark the beginning or end of the Ottoman Empire. Occurring in 1683, it’s somewhat in the middle. The practical effect for readers is that you’re jumping into a very specific point of a much larger tale.
Wheatcroft tries to alleviate some of the contextual issues with an introductory chapter that broadly – and I mean very broadly – tries to summarize the situation. In this, he is only partly successful, mainly because he provides not only objective facts, but subjective impressions that can be distracting. Ultimately, it’s probably not necessary to have a previously-acquired working knowledge of the Ottomans, but it’s helpful.
***
Once the table-setting is complete, The Enemy at the Gate proceeds chronologically. The story proper begins in 1682, prior to the siege, and keeps going even after the King of Poland and the Duke of Lorraine forced the Ottomans to retreat. Post-siege chapters cover Hapsburg attempts to bring Hungary under its control, including the capture of Buda in 1686.
Wheatcroft does a really good job of introducing all the major players, divining their intentions and motivations – even when it requires a bit of speculation – and explaining the operational environment. He is especially fascinated with the Ottoman side, and spends a good deal of time on its political structure, culture and traditions, and warmaking process. Wheatcroft has an undeniable enthusiasm for this material, and he is clearly delighted – for instance – to discuss the light cavalry capabilities of the Tartars, or the unit structure of the janissaries. He also pushes back forcefully on the western stereotype of the Ottoman Empire – especially prevalent in the 19th and early 20th centuries – as the “sick man of Europe.”
The Hapsburgs, of course, are not neglected, though Wheatcroft has fewer positive things to say about them. A non-contiguous, patchwork empire with sometimes tenuous authority, they nevertheless were able to pull things together – after a fashion – when the Turkish legions appeared. To take one example, Wheatcroft notes that the Ottomans had more soldiers classifiable as “elite.” European troops – and their generals – though not as capable on an individual level, had certain tactical aptitudes gained from the long experience of the Thirty Years’ War. This included better formations, and the capacity of commanders to move those formations efficaciously around on the battlefield.
***
In the acknowledgments section, Wheatcroft notes that he has been researching The Enemy at the Gate for twenty years. At certain points, this is very apparent, and he seems to be trying to cram a lot of detail into a volume that is only 268 pages of text. The addition of extraneous elements, along with a certain amount of repetitiveness, does slow the pace a bit.
However, once the siege begins, The Enemy at the Gate really engaged me. There appears to be a dearth of primary sources from which to draw, which requires Wheatcroft to work a little harder in the storytelling department. To that end, he does an excellent job combining the first person accounts with detailed descriptions of tactics, siege-craft, and the capabilities of the various military forces. For example, Wheatcroft exhaustively covers the Turkish sappers who built tunnels beneath Vienna’s walls, which were then packed with explosives.
One huge irritation is the map situation. Specifically, there is no dedicated map of Vienna and its defenses. This is glaring, especially in light of Wheatcroft’s close descriptions of the different bastions, revetments, moats, and gates. In order to follow, I had to pull up a map on my phone, which is never a good thing, since books and phones are natural enemies.
***
The Enemy at the Gate was published in 2008, during the rough midpoint of America’s misguided invasion of Iraq. I note this because Wheatcroft makes a concerted effort to tamp down on the “holy war” aspects of the Ottoman invasion. Indeed, he closes the book with a chapter reflecting on the relationships between Europeans and Ottomans, and Christians and Muslims, on the borderlands where East and West met and intermingled. He attempts to disentangle on-the-ground realities – which are always individualized and complicated – from later propaganda and nationalist myths, which created unshakeable binaries.
That’s not to say that Wheatcroft tries to sanitize or soft pedal the Ottoman invasion of Austria. Quite to the contrary, The Enemy at the Gate can at time seem a catalogue of horrors that goes far beyond the thousands of battlefield deaths. There were sacked cities, the massacre of noncombatants, the sexual assault of women, and the enslavement of captives.
The point, though – at least as I can see it – is that the dreadful consequences of warfare don’t need to be exponentially compounded by divisive – and potentially false – memories that ensure the survival of vicious hatreds long after the last actual participant has died.
June 16, 2025
I am someone who enjoys travelling around the world. I find knowing the history of the places I visit to be a huge improvement to my appreciation of the cities I am wandering around in. Having visited both Vienna and Istanbul, I really appreciated this excellent history book.
In 1683, two great empires came into conflict over the great city of Vienna. It came at a time when Europe trembled in fear at the mention of the Ottoman Empire. The Habsburg Dynasty and the Ottoman Sultan both claimed to be the inheritors of Rome. Vienna was a great prize for the Ottomans, and Sultan Mehmed IV wanted it in order to be ranked among the Great Ottoman Sultans. He chose the famous Kara Mustafa Pasha (Mustafa Pasha the Courageous) as Grand Vizier to be in charge of the campaign.
Whaetcroft sets the stage by going into detail about the two sides, their militaries, and their cultures. He also expounds on the fear of the "Turk" in European Courts, yet how rivalries among those powers led to little help actually coming to the Habsburgs.
Then, Wheatcroft masterfully describes the campaign where the Ottoman and Tartar forces were defeated by the tenacious defenders of Vienna and the relief army composed of the forces of Emperor Leopold I and King Sobieski of Poland and his winged Hussars.
A wonderful mix of history, culture, and military history combined into a superb description of this seminal military event. If you're a fan of either the Ottomans or the Habsburgs, then you will appreciate this excellent book.
In 1683, two great empires came into conflict over the great city of Vienna. It came at a time when Europe trembled in fear at the mention of the Ottoman Empire. The Habsburg Dynasty and the Ottoman Sultan both claimed to be the inheritors of Rome. Vienna was a great prize for the Ottomans, and Sultan Mehmed IV wanted it in order to be ranked among the Great Ottoman Sultans. He chose the famous Kara Mustafa Pasha (Mustafa Pasha the Courageous) as Grand Vizier to be in charge of the campaign.
Whaetcroft sets the stage by going into detail about the two sides, their militaries, and their cultures. He also expounds on the fear of the "Turk" in European Courts, yet how rivalries among those powers led to little help actually coming to the Habsburgs.
Then, Wheatcroft masterfully describes the campaign where the Ottoman and Tartar forces were defeated by the tenacious defenders of Vienna and the relief army composed of the forces of Emperor Leopold I and King Sobieski of Poland and his winged Hussars.
A wonderful mix of history, culture, and military history combined into a superb description of this seminal military event. If you're a fan of either the Ottomans or the Habsburgs, then you will appreciate this excellent book.
July 22, 2013
This book recounts the collision of empires by describing the many pitched battles that raged for centuries between the Habsburgs and Ottomans and their numerous vassal states on both sides. It was touted on both sides as being a clash of the Godly versus the infidel.
Territory was the aim. But there was another less tangible motivation, the claim of heir to the legacy of the Roman Empire. I didn’t realize before I read this book that the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves to be the true successors to the title of Roman Emperor because they had conquered the Byzantines and seized Constantinople. Thus, two hundred years later in 1683, when Sultan Mehmed IV sent his armies to conquer Vienna he was setting out to take away the capitol city of the Habsburgs who claimed the title of Holy Roman Empire (a title often regarded as a triple oxymoron).
The author reviews the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. A major part of the book is spent telling the story of the second siege of Vienna in 1683 (the first siege was in 1529). The Ottomans had conquered much of southeastern Europe up to and including Hungary, and since it bordered Austria, it was next in line. The siege lasted a couple months and the Ottomans had managed to breach the defenses and were probably one day away from storming into the central city when relief armies of allied Christian forces arrived. What followed was the Battle of Vienna.
The book then follows relations between Austria and Turkey in subsequent years. Ironically, after being mortal enemies for hundreds of years Turkey and Austria were allies during World War I. And today there are those warning that if Turkey is allowed to join the European Economic Union that the Battle of Vienna would have been fought in vain. It’s interesting how selective memories can be in order to suit particular political leanings.
Territory was the aim. But there was another less tangible motivation, the claim of heir to the legacy of the Roman Empire. I didn’t realize before I read this book that the Ottoman Sultans considered themselves to be the true successors to the title of Roman Emperor because they had conquered the Byzantines and seized Constantinople. Thus, two hundred years later in 1683, when Sultan Mehmed IV sent his armies to conquer Vienna he was setting out to take away the capitol city of the Habsburgs who claimed the title of Holy Roman Empire (a title often regarded as a triple oxymoron).
The author reviews the strengths and weaknesses of both sides. A major part of the book is spent telling the story of the second siege of Vienna in 1683 (the first siege was in 1529). The Ottomans had conquered much of southeastern Europe up to and including Hungary, and since it bordered Austria, it was next in line. The siege lasted a couple months and the Ottomans had managed to breach the defenses and were probably one day away from storming into the central city when relief armies of allied Christian forces arrived. What followed was the Battle of Vienna.
The book then follows relations between Austria and Turkey in subsequent years. Ironically, after being mortal enemies for hundreds of years Turkey and Austria were allies during World War I. And today there are those warning that if Turkey is allowed to join the European Economic Union that the Battle of Vienna would have been fought in vain. It’s interesting how selective memories can be in order to suit particular political leanings.
June 27, 2017
This book had the potential to offer so much on such an interesting subject however I found the author’s style of writing dull, so much so that I had problems finishing this book.
It’s a shame but I don’t think that this book offered anything new in this history of the 1683 Ottoman siege of Vienna that hasn’t already been covered in John Stoye’s “The Siege of Vienna”.
If you have not previously read anything on this subject then this may be the book for you but be aware that I found the writing style to border on being boring and mind-numbing at times. One other compliant I had with the book was that the maps provided were inadequate.
It’s a shame but I don’t think that this book offered anything new in this history of the 1683 Ottoman siege of Vienna that hasn’t already been covered in John Stoye’s “The Siege of Vienna”.
If you have not previously read anything on this subject then this may be the book for you but be aware that I found the writing style to border on being boring and mind-numbing at times. One other compliant I had with the book was that the maps provided were inadequate.
August 13, 2018
An excellent account of the siege of Vienna of 1683 and its aftermath - there is also a little about the history of the Habsburg-ottoman conflict and a good analysis of the reasons for the attack and the previous attempts of the Ottomans to take Vienna, but the bulk of the book is the siege and the Habsburg decisive victories that followed in the next 16 years
March 15, 2015
I enjoyed this fairly detailed history of the centuries of conflict between the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. There is an agenda, but it isn’t addressed until the final chapter, so that the bulk of the book can be read without the fog of a big message. Wheatcroft wants to draw parallells between the fear of the Turk that drove A-H diplomacy military affairs in the 1600s and the fear of the Turk (immigrant) that now affects much European policy toward ‘guest workers’. He makes the case that after some decades of conflict, the Turks and the Ottomans found ways to co-exist and even to unite against other enemies. I’m not sure the parallel works, but it is certainly useful to have the history at hand.
There are detailed descriptions of defenses and battles here, but there is also a good deal of diplomatic history and general information about the times. For example, Wheatcroft cites the essential information sent to Europe many years earlier by the Flemish ambassador Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq from the Ottoman court (recently reviewed by Yann, and in my E-reader now). In the west we do usually hear about the defense of Vienna as the battle that decided the history of Europe, but this places that siege among dozens where possession of towns and citadels see-sawed back and forth between the empires for decades.
There are detailed descriptions of defenses and battles here, but there is also a good deal of diplomatic history and general information about the times. For example, Wheatcroft cites the essential information sent to Europe many years earlier by the Flemish ambassador Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq from the Ottoman court (recently reviewed by Yann, and in my E-reader now). In the west we do usually hear about the defense of Vienna as the battle that decided the history of Europe, but this places that siege among dozens where possession of towns and citadels see-sawed back and forth between the empires for decades.
February 13, 2024
Andrew Wheatcroft is not a gifted writer. His account of the Great Siege of Vienna in 1683 between the Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburg's Holy Roman Empire is particularly turgid in the (barely adequate) political, ideological and military set up and conclusion, only gaining a bit more excitement when the actual siege is discussed. While maps were included, these did not include a detailed map of Vienna during the siege. No timeline was provided either. There were however, numerous grey scale copies of various paintings depicting the siege and portraits of the main players. A bare bones narrative of this particular siege of Vienna.
October 28, 2014
In this book Wheatcroft brilliantly shows the skirmishes and battles that raged for centuries between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, and their numerous vassals on both sides, represented not so much a “clash of civilizations’ as a collision of Empires. The author point out the struggle was not so much between Islam and Christendom, territory was the goal, and the right to claim the legacy of the Roman Empire.
Wheatcroft is the author of several books on both the Hapsburg and Ottomans. He is a noted Habsburg historian. Wheatcroft has done a great deal of research recently in Ottoman studies including issues of military history. The author covers in depth the Siege of Vienna in 1683. Wheatcroft covers both the political and military context of the siege. The Ottomans and their Tatar auxiliaries had great strength in the fighting skills of their infantry and the mobility of their horseman. They were less skilled and disciplined in the art of the Siege.
The book goes a long way to fill the gaps in popular knowledge about the Ottoman, after the Golden age of Mehmed the Conqueror and Suleiman the Magnificent and before the fall of the Empire in WWI. The book focuses on the 17th and 18th century battles between the mightiest Empire of Europe and the largest in the Middle East.
I found the book interesting and easy to read, it nicely filled the gaps in my knowledge of the subject. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Stefan Rudnicki did a good job narrating the book.
Wheatcroft is the author of several books on both the Hapsburg and Ottomans. He is a noted Habsburg historian. Wheatcroft has done a great deal of research recently in Ottoman studies including issues of military history. The author covers in depth the Siege of Vienna in 1683. Wheatcroft covers both the political and military context of the siege. The Ottomans and their Tatar auxiliaries had great strength in the fighting skills of their infantry and the mobility of their horseman. They were less skilled and disciplined in the art of the Siege.
The book goes a long way to fill the gaps in popular knowledge about the Ottoman, after the Golden age of Mehmed the Conqueror and Suleiman the Magnificent and before the fall of the Empire in WWI. The book focuses on the 17th and 18th century battles between the mightiest Empire of Europe and the largest in the Middle East.
I found the book interesting and easy to read, it nicely filled the gaps in my knowledge of the subject. I read this as an audio book downloaded from Audible. Stefan Rudnicki did a good job narrating the book.
July 1, 2012
The book has its strong and weak points. It’s an easy read. It’s informative. The author adds value with his analysis. He makes very persuasive links between the specific subject he covers and broader histories such as those of Europe as a whole. He also makes a strong case against conventional wisdom – especially the famous “sick man of Europe” narrative, which is applied to both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires at certain stages of their history. However, I think I got the gist of his message despite skimming through detailed descriptions of Ottoman military camps. The book in general is sprinkled with pages containing long explanations of subjects that I felt added little value. Another downside was the author himself. His only personal experience relevant to the book’s subject – according to the preface – was his residence in Vienna for a number of years. He also claimed no military or even political experience. Overall, his words carry none of the weight or baggage that, for example, a tried and tested military man would – not to mention a Turk, Austrian or Hungarian. The author’s distance does give him an advantage but simultaneously lightens his work to the point of ridicule in certain instances.
June 21, 2015
This a riveting account of an incredibly dramatic battle, and a key point in world history, that is sadly underdocumented/analyzed in English. The only other available books in current circulation are Stoyes' book, which is extremely dry and dull, and Simmons' book, which is little more than a well-written pamphlet aimed at wargamers.
Wheatcroft does great justice to this incredible story, using a narrative style that focuses in on characters in their own words, and uses the uniting theme of fear-of-the-infidel to draw parallels with current events and to properly seat the book in its national context.
Wheatcroft isn't totally honest in his introduction. This book *is* absolutely a military history, though it engages in a lot less "war-porn" than others of its stripe (by war-porn, I mean detailed descriptions of gear, order-of-battle information, unit designation and exploration, etc . . .), but to my mind, that only makes it more refreshing and satisfying.
The Enemy at the Gate is clearly a life's work, and it's contribution to English-language scholarship on the topic is only underscored by the sadness I felt on finishing it, knowing that there was basically nothing else to read if I wanted more. To Wheatcroft's great credit, I really do.
Wheatcroft does great justice to this incredible story, using a narrative style that focuses in on characters in their own words, and uses the uniting theme of fear-of-the-infidel to draw parallels with current events and to properly seat the book in its national context.
Wheatcroft isn't totally honest in his introduction. This book *is* absolutely a military history, though it engages in a lot less "war-porn" than others of its stripe (by war-porn, I mean detailed descriptions of gear, order-of-battle information, unit designation and exploration, etc . . .), but to my mind, that only makes it more refreshing and satisfying.
The Enemy at the Gate is clearly a life's work, and it's contribution to English-language scholarship on the topic is only underscored by the sadness I felt on finishing it, knowing that there was basically nothing else to read if I wanted more. To Wheatcroft's great credit, I really do.
December 2, 2020
Many historical events can be viewed from different perspectives, but the siege of Vienna, from 17 July – 12 September 1683, is one where historians can look at the same facts yet come to completely different conclusions. For instance, the siege could be viewed as a foolish overreach by the Ottomans, leaving fortified Austrian positions on their flank and trying to maintain an army of 170,000 at the end of a supply line stretching all the way back to Belgrade. However, it has also been seen as a brilliant tactical stroke; from their spies they knew that the Austrians would not expect an attack on Vienna, had widely dispersed their troops trying to discover the Ottomans’ objective, and had allowed the city’s fortifications to fall into disrepair.
Advantage could be given to the Ottomans for having superior elite troops, the sipahi heavy cavalry, tartar light cavalry, and janissary shock troops, as well as a much larger army overall. However, they also had a primitive command and control system that had not evolved with the times; an Ottoman general could order troops to attack, but had very little control over what happened after that. The Austrians had advantages of their own; they had gained hard won experience from the Thirty Years’ War and had evolved their formations to allow generals to move troops quickly around the battlefield. “No Ottoman commander could control or direct his janissaries in the way that a western general could command his infantry. For the Ottomans as the seventeenth century was drawing towards its close the battlefield was increasingly alien and unfamiliar territory.” (p. 46)
A disadvantage for the Ottomans was that their commander could not count on the authority of his position to ensure obedience to his orders. It was, instead, a very personal type of leadership.
A major disadvantage for the Austrians was the political rivalry with France. Louis XIV had ambitions to extend his territory all the way to the Danube, and was at least as big a threat as the Ottomans, forcing them to divide their forces between east and west, and making them dependent on allies. Chronically short of money, they would not have have been able to bring in troops from Poland and Germany had the Pope not bankrolled the campaign.
The siege was a brutal struggle from beginning to end. Ottoman military engineers quickly identified the weakest point in Vienna’s defenses, and concentrated the attack there. Both sides had plenty of artillery and blasted each other day and night. Whenever the commanders thought an opportunity presented itself, they launched sallies resulting in vicious hand to hand fighting in the ditches and outer fortifications, often using primitive hand grenades to great effect. “Nothing until the battle for Stalingrad in 1942 equaled the relentless struggle in the ditch before Vienna. In both battles men fought over the mountains of debris, shattered buildings and a landscape of utter desolation.” (p. 169)
The Turks were siegecraft experts, and relentlessly dug mines under the city’s defenses, each one bringing down part of one of the fortifications. The Austrians had their own counter-mining operations and bloody fighting took place in the dark tunnels.
Slowly but inexorably, the Ottomans advanced, reducing the city’s defenses piece by piece. The defenders knew that it would only be a matter of days, perhaps hours, before the final wall came crashing down and the invaders poured in. Plans were made to defend every street and house. No quarter was expected.
And then, with the attackers on the brink of victory, everything changed. The Austrians’ allies finally arrived. It was not, as has often been portrayed in dramatic histories, a complete surprise, with the Polish cavalry sweeping all before them. The Turks had seen them approaching, and made good use of the terrain to blunt the attack they knew was coming. However, the new troops were fresh and ready for battle; the Turks had been fighting nonstop for two months; they also underestimated the size of the relieving army and did not extend their defensive line far enough. It was into this open space that the Poles charged, armored heavy cavalry with deadly lances. The Ottoman army broke and ran, abandoning the field so quickly that the second wave of Polish knights had nothing to attack. Vienna was saved, at the last possible moment.
The 1683 siege is the centerpiece of this book, but the author covers two hundred years of conflict between the two rival powers. This information provides context for the battle and describes the fortunes of the armies as the lines moved back and forth. Each side saw crushing victories and humiliating defeats. After the siege was lifted the Austrians thought the Ottoman spirit was broken, that they could immediately clear the Balkans and, perhaps, even capture Constantinople. However, they still faced a powerful, disciplined foe and their initial attacks amounted to nothing. Three years later, however, with their army reinforced and well provisioned, they finally captured Buda, high on an almost impregnable hill.
After that, the fortunes of the Austrian armies declined. They could never find the generals they needed, and rarely won battles, whether against the Turks, the French, or the Prussians. The memory of the Ottomans was so strong they spent enormous sums fortifying towns and strongpoints along their southern frontier, and were unable to protect their vulnerable border with France.
Slowly the Ottoman threat subsided, and a new one arose: Russia. The Austrians and the Turks found, if not common cause, a reason to de-escalate tensions in order to confront the Tsar’s aggressive expansionism. By the time of World War I they even became allies against the French, British, and Russians.
There are several books which focus specifically on the 1683 siege, but the broader historical scope of this one does a good job placing the battle into its political, social, religious and strategic contexts. The writing style is clear and there are good notes and a significant bibliography for anyone wanting to find more information.
Advantage could be given to the Ottomans for having superior elite troops, the sipahi heavy cavalry, tartar light cavalry, and janissary shock troops, as well as a much larger army overall. However, they also had a primitive command and control system that had not evolved with the times; an Ottoman general could order troops to attack, but had very little control over what happened after that. The Austrians had advantages of their own; they had gained hard won experience from the Thirty Years’ War and had evolved their formations to allow generals to move troops quickly around the battlefield. “No Ottoman commander could control or direct his janissaries in the way that a western general could command his infantry. For the Ottomans as the seventeenth century was drawing towards its close the battlefield was increasingly alien and unfamiliar territory.” (p. 46)
A disadvantage for the Ottomans was that their commander could not count on the authority of his position to ensure obedience to his orders. It was, instead, a very personal type of leadership.
Ottoman infantry attacks rarely involved manoeuvre or formation, but were instead a headlong assault on an enemy reeling under a shower of arrows, musketry, archery or artillery fire. Making these simple tactics work depended on the greatest possible commitment from every individual, and here, too, there were well-tried methods of sustaining and raising morale. An Ottoman military leader needed to win and sustain the confidence of his troops. For the most part they would follow his orders, although mutiny was not unknown. But he also needed to woo and flatter them, to grease their palms with silver, to speak well of their courage and endurance. (p. 66)
A major disadvantage for the Austrians was the political rivalry with France. Louis XIV had ambitions to extend his territory all the way to the Danube, and was at least as big a threat as the Ottomans, forcing them to divide their forces between east and west, and making them dependent on allies. Chronically short of money, they would not have have been able to bring in troops from Poland and Germany had the Pope not bankrolled the campaign.
The siege was a brutal struggle from beginning to end. Ottoman military engineers quickly identified the weakest point in Vienna’s defenses, and concentrated the attack there. Both sides had plenty of artillery and blasted each other day and night. Whenever the commanders thought an opportunity presented itself, they launched sallies resulting in vicious hand to hand fighting in the ditches and outer fortifications, often using primitive hand grenades to great effect. “Nothing until the battle for Stalingrad in 1942 equaled the relentless struggle in the ditch before Vienna. In both battles men fought over the mountains of debris, shattered buildings and a landscape of utter desolation.” (p. 169)
The Turks were siegecraft experts, and relentlessly dug mines under the city’s defenses, each one bringing down part of one of the fortifications. The Austrians had their own counter-mining operations and bloody fighting took place in the dark tunnels.
Slowly but inexorably, the Ottomans advanced, reducing the city’s defenses piece by piece. The defenders knew that it would only be a matter of days, perhaps hours, before the final wall came crashing down and the invaders poured in. Plans were made to defend every street and house. No quarter was expected.
And then, with the attackers on the brink of victory, everything changed. The Austrians’ allies finally arrived. It was not, as has often been portrayed in dramatic histories, a complete surprise, with the Polish cavalry sweeping all before them. The Turks had seen them approaching, and made good use of the terrain to blunt the attack they knew was coming. However, the new troops were fresh and ready for battle; the Turks had been fighting nonstop for two months; they also underestimated the size of the relieving army and did not extend their defensive line far enough. It was into this open space that the Poles charged, armored heavy cavalry with deadly lances. The Ottoman army broke and ran, abandoning the field so quickly that the second wave of Polish knights had nothing to attack. Vienna was saved, at the last possible moment.
The 1683 siege is the centerpiece of this book, but the author covers two hundred years of conflict between the two rival powers. This information provides context for the battle and describes the fortunes of the armies as the lines moved back and forth. Each side saw crushing victories and humiliating defeats. After the siege was lifted the Austrians thought the Ottoman spirit was broken, that they could immediately clear the Balkans and, perhaps, even capture Constantinople. However, they still faced a powerful, disciplined foe and their initial attacks amounted to nothing. Three years later, however, with their army reinforced and well provisioned, they finally captured Buda, high on an almost impregnable hill.
After that, the fortunes of the Austrian armies declined. They could never find the generals they needed, and rarely won battles, whether against the Turks, the French, or the Prussians. The memory of the Ottomans was so strong they spent enormous sums fortifying towns and strongpoints along their southern frontier, and were unable to protect their vulnerable border with France.
Slowly the Ottoman threat subsided, and a new one arose: Russia. The Austrians and the Turks found, if not common cause, a reason to de-escalate tensions in order to confront the Tsar’s aggressive expansionism. By the time of World War I they even became allies against the French, British, and Russians.
There are several books which focus specifically on the 1683 siege, but the broader historical scope of this one does a good job placing the battle into its political, social, religious and strategic contexts. The writing style is clear and there are good notes and a significant bibliography for anyone wanting to find more information.
May 3, 2025
I read this book a long time ago and even at the time I thought it unsatisfactory. It tries to be an account of the clash between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires over several centuries but is really about the last siege of Vienna in 1683. The story of the siege of 1683 is a wonderful story but this is too short a book to put the siege in proper context nor to cover the siege and its political ramifications. It is neither fish nor fowl. It is also too much taken up with events at the time of its publication. I absolutely deplore any kind of religious bigotry but Wheatcroft indulges in ruminations on 'our' as in Western Europeans need to understand why Muslims in countries like the Netherlands might be offended by women being allowed to go topless like men.
Unfortunately men who feel it is the job of women to be 'modest' least they 'provoke' men into sexual assault are just blaming the victim. I don't think we should do anything to pander to the prejudices of any followers of Middle Eastern 'sky-gods'.
Overall this book left me feeling unsatisfied and also uneasy with undeclared and probklematic unstated agenda.
Unfortunately men who feel it is the job of women to be 'modest' least they 'provoke' men into sexual assault are just blaming the victim. I don't think we should do anything to pander to the prejudices of any followers of Middle Eastern 'sky-gods'.
Overall this book left me feeling unsatisfied and also uneasy with undeclared and probklematic unstated agenda.
February 4, 2014
A good book that could have been great with some editing. I did not know much about the Ottoman empire, or the Siege of Vienna, so I found it enjoyable overall.
The good: overview of Turkish history; description of the Ottoman fighting style, particularly how their organization and cleanliness set them apart from Western armies; the descriptions of the major players (the sultan, emperor, grand vizier and various generals) and the siege of Vienna. The not-so-good: too much military detail in parts; too much detail about the fortifications of Vienna (I had to repeatedly google terms like "bastion"); and the rambling description of the decades following the siege of Vienna (the last few chapters).
Also - I love when this happens - the author's (unwitting) description of Mehmet IV makes me suspect he is gay. It sure sounds like the bookish, diminuative sultan had a crush on his dashing, hyper-masculine Grand Vizier, which makes it all the more shocking that he orders his head when the Ottomans fail to take Vienna.
The good: overview of Turkish history; description of the Ottoman fighting style, particularly how their organization and cleanliness set them apart from Western armies; the descriptions of the major players (the sultan, emperor, grand vizier and various generals) and the siege of Vienna. The not-so-good: too much military detail in parts; too much detail about the fortifications of Vienna (I had to repeatedly google terms like "bastion"); and the rambling description of the decades following the siege of Vienna (the last few chapters).
Also - I love when this happens - the author's (unwitting) description of Mehmet IV makes me suspect he is gay. It sure sounds like the bookish, diminuative sultan had a crush on his dashing, hyper-masculine Grand Vizier, which makes it all the more shocking that he orders his head when the Ottomans fail to take Vienna.
May 14, 2023
Great work of popular history that really brings this warlike period to life. I learned so much about the birth of the Austrian-Hungarian empire and legendary heroes like Prince Eugene. There was also some great material on warlike pashas and the elite shock troops of the Ottoman Empire. The one thing missing was any real account of how the two cultures mixed. There's no mention of what life was like for Christian women under Muslim masters -- or the reverse!
May 27, 2022
This is a very competent book in the way that it covered the history around the rivalry between Ottomans and Habsburgs but also lacks a certain flow of writing to make it a friendlier reading.
April 28, 2019
Excellent history of which I knew very little. Great writing style. The savagery of the Ottoman vs Habsburgs wars is not surpassed anywhere throughout history. Equaled by the Eastern Front of WWII.
June 4, 2015
This book was very informative, but I didn't feel any great passion about it, nor get a huge sense of the author's point of view until the end, when he covers the centuries following this conflict. The Ottomans' continued desire to conquer Vienna belied their conviction that they were the true successors to the Eastern Roman Empire since they had conquered the Byzantine Empire and Constantinople. The Ottomans wanted to be a bit more then merely the leading Islamic nation in trade, technology and war, not to mention piety, as they were also concerned with providing convenient passage for pilgrims to Mecca. The Hapsburgs ruled the Holy Roman Empire and their capital was Vienna, so the quest to take Vienna was ultimately to make a statement about who was the rightful Roman heir. Both empires placed great emphasis on courtly rule and outdated pomp, so this conflict (ten thousand men battled for 37 days), made them seem vital and important again.
The author shows adroitly how the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans became masters of their own brands, and continued into the 20th century by highlighting their past glory and constructing themselves as venerable old guards. The Battle of Vienna is immensely important because it drew the final line in the sand as to how far west Islam would extend into Europe, and also began the process of reclaiming much of Eastern Europe from the Ottomans. However, the importance of this struggle is somewhat overshadowed by the major restructuring of Europe's map and hierarchy following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.
The author shows adroitly how the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans became masters of their own brands, and continued into the 20th century by highlighting their past glory and constructing themselves as venerable old guards. The Battle of Vienna is immensely important because it drew the final line in the sand as to how far west Islam would extend into Europe, and also began the process of reclaiming much of Eastern Europe from the Ottomans. However, the importance of this struggle is somewhat overshadowed by the major restructuring of Europe's map and hierarchy following the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.
March 8, 2014
Enjoyable narrative on the clash between the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires in 1683. A high-water mark for Ottoman conquest in Europe, the Turks were forced back by a Hapsburg counterattack and compelled to surrender Hungary.
Most fascinating for me was the tactical differences between the two armies and the effect of the printing press on Western military development. Turks were hand-to-hand masters who surged forward in a mob, while Hapsburg forces maneuvered in mass thanks to drills codified and disseminated in manuals. Thus Western generals kept more control over their forces once a battle commenced.
The book seemed uneven, with great behind the scenes research on both sides up to the climax at Vienna. Afterwards, the focus shifted to the Hapsburg reconquest of Central Europe, reconciliation between two second-class empires, and, the final irony, alliance against the allies in World War I. All covered very rapidly.
That said, Wheatcroft's book is accessible to both students of the era and novices such as myself. A worthwhile competent history.
Most fascinating for me was the tactical differences between the two armies and the effect of the printing press on Western military development. Turks were hand-to-hand masters who surged forward in a mob, while Hapsburg forces maneuvered in mass thanks to drills codified and disseminated in manuals. Thus Western generals kept more control over their forces once a battle commenced.
The book seemed uneven, with great behind the scenes research on both sides up to the climax at Vienna. Afterwards, the focus shifted to the Hapsburg reconquest of Central Europe, reconciliation between two second-class empires, and, the final irony, alliance against the allies in World War I. All covered very rapidly.
That said, Wheatcroft's book is accessible to both students of the era and novices such as myself. A worthwhile competent history.
November 9, 2012
Could have been a great book had it been either more focused or less focused. The second siege of Vienna is most of the text, and this part is handled well-making me think maybe the book should have just been about that. Everything else was glossed over calling into question the self-stated purpose of a grander historical overview. While I agreed with the author's main thesis about the Hapsburg and Ottoman enemies eventually reconciling from their centuries long rivalry and in the process becoming far more alike than they ever were apart, it was not executed well in the book itself.
December 23, 2022
The book started with A LOT of background to the Ottoman history and empire in general but almost NONE to the Christian side. By the title of the book I thought we would get both but that wasn’t the case.
Also I presumed that it would cover the whole of the Ottoman-Christian struggle. While this was the case for like 3 pages it was only covered the Siege of Vienna. These 2/3 chapters covered a terrible but sensational siege. I would give that part 4 stars and the other parts 2/3 stars.
This might just be my preference but I think this book deserves a 6.5
Also I presumed that it would cover the whole of the Ottoman-Christian struggle. While this was the case for like 3 pages it was only covered the Siege of Vienna. These 2/3 chapters covered a terrible but sensational siege. I would give that part 4 stars and the other parts 2/3 stars.
This might just be my preference but I think this book deserves a 6.5
January 29, 2022
An enjoyable and informative narrative of the Ottoman campaign to take Vienna in 1683, its antecedents and the resulting campaigns by the Hapsburgs to defeat and reverse the Turkish conquests in Europe.
July 29, 2022
Some dry bits but that's life for ya
November 25, 2020
Andrew Wheatcroft opens by reviewing the history of Ottoman expansion, and the divergent evolution of its military to those of the Austrian empire’s. Although Ottoman forces were formidable, technical advances in the west, combined with the tighter control and organization of western forces, meant that the much larger Ottoman force had in Vienna a tough nut to crack. Its attack was reduced to a prolonged siege, one Wheatcroft compares to Stalingrad, until at least the Poles attacked and relieved the Austrians. The history then follows the allied ‘reconquest’ of Hungary, and the attempt to drive the Turks out of Europe entirely. That proved impossible even after the Ottomans fell apart after WW1. The book is more about the war in general, and less about the siege specifically. It’s fine reading, but I’d expected more detail about the battle itself.
August 18, 2020
This is a well researched book. The book on the siege of Vienna in English.
This is why.
Andrew Wheatcroft clearly explains and shows the glory of the siege of Vienna. While making some stupid remarks about some of the Catholic generals being fat and that in the end, they all retired and died, this is outweighed by his recounting of their true Catholic spirit of loyalty, honour, discipline, daring and self sacrifice. Wheatcroft also goes through the aftermath all the way to the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. I give four stars due to his bad spirited remarks of the Catholic generals, and the relish that he obviously has of the destruction of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. It is still a good read.
This is why.
Andrew Wheatcroft clearly explains and shows the glory of the siege of Vienna. While making some stupid remarks about some of the Catholic generals being fat and that in the end, they all retired and died, this is outweighed by his recounting of their true Catholic spirit of loyalty, honour, discipline, daring and self sacrifice. Wheatcroft also goes through the aftermath all the way to the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. I give four stars due to his bad spirited remarks of the Catholic generals, and the relish that he obviously has of the destruction of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. It is still a good read.
December 23, 2020
This is a good, readable book about a period in history that is little-known to us in the English-speaking world. While I enjoyed the book, I found that the author tended to meander at times, and there were a lot of digressions that took away from the focus on the drama before the walls of Vienna in 1683.
An interesting take on the Austro-Turkish relationship is found in the end of the book, when Wheatcroft shows the two empires fostering more friendly relations in the 19th century, ultimately fighting as brothers in arms in World War I.
An interesting take on the Austro-Turkish relationship is found in the end of the book, when Wheatcroft shows the two empires fostering more friendly relations in the 19th century, ultimately fighting as brothers in arms in World War I.
November 29, 2020
Very interesting book that follows the second siege of Vienna from two viewpoints: the build-up from the Ottoman side and the end and aftermath from the Hapsburg camp. Great narrative of the unravelling of the campaign, the conventions of early modern warfare, and the advantages and shortcomings of each side. A great argument is made for a sceptic disposition towards a popular grand statement on the alleged long-term decline of Ottoman power, wherein the siege functions as a tipping point. The weakened, declined Turk is a Hapsburg construct in the years immediately after the successful, dramatic relief of Vienna by Imperial and Polish forces. We need not believe Hapsburg propaganda, whose raison d' etre was to create War Heroes and attract allies and investors for the great plan of a Reconquest in the east.
December 22, 2024
My first dive into the subject, personally I feel like the book was well written and presented only issue and I believe it was touched on in the reviews was its such a large subject to smash into 268 pages it feels rushed in some sections. Other than that it's a great dive into the battle for Europe and introduction into the subject.
August 31, 2021
Exciting, detailed history of the Habsburg-Ottoman wars, written using original, contemporary sources. Super read.
October 25, 2020
Enemy at the Gate is a history of the interaction, in war and in peace, between the Habsburg Empire (or Holy Roman Empire) and the Ottoman Empire, centred on the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683. The siege, its background and aftermath are the core of the book, but the less immediate antecedents (starting from the arrival of the Turks in the Middle East and Anatolia) and aftermath (until the First World War) are also outlined, the more sketchily as the time distance from 1683 increases. The author has used both European and Turkish sources; the bibliography includes more European than Turkish books, but in reading the book I couldn't detect any significant bias in terms of judgment or in terms of the amount of information provided.
By the time Vienna was besieged in 1683, the two empires had been in existence for centuries, but in their extension at that time they went back to the accession to the imperial throne of Charles V in the West (1519) and to the Ottoman conquest of Hungary in the East (1526), the latter having first put the two empires into direct contact following the crumbling of the powerful kingdom of Hungary. The two empires had already clashed at the gates of Vienna (1529) and at sea at Lepanto (1571). Both of these had been victories for the West, but neither had been strategically decisive.
The two empires had similarities and differences. Both were multiethnic polities, but of the two the Habsburg empire was more politically fragmented, being composed of a number of effectively autonomous states or quasi-states, especially in Germany, and religiously fragmented, a Catholic empire including significant Protestant minorities. The Ottoman empire was more unified politically, with the Sultan appointing the Grand Vizier (the head of the executive and military commander) at the head of a uniform, effective and streamlined administration, civil and military. The authority of the Habsburg emperor was much more limited, and depended on successful negotiation with devolved powers in different parts of the Empire. The Ottoman Empire was also wealthier - the lands composing it were not wealthier, but the state had, through centralised taxation, a more effective and bigger source of income at its disposal. The Ottoman Empire also incorporated religious minorities, but treated them better than the Catholic Habsburg treated its own Protestants, especially in Hungary.
There is a legend in Europe about the Ottoman military falling behind the European military. The evidence does not bear this out. Man for man, janissaries (professional infantry) and sipahis (professional cavalry) were better trained and at least as well armed as their western counterparts. Their weapons were different - they used very powerful bows, which required long-term training, and longer, heavier muskets which had greater range and accuracy than western muskets. Their units had received better and longer training, had had time to form a stronger esprit de corps, and were normally capable of very powerful, intense attacks. A further strength of the Ottomans was their homogeneity of equipment, training and warfare techniques, and a superb engineers corps, very well trained in siege warfare.
However, the commanders of the Ottoman armies were much less in control of their men than their western counterparts, whose soldiers had been trained not so much for individual effectiveness but for combat effectiveness in units which could be controlled on a larger scale. War in the West had evolved differently from war in the East. Western armies relied on a combination of conscripted and volunteer troops who were trained in a matter of weeks and whose strength was not so much in the skills of the individual soldier, but in the officers' control of large bodies of men who could be ordered to move and fire in a controlled manner. Western warfare depended on manoeuvre and was slower; Eastern warfare depended on speed and intensity. The downside of that was that an Ottoman attack, once launched, was difficult to control, call back or be made to change direction.
The two empires saw each other as enemies in religious and political terms. Religious competition was understandable on the basis of the universalist claims of both Christianity and Islam. Politically, both empires claimed to be the successors of the Roman Empire - the Habsburg, as the successors of Charlemagne; the Ottomans, as the conquerors of Constantinople, and therefore as the successors of the Roman Empire of the East. Of the two claims, the Habsburg's was on shaky legal grounds: in the 4th century the barbarian warlord Odovacer had deposed the last Western Roman emperor, Romulus Augustulus, and sent the ensigns of the Empire to Constantinople, effectively ceding sovereignty of the West to the Eastern Roman emperor. Thus, the coronation of Charlemagne (by the Pope, who had no imperial authority) was illegal. The Ottoman claim, based on the right of conquest, was at least based on precedent.
The mutual feelings between the population and the ruling and warrior classes of the two empires were mixed. On one hand, in an age where religion permeated the whole vision of society, there was, on both sides, a feeling of contempt for people ruled by a religion that was felt inferior. Each empire considered the other as in decay, moral, military and material, merely on the basis of their assumed religious inferiority. However, the people who were in close contact with the other side had more nuanced views, especially the military commanders who had healthy respect for the other side's abilities.
The underlying motives behind the campaign of 1683 have never been fully considered, and the information is scanty. It is likely that a new war in the west was the result of increasing confidence in Istanbul. Both Sultan and Grand Vizier knew that a full-scale campaign would cost a fortune and would demand the investment of their political credibility. The expenditure of both demanded a worthy objective. The campaign that the Ottoman commanders in Hungary wanted was very limited: capturing one or two of the powerful Habsburg fortresses north and south of the Danube. Yet the symbolic value of taking Vienna was plainly more persuasive than military logic. The conquest of the Habsburg capital, it was felt, would deal a hammer blow to the Habsburg empire and make it vulnerable to further conquest. The time was also well chosen, because the defences of Vienna were in poor state of repair, the Habsburg empire was threatened on its western side by the France of Louis XIV and thus also short of money to finance a serious war on another front. In 1682, victory seemed to be there for the taking.
The campaign was coordinated more or less personally by the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa. The reasons were complex, and partly personal: Kara Mustafa had been adopted into the powerful Koprulu family and wanted to show himself a worthy member of it. He also wished to avenge the defeat at St Gotthard, where an Imperial army under the Italian general Montecuccoli had defeated a larger Ottoman army which had been trapped by bad weather within a bend of the river they were trying to cross. Kara Mustafa was not a very experienced soldier, having only fought in three minor campaigns; he was a competent commander, but, having fought against rather weak enemies, he had come to underestimate his opponents. He took personal command of the besieging army, which numbered some 150,000 men; however, of these only a limited numbers were professional infantry and cavalry, perhaps just about half of the total, the rest being poorly trained volunteers.
The Habsburg commander was Charles, Duke of Lorraine. An experienced soldier who had fought at St Gotthard and against the armies of Louis XIV, he was also a diplomat - a necessary quality because the various contingents making up his army were commanded by officers who were not technically reporting to him. In order to carry our his plans, he relied on his diplomatic skills as well as his authority based on his military experience. His army numbered some 45,000 trained soldiers.
The commander of the Polish army which joined the Habsburg forces was the Polish King in person, Jan Sobieski. He, like Lorraine, was an experienced soldier. The Polish army numbered some 27,000 men, about 18,000 of whom were cavalry, including 5,000 hussars (heavy cavalry).
The commander of the besieged city was Count Ernst von Starhemberg, another experienced soldier who had fought against Ottoman and French forces, with an initial garrison of about 20,000 soldiers and 8,000 volunteers, much reduced during the siege.
The siege lasted from July 14 to September 12 1683. The city had been partly evacuated, only volunteers had remained to defend it; in the short time before the siege started, supplies had been brought in, and the defences (which were initially not in good shape) had been strengthened. Starhemberg had also made provisions to defend the city street by street, in case the defences were breached.
The siege almost succeeded. The Ottoman engineers (about 5,000 of them) undermined the bastions and the other defences systematically and effectively. The fighting, on each of the breaches thus created, was very hard and the casualties on both sides mounted. On the day before the relief army attacked, both sides expected that the last line of defence would be overwhelmed, and iron chains were pulled across every street to stop the Ottoman field guns from moving into the city and to allow the defenders to fight street by street.
The Habsburg relief army had slowly been assembled outside the city, and was joined in early September by the Polish army. The war was financed by the Catholic Church: the Pope, Benedetto Odescalchi, had improved the finances of the Church and financed in full both the imperial army and the Polish army, who joined the Habsburg force on August 31. There wasn't an overall commander. Charles of Lorraine commanded the Habsburg forces, but he had to negotiate his war plans with the largely autonomous commanders of the Saxon, Bavarian and other forces nominally under imperial command. He was also technically below the Polish king, but they effectively shared command as peers.
The joint relief army moved towards Vienna and started to get into position on September 9; after some hesitation, it was decided to attack on September 12, having moved artillery, infantry and cavalry uphill across the difficult terrain of the Wienerwald, and then over the ridge and downhill towards Vienna.
The attack was initially not co-ordinated, and was started by the imperial infantry, which moved without orders to attack Ottoman musketeers who had them in range of their more powerful weapons; Lorraine needed a few hours to regain control of his troops, and then met with the Polish king to coordinate the final push. The besieging army had set up no defences, like ditches or palisades, against an attack, and was routed after a massed charge of the Polish cavalry. The Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, abandoned the field and was later executed by his own side.
Historians have, with the benefits of hindsight, seen the attack on Vienna as a reckless enterprise, doomed to failure. This is not how it looked at the time, and it should be remembered that, when the relief army attacked, the besiegers were only one day away from entering the city. It was a close thing, and the result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Much of the blame for the defeat must be with Kara Mustafa, who conducted the siege competently but failed to set up suitable defences against an attack by the relief army. This might have been due to his experiences in the battlefield, where he fought against minor fortresses and minor enemies whom he easily defeated and routed, leading to complacency on his part. At Vienna he faced experienced and battle-hardened commanders and armies, who were a match for his army and more than a match for him. It is hard to disagree with the Sultan who held him responsible for the defeat - however, if the relief army had come one or two days later, he would have captured Vienna and dislodging him would have been very difficult; in that case, Lorraine and Sobieski would have been blamed for being too slow. Chance played a big role, as often happens in human affairs.
Wheatcroft says that it is a book about fear - the fear of the Ottomans felt by the Westerners, but not the other way round. This seems at first sight odd, since westerners also saw the Ottoman empire as being in a state of decay; however, the fear was real and was based partly on facts, partly on misunderstandings, partly on simple ignorance. On the military side, westerners were aware of the significant victories won by Ottoman armies, and their territorial conquests; they were also aware, and afraid, of the more aggressive, faster style of Ottoman warfare.
The main reason of western fear was however, according to Wheatcroft, the character of the Ottoman state, its greater political unity and its perceived determination and decisiveness. He puts it thus: "There was no contemporary parallel, no state in the western world so powerful, with such a complex bureaucratic structure, governed through so ruthless end untrammelled an autocracy and eliciting such all-pervasive fear."
I find this statement unconvincing. When talking about fear, one has to ask not just fear of whom (in this case, the Ottomans), but also fear by whom. Reading this book, there is no real evidence of fear in the behaviour, tactics and strategy of the Habsburg or Polish military. Wheatcroft's statement in the previous paragraph describes the fear of a political organisation - a rather abstract fear, more likely to be felt by the political elite than by ordinary people, and therefore unlikely to be all-pervasive. However, according to other sources, fear of the Ottomans was felt by Christian populations across much of the Mediterranean because of the frequent raids of privateers from Algiers and other cities in North Africa, who attacked many ports in Italy, Spain, France and elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. One should remember that the emirates of Barbary kept the British and the French busy until the French invaded Algeria between 1830 and 1847.
The fear of the Ottomans faded, as western technology developed, and the legend of decay lived on. However, this legend was proved wrong. We should remember that the Ottoman army defeated the Western allies at Gallipoli during the First World War, and that Turkey was successful in the War of Independence afterwards. Now Turkey is a member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU; it is a country to be taken seriously, as a partner and as a strong voice in the Muslim world, with a distinctive identity.
Still, the old fear of the Turks remains, and has played a part (for example) in the Brexit campaign in 2016.
By the time Vienna was besieged in 1683, the two empires had been in existence for centuries, but in their extension at that time they went back to the accession to the imperial throne of Charles V in the West (1519) and to the Ottoman conquest of Hungary in the East (1526), the latter having first put the two empires into direct contact following the crumbling of the powerful kingdom of Hungary. The two empires had already clashed at the gates of Vienna (1529) and at sea at Lepanto (1571). Both of these had been victories for the West, but neither had been strategically decisive.
The two empires had similarities and differences. Both were multiethnic polities, but of the two the Habsburg empire was more politically fragmented, being composed of a number of effectively autonomous states or quasi-states, especially in Germany, and religiously fragmented, a Catholic empire including significant Protestant minorities. The Ottoman empire was more unified politically, with the Sultan appointing the Grand Vizier (the head of the executive and military commander) at the head of a uniform, effective and streamlined administration, civil and military. The authority of the Habsburg emperor was much more limited, and depended on successful negotiation with devolved powers in different parts of the Empire. The Ottoman Empire was also wealthier - the lands composing it were not wealthier, but the state had, through centralised taxation, a more effective and bigger source of income at its disposal. The Ottoman Empire also incorporated religious minorities, but treated them better than the Catholic Habsburg treated its own Protestants, especially in Hungary.
There is a legend in Europe about the Ottoman military falling behind the European military. The evidence does not bear this out. Man for man, janissaries (professional infantry) and sipahis (professional cavalry) were better trained and at least as well armed as their western counterparts. Their weapons were different - they used very powerful bows, which required long-term training, and longer, heavier muskets which had greater range and accuracy than western muskets. Their units had received better and longer training, had had time to form a stronger esprit de corps, and were normally capable of very powerful, intense attacks. A further strength of the Ottomans was their homogeneity of equipment, training and warfare techniques, and a superb engineers corps, very well trained in siege warfare.
However, the commanders of the Ottoman armies were much less in control of their men than their western counterparts, whose soldiers had been trained not so much for individual effectiveness but for combat effectiveness in units which could be controlled on a larger scale. War in the West had evolved differently from war in the East. Western armies relied on a combination of conscripted and volunteer troops who were trained in a matter of weeks and whose strength was not so much in the skills of the individual soldier, but in the officers' control of large bodies of men who could be ordered to move and fire in a controlled manner. Western warfare depended on manoeuvre and was slower; Eastern warfare depended on speed and intensity. The downside of that was that an Ottoman attack, once launched, was difficult to control, call back or be made to change direction.
The two empires saw each other as enemies in religious and political terms. Religious competition was understandable on the basis of the universalist claims of both Christianity and Islam. Politically, both empires claimed to be the successors of the Roman Empire - the Habsburg, as the successors of Charlemagne; the Ottomans, as the conquerors of Constantinople, and therefore as the successors of the Roman Empire of the East. Of the two claims, the Habsburg's was on shaky legal grounds: in the 4th century the barbarian warlord Odovacer had deposed the last Western Roman emperor, Romulus Augustulus, and sent the ensigns of the Empire to Constantinople, effectively ceding sovereignty of the West to the Eastern Roman emperor. Thus, the coronation of Charlemagne (by the Pope, who had no imperial authority) was illegal. The Ottoman claim, based on the right of conquest, was at least based on precedent.
The mutual feelings between the population and the ruling and warrior classes of the two empires were mixed. On one hand, in an age where religion permeated the whole vision of society, there was, on both sides, a feeling of contempt for people ruled by a religion that was felt inferior. Each empire considered the other as in decay, moral, military and material, merely on the basis of their assumed religious inferiority. However, the people who were in close contact with the other side had more nuanced views, especially the military commanders who had healthy respect for the other side's abilities.
The underlying motives behind the campaign of 1683 have never been fully considered, and the information is scanty. It is likely that a new war in the west was the result of increasing confidence in Istanbul. Both Sultan and Grand Vizier knew that a full-scale campaign would cost a fortune and would demand the investment of their political credibility. The expenditure of both demanded a worthy objective. The campaign that the Ottoman commanders in Hungary wanted was very limited: capturing one or two of the powerful Habsburg fortresses north and south of the Danube. Yet the symbolic value of taking Vienna was plainly more persuasive than military logic. The conquest of the Habsburg capital, it was felt, would deal a hammer blow to the Habsburg empire and make it vulnerable to further conquest. The time was also well chosen, because the defences of Vienna were in poor state of repair, the Habsburg empire was threatened on its western side by the France of Louis XIV and thus also short of money to finance a serious war on another front. In 1682, victory seemed to be there for the taking.
The campaign was coordinated more or less personally by the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa. The reasons were complex, and partly personal: Kara Mustafa had been adopted into the powerful Koprulu family and wanted to show himself a worthy member of it. He also wished to avenge the defeat at St Gotthard, where an Imperial army under the Italian general Montecuccoli had defeated a larger Ottoman army which had been trapped by bad weather within a bend of the river they were trying to cross. Kara Mustafa was not a very experienced soldier, having only fought in three minor campaigns; he was a competent commander, but, having fought against rather weak enemies, he had come to underestimate his opponents. He took personal command of the besieging army, which numbered some 150,000 men; however, of these only a limited numbers were professional infantry and cavalry, perhaps just about half of the total, the rest being poorly trained volunteers.
The Habsburg commander was Charles, Duke of Lorraine. An experienced soldier who had fought at St Gotthard and against the armies of Louis XIV, he was also a diplomat - a necessary quality because the various contingents making up his army were commanded by officers who were not technically reporting to him. In order to carry our his plans, he relied on his diplomatic skills as well as his authority based on his military experience. His army numbered some 45,000 trained soldiers.
The commander of the Polish army which joined the Habsburg forces was the Polish King in person, Jan Sobieski. He, like Lorraine, was an experienced soldier. The Polish army numbered some 27,000 men, about 18,000 of whom were cavalry, including 5,000 hussars (heavy cavalry).
The commander of the besieged city was Count Ernst von Starhemberg, another experienced soldier who had fought against Ottoman and French forces, with an initial garrison of about 20,000 soldiers and 8,000 volunteers, much reduced during the siege.
The siege lasted from July 14 to September 12 1683. The city had been partly evacuated, only volunteers had remained to defend it; in the short time before the siege started, supplies had been brought in, and the defences (which were initially not in good shape) had been strengthened. Starhemberg had also made provisions to defend the city street by street, in case the defences were breached.
The siege almost succeeded. The Ottoman engineers (about 5,000 of them) undermined the bastions and the other defences systematically and effectively. The fighting, on each of the breaches thus created, was very hard and the casualties on both sides mounted. On the day before the relief army attacked, both sides expected that the last line of defence would be overwhelmed, and iron chains were pulled across every street to stop the Ottoman field guns from moving into the city and to allow the defenders to fight street by street.
The Habsburg relief army had slowly been assembled outside the city, and was joined in early September by the Polish army. The war was financed by the Catholic Church: the Pope, Benedetto Odescalchi, had improved the finances of the Church and financed in full both the imperial army and the Polish army, who joined the Habsburg force on August 31. There wasn't an overall commander. Charles of Lorraine commanded the Habsburg forces, but he had to negotiate his war plans with the largely autonomous commanders of the Saxon, Bavarian and other forces nominally under imperial command. He was also technically below the Polish king, but they effectively shared command as peers.
The joint relief army moved towards Vienna and started to get into position on September 9; after some hesitation, it was decided to attack on September 12, having moved artillery, infantry and cavalry uphill across the difficult terrain of the Wienerwald, and then over the ridge and downhill towards Vienna.
The attack was initially not co-ordinated, and was started by the imperial infantry, which moved without orders to attack Ottoman musketeers who had them in range of their more powerful weapons; Lorraine needed a few hours to regain control of his troops, and then met with the Polish king to coordinate the final push. The besieging army had set up no defences, like ditches or palisades, against an attack, and was routed after a massed charge of the Polish cavalry. The Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, abandoned the field and was later executed by his own side.
Historians have, with the benefits of hindsight, seen the attack on Vienna as a reckless enterprise, doomed to failure. This is not how it looked at the time, and it should be remembered that, when the relief army attacked, the besiegers were only one day away from entering the city. It was a close thing, and the result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Much of the blame for the defeat must be with Kara Mustafa, who conducted the siege competently but failed to set up suitable defences against an attack by the relief army. This might have been due to his experiences in the battlefield, where he fought against minor fortresses and minor enemies whom he easily defeated and routed, leading to complacency on his part. At Vienna he faced experienced and battle-hardened commanders and armies, who were a match for his army and more than a match for him. It is hard to disagree with the Sultan who held him responsible for the defeat - however, if the relief army had come one or two days later, he would have captured Vienna and dislodging him would have been very difficult; in that case, Lorraine and Sobieski would have been blamed for being too slow. Chance played a big role, as often happens in human affairs.
Wheatcroft says that it is a book about fear - the fear of the Ottomans felt by the Westerners, but not the other way round. This seems at first sight odd, since westerners also saw the Ottoman empire as being in a state of decay; however, the fear was real and was based partly on facts, partly on misunderstandings, partly on simple ignorance. On the military side, westerners were aware of the significant victories won by Ottoman armies, and their territorial conquests; they were also aware, and afraid, of the more aggressive, faster style of Ottoman warfare.
The main reason of western fear was however, according to Wheatcroft, the character of the Ottoman state, its greater political unity and its perceived determination and decisiveness. He puts it thus: "There was no contemporary parallel, no state in the western world so powerful, with such a complex bureaucratic structure, governed through so ruthless end untrammelled an autocracy and eliciting such all-pervasive fear."
I find this statement unconvincing. When talking about fear, one has to ask not just fear of whom (in this case, the Ottomans), but also fear by whom. Reading this book, there is no real evidence of fear in the behaviour, tactics and strategy of the Habsburg or Polish military. Wheatcroft's statement in the previous paragraph describes the fear of a political organisation - a rather abstract fear, more likely to be felt by the political elite than by ordinary people, and therefore unlikely to be all-pervasive. However, according to other sources, fear of the Ottomans was felt by Christian populations across much of the Mediterranean because of the frequent raids of privateers from Algiers and other cities in North Africa, who attacked many ports in Italy, Spain, France and elsewhere in the western Mediterranean. One should remember that the emirates of Barbary kept the British and the French busy until the French invaded Algeria between 1830 and 1847.
The fear of the Ottomans faded, as western technology developed, and the legend of decay lived on. However, this legend was proved wrong. We should remember that the Ottoman army defeated the Western allies at Gallipoli during the First World War, and that Turkey was successful in the War of Independence afterwards. Now Turkey is a member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU; it is a country to be taken seriously, as a partner and as a strong voice in the Muslim world, with a distinctive identity.
Still, the old fear of the Turks remains, and has played a part (for example) in the Brexit campaign in 2016.
August 14, 2018
This is basically the perfect military history. Beginning with a beautifully written introduction that sets out a few main themes that will guide the writing, what follows is straight narrative history. I was relieved by the lack of "cultural explanations" (indeed this author --Voltaire reborn--doesn't seem to feel passionately about either side) and also thankfully missing is character analysis. You will have to find a different book to learn about the foibles of Leopold, Kara Mustafa, Starhemberg and my beloved favorite Jan Sobieski... this book just tells us what happened. Period. I kept wondering if he would bring his opinions out at the end. He does and he doesn't. He does end with an interesting --very fair-- take on how Turkey's hope to join the EU was received (even citing the Pope's comments on this, which I had never read before). There are restrained opinions regarding the rivalry between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs turning into a surprising alliance later in history. And so to read this as a great clash of civilizations is folly since these sworn enemies became unlikely allies. It was a religious clash but it wasn't (and he does discuss how various Protestant sub groups, and even Islamic subgroups were on opposing sides for this). France, of course, sided with the Ottomans. The book was written before the madman in Norway murdered all those people and cited the "9/11" of Vienna... but he does include the inflammatory blog, the Gates of Vienna.
The book is very old fashioned in the sense that it is wonderfully written and prioritizes what happened over questions about who and why. Highly recommend this.
The book is very old fashioned in the sense that it is wonderfully written and prioritizes what happened over questions about who and why. Highly recommend this.
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