Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays

by Kieran Setiya

In the last forty years, action theory has revitalized moral philosophy. Philosophers have explored the nature of agency, what is involved in acting for a reason, how we know what we are doing, the role of intention, desire, and belief in motivating action, and more. At their most ambitious, philosophers have claimed that action theory is the foundation of ethics. For rationalists or constitutivists, the standards of practical reason derive from the nature of agency as a functional or teleological kind. They are no more mysterious than the standards for being a good clock or a good heart, given the function of clocks and hearts.

In this collection of new and previously published essays, Kieran Setiya defends a causal theory of intentional action on which it is explained by knowledge in intention, a form of practical knowledge that transcends prior evidence. Such knowledge rests on knowing how to do the things we do. The theory is otherwise agents need not regard their reasons as good, put means to ends, or adopt particular aims. It follows that we must reject the rationalist or constitutivist the nature of agency is too thin to support the standards of practical reason. But the upshot is not nihilism. Instead, the requirement of means-end coherence is explained by the cognitive aspect of intention; and the standards of practical reason are those of ethical virtue, applied to practical thought.

Genres: Nonfiction, Philosophy

318 pages, Hardcover

Published October 18, 2016

Reviews

[Istvan Zoltan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a collection of Setiya's essays on issues on actions, ethics, moral psychology, epistemology of action and mind, and some related concerns. 9 of the 12 have appeared in journals in the same forms before, 2 are new, 1 is rewritten, and there is also a long and detailed introduction which gives an overview of Setiya's work and position. The 3 starts (I liked it) indicate that the book is excellent for specialists but not much use for others. As a researcher on action theory I enjoyed it (I knew many of the essays in it since they appeared) and the index and crossreferences were helpful. But even within philosophy it is a very technical book. Some of its conclusions can have wider implications in ethics and moral philosophy, but only if many of Setiya's particular views can be defended in a package.

The essays are hard and will be of interest to philosophers - and very highly trained and smart psychologists and cognitive scientists - specialising in research on human action, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or moral psychology, and maybe in ethics. Advanced grad students can make use of them too.

Setiya's position is intricate and comprehensive: he aims at providing a theory of action, of motivation, of knowledge of intention and action. He addresses the views of Hume, Anscombe, Davidson and several contemporary philosophers. There is a good deal on practical knowledge, knowledge how, the transparency of our beliefs about what we intend, what we do, and what we are going to do. Setiya manages to tie up these concerns with essays on the norms governing practical reasoning, and all this with ethics. The main conclusion is that in the end the constitutive aims of action and agency - if there are any at all - cannot provide the standards of good practical reason, and hence cannot ground ethics either. A hard earned and interesting position.

For anyone who is a serious scholar of action theory and metaethics the book is very much recommended. For others, it is probably enough to read the introduction if they need it, or one or two of the specific papers on the topics that are relevant to their research. Nevertheless it is nice to see the essays in this collected format. Setiya more than deserved a collected edition, and together with his books Reasons without Rationalism, and Knowing Right from Wrong, it constitutes a piece of the impressive achievement of a still young researcher.