What do you think?
Rate this book
Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud
In this classic work, Herbert Marcuse takes as his starting point Freud's statement that civilization is based on the permanent subjugation of the human instincts, his reconstruction of the prehistory of mankind - to an interpretation of the basic trends of western civilization, stressing the philosophical and sociological implications.
304 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1953
238 people are currently reading
8894 people want to read
About the author
Herbert Marcuse
261 books614 followersGerman-Jewish philosopher, political theorist and sociologist, and a member of the Frankfurt School. Celebrated as the "Father of the New Left", his best known works are Eros and Civilization, One-Dimensional Man and The Aesthetic Dimension. Marcuse was a major intellectual influence on the New Left and student movements of the 1960s.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 160 reviews
August 31, 2020
one of the major marx/freud syntheses. makes the basic argument that sex is way hotter in socialism. should've gone without saying, but some y'all as thick as whale omelets.
March 30, 2009
"When philosophy conceives the essence of being as Logos, it is already the Logos of domination--commanding, mastering, directing reason, to which man and nature are to be subjected" (125)
"In its refusal to accept as final the limitations imposed upon freedom and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forget what can be, lies the critical function of phantasy" (149)
"The Orphic Eros transforms being: he masters cruelty and death through liberation. His language is song, and his work is play" (171)
For a thorough and efficient review of Marcuse's arguments, see 121-26 and 241-43. Marcuse bases his arguments on Freud's fundamental observation that a certain amount of repression of instincts is necessary to adapt human subjects to reality, and that this adaptation creates increasingly complicated civilizations while keeping destructive instincts in check. Marcuse then adds that technology is now at a point where the subject suffers 'surplus repression,' above and beyond what is strictly needed to maintain civilization. Freed by technology from the necessity of adapting ourselves to reality, being able to shape nature in whatever way we want (36, 92, 152, 156, 194), not having to devote ourselves to alienating work ("it is the purpose and not the content which marks an activity as play or work" (215)), we should be able to enter into a new civilization founded on the free play of the instincts and the eroticization of the whole life rather than on repression. What would a sensuous, non-repressive Reason (110) look like? Perhaps art tells us, particularly when it is not relegated to being "just art," but when it holds out the possibility of a fully eroticized work-for-itself that refuses all external instrumentality. Now, Marcuse recognized, in his 1966 introduction, that his historical narrative (101) needs some tweaking; 40 years on, we can see that it needs much more.
That said, I love his argument that a return to past repressed pleasures will be the grounds for creating a new future: "the images of phantasy could refer to the unconquered future of mankind rather than to its (badly) conquered past" (147); see also the revolutionary potential of primary narcissism (169) and the pastoral ("The terrible sentence which states that only the lost paradises are the true ones judges and at the same time rescues the temps perdu" (233, see also 49 on "perversions," and 18-19 on the truth value of memory)). On all this, I think of Benjamin's popular "Angel of History" (e.g., 90-91) ;
Having encountered, and had my thought upended by, Marcuse's essay "The Ideology of Death" (here) I want to particularly emphasize this:
Bonus: occasional jabs at Jung and his reactionary "obscurantist pseudo-mythology" (239, also: 148 & 192).
"In its refusal to accept as final the limitations imposed upon freedom and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forget what can be, lies the critical function of phantasy" (149)
"The Orphic Eros transforms being: he masters cruelty and death through liberation. His language is song, and his work is play" (171)
For a thorough and efficient review of Marcuse's arguments, see 121-26 and 241-43. Marcuse bases his arguments on Freud's fundamental observation that a certain amount of repression of instincts is necessary to adapt human subjects to reality, and that this adaptation creates increasingly complicated civilizations while keeping destructive instincts in check. Marcuse then adds that technology is now at a point where the subject suffers 'surplus repression,' above and beyond what is strictly needed to maintain civilization. Freed by technology from the necessity of adapting ourselves to reality, being able to shape nature in whatever way we want (36, 92, 152, 156, 194), not having to devote ourselves to alienating work ("it is the purpose and not the content which marks an activity as play or work" (215)), we should be able to enter into a new civilization founded on the free play of the instincts and the eroticization of the whole life rather than on repression. What would a sensuous, non-repressive Reason (110) look like? Perhaps art tells us, particularly when it is not relegated to being "just art," but when it holds out the possibility of a fully eroticized work-for-itself that refuses all external instrumentality. Now, Marcuse recognized, in his 1966 introduction, that his historical narrative (101) needs some tweaking; 40 years on, we can see that it needs much more.
That said, I love his argument that a return to past repressed pleasures will be the grounds for creating a new future: "the images of phantasy could refer to the unconquered future of mankind rather than to its (badly) conquered past" (147); see also the revolutionary potential of primary narcissism (169) and the pastoral ("The terrible sentence which states that only the lost paradises are the true ones judges and at the same time rescues the temps perdu" (233, see also 49 on "perversions," and 18-19 on the truth value of memory)). On all this, I think of Benjamin's popular "Angel of History" (e.g., 90-91) ;
Having encountered, and had my thought upended by, Marcuse's essay "The Ideology of Death" (here) I want to particularly emphasize this:
The silent 'professional agreement' with the fact of death and disease is perhaps one of the most widespread expressions of the death instinct--or rather, of its social usefulness. In a repressive civilization, death itself becomes an instrument of repression. Whether death is feared as a constant threat, or glorified as supreme sacrifice, or accepted as fate, the education for consent to death introduces an element of surrender into life from the beginning--surrender and submission. It stifles 'utopian' efforts. The powers that be have a deep affinity to death; death is a token of unfreedom, of defeat. Theology and philosophy today compete with each other in celebrating death as an existential category: perverting a biological fact into an ontological essence, they bestow transcendental blessing on the guilt of mankind which they help to perpetuate--they betray the promise of utopia. (236, see also 121)Eros and Civilization should also be praised for its assault on the so-called 'dignity of work,' as Marcuse rightly observes that this productivity is used against (rather than to liberate) workers: "this pleasure [of pride in a job well done:] is extraneous (anticipation of reward), or it is the satisfaction (itself a token of repression) of being well occupied, in the right place, of contributing one's part to the functioning of the apparatus" (220-21). As he argues [summarizing Schiller's revolutionary rereading of Kant:], "Man is free only where he is free from constraint, external and internal, physical or moral--when he is constrained neither by law nor by need. But such constraint is the reality: man is free when 'the reality loses its seriousness' and when its necessity 'becomes light'" (187). It is therefore not adaptation but de-adaptation that the revolutionary Freudian should seek. Adaptations to any one of the various prêt-a-porter personalities available in the current system of citizenship and work should hardly be the proper end of advocates for dignity! Thus Marcuse distinguishes between therapeutic and theoretical methods: therapy resigns its patients to the current order, whereas if Marcuse's theory were used in a therapeutic context it would de-adapt them from the current regime of reason, so creating saints or martyrs (247).
Bonus: occasional jabs at Jung and his reactionary "obscurantist pseudo-mythology" (239, also: 148 & 192).
June 13, 2016
Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud was a sensational bestseller when it first appeared in 1955 (long before fancy agents, big marketing campaigns, and social media). Why did so many people (it sold a total of about 350,000 copies) take to this book? Marcuse asks a very simple question in Eros. We all know that for society to function, we have to repress some of our most instinctual urges. We cannot exact violence on anybody we want (but we leave that to the government), we cannot take what we want (we accept the laws of property), and we cannot sleep with just whoever we desire (especially not in our families). That is the implicit or explicit agreement that makes societies function – – a form of the social contract. But why is it that this repression of some basic urges leads to so much unhappiness? Why don't we set up societies to maximize our pleasure and so that as many of our drives as possible can be satisfied? Why don’t we trade in the most instinctual and unsocial urges for other ways of living out our desires that make us perhaps at least as happy, if not happier? Marcuse proposed that the pleasure principle, which is our urge to live life fully according to what we really want, becomes something else in modern society. It becomes “the performance principle.” The easiest way to understand this is to think about our sexual drive. Instead of leading to fulfillment and erotic happiness, the sexual drive (in modern societies) is redirected to the purposes of procreation, and is thus essentially made useful. But in this way we are not satisfied, but simply taught how to turn our most instinctual desires into something productive. We are not only not allowed to live out our pleasure principle, but we are in fact encouraged to live it out only in productive, socially useful ways (the commodification of sex and procreation). Marcuse examines how this way of putting our most basic impulses in the service of society makes for a profoundly neurotic, unhappy populace (think 1950s America, which can barely contain its urges to live more freely).
The popularity of Marcuse’s book surely rests on this sense that many people had that sexuality was severely repressed in modern society. The book became a touchstone for the transformation of American society from a rather repressive and conservative social model to one where sexual and social mores were gradually loosened to allow more people to live according to what they felt was meaningful in their lives. (It’s important to ask whether the 1960s truly liberated especially people from a repressive regime, and simply found other ways of commodifying it. I’d vote for the former, that there was significant liberation). But Marcuse's book is far more important than only a relic from an era when American society changed profoundly. It is also an investigation into the process by which modern subjects end up desiring what they are supposed to be desiring. How does this happen at the level of the unconscious? We all know that advertising and ideology can change what we really want. But how does this process reach into the parts of our mind that are supposedly out of reach of ideology and education? How do people end up desiring who they desire, since there are obviously differences between people’s sexual preferences. If society formed our desires, we would all desire the same things. If the family is responsible (as Freud suggests), how can children of the same family turn out to be so differently in terms of their desire? There must be an additional force at work that shapes our most unconscious drives, fears, and fantasies. It is at this level that Marcuse wants to locate a revolution: to liberate our unconscious from being put in the service of a social system.
To lay the groundwork for this analysis, Marcuse presents an argument how Western philosophy and morality is built on a gigantic fallacy: “namely, the transformation of facts into essences, of historical into metaphysical conditions" (121). It is not a simple process. Instead it encompasses the entire history of Western philosophy, which postulates a greater or transcendent beyond (the idea of heaven, of a transcendent Meaning or Truth, or of any other substratum of life that is metaphysical, which means located above or outside of physical reality). By transforming factor into essences, Western philosophy (the history of Western philosophers from Plato to Hegel) makes us believe that the things we acquire unconsciously or consciously are natural, innate, and inborn. It is not very long ago that homosexual desire, for instance, was considered unnatural. An entire science was built around that, and anybody who would've argued otherwise was considered not scientific. Interracial marriage was prohibited since it was considered, by European science, to go against the rules of nature. There was all sorts of pseudo-science about women’s bodies in the world (the history of hysteria is an example), and it was accepted as immutable for very long periods. These are concrete examples in which human desire is subordinated to laws and essences that are considered immutable but are clearly just the transformation of facts into essences.
Marcuse describes Western philosophy as being invested in finding Truth or Meaning (this is not his way of putting it), instead of examining how our social existence, including our unconscious drives and desires, is socially constructed. It is worthwhile reading this chapter to see how Marcuse thinks of the struggle for existence that gives rise to early civilizations is initially a struggle for more pleasure. "Later, however, the struggle for existence is organized in the interest of domination: the erotic basis of culture is transformed" (125).
Marcuse turns to Freud to investigate how our desires, fears, and fantasies actually formed. Since these drives are all located not just on the conscious level but also in the unconscious, they cannot simply be attributed to the messages we cognitively grasp. Marcuse’s argued that in modernity, our original and unconscious desires, which Freud called the pleasure principle, are transformed into the performance principle: the drive to be productive in society. The cost for this productivity, as demonstrated by the great number of neurotic and poorly adjusted individuals, was profound unhappiness. Marcuse's book investigates Freud's concepts to show how and whether it would be possible to allow the unconscious desire to live itself out without destroying the social order.
This latter part is the Marxist in Marcuse, who comes out of the Frankfurt school, which applied a social political critique to human existence. But Marcuse is not satisfied with this political analysis. He wants to return to the drives, desires, and fears that are unconscious, and which therefore cannot simply be transformed by passing laws, writing a different constitution, or telling people something else.
But is Freud the way out of our historical dilemma? Marcuse thought so, and postulated a different way of understanding the pleasure principle. We should think of the pleasure principle as an urge to reach erotic fulfillment that is misconstrued – at the deep level of the unconscious, and not only by theorists, educators, and therapists – as being linked almost exclusively on genital sex and procreation. The book ends with a discussion of such a possibility of a more holistic form of erotic pleasure that strikes me as very 60s and somewhat fantastical. (The only way I can make sense of it is by thinking of the problematic conception of the pleasure principle as linked to genital sex and procreation as Western medicine, and Marcuse’s idea of a more holistic way of pleasure that involves the whole body and mind as alternative, Asian medicine. No surprise that the 1960s discovered “free love” and the Kama Sutra.) There is only one or two moments in the book where Marcuse talks about one of the central conundrums of Freudian theory: which is the way women are not allowed to express or live out their desire in modern, or any society. Marcuse acknowledges that there exist matriarchal societies where a different conception of eros that is not entirely bound to performance and productivity is possible. But he never develops this claim that the suppression of women's desire might be the key to control society, and that the true liberation of women would be the transformation of society. (I refer you to Catharine MacKinnon’s incisive critiques of 1960’s sexual liberation ideologies as ultimately mostly liberating straight men to have more sex with more women they regarded as objects).
It is as if feminism is lurking in the background but Marcuse cannot get himself to really acknowledge it. He writes that today the conditions for a revolutionary conception of desire – which we could also consider human happiness – are given. A true revolution would be possible today since work can provide for all necessities, and the excess energy could be used for pleasure. Instead, we have a situation where the excess energy that is no longer used to just survive and find food and shelter is used to administer more control. (Marcuse dismisses the argument that there are too many people on the planet by pointing out that scarcity is a man-made creation. If it is not true for the entire planet, it is certainly true that in Western industrialized nations, it would be possible to feed everyone and still give people enough time to pursue other things that would make them happy.) But he never really investigates whether women might be the subject and agents of their own desire, rather than being the object of desire because of their tremendous beauty and "the promise of happiness" held by this beauty.
The final chapter offers a sharp critique of Erich Fromm (another cult author of the era worth reading today). Marcuse's problem with Fromm and the Power of Positive Thinking that Fromm first postulated and which gives rise to an entire industry that ends up in today's self help books, is that it posits a "higher self" or a "best self" which is ultimately just a conformist entity that adheres to the cruel mandate of productivity in modern (capitalist or communist) societies. Marcuse sees great danger in these kinds of ideologies which effectively turn psychic or psychological struggles into moral problems: A neurosis is regarded as a moral (rather then mental health or externally caused) failure because if you cannot free yourself from it (with the help of therapy and Positive Thinking), then obviously you are somewhat responsible for your own dysfunctional traits.
Marcuse's book contains enough ideas to still spark a desire for a revolution today. There are technical and academic moments, especially in the discussion of Freud. But the philosophical interlude is a succinct and useful summary of Western philosophy. And the question of how our most instinctual and hidden desire, fears and fantasies are shaped is critical to answer for any politics worth its salt. It’s not sufficient to simply tell people that they want the wrong thing, and should choose something else. It’s a matter of understanding how they ended up wanting was is evidently not good for them, and how they started liking it, for any real change to take root.
The popularity of Marcuse’s book surely rests on this sense that many people had that sexuality was severely repressed in modern society. The book became a touchstone for the transformation of American society from a rather repressive and conservative social model to one where sexual and social mores were gradually loosened to allow more people to live according to what they felt was meaningful in their lives. (It’s important to ask whether the 1960s truly liberated especially people from a repressive regime, and simply found other ways of commodifying it. I’d vote for the former, that there was significant liberation). But Marcuse's book is far more important than only a relic from an era when American society changed profoundly. It is also an investigation into the process by which modern subjects end up desiring what they are supposed to be desiring. How does this happen at the level of the unconscious? We all know that advertising and ideology can change what we really want. But how does this process reach into the parts of our mind that are supposedly out of reach of ideology and education? How do people end up desiring who they desire, since there are obviously differences between people’s sexual preferences. If society formed our desires, we would all desire the same things. If the family is responsible (as Freud suggests), how can children of the same family turn out to be so differently in terms of their desire? There must be an additional force at work that shapes our most unconscious drives, fears, and fantasies. It is at this level that Marcuse wants to locate a revolution: to liberate our unconscious from being put in the service of a social system.
To lay the groundwork for this analysis, Marcuse presents an argument how Western philosophy and morality is built on a gigantic fallacy: “namely, the transformation of facts into essences, of historical into metaphysical conditions" (121). It is not a simple process. Instead it encompasses the entire history of Western philosophy, which postulates a greater or transcendent beyond (the idea of heaven, of a transcendent Meaning or Truth, or of any other substratum of life that is metaphysical, which means located above or outside of physical reality). By transforming factor into essences, Western philosophy (the history of Western philosophers from Plato to Hegel) makes us believe that the things we acquire unconsciously or consciously are natural, innate, and inborn. It is not very long ago that homosexual desire, for instance, was considered unnatural. An entire science was built around that, and anybody who would've argued otherwise was considered not scientific. Interracial marriage was prohibited since it was considered, by European science, to go against the rules of nature. There was all sorts of pseudo-science about women’s bodies in the world (the history of hysteria is an example), and it was accepted as immutable for very long periods. These are concrete examples in which human desire is subordinated to laws and essences that are considered immutable but are clearly just the transformation of facts into essences.
Marcuse describes Western philosophy as being invested in finding Truth or Meaning (this is not his way of putting it), instead of examining how our social existence, including our unconscious drives and desires, is socially constructed. It is worthwhile reading this chapter to see how Marcuse thinks of the struggle for existence that gives rise to early civilizations is initially a struggle for more pleasure. "Later, however, the struggle for existence is organized in the interest of domination: the erotic basis of culture is transformed" (125).
Marcuse turns to Freud to investigate how our desires, fears, and fantasies actually formed. Since these drives are all located not just on the conscious level but also in the unconscious, they cannot simply be attributed to the messages we cognitively grasp. Marcuse’s argued that in modernity, our original and unconscious desires, which Freud called the pleasure principle, are transformed into the performance principle: the drive to be productive in society. The cost for this productivity, as demonstrated by the great number of neurotic and poorly adjusted individuals, was profound unhappiness. Marcuse's book investigates Freud's concepts to show how and whether it would be possible to allow the unconscious desire to live itself out without destroying the social order.
This latter part is the Marxist in Marcuse, who comes out of the Frankfurt school, which applied a social political critique to human existence. But Marcuse is not satisfied with this political analysis. He wants to return to the drives, desires, and fears that are unconscious, and which therefore cannot simply be transformed by passing laws, writing a different constitution, or telling people something else.
But is Freud the way out of our historical dilemma? Marcuse thought so, and postulated a different way of understanding the pleasure principle. We should think of the pleasure principle as an urge to reach erotic fulfillment that is misconstrued – at the deep level of the unconscious, and not only by theorists, educators, and therapists – as being linked almost exclusively on genital sex and procreation. The book ends with a discussion of such a possibility of a more holistic form of erotic pleasure that strikes me as very 60s and somewhat fantastical. (The only way I can make sense of it is by thinking of the problematic conception of the pleasure principle as linked to genital sex and procreation as Western medicine, and Marcuse’s idea of a more holistic way of pleasure that involves the whole body and mind as alternative, Asian medicine. No surprise that the 1960s discovered “free love” and the Kama Sutra.) There is only one or two moments in the book where Marcuse talks about one of the central conundrums of Freudian theory: which is the way women are not allowed to express or live out their desire in modern, or any society. Marcuse acknowledges that there exist matriarchal societies where a different conception of eros that is not entirely bound to performance and productivity is possible. But he never develops this claim that the suppression of women's desire might be the key to control society, and that the true liberation of women would be the transformation of society. (I refer you to Catharine MacKinnon’s incisive critiques of 1960’s sexual liberation ideologies as ultimately mostly liberating straight men to have more sex with more women they regarded as objects).
It is as if feminism is lurking in the background but Marcuse cannot get himself to really acknowledge it. He writes that today the conditions for a revolutionary conception of desire – which we could also consider human happiness – are given. A true revolution would be possible today since work can provide for all necessities, and the excess energy could be used for pleasure. Instead, we have a situation where the excess energy that is no longer used to just survive and find food and shelter is used to administer more control. (Marcuse dismisses the argument that there are too many people on the planet by pointing out that scarcity is a man-made creation. If it is not true for the entire planet, it is certainly true that in Western industrialized nations, it would be possible to feed everyone and still give people enough time to pursue other things that would make them happy.) But he never really investigates whether women might be the subject and agents of their own desire, rather than being the object of desire because of their tremendous beauty and "the promise of happiness" held by this beauty.
The final chapter offers a sharp critique of Erich Fromm (another cult author of the era worth reading today). Marcuse's problem with Fromm and the Power of Positive Thinking that Fromm first postulated and which gives rise to an entire industry that ends up in today's self help books, is that it posits a "higher self" or a "best self" which is ultimately just a conformist entity that adheres to the cruel mandate of productivity in modern (capitalist or communist) societies. Marcuse sees great danger in these kinds of ideologies which effectively turn psychic or psychological struggles into moral problems: A neurosis is regarded as a moral (rather then mental health or externally caused) failure because if you cannot free yourself from it (with the help of therapy and Positive Thinking), then obviously you are somewhat responsible for your own dysfunctional traits.
Marcuse's book contains enough ideas to still spark a desire for a revolution today. There are technical and academic moments, especially in the discussion of Freud. But the philosophical interlude is a succinct and useful summary of Western philosophy. And the question of how our most instinctual and hidden desire, fears and fantasies are shaped is critical to answer for any politics worth its salt. It’s not sufficient to simply tell people that they want the wrong thing, and should choose something else. It’s a matter of understanding how they ended up wanting was is evidently not good for them, and how they started liking it, for any real change to take root.
November 11, 2018
Esse livro é um lufar de inteligência nesses tempos em que as pessoas se orgulham de sua indigência intelectual, a partir das pulsões freudianas básicas Marcuse semeia questões sobre a hipótese repressiva e subverte seus resultados e isso abrange desde o trabalho até às questões estéticas. Livraço.
July 17, 2018
A fantastic celebration and reinterpretation of Freud, which demonstrates not only the possibility of a radically free and non-repressive society but the historical necessity of it.
Marcuse works through the tradition of German idealism, borrowing from Kant, Schiller and Hegel, as well as the utopian tradition against the conservative readings of the non-repressive society by Jung and Freud. As well as this, Marcuse spends the final chapter obliterating the revisionist NeoFreudians, focusing on Horney, Fromm (Marcuse's interlocutor at the Frankfurt School) and Sullivan (a figure who still holds sway in the modern psychoanalytic schools).
Marcuse works through the tradition of German idealism, borrowing from Kant, Schiller and Hegel, as well as the utopian tradition against the conservative readings of the non-repressive society by Jung and Freud. As well as this, Marcuse spends the final chapter obliterating the revisionist NeoFreudians, focusing on Horney, Fromm (Marcuse's interlocutor at the Frankfurt School) and Sullivan (a figure who still holds sway in the modern psychoanalytic schools).
July 8, 2024
Philosophy for those who are young, dumb and full of cum!!!
August 30, 2009
During the 1995-1996 school year, I took Andrew Cutrofello's philosophy class entitled "Action & Value: Happiness & Responsibility." We read Kant's "Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals," Freud's "Civilization and Its Discontents," Marcuse's "Eros and Civilization, Renata Salecl's (a Lacanian) "The Spoils of Freedom," and Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics." Loyola had a large core curriculum that required three philosophy classes. I had already taken Philosophy of Human Nature, the one common philosophy class that all students take, as well as a class in logic with Harry Gensler, a Jesuit who was at Loyola and wrote the book. While I enjoyed both of my previous philosophy classes, it was Andrew's class and Marcuse's work that inspired me to take more philosophy classes -- I first took three more classes to complete a minor, one with John Bannan on "Philosophy of Emotion," one with Paul Abela on "Philosophy of Mind," and one with Jeffry Librett in the German department that was cross-listed with philosophy entitled "Psychoanalysis and Frankfurt School Social Theory." I again read Marcuse, and liked him even more the second time around (although Librett, while good, wasn't as great as Andrew). Later, I decided to become a philosophy major. I wound up reading Eros and Civilization three times during my undergrad career. I think my old roommate walked away with my copy of the book, though. I think Marcuse is my favorite critical theorist -- I like him better than Habarmas, who came to speak at Loyola while I was in grad school (the only works of Habarmas I made it through completely are "Communication and the Evolution of Society" and ""Knowledge and Human Interests", so maybe I'd like him more if I read more, but I doubt I'll do that). Then again, I did really enjoy Fromm. Anyway, Marcuse treats Freud and Marx, and does a good job of it. I'll stop rambling now, but if you'd like to see a video on Marcuse, see "Herbert's Hippopotamus."
http://video.google.com/videoplay?doc...
http://video.google.com/videoplay?doc...
July 10, 2022
just a teen girl spending her summer reading Freudian analysis 😊
Key Sections:
https://francesbeau.tumblr.com/post/6...
Key Sections:
https://francesbeau.tumblr.com/post/6...
May 18, 2016
Marcuse reworks Freud’s categories from the individual to society. To paraphrase Henry van Til, Marcuse is Freud externalized. There is a dialectic between the Eros principle and the Thanatos principle. In order for civilization to thrive, it has to suppress the libido, the free drive.
Freud identifies civilization with repression.
The Frankfurt end-game is a “non-repressive civilization” (Marcuse 5). “The very achievements of repression seem to create the preconditions for the gradual abolition of repression.” “The reality principle materializes in a system of institutions” (15). In other words, our continually suppressing the Eros-drive reshapes our very psychology which is further instantiated in institutions. Yet this pleasure principle remains latent in civilization.
Man experiences a dialectical conflict between the “life instinct” (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos). Key argument: man’s primary mental processes are sustained by the life principle, which is the pleasure principle. The problem: how can man continue in civilization if civilization is a suppressing of this life principle?
Key argument: correlation between progress and “guilty feeling” (78). Civilization will be violent in its structure because civilization is simply an expanding of the Father-figure, against whom the sons will always war. technology allows man to increase output while minimizing input, thus freeing “time” for Eros. In other words, in previous eras an emphasis on Eros meant denying civilization, but now with technology we can emphasize Eros while promoting civilization (93).
But the “Regime” (for lack of a better word) won’t allow this to continue uncontrolled, for if man is utterly free, then he is free from external control. How will the Regime do this? Possibly by technology, since technology can abolish both the individual and the “social function of the family” (96). Since technology has negated the family, who is the new father-figure? The corporo-capitalist bureaucracy. Marcuse notes, “Social control and cohesion are strong enough to protect the whole from direct aggression, but not strong enough to eliminate the accumulated aggressiveness” (101).
Key argument: Man’s history represents a splitting between the fantasy principle and the reason-principle (142). Man has a divided ego. For Marcuse aesthetics is self-defeating. If art is committed to form, then it is negated for it cannot then pursue freedom. Form = negation.
reason has been reduced to the rationality principle (159). Narcissus gazes into the river, which symbolizes the flux of time. Narcissus and Orpheus represent latent desires which are at odds with rationality-principle.
Kant: the aesthetic judgment is the realm where sense and imagination meet; it is the medium b/t freedom and nature.
Marcuse wants to use Kant and Schiller’s aesthetic to base a non-repressive civilization, one that contains a new rationality-principle. But here is the problem: Marcuse claims to unify art with reason, but most of his discussion (184-185) seems like an antagonism between the two. For Marcuse sees art-beauty as arising from the dark, latent forces.
Combine this with the Eroticization of society where one frees the libido from non-repressive civilization, and you have the nightmare which is modern art. This explains why most National Endowment for the Arts is pornographic. They take the correct insight that we have these dark, primal forces and they externalize them in society.
Pros
(1) Marcuse has put his finger on the tendency of modern industrial world to alienate workers, and this alienation often moves in dialectical ways.
(2) Marcuse points out the dangers of reducing economics to simply raising production while lowering costs--such leads to alienation (156).
Criticisms
(1) As Nancy Holland notes, “ Although scarcity may not have seemed to be an irreducible given when Marcuse wrote his book, the limits of the world’s supply of food, water, energy, and even clean air are now all too obvious” (Holland 76).
(2) As it stands Freud’s apparent definition of freedom is untenable: freedom from authority (be it ego or society) to pursue the id. Such chaos would necessarily reduce to anarchy, which is no freedom at all. How far does Marcuse go with this? I can sense he rejects (correctly) Freud on the personal level but applies him on the social level.
Freud identifies civilization with repression.
The Frankfurt end-game is a “non-repressive civilization” (Marcuse 5). “The very achievements of repression seem to create the preconditions for the gradual abolition of repression.” “The reality principle materializes in a system of institutions” (15). In other words, our continually suppressing the Eros-drive reshapes our very psychology which is further instantiated in institutions. Yet this pleasure principle remains latent in civilization.
Man experiences a dialectical conflict between the “life instinct” (Eros) and the death instinct (Thanatos). Key argument: man’s primary mental processes are sustained by the life principle, which is the pleasure principle. The problem: how can man continue in civilization if civilization is a suppressing of this life principle?
Key argument: correlation between progress and “guilty feeling” (78). Civilization will be violent in its structure because civilization is simply an expanding of the Father-figure, against whom the sons will always war. technology allows man to increase output while minimizing input, thus freeing “time” for Eros. In other words, in previous eras an emphasis on Eros meant denying civilization, but now with technology we can emphasize Eros while promoting civilization (93).
But the “Regime” (for lack of a better word) won’t allow this to continue uncontrolled, for if man is utterly free, then he is free from external control. How will the Regime do this? Possibly by technology, since technology can abolish both the individual and the “social function of the family” (96). Since technology has negated the family, who is the new father-figure? The corporo-capitalist bureaucracy. Marcuse notes, “Social control and cohesion are strong enough to protect the whole from direct aggression, but not strong enough to eliminate the accumulated aggressiveness” (101).
Key argument: Man’s history represents a splitting between the fantasy principle and the reason-principle (142). Man has a divided ego. For Marcuse aesthetics is self-defeating. If art is committed to form, then it is negated for it cannot then pursue freedom. Form = negation.
reason has been reduced to the rationality principle (159). Narcissus gazes into the river, which symbolizes the flux of time. Narcissus and Orpheus represent latent desires which are at odds with rationality-principle.
Kant: the aesthetic judgment is the realm where sense and imagination meet; it is the medium b/t freedom and nature.
Marcuse wants to use Kant and Schiller’s aesthetic to base a non-repressive civilization, one that contains a new rationality-principle. But here is the problem: Marcuse claims to unify art with reason, but most of his discussion (184-185) seems like an antagonism between the two. For Marcuse sees art-beauty as arising from the dark, latent forces.
Combine this with the Eroticization of society where one frees the libido from non-repressive civilization, and you have the nightmare which is modern art. This explains why most National Endowment for the Arts is pornographic. They take the correct insight that we have these dark, primal forces and they externalize them in society.
Pros
(1) Marcuse has put his finger on the tendency of modern industrial world to alienate workers, and this alienation often moves in dialectical ways.
(2) Marcuse points out the dangers of reducing economics to simply raising production while lowering costs--such leads to alienation (156).
Criticisms
(1) As Nancy Holland notes, “ Although scarcity may not have seemed to be an irreducible given when Marcuse wrote his book, the limits of the world’s supply of food, water, energy, and even clean air are now all too obvious” (Holland 76).
(2) As it stands Freud’s apparent definition of freedom is untenable: freedom from authority (be it ego or society) to pursue the id. Such chaos would necessarily reduce to anarchy, which is no freedom at all. How far does Marcuse go with this? I can sense he rejects (correctly) Freud on the personal level but applies him on the social level.
January 11, 2015
During my undergraduate days, there was a big fuss made in the liberal arts-side of my college education about Herbert Marcuse, so I read 2 books authored by him. This one was the first one I read and I must say I quite underwhelmed by his theories stated within this book. I'd consider it to be a second-rate sexualized Freud and many of his theories are not well-stated. I find it interesting that a second-rate philosopher such as Marcuse would be so acclaimed in current-day academia.
May 30, 2021
A fascinating attempt to meld psychoanalytic and Marxist analyses, which yields many insights and much hope. While holding fast to Freud's idea that civilization is the result of the repression of the pleasure principle in favor of the reality principle, Marcuse argues for his own idea of a surplus repression, which is the result of historically determined social domination due to scarcity. As technology creates abundance, such domination becomes increasingly irrational, opening the way for the reduction of surplus repression and even biological repression. In short, we will work less and play more. As civilization matures in the era of abundance, sexuality will be transformed into Eros, which will diffuse the pleasure principle into all aspects of life, including work. Right now, we don't have abundance, but we do have aesthetics ("the science of sensuousness") and archetypes such as Orpheus and Narcissus to provide an image of what can and will be.
From Herman Hesse, I've always thought of poetry as, somewhat contradictory, both game and prayer. After reading Marcuse, I've realized the connection between the two: poetry is play, and the prayer is for a time when poetry is purely play.
"The excuse of scarcity, which has justified institutional repression since its inception, weakens as man's knowledge and control over nature enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a minimum of toil... Technology operates against the repressive utilization of energy in so far as it minimizes the time necessary for the production of the necessities of life, thus saving time for the development of needs beyond the realm of necessity and necessary waste." (92-93)
"Civilization has to defend itself against the specter of a world which could be free." (93)
"With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with the multiplication of functions, all domination assumes the form of administration." (98)
"The better living is offset by the all-pervasive control over living. People dwell in apartment concentrations—and have private automobiles with which they can no longer escape into a different world. They have huge refrigerators filled with frozen foods. They have dozens of newspapers and magazines that espouse the same ideals. They have innumerable choices, innumerable gadgets which are all of the same sort and keep them occupied and divert their attention from the real issue—which is the awareness that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions. (100)
"... happiness is not in the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the reality of freedom and satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge: it is the prerogative of the animal rationale." (104)
"... behind the aesthetic form lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason—the eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination, the critique of the performance principle." (144)
"Primary narcissism is more than autoeroticism; it engulfs the "environment," integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world.... Freud describes the "ideational content" of the surviving primary ego-feeling as "limitless extension and oneness with the universe" (oceanic feeling).... In other words, narcissism may contain the germ of a different reality principle: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the obejctive world—transforming this world into a new mode of being." (168-169)
"The basic experience in this dimension is sensuous rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception is essentially intuition, not notion. The nature of sensuousness is "receptivity," cognition through being affected by given objects.... The aesthetic perception is accompanied by pleasure. This pleasure derives from the perception of the pure form of an object, regardless of its "matter" and of its (internal or external) "purpose." (176-177)
"The two main categories defining this order are "purposiveness without purpose" and "lawfulness without law. They circumscribe, beyond the Kantian context, the essence of a truly non-repressive order. The first defines the structure of beauty, the second that of freedom; their common character is gratification in the free play of the released potentialities of man and nature." (177)
"the interest of the senses" (182)
"The quest for the solution of a "political" problem: the liberation of man from inhuman existential conditions. Schiller states that, in order to solve the political problem, "one must pass through the aesthetic, since it is beauty that leads to freedom." The play impulse is the vehicle of this liberation. The impulse does not aim at playing "with" something; rather it is the play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion—the manifestation of an existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself." (187)
"No longer used as a full-time instrument of labor, the body would be resexualized. The regression involved in this spread of the libido would first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy. The body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis, a thing to be enjoyed—an instrument of pleasure. This change in the value and scope of libidinal relations would lead to a disintegration of the institutions in which the private interpersonal relations have been organized, particularly the monogamic and patriarchal family." (201)
"In the light of the idea of non-repressive sublimation, Freud's definition of Eros as striving to "form living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may be prolonged and brought to higher development" takes on added significance. The biological drive becomes a cultural drive. The pleasure principle reveals its own dialectic. The erotic aim of sustaining the entire body as subject-object of pleasure calls for the continual refinement of the organism, the intensification of its receptivity, the growth of its sensuousness. The aim generates its own projects of realization: the abolition of toil, the amelioration of the environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the creation of luxury. All these activities flow directly from the pleasure principle, and at the same time, they constitute work which associates individuals to "greater unities"; no longer confined within the mutilating dominion of the performance principle, they modify the impulse without deflecting it from its aim. There is sublimation and, consequently, culture; but this sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations, which are in themselves work relations." (211-212)
"The striving for lasting gratification makes not only for an enlarged order of libidinal relations (community) but also for the perpetuation of this order on a higher scale.... mature civilization depends for its functioning on a multitude of co-ordinated arrangements." (223-224)
"The necessity of death does not refute the possibility of final liberation. Like the other necessities, it can be made rational—painless. Men can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die—at a moment of their own choosing. But even the ultimate advent of freedom cannot redeem those who died in pain. It is the remembrance of them, and the accumulated guilt of mankind against its victims, that darken the prospect of a civilization without repression." (236-237)
From Herman Hesse, I've always thought of poetry as, somewhat contradictory, both game and prayer. After reading Marcuse, I've realized the connection between the two: poetry is play, and the prayer is for a time when poetry is purely play.
"The excuse of scarcity, which has justified institutional repression since its inception, weakens as man's knowledge and control over nature enhances the means for fulfilling human needs with a minimum of toil... Technology operates against the repressive utilization of energy in so far as it minimizes the time necessary for the production of the necessities of life, thus saving time for the development of needs beyond the realm of necessity and necessary waste." (92-93)
"Civilization has to defend itself against the specter of a world which could be free." (93)
"With the rationalization of the productive apparatus, with the multiplication of functions, all domination assumes the form of administration." (98)
"The better living is offset by the all-pervasive control over living. People dwell in apartment concentrations—and have private automobiles with which they can no longer escape into a different world. They have huge refrigerators filled with frozen foods. They have dozens of newspapers and magazines that espouse the same ideals. They have innumerable choices, innumerable gadgets which are all of the same sort and keep them occupied and divert their attention from the real issue—which is the awareness that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions. (100)
"... happiness is not in the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the reality of freedom and satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge: it is the prerogative of the animal rationale." (104)
"... behind the aesthetic form lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and reason—the eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of domination, the critique of the performance principle." (144)
"Primary narcissism is more than autoeroticism; it engulfs the "environment," integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world.... Freud describes the "ideational content" of the surviving primary ego-feeling as "limitless extension and oneness with the universe" (oceanic feeling).... In other words, narcissism may contain the germ of a different reality principle: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the obejctive world—transforming this world into a new mode of being." (168-169)
"The basic experience in this dimension is sensuous rather than conceptual; the aesthetic perception is essentially intuition, not notion. The nature of sensuousness is "receptivity," cognition through being affected by given objects.... The aesthetic perception is accompanied by pleasure. This pleasure derives from the perception of the pure form of an object, regardless of its "matter" and of its (internal or external) "purpose." (176-177)
"The two main categories defining this order are "purposiveness without purpose" and "lawfulness without law. They circumscribe, beyond the Kantian context, the essence of a truly non-repressive order. The first defines the structure of beauty, the second that of freedom; their common character is gratification in the free play of the released potentialities of man and nature." (177)
"the interest of the senses" (182)
"The quest for the solution of a "political" problem: the liberation of man from inhuman existential conditions. Schiller states that, in order to solve the political problem, "one must pass through the aesthetic, since it is beauty that leads to freedom." The play impulse is the vehicle of this liberation. The impulse does not aim at playing "with" something; rather it is the play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion—the manifestation of an existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself." (187)
"No longer used as a full-time instrument of labor, the body would be resexualized. The regression involved in this spread of the libido would first manifest itself in a reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy. The body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis, a thing to be enjoyed—an instrument of pleasure. This change in the value and scope of libidinal relations would lead to a disintegration of the institutions in which the private interpersonal relations have been organized, particularly the monogamic and patriarchal family." (201)
"In the light of the idea of non-repressive sublimation, Freud's definition of Eros as striving to "form living substance into ever greater unities, so that life may be prolonged and brought to higher development" takes on added significance. The biological drive becomes a cultural drive. The pleasure principle reveals its own dialectic. The erotic aim of sustaining the entire body as subject-object of pleasure calls for the continual refinement of the organism, the intensification of its receptivity, the growth of its sensuousness. The aim generates its own projects of realization: the abolition of toil, the amelioration of the environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the creation of luxury. All these activities flow directly from the pleasure principle, and at the same time, they constitute work which associates individuals to "greater unities"; no longer confined within the mutilating dominion of the performance principle, they modify the impulse without deflecting it from its aim. There is sublimation and, consequently, culture; but this sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal relations, which are in themselves work relations." (211-212)
"The striving for lasting gratification makes not only for an enlarged order of libidinal relations (community) but also for the perpetuation of this order on a higher scale.... mature civilization depends for its functioning on a multitude of co-ordinated arrangements." (223-224)
"The necessity of death does not refute the possibility of final liberation. Like the other necessities, it can be made rational—painless. Men can die without anxiety if they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion. After a fulfilled life, they may take it upon themselves to die—at a moment of their own choosing. But even the ultimate advent of freedom cannot redeem those who died in pain. It is the remembrance of them, and the accumulated guilt of mankind against its victims, that darken the prospect of a civilization without repression." (236-237)
June 26, 2007
Revolutionary. Marcuse's argument here sounds a lot like that of Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts and Capital, but it is certainly more specific and, aided by his psychological approach that criticizes Freud and neo-Freudianism, substantially deeper. He rails against 'a social order which is in some ways grossly inadequate for the development of healthy and happy human beings,' positing that the repressive institutions of Western civilization have sought to prevent the realization of human emancipation--that is, processes of self-realization. Like Marx, he sees emancipation as most possible within highly-developed societies; he claims that only here can humanity establish an order that allows people to freely participate in aesthetic creation and what he calls 'play'--in opposition to alienated labor and socially regimented leisure time activity. I really enjoyed this book, but I suppose it would have been that much more radical without having read Marx previously. Not that I don't think Marcuse makes some points beyond those posited by Marx, and not that I don't think these general ideas shouldn't be expressed time and again, in light of the alienation and repression that bring about 'everyday unhappiness.'
One of the major problems I have with this analysis, though (one that is common to Marxist analysis generally), is the degree to which it results in a patronization of 'less-developed' countries and peoples--the assumption is that the reality principle (ie, repression, capitalism, etc.) is dialectical in that only through its application (if I get the argument right) can it be transcended--ie, only through the brutal advancement of capitalism can capitalism be overcome. I like the idea that capitalism can (and should) be transcended, but I don't know if I can endorse a theory that requires less 'capitalist' societies to have to go through the vicissitudes of such development.
Some quotes with which to close:
"Non-repressive order is possible only if the sex instincts can, by virtue of their own dyanmic and under changed existential and societal conditions, generate lasting erotic relations among mature individuals."
Within the aesthetic imagination...
"Whatever the object may be (thing or flower, animal or man), it is represented and judged not in terms of its usefulness, not according to any purpose it may possibly serve.... In the aesthetic imagination, the object is rather represented as free form all such relations and properties, as freely being itself.... The pure manifestation of its 'being-there', its existenence. This is the manifestation of beauty."
One of the major problems I have with this analysis, though (one that is common to Marxist analysis generally), is the degree to which it results in a patronization of 'less-developed' countries and peoples--the assumption is that the reality principle (ie, repression, capitalism, etc.) is dialectical in that only through its application (if I get the argument right) can it be transcended--ie, only through the brutal advancement of capitalism can capitalism be overcome. I like the idea that capitalism can (and should) be transcended, but I don't know if I can endorse a theory that requires less 'capitalist' societies to have to go through the vicissitudes of such development.
Some quotes with which to close:
"Non-repressive order is possible only if the sex instincts can, by virtue of their own dyanmic and under changed existential and societal conditions, generate lasting erotic relations among mature individuals."
Within the aesthetic imagination...
"Whatever the object may be (thing or flower, animal or man), it is represented and judged not in terms of its usefulness, not according to any purpose it may possibly serve.... In the aesthetic imagination, the object is rather represented as free form all such relations and properties, as freely being itself.... The pure manifestation of its 'being-there', its existenence. This is the manifestation of beauty."
Read
November 29, 2008Marcuse has not only taken a great many of his cues from Freud, but has also modeled his method on Freud... and consequently, a great many of what I perceive as Freud's bigger flaws get carried on into Marcuse's work, namely an essentialist perspective on the family, a privileging of psychic over social forces, an assumption of "civilization" as a unified field, an inherent phallocentrism, etc. And yet, in spite all of that, Marcuse's Freudo-Marxist synthesis shows some true insights about the nature of eros. I would call it a flawed work, but one that really does have some good material to work with, and one I can recommend to anyone charting their ways through the turbulent waters of psychoanalysis and Marxism.
February 1, 2023
Gisteren (31/1/2023) mijn scriptie verdedigd. Als ik terug kijk op mijn hele scriptie proces ben ik Marcuse nog meer gaan waarderen. Zijn ideeën over een geschiedkundige context van het psychisch apparaat dat Freud beschreef, heb ik toegepast op de hedendaagse maatschappij. Het allerleukste en interessantste aan Marcuse's werk is dat hij een manier vindt om het sociale en het individuele te verbinden. Iets wat in mijn ogen heel belangrijk is om onze huidige samenleving beter te begrijpen.
April 17, 2021
I dont want a non repressive society I just want freaking healthcare!!! 😂😂
December 23, 2022
Eh vabbè che dire
July 21, 2024
The book is really interesting, but it was so complicated for me … it’s heavy with Freudian theories so be prepared
July 16, 2025
Herbert Marcuse continues Freud's inquiry into the historical constitution of the human psyche, asserting that the human drives postulated by Freud are "historically acquired" to the extent that the reality principle is contingent on an ever-changing historical basis. Freud's pessimistic conclusions can be roughly summed up as follows: 1) the advancements of civilization have been, and will always be, at the expense of individual happiness 2) the mental sickness of the individual is sustained by the sickness of the civilization 3) the modest aim of psychoanalysis (that turns neurosis into "mild unhappiness") tries to 'cure' the individual so that he may continue to exist in repressive society. Marcuse parses out the historical-locatability of Freudian theory to develop his critique of the dominion of productivity over happiness and freedom, as well as to speculate on a possible utopian reality, whereby the psychic drives undergo a radical revision and freedom is secured. In Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, Marcuse essentially uses Freud's ideas to go against Freud himself, claiming that reality is more pliable than Freud thinks, that revolution and revision are still possibilities.
Marcuse understands that Freud's 'reality principle' is "embodied in a system of societal institutions and relations, laws and values which transmit and enforce the required 'modification' of the instincts" (37). He claims that there are two fresh phenomena in today's civilization that present further modifications to the essential human instincts:
1) surplus repression, the restrictions necessitated by social dominion, as distinguished from and beyond basic repression that modifies instincts for fundamental perpetuation and prolongation of the human race.
2) performance principle, the prevailing historical form of the reality principle that necessitates the individual to arrange their life around work and performance for the repressive reality.
Fundamentally, these phenomena have degraded human potentialities by subjugating individuals to pain and alienated labor. Reality is repressive insofar as the modification of the instincts entail a deferment or complete loss of their gratification. But, just as Freud posits the reality principle as working 'in service of' the pleasure principle, our surplus-repressive reality works in service of its own aims: the productivity of ever-growing industry. In a way, the performance principle works in tandem with the reality principle to modify and subdue pleasure itself.
For Marcuse, the most obvious and pure social manifestation of the performance principle is work; "insofar as work is conditional upon delay and diversion of instinctual gratification, it contradicts the pleasure principle" (219). This is separate from Marcuse's understanding of play, which more or less describes human activity that is pleasurable in-itself with an orientation towards engaging pleasure's aesthetic dimension. Yet, this dynamic tension between work and happiness finds a unique counter-expression in today's 'workaholism'. The workaholic apparently finds pleasure in his work; but 'everyday' work (i.e. "socially useful occupational activity") in the prevailing division of labor is such that "the individual, in working, does not satisfy his own impulses, needs, and faculties but performs a pre-established function" (220). For Marcuse, the pleasure in such alienated labor is the pleasure of a "job well done." The pleasure is the anticipation of an external reward, or the bland satisfaction of being well-acculturated in a repressive society that praises 'hard-work' and time management.
When work is unfulfilling in itself, modest satisfaction is found in engaging in performative tasks for the Other. I think this is evidence for a larger tension that usually gets passed over when we characterize societies with the generalized binary of 'individualistic/collectivist'. What prevails in our current times is performative culture. Beyond individualism, there is an enhanced social desire to 'perform' life. Social media is yet another way to show one's achievements. The sphere of social media creates competitive conditions of envy and jealousy- one must put their life and things on display (big watches, cars, houses, pools, travels, etc). Life ‘satisfaction’ now depends on the gaze of others. Similar to how Marcuse parses out the conformist trend in Neo-Freudian thought, we see a conformist profanation of ideas of 'freedom' in our current times--in order for one to be happy, one must also 'appear' happy. Fundamentally, it is Scarcity and Envy that sustains the performance principle and the capitalist "freedom". Because the praise of others and the impersonal 'numbers' and 'likes' on social media will never feel enough to fully satisfy us, we continue to consume, endlessly browsing new commodities and identities for the grand performance of "self-actualization".
Marcuse suggests that the human proclivity to compete and to hoard resources cannot be classed as a natural inclination.. What is characteristic of civilized Western culture is the exploitation of Nature and human beings; ideologically, freedom is associated with some form of exploitation of resources. However Margaret Mead characterizes the aboriginal Arapesh culture as having an attitude of cultivation and maternity with respect to the world. For the Arapesh, the world is not an arena to dominate and exploit, but a "garden" which can grow and let other beings grow as well. An essential aspect to Marcuse ideation of a utopian reality is the transformation of sexuality into Eros, that is, the revitalization of polymorphous perversity which would in turn animate human activity towards pleasure and satisfaction for all. In this new situation, competition would not manifest itself in alienated performances, but rather in the sensuous realm of the pleasure principle. Exploitation is embedded into our understanding of self-realization. Consumer culture demands that I obtain the latest thing, the superior gadget that makes me better than the next guy. In turn, we are surprised at a society that is lacking in hoarding, pride, boasting, competition, and feelings of inferiority. Consumer culture thrives on the feelings of scarcity and inferiority. For Marcuse’s non-repressive society, cooperation is not a product of toil or alienated work, but rather, it is imbued with libidinal energy as the human being’s original polymorphous eroticism aggrandizes the prevailing limited sexuality. Work becomes play. Cooperation becomes pleasurable activity for the sake of itself, not as a ‘must’ for some external purpose. This entire possibility hinges on Freud’s notion of polymorphous perversity, which has since been repressed by the prevailing reality principle.
Marcuse's incorporation of 'play' into life is at once an attack on the prevailing 'rational' attitude that represses freedom, as well as the reinsertion of the aesthetic attitude of the artist's creativity. The artist, characterized by play, encompasses not only a special talent, but a certain attitude towards nature. Play ‘does not aim at playing ‘with’ something; rather, it is the play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion — the manifestation of existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself’ (187). Freedom, in this sense is characterized by Marcuse as a lightness, as ‘reality losing its seriousness’ (187). Western civilization favors seriousness and rationality—someone who makes do with the pre-established norms will ‘fit in’ and will be furnished a fine life. Further, our society of scarcity, one where a working-class lacks resources to survive, cannot think an “unserious” life of play. Marcuse argues this aesthetic attitude can only be reinvigorated when everyone in society has what they need to survive, and not be subjected to endless toil. Marcuse says, “such need for and attachment to [reality] are ‘merely the result of want.’ In contrast, ‘indifference to reality’ and interest in ‘show’ are the tokens of freedom from want and a ‘true enlargement of humanity.’ In a genuinely humane civilization, the human existence ill be play rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need’ (188).
Marcuse's conception of the repressive elements of performativity entails a reduction of sexuality into a merely 'productive' performance. Society has appropriated sexuality for a procreative-useful end. Sex is organized, and therefore limited. Interestingly, Marcuse not only alludes to the lost 'polymorphous perversity' found in Freud, but also society's ban on queer sexuality. In his utopian vision of freed sexuality, we see a movement beyond that of functional-procreative sex. He sees both in the archetypes of Narcissus and Orpheus an affirmation of sexuality that is not strictly procreative or functional (for Narcissus, a self-love, and Orpheus, homosexuality and the free 'play' of the human faculties that binds nature and its inhabitants together). Marcuse’s critique of the historical performance-principle regarding sexuality is an attempt to reinstate sex that is for pleasure's sake, not for societal performance. What constitutes the erotic goes well beyond that of procreative sex. Mere functionality disturbs the erotic in sex and fails to recognize it as an enjoyable pleasure for its own sake.
The spiritualization of the performance-principle is evident in the blatant condemnation of homosexuality by many Christian churches. It is said that God has called us to procreate, that we have been ‘sent’ to create life, to marry, to become parents, and so on. This idea of this 'normal' life being essential to our destiny limited our spiritual fulfillment. Nietzsche said, “moral judgements and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually-limited against those less limited–also a sort of compensation for having been ill-favored by nature–finally an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined–malice spiritualized” (Beyond Good and Evil, Section 219). In a sense, the discovery of one’s will constitutes a spiritual refinement. Non-heterosexual, non-procreative sex is the violent self-assertion beyond and against society’s functional imperatives. Many look to God for spiritual fulfillment, to feel “equal” among those who they see as spiritually-refined. But, the many religious men who portray themselves as morally righteous have very little spiritual refinement–they claim to be directed towards freedom and rights, yet at the same time participate in the removal of LGBTQ+ freedoms. We begin to sniff out the obscenities of even the highest Christian leaders. Such is the reason why Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization remains pertinent today. He stands against the functional-procreative sexuality that pervades repressive society.
I've used this review to make the claim that Marcuse's Eros is still as relevant and interesting work of critical theory as when it appeared in 1955. I think I'll be returning to this work again, especially since there were some really dense and difficult chapters. This is not an easy work, but I recommend it to any one interested in psychoanalysis and marxism.
Marcuse understands that Freud's 'reality principle' is "embodied in a system of societal institutions and relations, laws and values which transmit and enforce the required 'modification' of the instincts" (37). He claims that there are two fresh phenomena in today's civilization that present further modifications to the essential human instincts:
1) surplus repression, the restrictions necessitated by social dominion, as distinguished from and beyond basic repression that modifies instincts for fundamental perpetuation and prolongation of the human race.
2) performance principle, the prevailing historical form of the reality principle that necessitates the individual to arrange their life around work and performance for the repressive reality.
Fundamentally, these phenomena have degraded human potentialities by subjugating individuals to pain and alienated labor. Reality is repressive insofar as the modification of the instincts entail a deferment or complete loss of their gratification. But, just as Freud posits the reality principle as working 'in service of' the pleasure principle, our surplus-repressive reality works in service of its own aims: the productivity of ever-growing industry. In a way, the performance principle works in tandem with the reality principle to modify and subdue pleasure itself.
For Marcuse, the most obvious and pure social manifestation of the performance principle is work; "insofar as work is conditional upon delay and diversion of instinctual gratification, it contradicts the pleasure principle" (219). This is separate from Marcuse's understanding of play, which more or less describes human activity that is pleasurable in-itself with an orientation towards engaging pleasure's aesthetic dimension. Yet, this dynamic tension between work and happiness finds a unique counter-expression in today's 'workaholism'. The workaholic apparently finds pleasure in his work; but 'everyday' work (i.e. "socially useful occupational activity") in the prevailing division of labor is such that "the individual, in working, does not satisfy his own impulses, needs, and faculties but performs a pre-established function" (220). For Marcuse, the pleasure in such alienated labor is the pleasure of a "job well done." The pleasure is the anticipation of an external reward, or the bland satisfaction of being well-acculturated in a repressive society that praises 'hard-work' and time management.
When work is unfulfilling in itself, modest satisfaction is found in engaging in performative tasks for the Other. I think this is evidence for a larger tension that usually gets passed over when we characterize societies with the generalized binary of 'individualistic/collectivist'. What prevails in our current times is performative culture. Beyond individualism, there is an enhanced social desire to 'perform' life. Social media is yet another way to show one's achievements. The sphere of social media creates competitive conditions of envy and jealousy- one must put their life and things on display (big watches, cars, houses, pools, travels, etc). Life ‘satisfaction’ now depends on the gaze of others. Similar to how Marcuse parses out the conformist trend in Neo-Freudian thought, we see a conformist profanation of ideas of 'freedom' in our current times--in order for one to be happy, one must also 'appear' happy. Fundamentally, it is Scarcity and Envy that sustains the performance principle and the capitalist "freedom". Because the praise of others and the impersonal 'numbers' and 'likes' on social media will never feel enough to fully satisfy us, we continue to consume, endlessly browsing new commodities and identities for the grand performance of "self-actualization".
Marcuse suggests that the human proclivity to compete and to hoard resources cannot be classed as a natural inclination.. What is characteristic of civilized Western culture is the exploitation of Nature and human beings; ideologically, freedom is associated with some form of exploitation of resources. However Margaret Mead characterizes the aboriginal Arapesh culture as having an attitude of cultivation and maternity with respect to the world. For the Arapesh, the world is not an arena to dominate and exploit, but a "garden" which can grow and let other beings grow as well. An essential aspect to Marcuse ideation of a utopian reality is the transformation of sexuality into Eros, that is, the revitalization of polymorphous perversity which would in turn animate human activity towards pleasure and satisfaction for all. In this new situation, competition would not manifest itself in alienated performances, but rather in the sensuous realm of the pleasure principle. Exploitation is embedded into our understanding of self-realization. Consumer culture demands that I obtain the latest thing, the superior gadget that makes me better than the next guy. In turn, we are surprised at a society that is lacking in hoarding, pride, boasting, competition, and feelings of inferiority. Consumer culture thrives on the feelings of scarcity and inferiority. For Marcuse’s non-repressive society, cooperation is not a product of toil or alienated work, but rather, it is imbued with libidinal energy as the human being’s original polymorphous eroticism aggrandizes the prevailing limited sexuality. Work becomes play. Cooperation becomes pleasurable activity for the sake of itself, not as a ‘must’ for some external purpose. This entire possibility hinges on Freud’s notion of polymorphous perversity, which has since been repressed by the prevailing reality principle.
Marcuse's incorporation of 'play' into life is at once an attack on the prevailing 'rational' attitude that represses freedom, as well as the reinsertion of the aesthetic attitude of the artist's creativity. The artist, characterized by play, encompasses not only a special talent, but a certain attitude towards nature. Play ‘does not aim at playing ‘with’ something; rather, it is the play of life itself, beyond want and external compulsion — the manifestation of existence without fear and anxiety, and thus the manifestation of freedom itself’ (187). Freedom, in this sense is characterized by Marcuse as a lightness, as ‘reality losing its seriousness’ (187). Western civilization favors seriousness and rationality—someone who makes do with the pre-established norms will ‘fit in’ and will be furnished a fine life. Further, our society of scarcity, one where a working-class lacks resources to survive, cannot think an “unserious” life of play. Marcuse argues this aesthetic attitude can only be reinvigorated when everyone in society has what they need to survive, and not be subjected to endless toil. Marcuse says, “such need for and attachment to [reality] are ‘merely the result of want.’ In contrast, ‘indifference to reality’ and interest in ‘show’ are the tokens of freedom from want and a ‘true enlargement of humanity.’ In a genuinely humane civilization, the human existence ill be play rather than toil, and man will live in display rather than need’ (188).
Marcuse's conception of the repressive elements of performativity entails a reduction of sexuality into a merely 'productive' performance. Society has appropriated sexuality for a procreative-useful end. Sex is organized, and therefore limited. Interestingly, Marcuse not only alludes to the lost 'polymorphous perversity' found in Freud, but also society's ban on queer sexuality. In his utopian vision of freed sexuality, we see a movement beyond that of functional-procreative sex. He sees both in the archetypes of Narcissus and Orpheus an affirmation of sexuality that is not strictly procreative or functional (for Narcissus, a self-love, and Orpheus, homosexuality and the free 'play' of the human faculties that binds nature and its inhabitants together). Marcuse’s critique of the historical performance-principle regarding sexuality is an attempt to reinstate sex that is for pleasure's sake, not for societal performance. What constitutes the erotic goes well beyond that of procreative sex. Mere functionality disturbs the erotic in sex and fails to recognize it as an enjoyable pleasure for its own sake.
The spiritualization of the performance-principle is evident in the blatant condemnation of homosexuality by many Christian churches. It is said that God has called us to procreate, that we have been ‘sent’ to create life, to marry, to become parents, and so on. This idea of this 'normal' life being essential to our destiny limited our spiritual fulfillment. Nietzsche said, “moral judgements and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually-limited against those less limited–also a sort of compensation for having been ill-favored by nature–finally an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined–malice spiritualized” (Beyond Good and Evil, Section 219). In a sense, the discovery of one’s will constitutes a spiritual refinement. Non-heterosexual, non-procreative sex is the violent self-assertion beyond and against society’s functional imperatives. Many look to God for spiritual fulfillment, to feel “equal” among those who they see as spiritually-refined. But, the many religious men who portray themselves as morally righteous have very little spiritual refinement–they claim to be directed towards freedom and rights, yet at the same time participate in the removal of LGBTQ+ freedoms. We begin to sniff out the obscenities of even the highest Christian leaders. Such is the reason why Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization remains pertinent today. He stands against the functional-procreative sexuality that pervades repressive society.
I've used this review to make the claim that Marcuse's Eros is still as relevant and interesting work of critical theory as when it appeared in 1955. I think I'll be returning to this work again, especially since there were some really dense and difficult chapters. This is not an easy work, but I recommend it to any one interested in psychoanalysis and marxism.
June 17, 2022
The work depends of Marx and Freud, two writers I periodically embrace and then reject. In some ways, the book is almost silly except that it braces the imagination, at least, it braces mine. It was a forerunner of a lot of literature from the late 60s and early 70s.ht
I have fond memories of this work. Marcuse voiced a form of thought profoundly and soundly criticized by Sir Karl Popper. My instinct tells me to dismiss Marcuse but he writes sufficiently well and imaginatively to attract my interest even after over 50 years. I like this book best of all his works.
I would place this fairly high on any list I might make of books to reread. It is a vital work to read get a sense of the sixties counter culture.
I have fond memories of this work. Marcuse voiced a form of thought profoundly and soundly criticized by Sir Karl Popper. My instinct tells me to dismiss Marcuse but he writes sufficiently well and imaginatively to attract my interest even after over 50 years. I like this book best of all his works.
I would place this fairly high on any list I might make of books to reread. It is a vital work to read get a sense of the sixties counter culture.
March 14, 2024
Igual que Mark Fisher, me pregunto por qué nos hemos olvidado de ‘Eros y civilización’. Qué librazo.
November 8, 2024
życzyłbym sobie, żeby Marcuse był popularniejszy na świecie. rozbija mi trochę głowę, że w 1955 ktoś odważył się na ruch pomyślenia utopii. Marcuse antycypuje kontrkulturę i szeroko ją inspiruje, wychodzi z założenia, że może być lepiej, choć jeszcze zasadniczo neoliberalizm nie rozwinął skrzydeł i nie zawłaszczył wyobraźni.
Marcuse jest mocno osadzony w Freudzie, tj. jego krytyka wychodzi z pozycji ściśle psychoanalitycznych i pozostaje w jej obrębie, robiąc jednak konieczną poprawkę wobec pesymistycznej wizji Freuda, w której zawsze musimy poddać się represji podczas życia w cywilizacji. Na to szczęście Marks przychodzi z pomocą i pojęciem alienacji, choć przecież nie tylko, bo Marcuse wyciąga z piwnicy "niepoważnych" filozofów-utopistów jak Fourier czy Schiller krytycznie ich rewitalizując. W utopii i śmierć może być spokojna, jeśli tylko oddamy sprawiedliwość samym sobie i tych, którzy tego nie doczekali.
PS. ostatni rozdział jest już tylko zabawą - wspaniale masakruje neopsychoanalizę spod znaku Fromma, czyli zasadniczo współczesną psychologię, jako naukę i praktykę cementującą status quo, która lubi przemilczać wpływ kapitalizmu na zdrowie psychiczne. czy terapia behawioralno-poznawcza nie jest gaslightowaniem siebie opartym na zinternalizowaniu sobie przeświadczenia, że "to ja tu jestem problemem, nawet jeśli świat jest zły, to muszę go zaakceptować"?
Marcuse jest mocno osadzony w Freudzie, tj. jego krytyka wychodzi z pozycji ściśle psychoanalitycznych i pozostaje w jej obrębie, robiąc jednak konieczną poprawkę wobec pesymistycznej wizji Freuda, w której zawsze musimy poddać się represji podczas życia w cywilizacji. Na to szczęście Marks przychodzi z pomocą i pojęciem alienacji, choć przecież nie tylko, bo Marcuse wyciąga z piwnicy "niepoważnych" filozofów-utopistów jak Fourier czy Schiller krytycznie ich rewitalizując. W utopii i śmierć może być spokojna, jeśli tylko oddamy sprawiedliwość samym sobie i tych, którzy tego nie doczekali.
PS. ostatni rozdział jest już tylko zabawą - wspaniale masakruje neopsychoanalizę spod znaku Fromma, czyli zasadniczo współczesną psychologię, jako naukę i praktykę cementującą status quo, która lubi przemilczać wpływ kapitalizmu na zdrowie psychiczne. czy terapia behawioralno-poznawcza nie jest gaslightowaniem siebie opartym na zinternalizowaniu sobie przeświadczenia, że "to ja tu jestem problemem, nawet jeśli świat jest zły, to muszę go zaakceptować"?
June 30, 2025
• Le gusta demasiado Freud
• Le falta un TW: FREUD
• Marcuse es perfecta, pero yo sé que él sabe que escribe para su barbilla porque cada 3 párrafos pone: en otras palabras...
• He tardado 10 meses en leerme este libro y aún necesito subrayarlo para ubicarme
• La verdad, no esperaba ser bombardeada por Freud de esta manera
• La enseñanza: trabajad menos, follad mas A-MÉN
• Le falta un TW: FREUD
• Marcuse es perfecta, pero yo sé que él sabe que escribe para su barbilla porque cada 3 párrafos pone: en otras palabras...
• He tardado 10 meses en leerme este libro y aún necesito subrayarlo para ubicarme
• La verdad, no esperaba ser bombardeada por Freud de esta manera
• La enseñanza: trabajad menos, follad mas A-MÉN
March 18, 2025
Hackish
March 29, 2023
Neste livro Marcuse repassa os conceitos básicos freudianos de Eros e Tânatos para revigorar a sua presença na constituição de nossa civilização. Ao mesmo tempo rede críticas bem fundamentadas sobre a tentativa dos neofreudianos de desvalorizar a força destes conceitos.
April 6, 2023
مقولات روانشناسی تبدیل به مقولات سیاسی شده اند
آیا فروید تمدن را با سرکوب یکی می گرفت؟ آیا تضاد میان اصل لذت و اصل واقعیت آشتی ناپذیر است؟
اما نظریه فروید دلایلی برای رد یکی گرفتن تمدن با سرکوب در اختیار می گذارد.
آیا تمدن ناسرکوبگر ممکن است؟
1- خود نظریه فروید بر امکان پذیری تاریخی یک تمدن ناسرکوبگر صحه می گذارد
2- خود دستاوردهای تمدن سرکوبگر به نظر شرط لازم برای امحای تدریجی سرکوب را مهیا می کند.
برای توضیح این دلایل باید مفهوم نظری فروید را در چارچوب محتوای اجتماعی – تاریخی خودش از نو تفسیر کرد.
به عقیده فروید تاریخ بشر تاریخ سرکوب بشر است.
اروس کشنده است. فرهنگ بازدارنده است برای هم هستی اجتماعی و هم هستی بیولوژیکی. غرایز بنیادی انسان برای اینکه آزادانه به دنبال به دنبال غایت و اهداف طبیعی خود بروند با هر گونه تعلق و صیانت پایدار در تضاد خواهند بود.
چرا اروس و غریزه مرگ کشنده هستند:؟ برای آنکه برای ارضا شدنی تقلا می کنند که فرهنگ نمی تواند آن را اعطا کند. چه نوع ارضا شدنی؟ ارضا شدن، در هر لحظه، به معنای دقیق کلمه به عنوان هدفی در خود.
تمدن وقتی آغاز می شود که غایت اولیه – یعنی ارضای تام و تمام نیازها- اساسا چشم پوشی و کنار گذاشته شود.
رانه های حیوانی تحت تاثیر واقعیت بیرونی تبدیل به غرایز بشری می شوند. جهان اجتماعی تاریخی است که غرایز و نیازها و ارضای آنها را شکل می دهد. بنابراین اصل لذت تبدیل به اصل واقعیت می شود.
بر ضمیر ناخودآگاه اصل لذت حاکم است که فرآیندهای حاکم بر آن تنها به دنبال کسب لذت هستند اما این لذت کنترل نشده با محیط طبیعی و بشری به تضاد می خورد. در نتیجه نومیدی و یاسی تجربه می شود که ناشی از این درک است که ارضای تام و تمام و عاری از درد غیر ممکن است. بنابراین اصل واقعیت جانشین اصل لذت می شود. اما اصل واقعیت اصل لذت را عزل نمی کند بلکه آن را جرح و تعدیل می کند.
اگو محصول همین تثبیت اصل واقعیت است. تحت سیطره اصل واقعیت انسان عملکرد عقل را بسط می دهد و خوب و بد و راست و ناراست و سود و زیان را از هم تشخیص می دهد. از میان فعالیت های فکری انسان تنها فانتزی از سلطه اصل واقعیت بیرون می ماند و در پناه اصل لذت جای می گیرد.
اصل عملکرد: شکل خاصی از اصل واقعیت که حاکم شده است
آیا فروید تمدن را با سرکوب یکی می گرفت؟ آیا تضاد میان اصل لذت و اصل واقعیت آشتی ناپذیر است؟
اما نظریه فروید دلایلی برای رد یکی گرفتن تمدن با سرکوب در اختیار می گذارد.
آیا تمدن ناسرکوبگر ممکن است؟
1- خود نظریه فروید بر امکان پذیری تاریخی یک تمدن ناسرکوبگر صحه می گذارد
2- خود دستاوردهای تمدن سرکوبگر به نظر شرط لازم برای امحای تدریجی سرکوب را مهیا می کند.
برای توضیح این دلایل باید مفهوم نظری فروید را در چارچوب محتوای اجتماعی – تاریخی خودش از نو تفسیر کرد.
به عقیده فروید تاریخ بشر تاریخ سرکوب بشر است.
اروس کشنده است. فرهنگ بازدارنده است برای هم هستی اجتماعی و هم هستی بیولوژیکی. غرایز بنیادی انسان برای اینکه آزادانه به دنبال به دنبال غایت و اهداف طبیعی خود بروند با هر گونه تعلق و صیانت پایدار در تضاد خواهند بود.
چرا اروس و غریزه مرگ کشنده هستند:؟ برای آنکه برای ارضا شدنی تقلا می کنند که فرهنگ نمی تواند آن را اعطا کند. چه نوع ارضا شدنی؟ ارضا شدن، در هر لحظه، به معنای دقیق کلمه به عنوان هدفی در خود.
تمدن وقتی آغاز می شود که غایت اولیه – یعنی ارضای تام و تمام نیازها- اساسا چشم پوشی و کنار گذاشته شود.
رانه های حیوانی تحت تاثیر واقعیت بیرونی تبدیل به غرایز بشری می شوند. جهان اجتماعی تاریخی است که غرایز و نیازها و ارضای آنها را شکل می دهد. بنابراین اصل لذت تبدیل به اصل واقعیت می شود.
بر ضمیر ناخودآگاه اصل لذت حاکم است که فرآیندهای حاکم بر آن تنها به دنبال کسب لذت هستند اما این لذت کنترل نشده با محیط طبیعی و بشری به تضاد می خورد. در نتیجه نومیدی و یاسی تجربه می شود که ناشی از این درک است که ارضای تام و تمام و عاری از درد غیر ممکن است. بنابراین اصل واقعیت جانشین اصل لذت می شود. اما اصل واقعیت اصل لذت را عزل نمی کند بلکه آن را جرح و تعدیل می کند.
اگو محصول همین تثبیت اصل واقعیت است. تحت سیطره اصل واقعیت انسان عملکرد عقل را بسط می دهد و خوب و بد و راست و ناراست و سود و زیان را از هم تشخیص می دهد. از میان فعالیت های فکری انسان تنها فانتزی از سلطه اصل واقعیت بیرون می ماند و در پناه اصل لذت جای می گیرد.
اصل عملکرد: شکل خاصی از اصل واقعیت که حاکم شده است
November 1, 2017
إن أطروحة (سيغموند فرويد)، التي تزعم أن الحضارة تتأسس عل خضوع للغرائز الإنسانية تبدو بوجه عام صائبة. من ثمة يوضع سؤال المعرفة هاهنا حول مصالح الحضارة في تعويض المعاناة المصحوبة على الفرد دوما والتي غالبا ما لا تأخذ هاته المسألة على محمل الجد.
حيث إن جميع النقائص التي يضبطها (فرويد) معتبرا إياها عملية على نحو تكون لا رجعة فيها ولا مفر منها أبدا، تكون فيها حرية قبول الإنسان بالحاجيات الغريزية التي تحركه متعارضا مع ىالمجتمع المتحضر، من جهة أن التنازل و الرضا المؤجل مرتبطان بوضعية التقدم. ليست قيمة ثقافية قط. إنما يجب أن تكون مرؤسة من قبل العمل المنظم في فترات الراحة المتقطعة حيث الإنظباط المقترن بإعادة الإنتاج الواحد مرده في ذلك قانون الأمر الإجتماعي.
ثم إن التضحية النسقية للبيدو تعاود بشكل صارم تواضعها على عتبة الأنشطة والمؤثرات الإجاماعية المستعملة .
فتكون التضحية مثمرة جدا. داخل المناطق التقنية المتقدمة للحضارة. كما أن البحث في الطبيعة من جهته عملي كليا. وليس مجرد ماض لتحقيق أكثر تلبية للغرائز لاكبر عدد ممكن من الأفراد من أجل الرضا و القبول.
فليس مكننة الحياة ولا تقييسها، ولا التصحر الثقافي، ولا سلطة التدمير المؤمنة بالنجاح و التي لا تنتج من جهتها مسارا لتناول سؤال الأساس، الذي يحكم نجاح الحضارة الغربية هو الكافل. إذن وحده الحجاج الضمني للإنتاجية يأخذ وعدا مرة أخرى بحياة أفضل ليكون أكثر تحققا دوما.
بيد أن تحولات النجاح، تبدو مقطوعة النسب ومقيدة بإشعاع العبودية وتكثفها في كل ربوع الكون المخصوص بالحضارة الصناعية، منظورا لهيمنة الإنسان على الإنسان تنمو نحو النجاعة، هاته الوجهة لا تظهر كما لو أنها تراجع عرضي و نقطة فصل في ترسيمة النجاح، فمخيمات التمركز، و الإبادات الجماعية و الحربين العالميتين و القنبلة الذرية، ليس كل هذا إنتكاسة للبربرية؟ إنما هي النتائج الغير منضبطة للبحوث التكنولوجية التي لا وجهة ولا مستقر لها.
إن التحذير من هيمنة إنسان ما على إنسان أخر هو الأكثر نجاعة، الذي يتحتم تنزيله في أعلى سلم الحضارة. مذاك سيبدو التحقق المادي و الثقافي للإنسانية شبيها بالبدء في خلق عالم حر وحقيقي.
حيث إن جميع النقائص التي يضبطها (فرويد) معتبرا إياها عملية على نحو تكون لا رجعة فيها ولا مفر منها أبدا، تكون فيها حرية قبول الإنسان بالحاجيات الغريزية التي تحركه متعارضا مع ىالمجتمع المتحضر، من جهة أن التنازل و الرضا المؤجل مرتبطان بوضعية التقدم. ليست قيمة ثقافية قط. إنما يجب أن تكون مرؤسة من قبل العمل المنظم في فترات الراحة المتقطعة حيث الإنظباط المقترن بإعادة الإنتاج الواحد مرده في ذلك قانون الأمر الإجتماعي.
ثم إن التضحية النسقية للبيدو تعاود بشكل صارم تواضعها على عتبة الأنشطة والمؤثرات الإجاماعية المستعملة .
فتكون التضحية مثمرة جدا. داخل المناطق التقنية المتقدمة للحضارة. كما أن البحث في الطبيعة من جهته عملي كليا. وليس مجرد ماض لتحقيق أكثر تلبية للغرائز لاكبر عدد ممكن من الأفراد من أجل الرضا و القبول.
فليس مكننة الحياة ولا تقييسها، ولا التصحر الثقافي، ولا سلطة التدمير المؤمنة بالنجاح و التي لا تنتج من جهتها مسارا لتناول سؤال الأساس، الذي يحكم نجاح الحضارة الغربية هو الكافل. إذن وحده الحجاج الضمني للإنتاجية يأخذ وعدا مرة أخرى بحياة أفضل ليكون أكثر تحققا دوما.
بيد أن تحولات النجاح، تبدو مقطوعة النسب ومقيدة بإشعاع العبودية وتكثفها في كل ربوع الكون المخصوص بالحضارة الصناعية، منظورا لهيمنة الإنسان على الإنسان تنمو نحو النجاعة، هاته الوجهة لا تظهر كما لو أنها تراجع عرضي و نقطة فصل في ترسيمة النجاح، فمخيمات التمركز، و الإبادات الجماعية و الحربين العالميتين و القنبلة الذرية، ليس كل هذا إنتكاسة للبربرية؟ إنما هي النتائج الغير منضبطة للبحوث التكنولوجية التي لا وجهة ولا مستقر لها.
إن التحذير من هيمنة إنسان ما على إنسان أخر هو الأكثر نجاعة، الذي يتحتم تنزيله في أعلى سلم الحضارة. مذاك سيبدو التحقق المادي و الثقافي للإنسانية شبيها بالبدء في خلق عالم حر وحقيقي.
September 6, 2021
Marcuse's analysis starts from Freud's pessimistic view according to which the pleasure instinct needs to be significantly repressed to preserve civilization and avoid savagery. Marcuse argues that that was only true in the past, when dedicating the whole day to work was necessary to survival, and thus time devoted to pleasure needed to be limited. In today's industrial society, working the majority of the day has ceased to be a necessity and this habit is only maintained as a repressive mechanism on behalf of the dominant class.
In this context, Marcuse calls for a cultural and political revolution whose aim is the reconciliation of the principle of reality with the principle of pleasure: thanks to technological advancements, a much less repressive society, in which Eros and Reason are not in contradiction, is possible.
This new, happier society would be based on values that are opposed to the current dominating principle of performativity: productive, alienated work is turned into a playful, aimless research driven by interest and pleasure. Similarly, sexuality ceases to be exclusively aimed at reproduction and becomes a pursuit of pleasure that goes beyond our sexual organs and involves the entirety of our being. Art becomes more than an elitist intellectual exercise as the aesthetic dimension emerges as a guiding principle of the whole society.
Eros and civilization is a classic that inspired some of the major cultural movements of the century such as the 68's student movement, and for that alone it is worth reading. However, I find Marcuse's analysis still very relevant today, in a society where the repressive and dominating nature of performative society is well hidden by the apparent overabundance of pleasures.
In this context, Marcuse calls for a cultural and political revolution whose aim is the reconciliation of the principle of reality with the principle of pleasure: thanks to technological advancements, a much less repressive society, in which Eros and Reason are not in contradiction, is possible.
This new, happier society would be based on values that are opposed to the current dominating principle of performativity: productive, alienated work is turned into a playful, aimless research driven by interest and pleasure. Similarly, sexuality ceases to be exclusively aimed at reproduction and becomes a pursuit of pleasure that goes beyond our sexual organs and involves the entirety of our being. Art becomes more than an elitist intellectual exercise as the aesthetic dimension emerges as a guiding principle of the whole society.
Eros and civilization is a classic that inspired some of the major cultural movements of the century such as the 68's student movement, and for that alone it is worth reading. However, I find Marcuse's analysis still very relevant today, in a society where the repressive and dominating nature of performative society is well hidden by the apparent overabundance of pleasures.
November 13, 2024
I might give this two and half stars. There seems to me something to his thesis, and he does make some interesting, almost profound, points at times. Still, the book is so full of convoluted jargon it makes the argument muddled and at times inscrutable.
Also, it seems to me skewed from a male perspective. Is sexual frustration as big or important an issue for women? Do women tend to reduce eros to sex as much as men? Is men's tendency to do so innate, or at least in part just the product of a patriarchic society, as some feminist have argued? These are questions he doesn't ask or even seem aware of.
Also, it seems to me skewed from a male perspective. Is sexual frustration as big or important an issue for women? Do women tend to reduce eros to sex as much as men? Is men's tendency to do so innate, or at least in part just the product of a patriarchic society, as some feminist have argued? These are questions he doesn't ask or even seem aware of.
May 19, 2016
کتابی که خواندش دیگاه نوینی از تعبیر فرویدی تمدن و سرکوب جنسی را ارائه میدهد درواقع هربرت مارکوزه ضمن معرفی خوب و دقیقی از تز فرودید در خصوص رابطهی علی و متقابل بین «سرکوب جنسی» و «تمدن» تلاش میکند نشان دهد جامعهی متمدن بدون سرکوب جنسی هم ممکن است.
درواقع از نظره مارکوزه جامعه سوسیالیستی چنین جامعهیی ست.
درواقع از نظره مارکوزه جامعه سوسیالیستی چنین جامعهیی ست.
December 24, 2010
کتابی فلسفی درباره ی فروید
با فصل های مانند گرایش نهان در روان کاری
خاستگاه فرد سرکوب شده
ریشه های تمدن سرکوبگر
و
.
.
بیشتر بحث در مورد رهایی .. آزادی .. اروس و عشق و خصیصه های ضد فرهنگی دهه شصت است
با فصل های مانند گرایش نهان در روان کاری
خاستگاه فرد سرکوب شده
ریشه های تمدن سرکوبگر
و
.
.
بیشتر بحث در مورد رهایی .. آزادی .. اروس و عشق و خصیصه های ضد فرهنگی دهه شصت است
Displaying 1 - 30 of 160 reviews