Science, Truth, and Democracy

by Philip Kitcher

Striving to boldly redirect the philosophy of science, this book by renowned philosopher Philip Kitcher examines the heated debate surrounding the role of science in shaping our lives. Kitcher explores the sharp divide between those who believe that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary--the purists--and those who believe that it invariably serves the interests of people in positions of power. In a daring turn, he rejects both perspectives, working out a more realistic image of the sciences--one that allows for the possibility of scientific truth, but nonetheless permits social consensus to determine which avenues to investigate. He then proposes a democratic and deliberative framework for responsible scientists to follow.

Controversial, powerful, yet engaging, this volume will appeal to a wide range of readers. Kitcher's nuanced analysis and authoritative conclusion will interest countless scientists as well as all readers of science--scholars and laypersons alike.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Nonfiction, Politics, History Of Science, Academic

240 pages, Paperback

First published May 6, 1993

About the author

Philip Kitcher is John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He was the first recipient of the American Philosophical Association's Prometheus Prize for his work to expand the frontiers of science and philosophy.

Reviews

[T · Rating 3 out of 5]

3 1/2 stars. I find myself somewhat ambivalent about this work. While great points are made throughout, and Kitcher's ideal of well-ordered science seems to be on the right track, the work as a whole suggests a largely conflicted picture. On the one hand, he wants to promote the idea of democratizing science, of pursuing research with society specifically in mind, and of viewing epistemic significance in research as basically just what we happen to find interesting at the time. Yet, on the other hand, he maintains that some research simply shouldn't be pursued because it will likely lead to deleterious consequences, so there should be limits to free inquiry.

Here's the confliction. If science is democratized, and epistemic significance is pretty much just what we happen to find interesting at the time (say, certain truths related to some political movement or program), and certain avenues of research are shunned through limits on free inquiry (though Kitcher does say that no research should be banned outright), then how exactly do we avoid fostering a climate of neo-Lysenkoism? Most especially, how is this to be avoided if society, science, and politics are as intertwined as Kitcher, I think correctly, points out? Now, I definitely see value in democratizing science, but I think Kitcher sounds a bit too optimistic about the success and workability of such an endeavor.

But, nonetheless, the work does provide an enlightening discussion on the relationship between science and society, even if some parts were unsatisfying.

[Matthew Brown · Rating 3 out of 5]

Update 9/3/09 - I've presented a few papers on the book, all on roughly the same theme: hanging the significance of science on "natural curiosity" is a failing strategy. Starting to think more about part II of the book, which I also think is a failure (but an interesting one), and what we can do for an alternative.

This is going to be the next text in my grad seminar. We'll see how it goes.

Original review: This book is very accessible to a wide audience, which is great. And it is pointing out a serious and important task. It ultimately fails to live up to its task, I think, but the failure is interesting. A worthwhile read, and an important book for years to come.

[Jon Beadle · Rating 3 out of 5]

A dethroning of scientism.