Man, Play and Games

by Roger Caillois

According to Roger Caillois, play is "an occasion of pure waste of time, energy, ingenuity, skill, and often of money." In spite of this--or because of it--play constitutes an essential element of human social and spiritual development.
 
In this classic study, Caillois defines play as a free and voluntary activity that occurs in a pure space, isolated and protected from the rest of life. Play is uncertain, since the outcome may not be foreseen, and it is governed by rules that provide a level playing field for all participants. In its most basic form, play consists of finding a response to the opponent's action--or to the play situation--that is free within the limits set by the rules.
 
Caillois qualifies types of games-- according to whether competition, chance, simulation, or vertigo (being physically out of control) is dominant--and ways of playing, ranging from the unrestricted improvisation characteristic of children's play to the disciplined pursuit of solutions to gratuitously difficult puzzles. Caillois also examines the means by which games become part of daily life and ultimately contribute to various cultures their most characteristic customs and institutions.         
 
Presented here in Meyer Barash's superb English translation, Man, Play and Games is a companion volume to Caillois's Man and the Sacred.
 

Genres: Games, Philosophy, Nonfiction, Game Design, Anthropology, Plays, Sociology

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1958

Reviews

[Uroš Đurković · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kajoa ističe četiri vrste igara:

agon
alea
mimicry
ilinx

Ova podela je neverovatno zavodljiva, čak i kada ne obuhvata sve moguće primere.

AGON je takmičenje, odnosno, borba u kojoj su veštački stvoreni jednaki izgledi da bi se protivnici sreli u idealnim uslovima – rivalstvo u odnosu na neku osobinu (izdržljivost, brzina, snaga...). Duh agona vidljiv je u dvobojima, turnirima, kao i u svim sportovima – od boksa do fudbala.

ALEA je suprotnost agonu – ne dobitak u igri sa protivnikom, već sa sudbinom. Alea je, znamo, na latinskom kocka, tako da igre koje Kajoa naziva ovako mogu biti nazvane igrama na sreću. (Nebrojeno puta sam se setio aleatorike Džona Kejdža i kako sama muzika može biti prepuštena na formu sreće – kako je kockica bačena, tako kompozija teče.) Za razliku od agona, ovde je sudbina jedini činilac pobede – alea negira rad, strpljenje, eliminiše vrednost, tačnost, trening i postaje apsolutno ili-ili. Neka od tipičnih oblika ovih igara su: rulet, lutrije, trke pasa, različite opklade. Takođe, vrlo je zanimljivo da od sva četiri tipa igara samo alea nije svojstvena životinjama.

(E sad, istini za volju, i sam Kajoa odmah nakon navođenja karakteristika alea-e navodi i kombinaciju (agon+alea) vidljivu u npr. bridžu.)

MIMICRY predstavlja oblik igara koje se ostvaruju oponašanjem i prerušavanjem. Pravilo mimicry-ja je jedno jedino – da igrač opčini gledaoca, da ga ubedi. Kajoa detaljno govori o sveprisutnosti ove vrste igre u životinjskom svetu i to pre svega kao formativnog faktora, koji, naravno, važi i za ljudski rod. Zanimljivo je u tom svetlu zapažanje u jednoj fusnoti: u igračkama vezanim za oponašanje odraslih, dečaci su upućeni uglavnom na daleke, romantične, irealne situacije i avanture, dok su devojčice vezane za poznate, bliske i realne situacije. (Dečak je, veli Kajoa (49), u igri – vojnik, musketar, vanzemaljac, kauboj, gusar; dok je devojčica: kuvarica, majka, peglerka.) Svi oblici scenskih praksi: od dečjih igrokaza i podražavanja sve do institucionalizovanog pozorišta, oblik su ove vrste igara.

ILINX je najteže objasniti. Ali, iako je teško objasniti, ima u sebi nečeg vrlo poznatog, samo se o tome ne razmišlja često kao o igri. Ilinx je želja da se dospe u neku vrstu zanosa, grča ili vrtoglavice, koji naprečac brišu stvarnost. Oblici ilinx-a su raznoliki: od vrtenja u krug, preko ljuljaške, do vašara ili hoda na žici.

Uz sve navedene vidove igara, postoje i dve varijable koje treba imati u vidu jer oblikuju njihovo postojanje. To su LUDUS i PAIDIA. Dok prvi pojam označava kalkulativnost i kombinatoriku, drugi se svodi na uskomešanost i bujnost. I jedno i drugo preduslovi su igara i načini njihovog ispoljavanja. Dok je, npr. agon u padiji – trka bez pravila, agon u ludusu je sportsko takmičenje.

(Kajoa pojavu hobija određuje kao oblik ludusa i daje sledeću definiciju: hobi je „drugorazredna besplatna aktivnost, započeta i nastavljena iz zadovoljstva”) (61)

I da ne odem u prepričavanje knjige, koja će svakako doći do onih do kojih treba da dođe, važno mi je da kažem da Kajoa nije napisao samo sociologiju igara, već i sociologiju inspirisanu igrama. A razlika uopšte nije zanemarljiva. Ne radi se, dakle, o deskripciji, već društvenoj mehanici – u odnosu na prakse igara nekih društava može se zaključiti više nego što bi neko pretpostavio. A u igrama smo svi mi sačuvani.

Šteta je što Kajoa nije doživeo video-igre. Mislim da bi sve dobilo nov smisao.

Bonus – nekoliko zanimlnjivosti:

Čigra u Evropi je nepoznata sve do 18. veka. (105)

U SAD-u je 1953. godine bilo prijavljeno 30 000 profesionalnih astrologa. (76)

Izvesna Lois Konvej bila je proglašena na takmičenju za mis-skelet, jer je pod x-zracima pokazala najlepši kostur. (143)

U SSSR-u igre na sreću su bile zabranjene, ali se štednja podsticala kao retko gde u svetu. I upravo u okviru štednje, država je pravila svoje nagradne igre. (184)

Neke civilizacije imale su sasvim drukčije termine za igre. Na kineskom tako reč VAN može da označava dečje igre, bezbrižne i sitne razonode, slobodnije seksualne odnose, ali i sve one igre koje zahtevaju razmišljanje i zabranjuju svaku žurbu (među njima i gledanje vodopada ili kuvanje) (63)

[Shawn · Rating 4 out of 5]

Building off of Johan Huizinga’s account (read my review), Roger Caillois, in Man, Play and Games, introduces an expanded and more exhaustive account of play. Huizinga put forward the thesis of showing how culture and play interact, support and emerge out of each other. Caillois’ goal is different; he wants to provide an exhaustive, descriptive account of play in all its variations and forms.

He starts by recapitulating Huizinga’s account and discussing what he regards as its short comings. According to Huizinga, play is a voluntary activity with fixed rules that create a special order residing outside the ordinary pattern of life. It is absorbing, with its own sense of space and time. Lastly, it is not connected to the achieving of any interest (external to play).

Caillois regards Huizinga’s account of play as both “too broad and too narrow” (4). It is too broad because it incorporates into “play” what Caillois calls the “secret and mysterious” (4). This seems to be referring to ritual or religious practices that seem to fit Huizinga’s definition, but do not seem, rightly, to be called “play.” (Indeed, Huizinga does focus a lot on these ‘mysteries’.)

It is too narrow, argues Caillois, because Huizinga’s account excludes types of play that are not based on rules as well as games of chance. Caillois distinguishes between rule-based games and make-believe. In the latter, rules do not govern or establish the play: instead the players play roles. The governing element is more an attitude or stance that players take to act as if they are someone other than what they are. These are clearly examples of play so ought not to be excluded from the concept.

Since Huizinga regards play as incompatible with profit or the gaining of material interests, there is no room in his account of play for games of chance. Caillois seeks to remedy this by arguing that while play has to be unproductive, it does not need to preclude the players from exchanging property or wealth. The goal of play is not to produce anything: “it creates no wealth or goods…[it] is an occasion of pure waste” (5). The players’ attitudes, if they are indeed playing, have to reflect this as well. This serves to exclude professional players, such as pro athletes: “it is clear that they are not players but workers” (6). In games of chance, Caillois argues, there is no production, only an exchange of goods. These are zero-sum games, there is no productive value at all: hence the idea of pure waste.

I think Caillois is right to point out Huizinga’s exclusion of games of chance; nevertheless, I am not convinced that play necessarily must be unproductive or that games of chance are necessarily zero-sum. Caillois does not argue for either of these claims (likely because many people regard them as truisms), but they require, I think, independent justification.

Caillois goes on to introduce his definition and influential typology of play. His definition is that play is an activity that is free, separate, uncertain, unproductive, governed by rules and make-believe (9-10). They are free because they cannot be obligatory without losing their play-quality. They are separate in the sense of creating a special space and time (distinct from the mundane/everyday existence). They are uncertain in that the results or outcomes of the play are not known in advance or predetermined. They are unproductive, as indicated above, because they produce no goods or wealth. They are governed by rules that define the goals and appropriate means for these goals. Lastly, they involve make-believe because of the attitude players have to have towards the play: an acceptance of the special, created world of play.

I’ve already noted my concern about the necessity of the unproductive. Certainly play is something that is a good in itself: it has internal goods that are the primary reason for participating and engaging in the play. But this does not exclude the possibility of external reasons as well. Many things can both be goods-in-themselves while at the same time still being constitutive of other goods. Another quibble is the manner which Caillois treats the issue of rule-governed play and make-believe. Moments before he introduces this list of essential attributes he claimed that play was either rule-governed or make-believe (9), but then he lists these elements as part of a conjunctive that makes up his differentia. Later, he clarifies these latter two parts by arguing that play is regulated and fictive (43). In this way, he avoids this problem. Regulation is not the same as rule-based: make-believe role-playing can be regulated by roles one takes on without explicit rules. Fictive gets at the important idea that playing requires one stepping into this special world; and this doesn’t necessarily imply an absence of rules. Though in this later presentation, he does tell the reader that these two aspects tend to exclude each other.

Caillois’ definition, though, is not that different from Huizinga. What really marks out Caillois’ contribution is his classification of games. He divides games into four broad types: Agon (competition); Alea (chance); Mimicry (simulation): and Ilinx (vertigo). Each of these can range along an axis from what Paidia to Ludens. This range moves from something close to pure frolic (Paidia; lacking almost any structure or rules; the players’ attitudes are more exuberant and spontaneous) to highly structured (Ludens; more calculated and controlled; requiring much more precise and developed skill).

So sports, being competitive, fall under agon. Casino games and dice playing are alea. The game of tag is a kind of mimicry (One pretends to be ‘it’). Lastly, ilinx are kinds of play, like whirling around or amusement park rides, where the goal is a momentary break from normal consciousness. Many games are a mix of these types. A game like poker involves both alea and agon: it is a competition requiring the developing of keen psychological skills but depends on the random distribution of cards.

Using this matrix, Caillois is able to organize all games and types of play. It also allows him to identify ways in which play or games interact with culture and how play can be corrupted. In other words, create what he calls a “Sociology derived from Games”

His definition and typology are also used to explain how play or games get corrupted. Essentially, play is corrupted as more of the rules, structures, and motivations of the non-play/mundane reality mix into play. Not surprisingly, the pursuit of profit is a major corrupting force. Professionals are a “contagion of reality” (45). It pushes aside, at least momentarily, the internal motivations and goals of play. Not just profit does this, but the bringing in reality in any of various ways can corrupt the play. Professionalism can also defeat the free element of play by making it obligatory to play on such-a-such an occasion. The inclusion of too much ‘reality’ can undermine the fictive element. Interestingly, Caillois also sees a parallel perversion that occurs when the blurring goes from play to reality. For example, he discusses superstition as the application of the rules of alea (games of chance) to reality.

As a philosopher of sport, I am much more interested in the definition and typology than the sociological accounts of games (or how games inform sociology). No doubt this can be fascinating in many ways and of possible great worth for a sociologist or anthropologist. Nevertheless, I am not such how far an understanding of the play-elements of tribes that use masks for their sacred rituals can give us about contemporary games and athletics. This is not a criticism of Caillois or others who would extend this account. It is just a statement of (1) my own interests and (2) how far I think an over-arching, all-encompassing conception of ‘play’ can go. As far as (2) goes, I think Huizinga and Caillois are reaching too far into other areas for the concept of play. They are identifying categories of things that are closely related to play or play-inchoate. There is likely a more general concept that covers all these things, but they err in extending ‘play’ to cover all of this. Thus, insofar as one is trying to understand ‘play’ proper, this over-arching conception does not add that much. Caillois seems to suspect this as well: “The facts studied in the name of play are so heterogeneous that one is led to speculate that the word “play” is perhaps merely a trap” (162).

Caillois’ book is an exhaustive, comprehensive, and structured account of play and its role in society and culture. It is an important work if one is interested in play, games, sport, or their interactions with society.

[Anthony Buckley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Caillois’s celebrated book arose out of a more general mid-20th century interest in play beginning with Huizinga’s famous Homo Ludens (1938) but including the massively influential studies of childhood play by Piaget. Caillois criticises Huizinga, complaining, for example, that he excludes games of chance from his discussion of play, and also that Huizinga regards play as always secretive and mysterious, while it is often “spectatular and ostentatous”, even making an assault upon secrecy and mystery.

Caillois, nevertheless, owes much to Huizinga. He defines play as (1 )free from an obligation to take part; (2) separate from ordinary life; (3) uncertain, in its course and outcome; (4) unproductive, creating neither goods nor wealth; governed (5) governed by rules peculiar to itself; and (6) accompanied by make-believe. I do not myself find this definition very convincing. Many of the activities we might call playful do indeed have some of these characteristics, but few of them have all; and some of them are found in non-playful activities.

From here, however, Caillois creates his famous classification or typology of play. This typology has a special place in the study of play and games, but this is largely because nobody has produced a better one.

One axis of his classification differentiates between “four rubrics, depending on whether, in the games under consideration, the role of competition, chance, simulation, or vertigo is dominant”. Caillois frequently speaks as if these distinctions do indeed form a classification. However, elsewhere he acknowledges that these rubrics are, rather, features or characteristics found in some playful activities but not in others. Not least, he devotes much space to those instances where a playful activity may have more than one of these features. For example, he speaks of instances where competition and chance occur together, where competition and simulation occur together and so forth. And then he speaks of the corruption of play, where again there is confusion between play and other forms of activity. The net result is that the clear distinction between types of play (that one might indeed hope for from a classification) falls to pieces. One problem here is that competition, chance, simulation and vertigo are features that crop up elsewhere than in those activities that might be called play. Most obviously competition is a feature of much entirely serious economic life, Chance is also a feature of quite ordinary existence. Mimicry is considered by Piaget – and not only by him – to be a basis for childhood learning. Even vertigo is a feature of certain activities, not normally considered playful.

These difficulties are somewhat mitigated by the other axis of his classification. This makes a simple polarity between freedom and control. One quality found in play is paidia, or joyful free expression. And it is this, that Caillois seems to think is the essence of play. Opposed to this is the attempt to control the paidia, making it more or less orderly, by means, especially, of rules: this he calls ludus. There is a continuum between paidia and ludus, because all play, by its nature, contains freedom, turbulence and joyfulness, while even the least inhibited play is to some extent controlled and orderly. And it is here, I think that Caillois is strongest. One can do more or less anything playfully and it is this the freedom and joyfulness that effects this transformation from the dull to the playful that his notion of paidia captures.

This is, therefore, a major and important work. I do worry, however, that the attempt to use the word “play” to cover such a wide range of phenomena is ultimately misguided, attempting (as Caillous himself says of Huizinga) both too little and too much. Croquet and theatre, crosswords and roulette, waltzing and tightrope walking: all find their way into a typology whose features overlap not only with each other but also with fields other than the playful.

My own feeling is that it may be exceedingly useful to identify various activities that are “bracketed off” from ordinary everyday activities. Among these are make-believe, games, theatre, ritual . . . One may then identify what it is that makes these activities distinctive. I sense that Caillois is not entirely successful in his attempt, and that part of his problem lies with the central attempt to make “play” the key to understanding too wide a range of phenomena. Nevertheless, he takes an early and major step.

[Ermina · Rating 3 out of 5]

Potrajalo je ovo čitanje, što zbog drugih obaveza, što zbog čudne tendencije da već drugi autor o igri piše dosadno.
Za razliku od Huizinge, Caillois uvodi i neke maaalo zanimljivije segmente, pa mi je uspio zadržati pažnju. Donekle.
Mislim da se, na kraju krajeva, iz ove literature može naučiti dosta toga, ali izvedba tog podučavanja nije baš najsjajnija.

[Victoria Hawco · Rating 3 out of 5]

We love someone who says up front what their thesis is.

[Andy · Rating 1 out of 5]

I am a fan of all sorts of games, from sports to board games to imaginative free play (to me, the NFL and Settlers of Catan are two sides of the same die), and so I thought I might enjoy this book, which is apparently a landmark in the intellectual analysis of games. I was wrong; I found it to be a mess of mostly pseudo-intellectual blather.

There is one good idea, the "ludus"-"paidia" spectrum, contrasting the enjoyment of a structured game in which people exhibit skill and strategy bound by rigorous rules (ludus) to a more disorderly, creative fun where rules and "winners" may be haphazardly defined and the enjoyment comes from finding your own way of playing (paidia). There are also a few interesting examples of games from different cultures.

Other than that, I found the book to be full of many statements that weren't well supported. The agon/alea/mimicry/ilinx classification seemed to be more driven by a desire to make grid diagrams than actually clearly spanning the range of possible games in any way. (Some aspects of games, such as addictiveness, humor, or what I'd describe as "the joy of taking things apart to see how they work" are not well captured by this classification.) There are overwrought statements made that are just made, without evidence beyond the author's confidence that you follow his train of thought and agree with where he's going, such as:

Any corruption of the principles of play means the abandonment of those precarious and doubtful conventions that it is always profitable, if not permissible, to deny, but the arduous adoption of which is a milestone in the development of civilization. If the principles of play in effect correspond to powerful instincts... it is readily understood that they can be positively and creatively gratified only under ideal and circumscribed conditions, which in every case prevail in the rules of play.

As far as I can tell, all this means (to the degree that it means anything) is that things can get out of hand if we let our impulses spill over from the meaningless boundaries of a game into places where they can do social harm. Whether this qualifies as a "milestone in the development of a civilization," I'm not so sure.

There is also what I'd describe as an overwrought attempt to tie game-playing into social practices. Sure, I buy that the thrill of acting and pretending that you're someone that you're not finds expression both in some games and in social rituals where people where masks or costumes. It suggests some potentially interesting analyses, such as the neurological state of the brain when involved in both, or the relative popularity of certain types of games in certain societies, etc. But when it turns into the author simply stating unrigorous or unfalsifiable statements about how a police state functions as a mask, or re-describing religious practices with words like "ilinx" jammed in here or there, then I've lost interest.

There's no need for you to read this book.

[Dmitry Kurkin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Хорошую теорию узнаешь по ее предсказательной способности. Кайуа, развивая идеи "Homo Ludens" Хейзинги, четко и точно описал не только типологическое многообразие видеоигр, появившихся через несколько десятков лет после выхода книги (agon - состязательные, alea - азартные, то есть все, построенные вокруг лутбоксов и псевдослучайных чисел, и mimicry - от NFS до симулятора козла), но и нарождающуюся только сейчас область VR, суть которой сводится как раз к ощущению ilinx, "головокружения", пьянящего восторга от выхода из собственного тела. При всей нестрогости классификации это очень мощный прогноз.

[tea, boginja opste prakse]

toliko mi je zao sto ne mogu na ispitu da pricam moju teoriju o tome kako bdsm nastaje kad se sretnu agon i ilinx i o tome kako je mazohizam asketska igra

[Bernardo Mozelli · Rating 3 out of 5]

While Caillois does succeed in solving some loose ties and overall optimizing Huizinga's theory of play's place in culture, Homo Ludens' ambition ends up producing more interesting (albeit less academically sound) results.

[Samuel Ch. · Rating 2 out of 5]

No es que este libro haya sido malo. Es que no es útil.
Caillois redunda en un cuadrante matemático de la diversión. Cuatro configuraciones de juego en la que se reúnen, según el autor, todas y cada una de las actividades lúdicas del ser humano.

Caillois le da una visión estructuralista al divertimento. Se olvida del espíritu competitivo, de las ganas de triunfar, del esparcimiento; en su lugar, se esmera en dar catálogo a todo lo que hacemos que es, en apariencia, improductivo. Desde la pirinola hasta los voladores de Papantla (que por cierto, según el autor, esta actividad completamente ociosa ha sido prohibida y desaparecida por el gobierno. Gran mentira), los juegos y el ser humano son, en este estudio, un sistemático quehacer provisional.

Con todo y sus referencias al Homo Ludens de Huitzinga, Roger Caillois falla en explicar por qué jugamos, por qué somos gente lúdica, dinámica, activa, y en su lugar dedica decenas de páginas a decir qué es un juego, qué no es un juego, y por qué.

[Mjhancock · Rating 4 out of 5]

Caillois sets up his four categories of play--agon (competition), alea (chance), mimicry (simulation/imitation), and ilinx (vertigo)--and outlines how he thinks they function in play and society in general.

The first two chapters of this book are pretty foundational for the humanities side of game studies--they're used very commonly by academics in undergraduate classes related to game studies. In fact, I use them for that purpose. And I was just reading them over again for a course discussion and thought--why don't I read the whole book this time? And I did. How is it? Well, let's just say there's a reason people only assign the first two chapters.

Ok, that's grossly overstating the situation, but I couldn't resist. The book is divided into nine chapters, with two appendices. In the first chapter, Caillois sets up a definition of play, one that is heavily based on the one advanced by Johanne Huizinga in his earlier book on play. In the second chapter, Caillois sets up the aforementioned four categories of play, as well as a spectrum ranging basically from free play to rigid rules. The very brief chapter three makes the point that all of these elements generally exist in social context, or playing games with others; chapter four considers what happens when each of the four is taken to an extreme. The final chapter of the first section basically elaborates on his beliefs regarding the role of games in relation to culture, that, as he puts it, you can describe a "sociology derived from games."

The second half of the book is his exploration of just that. The general theory is that more "advanced" cultures operate through a combination of agon and alea, and less advanced rely more on mimicry and ilinx. He goes through which pairings are impossible, and which fit well for structuring a society. And this is where he loses me, to a large extent. Caillois does what a lot of anthropologists in the 60s did, which was equate the development of cultures to the development of a child. It's a metaphor that can go a long way in justifying one culture dominating another (you're not doing cultural imperialism, you're just the "adult" in the room) and all sorts of international evils that have been done throughout history. It also assumes that the exact Western culture that exists today is the pinnacle of said evolution, and any deviations from that path means the society is less "evolved." To say that modern society has abandoned mimicry and ilinx seems pretty shortsighted, given how much our culture revolves around entertainment and sports. You could argue that both of those came into existence because mimicry and ilinx were otherwise missing from day to day life, but then you have to agree with Caillois' statement that games are separate from every day life, which is not a given.

There are still some observations I'll grant him, however. The idea that modern society turns to alea and agon as the solutions to inequality seems to work, as does the role of identification; his long thoughts on celebrity culture are definitely interesting. And because I think mimicry and ilinx never left culture, the final chapter on how they sneak back in works fine with me. As mentioned, there's also two appendices, which consider the importance of games of chance and the psychological and mathematical approaches to games and why they're lacking.

On the whole, I'm glad I read it; it gives some context for the rest of Caillois' argument. It's a product of its time, but some of the insights are worth keeping.

[Agential Arts Workshop · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’m writing this review from a potentially unfair perspective—the perspective of applying what’s in the book to the creation of games, specifically video games. I know that’s why a lot of layfolk are interested in this and other games studies books from the period, and I don’t really feel that’s a useless angle to come at these types of sociological books. I just happen to think it’s useful in that regard.

Another thing to get out of the way is the fact the book was written at a point in spacetime that wasn’t exactly interculturally enlightened. There will be wincing when a modern reader comes across two or three lines in this book, but the nature of those occurrences fortunately doesn’t do anything to diminish the value of the overall premise. However, I did remove a star from my rating of this book for that aspect of the reading experience.

Lastly, this is not a book about or discussing “game design.” This is a sociological book discussing “game studies” that happens to be frequently sited within books about game design. If you approach this book looking for 1-to-1 applications of pragmatic and technical game design insights, you’ll end up disappointed.

All of that said, the thing in this book that can best be applied to practical game creation, especially the creation of video games, is the dissection of the purpose of play, both structurally and within the context of an enclosing culture. What I’m talking about here isn’t exclusively in reference to thinking about games we create within the context of our realworld cultures, but more specifically thinking about the types of play we inject into the experiential cultures of our constructed playspaces; whether that’s the experiential culture of the playspace of Tetrisworld, or the experiential culture of the playspace of a sprawling continent on a diverse fantasy planet.

The book provides a frame through which the experiential purpose of play in specific cultural and experiential contexts can be dissected and analyzed, even if one doesn’t agree with the specific breakdown Caillois proposes. It indirectly provides an analytical tool that can be extrapolated onto thinking about what type of play, rules, and structure can help facilitate what types of experiences within the specific context of the “culture” of the playspace ecologies we build as creators.

This book is worth reading, regardless of the angle you’re coming from as a person interested in the experience and potential purposes of play.

[Michael A. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting look at playing and games and how they relate to society from a historico-sociologico-anthropological perspective. Probably pretty outdated considering it was published in the 50s, but interesting to read about games from different countries. His typology of games was quite interesting, and it must have been a challenge to fit every game to ever exist into categories.

It seems as though a dialectical relationship exists between agon (competition) and alea (luck) based games - one cannot exist without the other. Mimicry and Illinx don't seem to have this special relationship but they do have special functions in society. I thought it was very interesting how typologies of games bleed into non-games: for example, hereditary monarchies are alea: pure luck based. It is interesting how the USSR wanted a society that was pure agon yet parts of alea still existed: this is what makes me wonder if there is a dialectical relationship between agon and alea - one not being able to exist without the other.

And of course hybridity exists, a game can be mimicry and agon, illinx and alea, etc. One complaint is the footnotes were quite long and seemed almost irrelevant, as an example there was a two or three page long foot note about a beetle - I was unsure how it related to the content at hand - eventually I stopped looking at the footnotes.

The prose is quite clear and accessible and I would recommend this to anyone interest in theorizing about playing and games with the caveat that it is from the 50s.

[Guilherme Smee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Na tradição de Homo Ludens, de Huizinga, Roger Callois também desenvolve um tratado sobre os jogos neste livro intitulado Os Jogos e os Homens. A primeira parte do livro é a melhos, onde o autor traz uma definição dos jogos e também traz uma diferenciação através de quatro categorias. São elas a agôn (os jogos de competição); a alea (os jogos de sorte); a mimicry (os jogos de imitação); e a ilinx (que são os jogos que provocam vertigem no jogador, como nos parques de diversão). Talvez essa diferenciação seja a maior contribuição de Callois para a área, porque é a partir dessas categorias que o autor vai desenvolver o restante de sua pesquisa. Por exemplo, ele soma algumas dessas categorias para poder analisar outros tipos de jogos. A última parte do livro que fala sobre jogos de azar e é complementada também com outros textos soltos foi a que menos gostei, mas esse me parece um livro indispensável para quem pesquisa jogos de todos os tipos.

[Isabella · Rating 5 out of 5]

THE seminal work of my concentration. Ultimate inspiration for the following BARS I spat in my game design manifesto this sem.: « There is no science that stipulates the
division of Man into his post-Erectus, evolutionary brothers. We are not Homo Sapien without the
totality of Homo Faber, Homo Luden, Homo Fictus, and so on. Genomically this is true;
anthropologically this is true. I therefore find it puzzling that we would attempt to relegate the part of
us that plays to this being that is Other to us. Indeed, is it not the part of us that ponders, creates, and
feels, as well? If so, then in the same, ironic, manner that Oscar Wilde insists upon the uselessness of
art, I too, would posit that all games are quite useless. »

[Jade Aslain · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the most unexpected social theoretical exlorations I've read. The nietzschean develoment (transvaluation, genealogy) throughout the work is subtle but well applied. Whereas in the 20th century social anthropology tended to focus on the sacred and profane, toolmaking and symbolic classification, and the more obvious features of social organization and evolution, this text focuses on something which the author notes is trivialized today, but has on the other hand been integral to the development of social complexity, and the civilizing process: play. This work is brilliant and insightful.

[Brigitte · Rating 4 out of 5]

The creation of a system to categorize games and play in this book has, somewhat surprisingly, been useful in discussions about other topics. For example, it allowed me to talk about cars as anthropocene toys and how they evoke pleasure by categorizing the type of pleasure evoked and using that to generate discussion about why people enjoy car racing. Additionally, this was written in a clear manner that considers psychological, mathematical, and sociological approaches to the nature and history of games and their relevance in different cultures.

[Serhii Povísenko · Rating 4 out of 5]

The continuation of Huizinga’s ideas focuses on agon—competition—and the rule-based nature of games. Caillois expands on this by offering a broader categorization and further exploring how games influence culture, building on Huizinga’s foundation. I enjoyed reading it. At times, it can be overly descriptive and a bit dull, but the insights and overall spirit of the text make it worthwhile. I definitely want to read it again.

[Michael Dickson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not blown away but definitely fascinating. He classifies different types of games that appear in all cultures based on the basic instincts they're based on (competition, chance, simulation and vertigo) and then examines their relation to the cultures they thrive in.

[Eris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent discussion of different typologies of play.

Is Caillois seducing us to join the mimetic-ilinxic axis of society? Or is he truly as normative as (at least in the translation) his choice of words suggest? In any case, this really got me turning the pages again. Warm recommendation!

[Filippo · Rating 3 out of 5]

Un bel saggio, punto cardine dello studio sui giochi.
Un avanzamento rispetto ai concetti espressi in Homo ludens.
Mi è piaciuta molto l'analisi dei giochi, mentre l'espansione dell'analisi alla società mi ha convinto parzialmente.

[Nicklas Karlsson · Rating 3 out of 5]

We really need a modern updated book along the same lines!

[Tova Holmberger · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ants

[Patrick Diego · Rating 3 out of 5]

mto wishful thinking.

[Jim Leckband · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good introduction to the analysis of games in a sociological context. He was right when he mentioned that game theory was really not germane to his goals, sorry Mr. von Neumann.

[Brendan]

Only read a little of. What does ' vertigo ' mean to this guy ?

[Elisa · Rating 4 out of 5]

First part was chef kiss for my PhD

[Michele Banale · Rating 4 out of 5]

bello. una riflessione su gioco-cultura del 1958 con ancora una sua profonda attualità

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not wuite what I was expecting, but maybe that's my fault. A sociological framework for discussing games that divides them into facets of gambling, physical contest, strategy, and imaginary play.

You won't get the awesome insights of Goffman or Durkheim, but it's okay. The best part was the footnotes, where you'll read about esoteric games in world cultures.

Onward toward an ethnography of human games, Callois, it's what we all want. I think.

[Jacques le fataliste et son maître · Rating 5 out of 5]

Se penso a Caillois, penso a questo libro: idee che si ritagliano con precisione, sorrette da una scrittura limpida.
Feconda ed elegante la classificazione dei giochi in giochi di lotta (agon), di mascheramento (mimicry), di vertigine (ilinx) e di sorte (alea) – e suggestivi i termini scelti per indicare i gruppi! (Be’, ci vuole anche questo per fare la fortuna di un’idea: una bella terminologia…)