Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara

by Deborah Shapley

The first comprehensive biography of Robert S. McNamara follows his road to secretary of defense, where, during the 1960s, he shaped nuclear policy and orchestrated U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 40,000 first printing. $40,000 ad/promo. Tour.

Genres: Biography, History, Politics, Nonfiction, American History

734 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1993

Reviews

[Bruce Feeney · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book. Well written. McNamara is an amazing character highly driven by his intellect and steered by history, the events of his life and the country seem inevitable. An almost tragic hero.

[Nolan · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a fascinating story of a brilliant failure who succeeded at some things. To write the former defense secretary off as a colossal failure would be inaccurate and is not what this biography does. Instead, it does a fair and honest job of looking at a life that is an intriguing combination of sunshine and shadow. This essentially is the story of a man who sought to govern by the numbers and failed to be honest with himself or the American people.

I’m far too young to remember firsthand most of the events referenced in the book, but I have always been fascinated by what I see as a kind of cynical subterfuge on the part of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations regarding Vietnam. Most of all, my heart breaks for those men who fought that conflict when this nation’s very leaders, especially McNamara, doubted the conflict could be won, and said nothing.

I ought to have come away from this biography with a deeper appreciation for McNamara’s successes, and there were many. But instead, I came away sickened by the lies and failures of someone who could have done more to save young American lives and did not.

They called McNamara the human computer. He could take a position and rattle off innumerable statistics in support of his position. So domineering was he that those who differed with him were often vanquished from the scene and rendered relatively ineffective.

It is the story of a man who failed miserably at fatherhood after he moved his family to Washington from Ann Arbor to take on the job of Kennedy’s defense secretary. During his years at Ford, McNamara was able to unify his family; they appeared to be a solid unit. But things fell apart after his job changed. Indeed, the relationships were so abysmal that at one point, one of his daughters insisted he was her uncle when someone questioned her last name. How dreadful a parent do you have to be before one of your offspring will so resoundingly distance him or herself from you.

I confess that, because of its length, I considered not reading this at all or perhaps giving up on it early. But it is written so well that, once you start, you’ll want to see how it turns out. The truth is that some eight million Americans were in some way or other touched by a war that was arguably prolonged by decisions McNamara and others made. There seems to be a mixed bag of verdicts regarding his role as president of the World Bank. While McNamara died in 2009, this book ends in the early 90s.

To watch a C-SPAN interview with the author, go to:
https://www.c-span.org/video/?38911-1...

[Dominique · Rating 5 out of 5]

Promise and Power is the story of Robert McNamara, who gained notoriety by how the way he handled the Vietnam War while he was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968.

It is the story of a human computer who was almost completely rational in his thinking and successfully led Ford Motor Company and took ideas and studies of business to the Defense Department where rigid rules of x and y and his continuous insistence on numbers and statistics could not resolve the issues on the battlefield where there is continuous unpredictability and fluidity. Nor could his continuous loyalty to the President or his insistence on efficiency help resolve communism in the region.

Thereafter, Robert McNamara redeemed himself by becoming President of the World Bank who, when he was young, set the goal of helping the greatest number of people.

I appreciated learning not just about an analytical leader (seems rare to find books about analytical people) but I appreciated learning some concepts of business administration and as a novice with a historical interest in the Vietnam War, I like how the author introduces the reader to the cultural and historical aspects of the country.

I recommend watching the C-SPAN interview with the author about her book: Deborah Shapley Interview

Biographical Summary Review: 9
Book Reference Review: 2
History Reference Review: 3
Movie Reference Review: 4
Military Reference Review: 5
Dictionary Reference Review: 204
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Grammatical Error Count: 1
Factual Error Count: 1

[Christopher Saunders · Rating 4 out of 5]

First major biography of Kennedy and Johnson's controversial Defense Secretary, written while McNamara was still circumspect about discussing Vietnam (he hadn't yet written his memoirs or engaged in the public apologetics of his final years). Shapley views McNamara, the Ford executive who became the Vietnam War's main architect, as a man driven by ruthless ambition and technocratic precepts, whose analytical mind often submerged his human feelings and doubts about policy. Well-suited to running a motor company or work as an intelligence analyst, McNamara's numbers-based management style made him a remarkably ill-fit to run the Pentagon during one of America's most divisive, futile conflicts, inventing arcane, tortured statistical analyses to prove that an unwinnable war was being "won." The nicest thing Shapley can say about McNamara is that his very real talents, channeled differently, could have benefited the country, and world greatly. She gives a largely glowing account of his time running the World Bank, when he traded body counts and bombing tonnage for humanitarian aid and wide-ranging efforts to end Third World poverty. Like all public figures, Bob McNamara emerges as complicated, flawed and human, if not always sympathetic or understandable; mostly, Shapley figures, he was the wrong man in the wrong job at the worst possible time.

[Reader · Rating 4 out of 5]

Educational, informative, gripping at times. Gread insight into how decisions were made at the top of US politics; decisions that affected millions of people and took hundreds of thousands of lives. An abject moment in history, exacerbated by the stubborness of McNamara - although in fairness, he was powered by an universal American pride that still exists today: 'we're american, we cannot lose, we're the mightiest'. At the expense of (in this instance), Vietnam and Cambodia and their poor, wretched inhabitants.

[Eric_W · Rating 5 out of 5]

The flap over Robert McNamara’s memoirs In Retrospect was startling. The impression from listening to commentators and letter-writers is that his mea culpa represented a turnabout and betrayal of everything the United States stood for during the Vietnam war.

Deborah Shapley’s excellent biography reveals a much more complicated scenario. (McNamara had told Shapley he would never write his memoirs; it would be interesting to know for certain what changed his mind in the years since 1992.) It is discouraging to discover years after an event how little we actually knew of the decisions that were being made behind the scenes. Shapley’s biography is full of such revelations — revealing again how close we came to nuclear holocaust during the Kennedy presidency. Eisenhower had reduced the military forces considerably during his tenure as president (much to the consternation of Maxwell Taylor, who resigned over Ike’s reductionist policy). When Kruschev fulminated and threatened about Berlin, Kennedy called up the reserves and increased the size of U.S. forces, calling for a force of a million men in Europe (providing the eventual source of troops for Vietnam). At the same time he encouraged civilians to build bomb shelters. In the meantime, McNamara had commissioned a supersecret study by several highranking generals to analyze what would happen in the case of nuclear war at different levels. He was horrified to learn from their study that in all cases the United States would be completely destroyed. The official policy of the United States under Dulles and Eisenhower had been massive retaliation. Kennedy changed the policy to one of “flexible” response. Under this policy, the immediate response to Soviet attack would be small tactical nuclear weapons, escalating only as needed. McNamara began to have serious doubts about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, following the secret study and the crash of a B-47 in North Carolina that released a bomb that fortunately did not explode. Yet, for ostensible reasons of deterrence, it was imperative that the government stand by its avowed use of nuclear weapons to counter hostile Soviet actions in Berlin. Anyone in the U.S. bureaucracy who suggested otherwise (even though Kennedy and McNamara had serious self-doubts about whether they would indeed use them) was severely reprimanded. McNamara later personally questioned the wisdom of lying in public. McNamara tried to export his success at Ford to the Defense Department. He was obsessed with a desire for economy and efficiency. Perhaps emblematic of his mania was the TFX, a fighter that was supposed to serve the interests of all the services. In one almost tragic scene, Shapely describes McNamara down on his knees on the floor in his office, surrounded by representatives of the manufacturers and the services, pawing through blueprints trying to find the elements missing that were needed to make the plane fly. The irony was that “to make his philosophic point about commonality, simplicity and efficiency, [he:] picked an unworkable set of common requirements, and hence a very sophisticated piece of hardware.” The TFX never got off the ground. McNamara’s tenure at the World Bank after he left government — he became more and more distressed with Vietnam and was eased out by Johnson — was more successful. Quantification was a more useful skill in dealing with problems of hunger and the poor around the world. But he remained aloof and was perceived as arrogant by his staff. “He loves humanity more than he loves human beings,” was the comment of one reporter.

[Jennifer · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am trying to write a biography of a man as complex and contradictory as Robert Strange McNamara and hope it comes out as well-argued, interesting and meaningful as the work Shapley has done. I did not live through the Kennedy or Johnson eras, but I have lived with the effect of many of the choices McNamara made - some good, some bad. I did not think I would have liked the man after reading his apologia "In Retrospect" or watching the "Fog of War" or from reading his endless memos and letters. But, this work has convinced me that he was not a complete villain. He could be charming. He had a moral compass. But, like us all, McNamara had flaws and contradictions and it is those that make him human. And, humans are far more interesting than your average comic-book bad guy. There are elements of McNamara's approach, style, world-view that I admire and respect.

It also makes it very clear that the work I am doing is necessary. Cabinet members and other agency heads have far more power than many of us understand. Turns out that accountability to a constituency is not such a bad idea. In the case of a presidential appointee there is the danger that - as in the case of McNamara - they only see themselves as having a constituency of one. Being accountable to JFK or LBJ is not the same as being accountable and responsive to the American people.


The conclusion? "We make our decisions. And then our decisions turn around and make us." - P. W. Bornum

[Gary Brim · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written book covering the career of someone who would be very hard to write about. The book makes clear that the mistakes he made at Ford were repeated (to a greater consequence) at the Defense Department and the World Bank. A smart man, McNamara developed a management process that ruled him in all circumstances and made grievous errors as a result. The book's only flaw is the author's presumption that her opinions on politics and public policy are instead facts with which no one would disagree. The book would be better if readers did not have to wade through her editorializing, or if she at least had clearly stated her points as opinion or analysis.

[Michael Ransley · Rating 4 out of 5]

Probably the first person who understood the value of big data.

His life was clearly one of attempting to fix things and in the process he may (although I am not so sure) have made things worse.

Must read for people interested in technology and its application to society.