Profiles the fateful military partnership between the U.S. Army chief-of-staff and future president during World War II and into the Cold War years, citing their collaboration on major battles, Marshall's influence on Eisenhower's subsequent military and political career, and the reversal in their positions toward the end of the war.
Mark Perry (1950 – 8 August 2021) was an American author specializing in military, intelligence, and foreign affairs analysis.[1][2]
He authored nine books: Four Stars,[3] Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA,[4] A Fire In Zion: Inside the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,[5] Conceived in Liberty,[6] Lift Up Thy Voice,[7] Grant and Twain,[8] Partners In Command,[9] Talking To Terrorists,[10] and The Most Dangerous Man in America: The Making of Douglas MacArthur.[11]
Perry’s articles have been featured in a number of publications including The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Nation, Newsday, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Christian Science Monitor, and The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio).
Background Perry was a graduate of Northwestern Military and Naval Academy and of Boston University.
Career Perry was the former co-Director of the Washington, D.C., London, and Beirut-based Conflicts Forum,[12] which specializes in engaging with Islamist movements in the Levant in dialogue with the West. Perry served as co-Director for over five years. A detailed five-part series on this experience was published by the Asia Times in March and in July 2006.[13] Perry served as an unofficial advisor to PLO Chairman and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat from 1989 to 2004.[14][15]
Over the years, I have read many biographies of both Eisenhower and Marshall. This book is not a biography of either man but an examination of the relationship between Eisenhower and Marshall. Marshall developed the strategic military plan for World War II in both theatres of war. Eisenhower implemented that plan in Europe & Africa. Eisenhower worked for General Douglas MacArthur when he was Chief of Staff of the Army; but he never developed a relationship as he did when he worked for General George Marshall when he was Chief of Staff of the Army.
The book is well written and researched. The book begins when Eisenhower starts work for General Marshall in the beginning of 1941 and ends with Marshall as Secretary of Defense and Eisenhower as the first Commander of NATO. Mark Perry does spend sometime on Eisenhower’s role developing NATO.
Mark Perry writes primarily about military topics and has written books about General Douglas MacArthur and many books about the American Civil War including the book “Grant and Twain”.
I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is seventeen hours and fifty-three minutes. James Anderson Foster does an excellent job narrating the book. Foster is an Audie nominee and winner of multiple Earphone Awards. He also is one of Audible’ s top 20 highest rated narrators.
Partners in Command fits into the somewhat recent trend in history books of focusing in on an historical specific - a battle, a speech, a pivotal month or as in this case, the relationship between two men, George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, during a pivotal time in history - and filling in a narrative - with anecdotes, flashbacks, etc - around it. (I don't view this as an inherently bad thing - different readers have different interests).
First the good news, in this reader's humble opinion any continued investigation or chronicle of the challenges these two men faced either together or separately and their successes, (and failures), in meeting them is valuable. For whatever reason George Marshall is not only underappreciated today, he seems to have been forgotten. And in hindsight it's very difficult to imagine anyone else on either side of the Atlantic assuming the role Eisenhower did as capably as he did. (This is something FDR intuitively understood.) This book does a very good job in detailing the difficulties faced and the decisions made by these two generals during WWII, often while they were thousands of miles apart with few face to face meetings and under extreme pressure to win the war in Europe.
Which brings me to the down side - the author may have bit off more than he could chew in a book of this type, and it might have been a better idea to conclude with the success of D-Day. (Although selling a publisher at this time on "yet another" D-Day book is probably a difficult task.) Many important topics - build-up of the pre-WWII US military into a fighting force, NATO, the Cold War, the Marshall Plan & post WWII Europe - and individuals - Churchill, FDR, Truman among others - are given, at best, cursory treatment. (The post WWII "peace" part of this book is minimal.) This is understandable in keeping the book to a "readable" length but comes up short of its billing (War & Peace). There are also some unforgivable errors in this book with two whoppers contained within the first 20 pages - the dates of the Battle of Stalingrad and Germany's declaration of war on the US. Hard to comprehend how these slipped through any editing process.
If you are looking for a starting point in understanding these two men and the US High Command/military management of the European theater in WWII, you've found it. This book is entertaining and very readable. If you are familiar with this period of history and the players, there is really nothing new here.
My father had been recommending this book for some time, but I had been hesitant to dive-into it, afraid that the content would be too heavy on military jargon & statistics. My hesitation was unwarranted, as what I discovered within the pages of Mark Perry's PARTNERS IN COMMAND: GEORGE MARSHALL & DWIGHT WISENHOWER IN WAR & PEACE was a well-rounded, thoughtful read. With the expert delving of a seasoned researcher, Perry takes the reader into the world in which Marshall & Eisenhower inhabited. We get to understand the two men who led America's Armed Forces to victory during World War II -- Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, and his subordinate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Perry uses letters and other research materials to help us to know what made each man to become who he was during one of the most pivotal times in America's history.
While both men share commonalities, it's Marshall who shines brightest in his unwavering belief that a military man's job was to be above the fray of politics; to serve faithfully & loyally without any self-serving ambition. Perhaps the greatest example given of Marshall's humility was when FDR suggested to Marshall that if he wanted to lead the troops in Europe during the Normandy landings, all he needed to do was ask. Marshall, despite his own desires to lead Allied forces in the liberation of Europe, acquiesced to his Commander-in-Chief's desire to keep him in Washington. Marshall never let his disappointment in this decision affect his relationship with or faith in Eisenhower when Eisenhower was ultimately chosen. This spoke to the greatness of George Marshall's character.
Perry writes how Marshall handpicked Eisenhower, allowing him the independence to pursue his own path, and to rise to the upper echelons of America's military hierarchy. Both men used their diplomatic natures to piece together an Allied coalition that would overcome the tyranny of the Axis regimes that threatened the free world.
While the majority of Perry's book focuses most rightly on the men during the Second War War, it's his review of Marshall's public life afterwards that I found most admirable. While Eisenhower turned to the Republican party after the war (his disillusionment & fraction with Democratic President Truman is given as part of this), Marshall became a statesman, admired by both parties while continuing to live by his standards of staying above the fray of politics, using the remainder of his public life for the betterment of mankind -- first, in his attempts to help end the Chinese Civil War through his efforts to bring Democracy to China, and then, later, becoming Truman's Secretary of State, helping to craft the Marshall Plan for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Perry remains an impartial writer of both men and their characters, but it's Marshall who comes away being more admirable for his ability to stay true to his beliefs; to remain non-political; to serve without any self-serving ambition. When Marshall would later come under attack from Republicans when Truman nominated Marshall for Secretary of Defense, it's Eisenhower who failed the man who served as his mentor, supporter, and Chief. Perry explains how Eisenhower purposely chose to stay quiet as Marshall was unjustly maligned for what the Republicans portrayed as Marshall's failure in China (by laying the blame at Marshall's feet, the Republicans claimed it was Marshall & Truman who helped lead the Communists to the takeover of that country). Perhaps Eisenhower's silence was due to his own political aspirations. At this point in Eisenhower's life, he had aligned himself with the Republican party with the intention of running for President. Still, as a reader, I found Eisenhower's turn to political ambition over the support of his former promoter and Chief of Staff, served as an indicator of a great flaw in Eisenhower's character. When, during the war, Eisenhower was blamed for the bumbling of the invasion of Italy, it was Marshall who stood by his subordinate, showing continued faith and support. It was disappointing to see that when the situations were reversed, Eisenhower did not do the same; and worse, did not do so for his own advancement.
PARTNERS IN COMMAND is more than a worthy read. It provided greater insight into how America was able to successfully partner with its Allies to overcome tyranny. Mark Perry admirably informs how this was achieved through the leadership of men like George C. Marshall & Dwight D. Eisenhower.
One of the best stories of WWII is how Generals Marshall and Eisenhower developed a strategic partnership to guide the Allies to victory. Both were superb military leaders as well as statesmen. The British strategy to hit the Germans in the Med was without doubt the correct path. North Africa, Sicily, and Italy were all campaigns that drained the German Army. Overlord destroyed the hollow remainder in France. The Ardennes and the attempted relief of Budapest was the last gasp of the Panzers.
Military/diplomatic leadership are now one and the same. Military leaders almost always interact with other nationals and diplomats at all levels today. In essence, one cannot be a military leader without the necessary political skills to deal with our own government as well as other governments. Those skills are not taught in ROTCs are Academies, not at least when I went through. They are soft skills learned on the frontiers. Marshall became Secretary of State and later Secretary of Defense. Eisenhower went on to lead NATO and become President. Military leadership is political leadership. They are fundamentally intertwined. This book goes a long way of explaining how this works. I encourage everyone to read this one.
I would have given this book 2 or maybe three stars, but the editing was ATROCIOUS! There were many, many easily avoidable errors of fact riddling this book, which I found without really reading it closely.
Let's look at p.257, for one example. An LCT is larger than an LST? (line 1)
Corps and divisions change identities within the same page, and names are misspelled repeatedly.
So many errors, that I don't think I could trust the main story, which is otherwise well put together, covering the planning and command disagreements that Marshall and Eisenhower had to work through to get to the Allied victory in Europe. I have to conclude that Mr. Perry does not know much about military affairs, or at least about World War II history, and I would be reluctant to read any more of his works.
I read this book from a different perspective than most readers of biographies - biography junkies, and WW II history buffs - it was assigned by my CEO to us (all his management) because it is one of the best books on leadership ever written. There are incredible lessons to be learned from the internal conflicts within the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the allies' combined chiefs. My CEO made a great comment the other day, "Marshall was the most powerful man in the world, and he couldn't get things done - I don't feel so bad."
Partners in Command by Mark Perry is an interesting examination of the relationship between Generals Marshall and Eisenhower during World War II. Focusing on their personal correspondence, it is most insightful in the period commencing with Eisenhower's assignment to the Army Staff the week after Pearl Harbor to the victory in Europe. Their prewar experiences as well as their experiences post war are also covered in some detail to provide valuable background and context. The author traces a number of key threads throughout, including the influence of General Fox Conner, Eisenhower's deference to Marshall on a number of issues and key debates during the war on command in coalition warfare.
One of the major themes is of this book is the influence of Fox Conner on Eisenhower and the shared vision between Marshall and Eisenhower on their interpretation on 'the American Way of War'. Eisenhower's tour with Fox Conner in Panama is cited as a watershed -- Conner had served with Marshall in WWI and his influence on Eisenhower is considerable. Conner believed another war in Europe inevitable (as Marshall did) and the United States should only, "....fight as a last resort, fight with Allies, and fight quickly (as democracy quickly tires of it)." While this may be an overly simplified version of a more sophisticated and nuanced theory, the author follows it throughout the book. He also contrasts this with the countervailing "Pattonesque" philosophy that "Americans Play to Win". Perry is advancing, in some ways, an American theoretical counter to the Clausewitizian 'war is a continuation of policy by other means'. Cinematic comparisons aside, Conner, Marshall and Eisenhower believe in the American outlook, war is the exception rather than the rule.
The author relies on personal correspondence between the two General officers and the primary focus of the book is the Marshall-Eisenhower relationship. Luck and knowing the right people clearly had a role in bringing these two officers together. It is useful to remember that although Eisenhower is often cited as a relatively junior, lieutenant colonel, in 1941 (in most narratives), he was 51 years old (the same as the author of this book review) at the time. Eisenhower's siblings were very successful in fields outside the Army as well, one of his brothers running the Japanese-American internment and later serving as the President of three different universities. The relationship between the two was subordinate at first, deferential throughout (characterized as senior/subordinate and then ‘upper/lower class’ as in Academy life) but moved in stages and progressed in maturity as Eisenhower passed the various trials put before him -- first as a Staff Officer in War Plans, drafting orders in the forlorn effort to support Mac Arthur in the Philippines, then pulling together a combined command in England and then leading the North African invasion and campaign. As Eisenhower negotiated each test, learning hard lessons but gaining allies along the way, Marshall placed more responsibility on his shoulders. Marshall insisted -- with rare exceptions noted -- that Eisenhower let the facts put before him and his mission drive his decisions. He seemed exceptionally comfortable in delegating authority as Eisenhower earned responsibility for the success of the coalition effort.
The problems Eisenhower solved were broader than purely military issues. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that both these Generals were politically adept – Eisenhower’s personal relationship with Churchill being a primary example. Favoritism and political skills were almost indistinguishable in some cases -- in fact, the author offers evidence that this is what saved Marshall from being held accountable for Pearl Harbor while his Navy counterpart and good friend (Admiral Stark) was. This is not an unfamiliar topic -- other authors have discussed Eisenhower’s favoritism in the European Campaign and Marshall’s formality with both Roosevelt and Eisenhower is consistent throughout the work. Somewhat counter intuitively, the author demonstrates that the British (and Churchill in particular) were willing to accept Eisenhower as Supreme Commander for the ETO but continued lobbying for a British Deputy Ground Commander -- they saw Eisenhower for what he was (a leader valued for his political skills) rather than what he was not (an engaged senior commander). Political skills were the indispensible tool Eisenhower wielded and the one valued over his military prowess in these circumstances. And while this is not a new or particularly insightful observation, the author demonstrates it in convincing fashion, without an overwhelming level of detail.
In fact, details are what seem to give this book its issues and some inconsistencies. Was the North African invasion and subsequent German surrender in North Africa really as significant as the German defeat at Stalingrad? While most historians argue they were somewhat related, the scope of the German defeat at Stalingrad is generally considered to have doomed their hopes for victory on the Eastern Front and in the War. The North African victory, while impressive in terms of Germans and Italians captured, doesn't seem to meet such a lofty standard in accepted histories of the war. In fact, this was Marshall's main argument against Torch and other British attempts to attack the periphery of Europe. The author rightfully presents the British insistence on peripheral campaigns as a constant source of friction between the allies but there seems to be merit in their assertion that America and her Army were not ready to confront the Germans when and where Marshall desired. The book seems to conclude that Marshall's desire for a cross-channel attack in 1942 or even 1943 were fundamentally misplaced North Africa, Sicily and Salerno seem to confirm the low British opinion of not only our forces but our commanders. It is inconsistent that a Ground Deputy (Alexander) in North Africa helps Eisenhower who doesn't seem particularly engaged but Alexander's lack of 'grip' would be the cause of Eisenhower's problems in Sicily, instead of his responsibility, if Eisenhower is maturing – as both this book and history argues in general that he was able to do.
As the author delves into some historical detail, the minor errors in history are somewhat annoying. The Japanese, for example, will seize Corregidor with a Regiment (-) from the 4th Division – not 4 Divisions. The German push on Stalingrad wasn't until the 1942 offensive (in earnest) rather than 1941, as cited by the author (they were threatening Moscow and Leningrad in the winter of the first offensive). The 2d Polish Corps will eventually take Casino on what is generally considered the fourth Allied attempt -- not the 2d Polish Armored Division. While these errors are really only annoying they detract from the quality of the work and could have been easily identified in proofreading they distract from the context of senior leader decision making. Additionally, what is lacking is some perspective on the degree to which the other theaters made demands on Marshall's time. Most of this is implied but books such as Taffe's "Marshall and His Generals" present a more balanced account of Marshall's world-wide responsibilities in managing General Officers in particular. These errors, however, are minor given the focus on the relationship between these two officers. Overall "Partners in Command" is an enjoyable read and insightful into the personal and professional relationship between two of the most influential officers in our Army's history.
Ten years ago I read David McCullough's big ol' doorstop of a Truman biography and I had since wondered why at Eisenhower's inauguration the incoming president had not been cordial to his predecessor. Was it Korea? Was he mad at him for firing MacArthur? He was too big a personality for it to be a Republican/Democrat issue. Perry says the two men got along well until Potsdam, when the new president invited his 5-star European theater commander to the conference on how the victors would handle Europe. Ike "was quickly disenchanted by the fact that his views were not solicited by the president or his chief aides. He was perceived as simply a military man who spent his time shifting troops from one point to another, a person who might be a great commander, but one with no political depth." So it makes sense. Eisenhower was complicated--but his recent duties in the theater proved his political depth; he wasn't excited about the Bomb, either, but later his administration made nukes the linchpin of their defense policy. He was a multi-faceted gem, and Perry gives us the tools to appraise him. Here is demonstrated the welcome nuance and insight that a good biographer brings to light--in this case via an examination of the relationship between a mentor and the man in which he recognized potential, and later groomed to administrate the storming of Festung Europa. As an old Cold Warrior, I was excited to read about these two great soldier-statesmen and the qualities that each brought to both the fight against Hitler and the challenges of Containment. I was delighted with the narrative on their struggles with institutional inertia from Allies on both sides of the English Channel, and the esteem each held for both public service and the awesome responsibilities they tackled together. Wholeheartedly recommend to anyone interested in leadership, diplomacy, or character; we sorely need the examples at this moment in American history.
Last Saturday (26 June ’10), I finished “Partners In Command” by Mark Perry (2007). The book is a dual biography of Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower. I purchased the book because I have had a long term interest in Marshall. Aside from Patton, Marshall has been one of my favorite World War II generals. The book speaks very favourably of Marshall; almost as highly of Eisenhower; and, rather poorly of everyone else. In particular, Bradley, Montgomery and Patton suffer by comparison. The lesson of the book, which the author repeats in almost every chapter: Democracies should only go to war when they are attacked (and therefore “have to fight”), they should only fight when they have allies, and, they should fight for as short a time as is possible to win.
I must admit, I have never “really” been a big fan of Eisenhower. Partly because I considered him a “community organizer” and not a true general; partly because he was a Republican President – who I felt did little to move the country forward during his eight years in office; and, mostly because he selected an obvious thug – Richard Nixon – to be his Vice President. I believe had he not done so, it is unlikely Nixon would have ever become President and the country might have been spared the Watergate scandal and its on-going legacy – Carter, Reagan, and both Bush’s. The last part is probably unlikely, Bush I might still have become President, but I don’t think we would have had to suffer Bush II / Chenny. Still history is the way it is…
I would still like to read more about Marshall and will be on the lookout for more books about him. Everything I’ve read about him indicates he was a man of extreme integrity, humility and completely dedicated to his country.
In "Partners in Command," historian Mark Perry examines the partnership between General George Marshall and General Dwight Eisenhower. Perry follows the men from their time in the OWP to the major battles in North Africa and Italy, the planning and execution of the D-Day invasion, the crisis of the Bulge, and the postwar implementation of the Marshall Plan, and NATO. Perry argues that Marshall and Eisenhower intuitively understood each other, compensated for one another’s strengths and weaknesses. Their struggle to overcome the political infighting, and bureaucratic inertia of both British and American commands is an oft told tale. The experience creating SHAEF proved to be an invaluable framework that Marshall and Eisenhower would later employ when establishing the foreign policy and military structures that became the basis for winning the Cold War.
Both men were mentored by Fox Conner, a largely overlooked WW I general whose advice on strategy and coalition warfare was invaluable to those fighting WW II. Perry traces these connections, and so adds to our understanding of American strategic thinking. Like all partnerships, Marshall and Eisenhower’s relationship evolved during the war. By 1944, Eisenhower, the junior partner, had become Marshall’s equal. "Partners in Command" is an instructive view of two historic military figures and the ways in which their unusual collaboration would shape the post-war world.
George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower worked step by step in concert to defeat the Axis powers. This is a detailed account of the European campaign with glimpses into what Marshall was also doing for the Pacific.
Why I started this book: It's the beginning of the year, and I am feeling virtuous and determined to cross more titles off my professional reading list.
Why I finished it: This book really went to great lengths to show how the personalities of top generals and politicians shaped the outcome of World War II. And I gained a great appreciation for just what Eisenhower brought to his command, and how his leadership was so easy to misunderstand or miss and yet how vital it was.
Partners in Command. As the title suggests, Perry focuses on the dynamics in the command relationship between General Marshall and General Eisenhower which led the victory in WWII and created NATO. A great read with facts and dialogue I’d never heard before. I’d say a must read for those interested in studying either General Marshall or President Eisenhower, or for anyone interested in the strategic level of war.
More a book about all the key leasers in WWII than a book solely focusing on Marshall and Eisenhower. Additionally, the book described events in which they both were generals, and less on their specific relationship.
This is by far the best book I have read about General Marshall & General Eisenhower. Their professional friendship throughout WW2 and the years after the war are a excellent example of how working jointly as a team any obstacle can be overcome.
Mark Perry provided a wonderful insight into the relationship of two Army generals during the planning for and the implementation of battle strategy that ended World War II in Europe. "Partners in Command" provided a unique look at how General George Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower battled with American and British politics, the battlefield egos of the senior Allied staff, and their personal struggles to successfully attack three fronts (North Africa, Italy and France), and bring an end to the Third Reich.
It was not an easy task for Eisenhower, under the constant pressure of British commanders unconvinced that a strategic planner with no real battlefield leadership experience, could effectively lead all Allied forces to victory in Europe. From the U.S. entry into World War II, Eisenhower not only had to battle the British general staff, he also had to deal with his own U.S. commanders who frequently not only disagreed with him on tactics, but also questioned his ability to deflect British influence which may have compromised American political and military positions. Eisenhower also had to frequently deal with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill -- a persistant campaigner who attempted to use his political clout and his relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt to impact decisions made by "Ike" while in London.
Eisenhower stabilizing influence - amid all this bickering and negotiating -- was George Marshall. As the Army Chief of Staff and the senior uniformed War Department official in Washington, it was Marshall's calm, low-key demeanor that provided Eisenhower with the guidance and balance Ike needed in dealing with the politics or war. Marshall promoted Eisenhower's qualification to both Churchill and FDR to run the Allied war effort in Europe, then gave Ike the reigns to make most of the major decisions involving the European Theater. Perry showed how their frequent cables each other allowed readers to see that Eisenhower's decisions had a lot of Marshall's influence, but they were truly Eisenhower's decisions.
The books covers the early years of both officers - how they first started working together in the War Department's strategic planning cells and how Eisenhower's abiity to combine politics and military service lead him to the his World War II assignment. It shows Marshall as the experienced mentor, teaching "his lieutenant" all the tactics he needed to be a successful commander. It wasn't always rosey, but the strong wartime relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower resulted in the war's end in Europe.
There are interesting sidebars regarding Marshall's relationship with the Navy commanders in the Pacific (especially Admiral King) and Marshall's many episodes with General Douglas MacArthur -- who Eisenhower served as an Army colonel. There are also tidbits on family and chapters regarding the two officers following World War II -- leading to implementation of the Marshall Plan, Eisenhower's appointment as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, and (naturally) Ike's election as President of the United States.
A wonderdful book for World War II followers to read.
I had to give this book three stars even though I would have preferred to give it two and a half. Clearly "GoodReads" is run by facists who want to limit our personal choices. I have to admit that I started Mark Perry's "Partners in Command" with a favorable attitude after reading positive reviews. However, I came away feeling that Perry had failed to transmit to the reader any sense of the core of his narrative.The word superficial rears its indifferent head throughout most of the book. We get harsh judgements of the British generals and the overall outlook of the British government, without any real sympathy or understanding towards what had to be the deep scars left by battles like the Somme and Passhendale in WWI.Perry mentions these events but does not give them the consideration they deserve in shaping British attitudes to the Second World War.90% of Oxford's class of 1914 perished in France. American generals tend to look somewhat better than their British counterparts in "Partners", but it is a close run race.With all the squabbling, bickering, and inter-service conflict it is truly amazing that anybody had time to focus on "killing the hun" (as Patton would have phrased it). Of course the subject of Perry's book is the relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower.Perry is working under the burden left by the personalities of the two men.Both were deeply committed to their duty as soldiers. Soldiers in the best sense of carrying out their orders and doing their duty regardless of ego or personal gain.If Marshall was bitter about being passed over for overall command of the Allied invasion of France, in favor of his nominal subordinate "Ike", history has no trace of it.This is a sharp contrast to other generals trying to manuver themsleves into greater authority (read...Monty).For this selfless act alone Marshall fails to get the attention he deserves. The real problem I have with Perry is that in a study of Eisenhower and Marshall he fails to define the relationship between the two men. The best he does is as upperclassman to underclassman.After all the research and study one would think that Perry could do better than this vague defintion of the relationship between to giants of American history.
I have a growing library of biographies of WWII high profile people (mainly US generals). This book was a decent compilation of the relationship between Marshall and Ike. Many of the factual details of their relationship and personal time lines are already well known. No big surprises. The differences in stances and viewpoints over the Italian campaign, Operation Anvil and delays in the Normandy invasion are better explained here than in other biographies.
I enjoyed the review of the personalities and influences of Roosevelt and Churchhill on these two generals. British General Bernard Law Montgomery actually comes out with a slightly (only slightly) better appeal than with most other books. His meticulous planning for the Overlord invasion is credited. However, his advance on and exploitation of the enemy after the invasion were not exactly stellar.
The record of correspondence from Ike to Marshall during the war is well known. This book extends the correspondence by providing background and added details. Helps to fill in some blanks and add to understanding of these two men and their unique partnership. A good book, but don't count on new breath-taking information.
Biographies and histories of the Second World War usually either relate a broad stroke of events or narrow the focus into boring details of very specific campaigns. The actions of Marshall and Eisenhower, however, were here nicely inserted between the overall World Political structure and the nitty gritty of fire and maneuver combat. I found the colloquy of Marshall and Eisenhower absolutely fascinating as it provided the very human side of these two men not often disclosed. The superhuman effort required to forge alliances despite all the blood, despite all the nationalistic factions involved, while proceeding toward ultimate victory in Europe was staggering. In character with a steadfastly held vision and to their credit, no hint of jingoism was ever exhibited by either Marshall or Eisenhower. Although former French President Charles de Gaulle once opined, “the graveyards are full of indispensible men,” I believe the United States and the free world were singularly fortunate in the historical convergence of the genius of these two extraordinary military commanders
This was an engaging and thought-provoking history of two of the central personalities that provided the driving force for Allied victory in World War II. I thought one of the strongest points of the book was not the analysis of the relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower, but the often taut and strained relationships between the British and American military command structures during the war. It's easy to take for granted that the US and the UK have been tried and true military allies for over a century, but Perry does a great deal to show that this relationship required the constant nurturing and cajoling of men like Eisenhower and Marshall to remain solvent. I really enjoyed this book and would recommend it to anyone interested in WWII military history. And if you find it to your liking, take a look at another dual biography by Mark Perry, Grant and Twain.
Interesting look at Marshall and Eisenhower from the outbreak of WWII until Marshall's death. There was some background on each so you get a glimpse of the making of each man, and some detail on Eisenhower's life after Marshall. But 90% of the book is devoted to the two working together in war and keeping the peace after. Eisenhower was much more of a political general, keeping the Allies working together under a single unified commander while Marshall had the ultimate insight in organizing for war. Neither was much of a combat strategist at the detail level, but they had others to take care of that. Great at shedding light on the tension between all levels of military and political leadership between US and Britain. v
What an interesting perspective from which to read about World War 2. I enjoyed it. As something of an amateur WW2 historian, I am at least familiar with the major battles of that war. In the case of Partners in Command, the perspective on these familiar events was from a much higher and unfamiliar vantage point, as it would have to be in a book about the relationship between two of the war's top commanders. The breadth of perspective on the war was comfortably mitigated by the ultimate narrowness of the primary subject, a not overly-personal relationship between two very professional soldiers. I do appreciate what I learned about George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, and the dynamics of the relationship between the two were more fascinating than I expected.
American battle doctrine - win by defeating armed forces, not by occupying territory. Direct attack favored by US, vs. "nibbling at the edges" favored by Churchill. UK, US commanders despised each other. even US commanders despised each other! (e.g. Bradley, Clark) DE and GM got along so well professionally because both understood Fox Connor - "never fight unless you have to, never fight for long, and never fight alone." The politics of the Alliance were as important during the war as after - Marshall Plan and NATO a continuation of the same strategy. Couldn't have won WWII without *both* men in place.
This is an informative and eye-opening book. I can't believe that the world survived WWII, and the pressure that men like Marshall and Eisenhower endured. The fate of the world was on their shoulders. There is a lot of detail about military battles and strategy. Though this is fascinating, I was hoping for more information about the heart and soul of these men. What I've concluded from this book is that these men really didn't have time for anything personal. They were all business, very serious, and completely consumed with winning the war. Thank God for them.
Tells part of the story of World War II through the lens of the relationship between Gen Marshall and Gen Eisenhower. It was an entertaining read. My greatest surprises are the continual infighting between the US and Britain on the command structure, which required a lot of Marshall's time, and the fact that much of the American public did not have faith in Eisenhower just a few months prior to Victory in Europe.
In trying to figure out how we got into this (our current) mess, I sometimes turn to history. Didn't know much about Ike before hand. Apparently, he was quite a brilliant administrator and planner. Also, learned a lot about his boss, George Marshall (of the Marshall Plan). Worth a quick skim to appreciate some of the details of WWII.
For anyone looking to better understand the relationship between two truly great generals, I recommend this book. There are a few typographical errors, and Perry's copy editor missed a couple of extremely bad errors in timeline, but the overall biographical look at the relationship between Ike and Marshall was well put. This book was an extremely easy read, and held my interest throughout.
Deals with the complexities of the military, politics, and international relations very well. Appreciated the writing style and the comparisons made of the major generals of WWII. Showed the difficulties in which both had to deal with in terms of appeasing the British command, the press, the military, and politicians.
Pretty good book on the Air Force Chief of Staff's reading list. Gives the reader an in-depth look at the jobs of Eisenhower and Marshall during WWII. I recommend to anyone who is interested in WWII history, otherwise it might be a little dry for the casual reader.