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Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class
Winner of the 2011 Merle Curti award, an epic account that recasts the 1970s as the key turning point in modern U.S. history, from the renowned historian
A wide-ranging cultural and political history that will forever redefine a misunderstood decade, Stayin’ Alive is prizewinning historian Jefferson Cowie’s remarkable account of how working-class America hit the rocks in the political and economic upheavals of the 1970s. In this edgy and incisive book—part political intrigue, part labor history, with large doses of American music, film and television lore—Cowie, with “an ear for the power and poetry of vernacular speech” ( Cleveland Plain Dealer ), reveals America’s fascinating path from rising incomes and optimism of the New Deal to the widening economic inequalities and dampened expectations of the present.
A wide-ranging cultural and political history that will forever redefine a misunderstood decade, Stayin’ Alive is prizewinning historian Jefferson Cowie’s remarkable account of how working-class America hit the rocks in the political and economic upheavals of the 1970s. In this edgy and incisive book—part political intrigue, part labor history, with large doses of American music, film and television lore—Cowie, with “an ear for the power and poetry of vernacular speech” ( Cleveland Plain Dealer ), reveals America’s fascinating path from rising incomes and optimism of the New Deal to the widening economic inequalities and dampened expectations of the present.
488 pages, Hardcover
First published August 17, 2010
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3390 people want to read
About the author
Jefferson R. Cowie
8 books56 followersA social and political historian whose research and teaching focus on how class, race, inequality, and work shape American capitalism, politics, and culture, Jefferson Cowie is James G. Stahlman Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 103 reviews
January 18, 2012
One of the most significant and flawlessly executed works of history/political analysis I've read in a long time. Dividing his attention roughly equally between economic, political and cultural history, Cowie tells the tragic tale of the demise of the American working class from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. It's a story of lost opportunities, poor decisions, and occasional heroic if ultimately futile resistance. He doesn't sugar-coat the internal problems of the labor movement (though I'd recommend consulting Crash Course for additional detail on just how big a hash the UAW made of what might have been a winning hand), but he's clear that the collapse originated in and was orchestrated by an unholy alliance of corporate issues and Republican politicians determined to distract working people from their own issues with appeals to race and "cultural" issues (the infamous Amnesty, Acid and Abortion trinity used to attack George McGovern). Cowie does a very nice job weaving music, film and television series into the story. I was particularly taken with his discussions of Merle Haggard, Saturday Night Fever (opening into disco generally), and Bruce Springsteen. In the conclusion, built around Springsteen's "Born in the U.S.A.," Cowie does his best to imagine a new kind of coalition linking workers in a post-unionized world. Juxtaposed with the current upheavals in Wisconsin, it's a useful beginning to a conversation which has been short-circuited for almost forty years.
December 26, 2012
I had often felt that the Democratic party received a 100 year reprieve from the loss of its Southern wing in the 1970s. Now I have an idea why. The thesis of this book, in my opinion is that the labor movement lost steam for three reasons: 1 they failed to include minorities and women among their ranks during their heyday, groups that could have helped insulate them from the attack on unions by business in the 70s, relying instead on white working men to continue to be the backbone of the country as a whole and unions in particular; they failed to expand past their industrial base when they had a chance as labor leaders became more concerned with protecting their position and to a lesser extent the position of the rank and file membership; and third - by not doing one and two they allowed business and the Republican party to change the discourse about labor from an economic discussion to a cultural one. Thus, George Wallace and Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan were able to decimate the labor union by taking away the collective responses that working people showed during the depressions and other times of labor upheaval. In the 70s, because so many were left out of labor's calculations, there was no country to call upon to decry the immoral way in which organized labor was treated by businesses and politicians.
March 31, 2024
Jefferson Cowie's Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class provides an incisive look at how the cultural ferment of the '60s and '70s drove the white working class to the Right. Traditionally supporters of the Democratic Party, America's blue-collar whites were increasingly alienated by the Party's embrace of racial minorities, feminism and antiwar movements - while simultaneously despising their perceived sellout to corporate interests, abandoning the FDR-LBJ mode of progress for a fuzzy neoliberalism that offered minor tinkering in place of sweeping solutions. Thus, the hard hats abandoned class consciousness for a nebulous resentment which conservative politicians happily exploited. Cowie's book details the labor struggles between ossified "dinosaurs" of the labor movement (George Meaney of the AFL-CIO, crooked Frank Fitzsimmons of the Teamsters) and the reformers (Cesar Chavez, who struggled to mate Latino race consciousness with union activism; Jock Yablonski, a United Mine Workers organizer whose calls for reform led to his assassination) who demanded more immediate changes; the "left of the possible," in Walter Reuther's terms, was no longer good enough. Richard Nixon shrewdly exploited these fissures in the New Deal coalition, making the hardhats a key part of his Silent Majority. By appealing to their patriotism, religious faith and pride in hard work, Republicans turned blue collar whites against hippies, protesters, condescending liberals and minorities whom they perceived as stealing jobs and destroying the fruits of their work - while cynically supporting labor regulations that protected their place in society. After Nixon's fall, the Democrats faltered with an identity conflict: the pull between McGovernite progressives and Wallaceite reactionaries resulted in Jimmy Carter, who rode a nebulous "centrist anti-statism" into the White House, then disappointed left, right and center with his ineffectual presidency. Come Ronald Reagan, and the working class appeared lost to Democrats forever - a failure whose consequences, in 2021, are all too apparent.
This description makes the book seem like a straightforward history of the '70s, like Peter N. Carroll's It Seemed Like Nothing Happened or the works of Rick Perlstein. But Cowie is less concerned with the tug-and-pull of politics (although he incorporates his share) than the less-easily defined culture wars and social battles. He explores phenomena as seemingly disparate as the Hardhat Riot, where New York construction workers clobbered antiwar protesters, and Disco Demolition Night in Chicago, which revealed the ugly racial and homophobic dynamics underpinning the "Disco Sucks" movement; the musical careers of Merle Haggard, Bruce Springsteen and Devo; attempts by women to enter the workforce as battles rage around ERA and abortion, and the creation of the Rust Belt amidst the recession of the '70s; Hollywood's simultaneous glorification and condescension towards blue collar Americans. He reveals Nixon's Silent Majority as driven by legitimate grievances, but Nixon, Wallace and Reagan convinced them to channel them towards weaker targets that provide an easier outlet for rage. Why protest against capitalist inequity when you can clobber a hippie or burn a Bee Gees record? Replacing class politics with faux-populism, economic rage with racial and sexual grievances, conservatives capitalized on their disconnect with baleful consequences. And Cowie captures it all in a powerful, insightful book.
This description makes the book seem like a straightforward history of the '70s, like Peter N. Carroll's It Seemed Like Nothing Happened or the works of Rick Perlstein. But Cowie is less concerned with the tug-and-pull of politics (although he incorporates his share) than the less-easily defined culture wars and social battles. He explores phenomena as seemingly disparate as the Hardhat Riot, where New York construction workers clobbered antiwar protesters, and Disco Demolition Night in Chicago, which revealed the ugly racial and homophobic dynamics underpinning the "Disco Sucks" movement; the musical careers of Merle Haggard, Bruce Springsteen and Devo; attempts by women to enter the workforce as battles rage around ERA and abortion, and the creation of the Rust Belt amidst the recession of the '70s; Hollywood's simultaneous glorification and condescension towards blue collar Americans. He reveals Nixon's Silent Majority as driven by legitimate grievances, but Nixon, Wallace and Reagan convinced them to channel them towards weaker targets that provide an easier outlet for rage. Why protest against capitalist inequity when you can clobber a hippie or burn a Bee Gees record? Replacing class politics with faux-populism, economic rage with racial and sexual grievances, conservatives capitalized on their disconnect with baleful consequences. And Cowie captures it all in a powerful, insightful book.
May 7, 2012
To be brutally honest, the first two chapters of this book put me to sleep. I despised the beginning, it wasn't even that bad, I believe that the flow of it and myself were not jiving. And just when was ready to write it off, this book completely hooked me. I've met junkies that were less addicted to their drugs than I was this book when I finally was hooked. And I logically know why.
Jefferson Cowie completely answers the question that has been stagnating around this country for the last forty years: what the hell happened in the 70s that completely changed and restructured our social, political and cultural lives by the 80s that was a precursor to where we are today? By examining legislation, social movements, historical documents, and popular culture, Cowie is able to seamlessly sew together an argument that appears to have a solid foundation in fact. I will probably read this book over and over again as continue to examine my own culture and try to find logic in how we came to where we currently exist.
Jefferson Cowie completely answers the question that has been stagnating around this country for the last forty years: what the hell happened in the 70s that completely changed and restructured our social, political and cultural lives by the 80s that was a precursor to where we are today? By examining legislation, social movements, historical documents, and popular culture, Cowie is able to seamlessly sew together an argument that appears to have a solid foundation in fact. I will probably read this book over and over again as continue to examine my own culture and try to find logic in how we came to where we currently exist.
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December 30, 2023You and I have been a told a million lies in the media about the American working class. If you’re American, regardless of which stratum you’re in, you’ve been told lies since birth. They are the strength of the nation, they want too many damn handouts, they got taken over by greedy union bosses, they are coddled little brats, they are the reactionary rump of cishet white patriarchy, they are an unrealized reservoir of revolutionary potential, they will always cast their lot in with those in power, they were hoodwinked by Nixon, they were hoodwinked by Reagan, they were hoodwinked by Trump, they didn’t actually support Nixon, Reagan, or Trump. Cowie examines each of these (mostly bullshit) assertions and finds the nuance therein.
And Cowie – like E.P. Thompson before him – refuses the easy castigation, and unlike Thompson, he refuses sainthood. He is more interested in granting subjectivity and understanding above all else. Or, to give a more pertinent analogy, one brought up by Cowie again and again, like Bruce Springsteen and those left in the darkness at the edge of town.
I went back to my hometown for the first time in years recently – on the western fringe of the Rust Belt, and reading Cowie, it was hard not to look back on all those vacant lots and all that peeling paint. Like all good history books, it gets you in the spine.
And Cowie – like E.P. Thompson before him – refuses the easy castigation, and unlike Thompson, he refuses sainthood. He is more interested in granting subjectivity and understanding above all else. Or, to give a more pertinent analogy, one brought up by Cowie again and again, like Bruce Springsteen and those left in the darkness at the edge of town.
I went back to my hometown for the first time in years recently – on the western fringe of the Rust Belt, and reading Cowie, it was hard not to look back on all those vacant lots and all that peeling paint. Like all good history books, it gets you in the spine.
November 29, 2011
This is truly an amazing and informative book, one that everybody with an interest in American history should read.
July 12, 2011
Unemployment is high, gas prices are kinda high, a reactionary political movement is afoot, and there’s a Democrat in the White House, so by the conventions of lazy historical analogy it must be the late 1970s again with Barack Obama reprising the role of Jimmy “Malaise Forever” Carter. Except these analogies obfuscate more than enlighten, doing an injustice to a decade when New Politics met the old New Deal and everything went to hell. If you’re interested in labor history, working-class politics, or a historical account of how the post-war liberal consensus blew apart, I recommend Jefferson Cowie’s Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class.
One takeaway lesson for contemporary politics is the degree to which the success of the liberal project is dependent on maintaining full employment. This was made especially clear in the section on the rights revolution in the workplace, when institutions like the EEOC strengthened the enforcement of anti-discrimination and affirmative action statutes, allowing women and minorities access to the economic pie. Unfortunately, it was a rapidly shrinking pie, at least within basic industry. The result was politically and socially explosive: it’s one thing for affirmative action programs to answer the question “who gets hired?” during the expansionary 60s, quite another when “who gets fired?” becomes the question in the recessionary late ’70s.
The DC-focused part of the book centers on the debate over the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill and the failure of progressives to overcome a Senate filibuster during the 1978 attempt to pass labor law reform. Readers of Hacker & Pierson’s will recall this episode from Winner Take All Politics. One can think of Cowie’s work as a narrative companion to the more analytic Hacker work.
One takeaway lesson for contemporary politics is the degree to which the success of the liberal project is dependent on maintaining full employment. This was made especially clear in the section on the rights revolution in the workplace, when institutions like the EEOC strengthened the enforcement of anti-discrimination and affirmative action statutes, allowing women and minorities access to the economic pie. Unfortunately, it was a rapidly shrinking pie, at least within basic industry. The result was politically and socially explosive: it’s one thing for affirmative action programs to answer the question “who gets hired?” during the expansionary 60s, quite another when “who gets fired?” becomes the question in the recessionary late ’70s.
The DC-focused part of the book centers on the debate over the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill and the failure of progressives to overcome a Senate filibuster during the 1978 attempt to pass labor law reform. Readers of Hacker & Pierson’s will recall this episode from Winner Take All Politics. One can think of Cowie’s work as a narrative companion to the more analytic Hacker work.
February 19, 2011
Well written but depressing history of the decline of the working class in the 1970s.
June 1, 2023
3.5 stars rounded down. Cowie writes a fairly dense book about the working class during the time period from 1968-1982. There is a major focus on the relationship between the workers and their views of the Unions that are protecting their rights.
There are a few things that I really liked in this book. There is a deep dive on the politics of the time period, you get to see how the McGovern and Nixon campaigns that were vying for the presidency in 1972 thought of the working man. Later in the book, you get the contrast between Carter and Reagan during the 1980 presidential election. Cowie really is in his stride here, you feel like you are right there on campaign with the candidates, hearing them explain their outlook to you. Great analysis by the author really brings insight into this time period. Also, Cowie adds a lot of social/cultural commentary from this time period. He talks about the music and the movies that symbolized what the "ordinary American" was listening to/viewing at this time period. So, he covers the meaning in Bruce Springsteen and the BeeGees's music. He shows that Devo's music had a lot of depth to it (which I did not know since I think I only know two of their songs). Cowie tells the story of the importance of "Rocky", "Saturday Night Fever" and "Norma Rae", all movies that were touchstones of the decade. I enjoyed this cultural/social aspect of the book very much.
There were a few things that didn't work as well in the book for me. Cowie's writing style is a bit textbooky at times. When he is detailing the reasons for tax increases or the steps that the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill went through as it moved through Congress, it gets close to being pretty tedious to read. As much as I appreciated the sections of how music and movies reflected the ideas of the 70's, he should have also included a bit about the literature of the time period, as I think that is just as important as the other two mediums, especially for a well educated professor.
If you are curious about the working class in the 70's, which Cowie claims are its dying days, then this book will go a long ways to satisfy that itch.
There are a few things that I really liked in this book. There is a deep dive on the politics of the time period, you get to see how the McGovern and Nixon campaigns that were vying for the presidency in 1972 thought of the working man. Later in the book, you get the contrast between Carter and Reagan during the 1980 presidential election. Cowie really is in his stride here, you feel like you are right there on campaign with the candidates, hearing them explain their outlook to you. Great analysis by the author really brings insight into this time period. Also, Cowie adds a lot of social/cultural commentary from this time period. He talks about the music and the movies that symbolized what the "ordinary American" was listening to/viewing at this time period. So, he covers the meaning in Bruce Springsteen and the BeeGees's music. He shows that Devo's music had a lot of depth to it (which I did not know since I think I only know two of their songs). Cowie tells the story of the importance of "Rocky", "Saturday Night Fever" and "Norma Rae", all movies that were touchstones of the decade. I enjoyed this cultural/social aspect of the book very much.
There were a few things that didn't work as well in the book for me. Cowie's writing style is a bit textbooky at times. When he is detailing the reasons for tax increases or the steps that the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill went through as it moved through Congress, it gets close to being pretty tedious to read. As much as I appreciated the sections of how music and movies reflected the ideas of the 70's, he should have also included a bit about the literature of the time period, as I think that is just as important as the other two mediums, especially for a well educated professor.
If you are curious about the working class in the 70's, which Cowie claims are its dying days, then this book will go a long ways to satisfy that itch.
April 1, 2018
Strong history of the 1970s. I appreciate the agonies of the working class, and why white blue-collar Democrats defected to the Republican Party, better than before. National union leaders' complacency, the government's focus on fighting inflation instead of unemployment under Ford and Carter, and unease about racial, gender, and social change drove white workers to support populists like George Wallace and genteel conservatives like Ronald Reagan. I wish Cowie had included more material on African American laborers in the second half of the book, but the first half includes a fascinating chapter on Cesar Chavez and black machinists in Chicago. The cultural analysis is sharp. Cowie exposes the individualism and criticism of labor that suffused many iconic 1970s films, even the ones like "Norma Rae" that tried to be pro-labor. I don't agree with all of Cowie's cinematic interpretations (he stretches credulity trying to turn "Jaws" into a parable about the death of the working class), but then again I always quibble with historians' movie interpretations. This is a masterful work of history, written from a liberal (if not democratic-socialist) perspective, but well sourced and displaying a strong sympathy for blue-collar voters.
September 24, 2010
A really excellent, insightful overview of the splintering of the New Deal coalition in the period between Nixon and Reagan, through the prism of the blue-collar worker. Sympathetically written, without going easy on anyone. Cowie does a great job in particular of connecting popular culture to the broader political environment without seeming flip: there's even a half-chapter on the early works of Devo in the context of blue-collar Akron.
If you're the sort of person that reads every book about the culture of the 1970s the week it comes out (and, uh, I am), it's worth noting that Cowie's book covers much of the same territory as Kevin Mattson's recent examination of Carter's "malaise" speech, "What the Heck Are You Up to, Mr. President?" quite a bit more convincingly.'What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?': Jimmy Carter, America's 'Malaise,' and the Speech that Should Have Changed the Country
If you're the sort of person that reads every book about the culture of the 1970s the week it comes out (and, uh, I am), it's worth noting that Cowie's book covers much of the same territory as Kevin Mattson's recent examination of Carter's "malaise" speech, "What the Heck Are You Up to, Mr. President?" quite a bit more convincingly.'What the Heck Are You Up To, Mr. President?': Jimmy Carter, America's 'Malaise,' and the Speech that Should Have Changed the Country
January 13, 2011
"It is August 1974, the month of Nixon's resignation. An old-fashioned labor-liberal refuses to cross a picket line at his workplace, single-handedly shutting down production for a month. "It's a matter of principle for me," he says. "I simply refuse to work with anybody who takes money to do a union man's job while that man is on strike.... I could no more go into a building and work with scabs than I could play handball in church." His co-workers were liberals too, but of a newer type. "I don't think he has any support anywhere," one of them says. "It was very noble-sounding, but not, uh, wise." The holdout is a man named Carroll O'Connor, and the workplace is the set of All in the Family at CBS studios, where he plays Archie Bunker."
July 20, 2012
I'm torn with this book. I want to like it far more than I do...but it gets far too bogged down in its historical labour analysis for its own good. It makes for one hell of a fantastic thesis, but an occasionally trying read. I'm fascinated by the decade in which I was born, and several books have arisen lately to examine it under a variety of microscopes. "Stayin' Alive" tries to be too specific AND too broad...the end result being first rate scholarship, but a runner-up in the enjoyability sweepstakes.
October 13, 2011
Beyond the bell bottoms, butterfly collars, and ruffle tuxes, lay perhaps the most unintentionally consequential decade of the modern era. There are a lot of common tropes of the 70s, but only now is the utter decimation of the American manufacturing sector getting its proper due. Cowie attacks the issue from every available lens: politics, economics, foreign policy, race, and (most enjoyable) popular culture towards one of the most exhaustive and engaging surveys available on the subject.
September 7, 2020
Extremely relevant, especially today, the book took some effort to find, but is worth it.
It is important to understand the history of how the economic climate we live in came to pass. Whenever the current state of the economy or culture is brought up, it is not long before the "industrialized, labor strong glory days of America" are brought up and everyone seems to have an overly-simplistic answer to how that society fell apart, and as Crowie displays in this book they are all wrong, and (like most things) it's complicated. There were multiple forces both domestic and foreign which altered the economic and cultural landscape during the shifting 70's which settled as the 80s and grew to the world we know today.
The author brilliantly creates a contrast in his portrayal of labor. Between early chapters where labor was viewed as a powerful political and economic force in the early 1970s and later chapters where it was well on it's was to becoming a shell of its former self as it was as the decade concluded.
Developing a character in Dewey Burton as a persona for the working class during the introduction then drawing connections to him throughout the book is an interesting choice. I enjoyed the short peek into the mindset of the average working class person of the era but I did not find later connections to him as helpful as the author likely intended.
I enjoyed the 2 chapters which focused on pop culture more than I expected to. While it includes some stretches, I'd highly recommend readers watch/ listen to a portion of the media discussed, I'll never watch Dog Day Afternoon or Rocky the same way again. I can perfectly see the changes in culture Crowie discusses by viewing the contrast the Rocky's character between films 1 and 4, which is a perfect microcosm of the changes in society between the release dates.
The final chapter is a sad, inevitable conclusion to the journey Crowie started. When seen through the historical perspective outlined in the book, PATCO certainly feels like the official death of a labor movement which was slowly bleeding out for the previous decade. The book closes with a sliver of hope "The steel mills and their communities may be gone, but the workers are still out there", de-industrialization did not kill the working class, and Crowie warns against this thought. The modern working class is far more diverse than that of the 1970s both in the work that it performs and the members who compose it. It is only through an inclusive, democratic movement willing to fight both economically and culturally can a new working class identity emerge.
It is important to understand the history of how the economic climate we live in came to pass. Whenever the current state of the economy or culture is brought up, it is not long before the "industrialized, labor strong glory days of America" are brought up and everyone seems to have an overly-simplistic answer to how that society fell apart, and as Crowie displays in this book they are all wrong, and (like most things) it's complicated. There were multiple forces both domestic and foreign which altered the economic and cultural landscape during the shifting 70's which settled as the 80s and grew to the world we know today.
The author brilliantly creates a contrast in his portrayal of labor. Between early chapters where labor was viewed as a powerful political and economic force in the early 1970s and later chapters where it was well on it's was to becoming a shell of its former self as it was as the decade concluded.
Developing a character in Dewey Burton as a persona for the working class during the introduction then drawing connections to him throughout the book is an interesting choice. I enjoyed the short peek into the mindset of the average working class person of the era but I did not find later connections to him as helpful as the author likely intended.
I enjoyed the 2 chapters which focused on pop culture more than I expected to. While it includes some stretches, I'd highly recommend readers watch/ listen to a portion of the media discussed, I'll never watch Dog Day Afternoon or Rocky the same way again. I can perfectly see the changes in culture Crowie discusses by viewing the contrast the Rocky's character between films 1 and 4, which is a perfect microcosm of the changes in society between the release dates.
The final chapter is a sad, inevitable conclusion to the journey Crowie started. When seen through the historical perspective outlined in the book, PATCO certainly feels like the official death of a labor movement which was slowly bleeding out for the previous decade. The book closes with a sliver of hope "The steel mills and their communities may be gone, but the workers are still out there", de-industrialization did not kill the working class, and Crowie warns against this thought. The modern working class is far more diverse than that of the 1970s both in the work that it performs and the members who compose it. It is only through an inclusive, democratic movement willing to fight both economically and culturally can a new working class identity emerge.
January 10, 2023
There are good parts to this book and it is a useful resource, but it unfortunately makes errors which I find hard to excuse. In trying to square the circle of sympathy for the white working class of the 70s with sympathy for the era's social movements (for racial justice, women's liberation, against the Vietnam war), Cowie ends up in a mess of contradictions, at times mourning the lack of militant class consciousness in his white working class subjects as some drifted towards prioritizing racial and gender status, and at other times suggesting that actually these identity-based grievances were legitimate.
In Cowie's world, the conservative turn in the 70s in fact took place for many well-justified reasons: the New Left young radicals were disrespectful and looked down their noses at white workers; there were reasonable concerns about busing as a scheme for integration; the white working class authentically identified with pro-life politics because family life was meaningful to them; and they felt protective of fighting in the Vietnam War out of a sense of duty. At worst, Cowie's analysis veers into the worst sort of identity politics often found in the liberal press: (1) identifying the whole of the working class with its white members, (2) in turn identifying its white members with their most conservative elements, and then (3) suggesting that their conservatism is the authentic expression of deeply held values without assessing its deeper historical origins. (Sure, some people may have decided to vote Republican over busing -- but why did this policy provoke a reactionary response rather than efforts to join with the Civil Rights movement for a better solution to urban segregation? This is left mostly unanswered).
It's interesting because Cowie himself often contradicts this tendency at various points. This happens most notably when he contradicts tendency (2) by emphasizing that the white segments of the working class were internally conflicted and torn about whether to identify with their class status or identities like sex, race, and nation, rather than all of them abandoning class struggle for "culture war" all at once. It also happens at the points when Cowie contradicts tendency (1) by acknowledging the existence of the non-white parts of the working class, which happens less frequently. He never contradicts tendency (3).
A lot of this book focuses on politics and pop culture, though I found Cowie's attempts to analyze elections quite weak and his discussions of pop culture too repetitive and too unfortunately subject to the unfortunate white identity politics outlined above. My favorite parts of this were the discussions of 70s labor struggles. Cowie systematically lays out a series of struggles that seemed to offer hope for an expansion of class politics in the 70s, breaking away from the union establishments' narrow focus on pay and benefits to fight for things like health and safety on the job, democratic unions and workplaces, less alienating workplace conditions, and an expansion of labor rights to new sectors with higher concentrations of women and people of color. These included the Lordstown strike by UAW members, insurgent campaigns for elected office in corrupt unions like the United Mine Workers and Steel Workers, Cesar Chavez' organizing of agricultural workers, and the profusion of public sector organizing. Unfortunately, Cowie's analysis of why these initiatives failed to gain more traction is quite limited, though a recurring theme is the disinterest, recalcitrance, and sometimes strong opposition from union bureaucracies.
Another strong discussion here is the treatment of the "Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill" at the start of Carter's presidency in 1976, which sought to revive long-held New Deal aspirations but died amid fears of inflation, opposition from even liberal economists, and the deafening silence of a labor movement that was steadily being pummeled out of existence by the contraction of manufacturing. It's really pretty powerful to read and is a moving requiem for the New Deal era.
The main problem is Cowie leaves us guessing on the critical steps from the hopeful movements of the early 70s to the rapid decline and fall of the second half: from what he (usefully) calls the "hope in the confusion" (1968-74) to the "despair in the order" (1974-80). Well, he does offer something like an explanation, but it's an extremely weak one, trying to point to Nixon's 1972 campaign as the pivotal moment that signalled the end of class struggle and the beginning of an era of culture war. Maybe it felt that way to contemporaries, but this obscures more than it reveals: 1972 was in many ways just a rerun of 1968 with the Wallace vote going to Nixon instead, and it only focuses on what is happening at the political level rather than on the balance of social forces that shape the state of politics. (Cowie also amusingly suggests that the public's distaste for student radicals sunk McGovern, using as evidence only a couple quotes from people who thought maybe that's what happened -- truly a vibes-based analysis unsupported by data). Instead of this limited frame and these hot takes I would have liked to have heard much more about anti-Civil Rights protests and attitudes in the North, and a deeper analysis of the failures and limitations of the promising labor struggles Cowie marks out.
Yet there is still a fairly clear picture that seems to emerge here regardless of Cowie's limitations. A multi-racial, cross-gender working class coalition failed to emerge because the white working class was in a state of paralysis over the questions of race and gender (I am less convinced of the roles of nationalism). It was less of a mass defection to conservatism than a state of confusion. Organized unions, historically the leaders of class struggle, sought mostly to defend their turf from insurgents and perceived outsiders. Insurgent labor movements fizzled and by the time Democrats took the White House, organized labor was already a shell of its former self and was powerless to resist the inevitable depredations of capitalist competition. Into the vacuum left by labor's collapse stepped the two key players of today's Republican Party, the business lobby and the conservative evangelical church. They easily set about clearing the wreckage of the New Deal and paving the way for the neoliberal order, cemented by the victory of Ronald Reagan in a year of recession and historically low voter turnout. What existed of an organized working class in the US was not so much defeated in battle as it was euthanized. It was released from a state of paralysis not by revival but by death. The rest is history.
In Cowie's world, the conservative turn in the 70s in fact took place for many well-justified reasons: the New Left young radicals were disrespectful and looked down their noses at white workers; there were reasonable concerns about busing as a scheme for integration; the white working class authentically identified with pro-life politics because family life was meaningful to them; and they felt protective of fighting in the Vietnam War out of a sense of duty. At worst, Cowie's analysis veers into the worst sort of identity politics often found in the liberal press: (1) identifying the whole of the working class with its white members, (2) in turn identifying its white members with their most conservative elements, and then (3) suggesting that their conservatism is the authentic expression of deeply held values without assessing its deeper historical origins. (Sure, some people may have decided to vote Republican over busing -- but why did this policy provoke a reactionary response rather than efforts to join with the Civil Rights movement for a better solution to urban segregation? This is left mostly unanswered).
It's interesting because Cowie himself often contradicts this tendency at various points. This happens most notably when he contradicts tendency (2) by emphasizing that the white segments of the working class were internally conflicted and torn about whether to identify with their class status or identities like sex, race, and nation, rather than all of them abandoning class struggle for "culture war" all at once. It also happens at the points when Cowie contradicts tendency (1) by acknowledging the existence of the non-white parts of the working class, which happens less frequently. He never contradicts tendency (3).
A lot of this book focuses on politics and pop culture, though I found Cowie's attempts to analyze elections quite weak and his discussions of pop culture too repetitive and too unfortunately subject to the unfortunate white identity politics outlined above. My favorite parts of this were the discussions of 70s labor struggles. Cowie systematically lays out a series of struggles that seemed to offer hope for an expansion of class politics in the 70s, breaking away from the union establishments' narrow focus on pay and benefits to fight for things like health and safety on the job, democratic unions and workplaces, less alienating workplace conditions, and an expansion of labor rights to new sectors with higher concentrations of women and people of color. These included the Lordstown strike by UAW members, insurgent campaigns for elected office in corrupt unions like the United Mine Workers and Steel Workers, Cesar Chavez' organizing of agricultural workers, and the profusion of public sector organizing. Unfortunately, Cowie's analysis of why these initiatives failed to gain more traction is quite limited, though a recurring theme is the disinterest, recalcitrance, and sometimes strong opposition from union bureaucracies.
Another strong discussion here is the treatment of the "Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill" at the start of Carter's presidency in 1976, which sought to revive long-held New Deal aspirations but died amid fears of inflation, opposition from even liberal economists, and the deafening silence of a labor movement that was steadily being pummeled out of existence by the contraction of manufacturing. It's really pretty powerful to read and is a moving requiem for the New Deal era.
The main problem is Cowie leaves us guessing on the critical steps from the hopeful movements of the early 70s to the rapid decline and fall of the second half: from what he (usefully) calls the "hope in the confusion" (1968-74) to the "despair in the order" (1974-80). Well, he does offer something like an explanation, but it's an extremely weak one, trying to point to Nixon's 1972 campaign as the pivotal moment that signalled the end of class struggle and the beginning of an era of culture war. Maybe it felt that way to contemporaries, but this obscures more than it reveals: 1972 was in many ways just a rerun of 1968 with the Wallace vote going to Nixon instead, and it only focuses on what is happening at the political level rather than on the balance of social forces that shape the state of politics. (Cowie also amusingly suggests that the public's distaste for student radicals sunk McGovern, using as evidence only a couple quotes from people who thought maybe that's what happened -- truly a vibes-based analysis unsupported by data). Instead of this limited frame and these hot takes I would have liked to have heard much more about anti-Civil Rights protests and attitudes in the North, and a deeper analysis of the failures and limitations of the promising labor struggles Cowie marks out.
Yet there is still a fairly clear picture that seems to emerge here regardless of Cowie's limitations. A multi-racial, cross-gender working class coalition failed to emerge because the white working class was in a state of paralysis over the questions of race and gender (I am less convinced of the roles of nationalism). It was less of a mass defection to conservatism than a state of confusion. Organized unions, historically the leaders of class struggle, sought mostly to defend their turf from insurgents and perceived outsiders. Insurgent labor movements fizzled and by the time Democrats took the White House, organized labor was already a shell of its former self and was powerless to resist the inevitable depredations of capitalist competition. Into the vacuum left by labor's collapse stepped the two key players of today's Republican Party, the business lobby and the conservative evangelical church. They easily set about clearing the wreckage of the New Deal and paving the way for the neoliberal order, cemented by the victory of Ronald Reagan in a year of recession and historically low voter turnout. What existed of an organized working class in the US was not so much defeated in battle as it was euthanized. It was released from a state of paralysis not by revival but by death. The rest is history.
May 30, 2021
A real feat of history writing, nothing else I've read on the 1970s has managed to interweave the economic, the political, and the cultural--nor move between the struggles and phenomenology of those on the ground to the policy decisions and deliberations of major movers and shakers--as well as Cowie does here. He narrates the 70s through the shifting meaning of "working class" as it was contested, redefined, and mobilized by union bosses, politicians, proletarians, artists, and others as they attempted to confront or exploit the crises of their moment. I'm not entirely convinced by Cowie's approach to race--though the main throughline, about the missed chance for a "dialectical synthesis" between organized labor and civil rights (as well as other new social movements), is true enough--but nothing has given me a better sense of how 70s were experienced at the time. Genuinely eye-opening readings of the music and films of the era as well.
March 14, 2019
This was a pretty good book. He makes a strong argument that the 1970s were a period of transition between the New Deal and the current one – New Gilded Age? – with a lot of emphasis on culture, presidential politics (and organized labor's role), and white blue-collar workers (union and not). The early 70s were a period of “insurgencies” which “failed to make lasting imprint on American life” (70) for at least five reasons which “all fit together in a single frame” that “the seventies were the ragged edge of the political shadow cast across the postwar landscape by the crisis of the 1930s and 1940s”: 1) “uprising and organizing” were “too fragmented and dispersed to constitute anything close to a single or unified movement” (71); 2) social forces outside of the labor world also tended to be centrifugal” (71); 3) labor leaders did their best to resist the pleas, attacks, democratization movements, and criticisms coming from many corners”; 4) recession; and 5) a general “change in the national mood” and “in the nation's sense of identity,” “despair” (73). This last part is perhaps the weakest part of the book - the idea that there were “wildly recognized moods of malaise and self-absorption” during the 1970s. Though he does discuss stagflation and the declining economic situation for workers, unfortunately he mostly leans on cultural analysis in two full chapters on film/TV/music of the 70s for this discussion. A stronger argument in the book is that there never was a unified working class, and the 70s saw the complete collapse of what there was of it: “Class, always a fragile concept in American civic life, died the death of a thousand cuts in the 1970s, but few problems sliced as deeply as how race and class were set against each other” (236).
February 19, 2011
"Workers lost their union cards in the seventies just in time to pick up their credit cards for the eighties." "By shifting to the right, [the Democratic Party] gave ideological ground to the opposition, especially by conceding that high wages, full employment, and deficit spending caused inflation.... In the name of short-term political gain,... they discredited their own [macroeconomic] policy history and therefore their future."
A fantastic exploration of the profound political and economic shift that took place in the United States during the 1970's. A great addition to my library, and a great learning tool written by a skilled historian who knows how to weave politics, the labor movement, and popular culture together to capture the public zeitgeist. The chapters surrounding the Nixon administration's strategy for wooing white, working-class voters who traditionally sided with labor, the Carter administration's failure to back the labor movement and its technocratic approach to government that primed the country to list to the right under Reagan (focusing more on fighting inflation than on curbing unemployment), and the separation of individually-focused civil rights concepts from a labor-oriented shared economic vision that led to a sense of disenfranchisement among many working-class voters are definitely worth a careful read. I'll be using this as one of my reference materials for a while!
A fantastic exploration of the profound political and economic shift that took place in the United States during the 1970's. A great addition to my library, and a great learning tool written by a skilled historian who knows how to weave politics, the labor movement, and popular culture together to capture the public zeitgeist. The chapters surrounding the Nixon administration's strategy for wooing white, working-class voters who traditionally sided with labor, the Carter administration's failure to back the labor movement and its technocratic approach to government that primed the country to list to the right under Reagan (focusing more on fighting inflation than on curbing unemployment), and the separation of individually-focused civil rights concepts from a labor-oriented shared economic vision that led to a sense of disenfranchisement among many working-class voters are definitely worth a careful read. I'll be using this as one of my reference materials for a while!
November 28, 2012
Brilliant book. Starts slow, with a lot of inside-baseball detail about the coming apart of the labor movement in this country in the 1970s, against the shoals of post-60s cultural fractures on the Left (in a hutshell: white working class hatred for hippies and blacks), macroeconomic crisis (stagflation), institutional corruption (or at any rate perceptions thereof), and political revanchism (read: Reagan). The book really hits its stride in the last third when it then uses this broad panorama to read many of the key pop cultural texts of white America in the 1970s, from television to movies to music. As such it provides a compelling and highly timely account of the beginning of what Bill O'Reilly has recently labeled "the end of traditional America" -- e.g. the end of low-brow, masculinist white supremecism.
Would have benefited from some consideration of the broader international context for these changes. Many of the structural issues facing the US economy were similar to those faced in other parts of the global industrial core in the 1970s, and a comparative look at the cultural and political responses to that crisis would have further highlighted the distinctiveness of the American experience.
Would have benefited from some consideration of the broader international context for these changes. Many of the structural issues facing the US economy were similar to those faced in other parts of the global industrial core in the 1970s, and a comparative look at the cultural and political responses to that crisis would have further highlighted the distinctiveness of the American experience.
October 10, 2010
This is really two books in one: a history/analysis of the decline of the working class and the labor movement in the '70s and the crafting of and implication of Richard Nixon's strategy to bring the white working class into the Republican fold; and a tour of the reflection of the American worker in the popular culture (especially music and film) of the time.
For me, at least, the first was far more engaging and insightful than the second: fresh with insights and, unfortunately, close parallels to contemporary politics. Also a definite improvement on earlier studies (especially the Edsalls' Chain Reaction. The second was the stuff of college essays. So - very much worth reading, especially if you breeze through parts.
For me, at least, the first was far more engaging and insightful than the second: fresh with insights and, unfortunately, close parallels to contemporary politics. Also a definite improvement on earlier studies (especially the Edsalls' Chain Reaction. The second was the stuff of college essays. So - very much worth reading, especially if you breeze through parts.
Read
July 26, 2023Engaging and educational read that might go a little deeper into the 1970s working class than many readers are looking for. It really covers the entire decade well and engages the politics and culture of the time period to give the reader a sense of the moment while also being able to trace backward how we've found ourselves in the current populism wave we are experiencing.
A good read for advanced history students and readers, those who want to know more about the 1970s, and anyone looking to add to their knowledge of US labor unions.
The only thing I was looking for here was perhaps a link to the lack of union power in the present day for most workers while select industries like professional sports, airline pilots, and police have been able to keep powerful unions. I'd imagine that links back to the 1970s.
A good read for advanced history students and readers, those who want to know more about the 1970s, and anyone looking to add to their knowledge of US labor unions.
The only thing I was looking for here was perhaps a link to the lack of union power in the present day for most workers while select industries like professional sports, airline pilots, and police have been able to keep powerful unions. I'd imagine that links back to the 1970s.
January 12, 2021
Masterful Work of History
This is the best book yet about the 1970s, with all of its social, economic and cultural dislocations. It truly illustrates how the 70s was a coda to the 60s and a harbinger of the 80s at the same time.
This is the best book yet about the 1970s, with all of its social, economic and cultural dislocations. It truly illustrates how the 70s was a coda to the 60s and a harbinger of the 80s at the same time.
April 27, 2025
I have felt compelled to read a lot of American history and political works trying to make sense of the current situation, but I like to alternate with topics orthogonal to that. So, I assume this would be about 70's excess, disco, bell-bottoms, etc. Well, my childhood recollections were upended as this pointed out the political turmoil of bussing, Vietnam, the oil embargo, wildcat strikes, and more made this a tumultuous and pivotal period when the white working class was grievance-led away the Democratic party to GOP adherence, first in the South, by bugaboos of witch hunts and economic promises.
Even Saturday Night Fever was a lie. The 1977 film starring Travolta as Tony Manero, a young Italian-American man who spends his weekends dancing and drinking at a local disco while dealing with social tensions and disillusionment in his working class ethnic neighborhood in Brooklyn was based on "Tribal Rites of the New Saturday Night", a mostly fictional 1976 New York article by music writer Nik Cohn. In 1996, Cohn revealed the article to have been a complete fabrication, based only on clubgoers he knew from his native England.
From the Introduction here:
This was a time of pivotal realignment in the electorate.
Even Saturday Night Fever was a lie. The 1977 film starring Travolta as Tony Manero, a young Italian-American man who spends his weekends dancing and drinking at a local disco while dealing with social tensions and disillusionment in his working class ethnic neighborhood in Brooklyn was based on "Tribal Rites of the New Saturday Night", a mostly fictional 1976 New York article by music writer Nik Cohn. In 1996, Cohn revealed the article to have been a complete fabrication, based only on clubgoers he knew from his native England.
From the Introduction here:
From a policy perspective, the Democratic Party faced a dilemma that it could not solve: finding ways to maintain support within the white blue-collar base that came of age during the New Deal and World War II era, while at the same time servicing the pressing demands for racial and gender equity arising from the sixties. Both had to be achieved in the midst of two massive oil shocks, record inflation and unemployment, and a business community retooling to assert greater control over the political process. Placing affirmative action onto a world of declining occupational opportunity risked a zero-sum game: a post-scarcity politics without post-scarcity conditions. Despite the many forms of solidarity evident in the discontent in the factories, mines, and mills, without a shared economic vision to hold things together, issues like busing forced black and white residents to square off in what columnist Jimmy Breslin called “a Battle Royal” between “two groups of people who are poor and doomed and who have been thrown in the ring with each other.”
The mercurial nature of the politics of ’72 was such that when Wallace was eliminated from the race, Dewey voted for the most left-leaning candidate of any major party in the twentieth century, Democratic senator George McGovern. The choice did not come easily. The autoworker was genuinely stumped about whether incumbent Richard Nixon’s Silent Majority or challenger George McGovern’s soggy populism best represented his interests. It would be a betrayal of everything he stood for to vote for a Republican, he believed, but he had grave concerns about McGovern and his entourage of student radicals. He also sensed a “meanness” creeping into McGovern’s campaign after he threw vice presidential nominee Tom Eagleton off the ticket due to his earlier problems with mental illness. Much of the labor movement, especially the hierarchy of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), could not stomach McGovern’s New Politics with its anti-war positions, youth movements, and commitment to open up the Democratic Party to wider spectrum of Americans. The labor federation, fearing for its traditional kingmaker role in the Democratic Party, fought the McGovern insurgency with every scrap of institutional power it could muster.
Meantime, Richard Nixon, taking his cues from Wallace, was designing his own heretical strategy to woo white working-class voters away from the party of Roosevelt. His plans to build a post-New Deal coalition—the “New Majority” he liked to call it—around the Republican Party in 1972 was based on making an explicit pitch for white, male, working-class votes by appealing to their cultural values over their material needs. His targets were men like Burton, who had first been dislodged from the Democratic mainstream by George Wallace. Despite Nixon’s courtship of Dewey’s vote, the autoworker remained suspicious of Nixon’s loyalties. “Nixon hasn’t proved anything to me when he raises the prices of new cars and freezes the wages of the people who build them,” Burton explained about falling back on bread-and-butter Democratic politics with his vote for the left-leaning McGovern. “I really don’t think McGovern will win,” he finally concluded. “But maybe if we vote for him we can show Nixon what we want, what the working man wants.” The majority of white working-class voters disagreed, selecting Nixon...
This was a time of pivotal realignment in the electorate.
The remobilization of the business leadership was one of the most dramatic shifts in postwar policy history, recasting the legislative landscape for generations to come. If the New Deal was the revolution, this was the counter-revolution. Having contained labor policy for the entirety of the postwar era, corporations lost key legislative battles during the Johnson and Nixon years, fought to a stalemate during the transition period from 1975-77, and, by 1978, got reorganized and stood poised to win almost every battle on taxation, spending, regulation, and inflation for decades to come.
II
Despite the draconian demands of policy makers, few working people were immediately abandoning the Keynesian ship—there was not a large-scale lurch to the right in popular economic thinking. The conservative movement made substantial inroads into white workers’ cultural identity in the late sixties and early seventies, but it was still a long way from scoring points on economic grounds. This is where Nixon’s groundwork on wooing working-class voters paid off, and where conservative strategists began to learn what country musicians already knew. Economics may have broken the policy levees and convinced policy elites, but it was the social issues that delivered working people to the new political waters. As the New Right’s media guru Richard Viguerie noted, “We never really won until we began stressing issues like busing, abortion, school prayer and gun control. We talked about the sanctity of free enterprise, about the Communist onslaught until we were blue in face. But we didn’t start winning majorities in elections until we got down to gut level issues.” In a similar vein, Pat Buchanan continued his earlier work for Nixon, plowing terrain and sowing seed for a working-class right—often consciously setting the poorer and the more affluent elements of the New Deal coalition off from one another. The future of the Republican Party, he argued, would be as “the party of the working class, not the party of the welfare class.” The federal government and know-it-all cultural elitists were well on their way to eclipsing the bosses as the workingman’s enemy. As M. Stanton Evans, the president of the American Conservative Union, put it, the key was finding a common ground of anti-statism: “some of them reach their political position by reading Adam Smith while others do so by attending an anti-busing rally, but . . . all of them belong to a large and growing class of American citizens: those who perceive themselves as victims of the federal welfare state and its attendant costs.”
William Rusher, in his 1975 book The Making of the New Majority Party, argued, like Tom Wolfe, that the politics of old class divisions were over. An odd cross-class coalition of business, industrialists, blue-collar workers and farmers stood in opposition to a McGovernite “new class led by elements that were essentially non-productive” members of the chattering classes—like academics, intellectuals, government bureaucrats, and the media elite—who claimed to know what was good for the nation. The modern welfare state, Rusher argued, “exists simply as a permanent parasite on the body politics—a heavy charge on both its conscience and its purse, carefully tended and forever subtly expanded by the verbalizers as justification for their own existence and growth.” Although strategists like Rusher and Viguerie had hoped that they might be able to entice former actor and California governor Ronald Reagan as the standard bearer for a new Conservative Party (sharing a dream ticket with George Wallace, they hoped), Reagan finally rejected the tactic of a new party but fully embraced the white working-class Republican ideal. In 1976, Reagan failed to win the nomination of his party for the presidency, but he was enroute to capturing its soul.
As Reagan told the Conservative Political Action Conference in 1977, “And let me say so there can be no mistakes as to what I mean: The New Republican Party I envision will not be, and cannot be, one limited to the country club-big business image that, for reasons both fair and unfair, it is burdened with today. The New Republican Party I am speaking about is going to have room for the man and the woman in the factories, for the farmer, for the cop on the beat and the millions of Americans who may never have thought of joining our party before, but whose interests coincide with those represented by principled Republicanism.... The Democratic Party turned its back on the majority of social conservatives during the 1960s. The New Republican Party of the late ’70s and ’80s must welcome them, seek them out, enlist them, not only as rank-and-file members but as leaders and as candidates.
The New Right’s coalition linked worker and businessman, shop floor and Wall Street, tavern and country club, cultural conservative and economic libertarian. Roosevelt’s famous “Forgotten Man” was becoming a Republican, his enemy less the “economic royalists,” the class elites, against which Roosevelt inveighed in his landslide 1936 victory, than the cultural elitists who would look down on the politics and culture of blue-collar America. Not all of even the white, male working class joined the New Right, of course, but certainly enough to make a viable coalition on the margins where elections are won.
July 18, 2019
This is one of the best history books I've ever read. It covers the reasons for the decline of the New Deal coalition, which was based on industrial labor unions and the working class they represented. Cowie uses a mixture of labor, political, and cultural history to trace this decline, with a great balance between detail and readability.
Cowie gives three interconnected reasons for the decline of organized labor: the inability for union upper management as a whole to adjust to the increasing demographic and ideological diversity of the 1960s; the Republicans embracing the "culture war" platform used by segregationist Dixiecrat George Wallace, improved by Nixon, and perfected by Reagan; and, finally, the new generation of Democratic politicians who were less interested in labor and more interested in money from PACs. Each of these is well traced out, and he combines this analysis with how these conflicts were playing out in movies, music, and other forms of popular culture.
They say good history should explain the present, and this book absolutely delivers on that front. Constantly I thought to myself "wow, so THAT'S why today's political and economic situation is like this!" while reading through Cowie's highly engaging work. I came away feeling like I understood the present far better than I did before reading this book, which is about as high a praise as you can give any work of non-fiction. If the premise sounds the least bit interesting to you, you won't be disappointed.
Cowie gives three interconnected reasons for the decline of organized labor: the inability for union upper management as a whole to adjust to the increasing demographic and ideological diversity of the 1960s; the Republicans embracing the "culture war" platform used by segregationist Dixiecrat George Wallace, improved by Nixon, and perfected by Reagan; and, finally, the new generation of Democratic politicians who were less interested in labor and more interested in money from PACs. Each of these is well traced out, and he combines this analysis with how these conflicts were playing out in movies, music, and other forms of popular culture.
They say good history should explain the present, and this book absolutely delivers on that front. Constantly I thought to myself "wow, so THAT'S why today's political and economic situation is like this!" while reading through Cowie's highly engaging work. I came away feeling like I understood the present far better than I did before reading this book, which is about as high a praise as you can give any work of non-fiction. If the premise sounds the least bit interesting to you, you won't be disappointed.
December 2, 2011
This is a fantastic exploration of the culture and politics of the 1970s and how the concept of the American "working class" was never able to transcend the labor/liberal political coalition and image (i.e., white men with lunch pails at their industrial factory job) that made the New Deal so politically successful from the 30s until the early 70s. Cowie finds thinkers that articulated a new conception of class that included a synthesis of race and gender, but those ideas gained prominence as American industry began its decline and a resurgent right and business community began organizing as a class in a massive campaign to discipline labor. This campaign was basically successful by the time Reagan sacked all the PATCO air traffic controllers.
Like any good history, Cowie explores the contingencies of the period he examines. For example, in the 70s the Humphrey-Hawkins bill calling for full employment almost passed in the Senate. Now, this would be considered fringe lefty stuff and only get a vote from Bernie Sanders.
If you want to examine the new right's appeal to the white "working class" this work explores the complexities (and the role of race and gender)way better than What's the Matter With Kansas? Although, nonspecialists will probably want to skip the detailed studies of labor organizing in the 70s and the McGovern campaign.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphrey...
Like any good history, Cowie explores the contingencies of the period he examines. For example, in the 70s the Humphrey-Hawkins bill calling for full employment almost passed in the Senate. Now, this would be considered fringe lefty stuff and only get a vote from Bernie Sanders.
If you want to examine the new right's appeal to the white "working class" this work explores the complexities (and the role of race and gender)way better than What's the Matter With Kansas? Although, nonspecialists will probably want to skip the detailed studies of labor organizing in the 70s and the McGovern campaign.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humphrey...
February 5, 2022
Jefferson Cowie’s encyclopedic knowledge of the working class’s descent into hell in the 1970s is matched only by his ability to make you feel as if you are present, helplessly watching every tentative step and sudden fall away from the promise of the 60s and into the soulless, merciless neoliberal world we now inhabit. He juxtaposes the intricacies of 70’s law and politics with iconic cultural artifacts, bringing new meaning to beloved works like Born to Run, Jaws, and Saturday Night Fever (which provided the inspiration for Cowie’s title). The density of the text is a benefit, not a flaw: I expected Stayin’ Alive to be a difficult read but found a work brimming with life that made me feel as if I must go watch 10 different movies at once to continue experiencing the vivid pictures of which Cowie offered a glimpse.
Cowie opens with an anthology of sorts, describing a diverse array of labor insurgencies that tried to wrest power from the out-of-touch union bureaucracies that had become an object of widespread disdain. Rather than promote the common good, they maintained the rigid status quo that first secured strong wages for its members in the 60s. Prioritizing loyalty above democracy or inclusion led these once-venerable unions fractured under the weight of youth, women, and minorities clamoring for their rightful spot. Adherence to the status quo, as personified by United Mine Workers leader Tony Boyle, claimed lives in ways both horrifically violent and horrifically mundane. After a mine explosion in Farmington, West Virginia killed 68 coal miners, Boyle walked around the ruins in a suit praising the mining company’s safety record and not speaking to the families; he then planned and executed the assassination of Jock Yablonski, a dissident mine leader trying to unseat him in the coming election. The organization Miners for Democracy was founded in the wake of his assassination, advocating forcefully for black lung compensation that Boyle had ignored and successfully unseating him but quickly fading into the background. Labor unrest in other industries followed this dissonant pattern of forceful outrage but only minor change. In Lordstown, Ohio, General Motors proposed a new plant that would pump out nearly twice as many cars per minute as their standard facilities. Workers voted 98% to strike – not against insufficient wages but against the demeaning nature of such constant, unremitting pressure on the assembly line, reminding me that minimum wage should not be the end-all be-all of modern labor activism; we must also give people a dignified life. This General Motors strike faced the same fate as Miners for Democracy; they got benefits but no control over the system, leaving the organization of production untouched until it was radically reshaped in the Volcker Shock at the end of the decade.
Cowie closes Chapter 1 with the observation that “Despite these insurgencies’ attempts to change the paradigm, the culture and economy began to tilt backwards towards the pre-New Deal status quo: fragmentation, political division, and economic inequality.” He adds that the New Deal may have been a singular political moment rather than a blueprint for future economic reform; the working class may never be united as it was during the Depression.
Stayin’ Alive goes on to probe a number of other fascinating subjects, about which I will be more brief. Cowie investigates George McGovern’s ensemble role in the cast of American history in more detail, revealing the tragedy of America’s Cassandra: a man who passionately understood the struggles of the working class, even publishing a dissertation on a struggle between miners and the brutal National Guard. but was powerless to reach them. Despite a nearly flawless voting record, the AFL-CIO voted not to support him against Nixon, a man who had frozen workers’ wages. Why? Nixon waged a culture war to win the working class without needing to improve their material conditions, and McGovern’s support for New Politics, minorities, and the youth alienated white workers who wanted the spotlight to be them. These voters then prioritized cultural concerns – the feeling of being remembered – over a political platform directed at them. Cowie perfectly integrates the cultural artifacts of the 70s into this tale; country music arose as a backlash to America’s departure from tradition in the 60s, and much of blue-collar America saw themselves as Archie Bunker rather than understanding him to be a mockery of the American man of a bygone era. I came to understand the 70s as one long backlash against the 60s.
Cowie concludes with a description of the new world of rampant individualism that emerged from the ashes of the labor movement. The Campaign Finance Reform act enabled a “Revolution of the Haves,” where business PACs proliferated and business gained exponentially increasing influence over politics just as labor’s power dwindled. To me, the era of collective action seemed to close with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, where injunctions could once again be used to suppress collective action – a hated practice that had hitherto been abolished with the Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932. In its place there was nothing but individualism: every man or woman of all races for themselves. Cowie’s most enduring remark of the book is a comment on the flaws of the modern rights framework: while acknowledging that the struggle for diversity is an inherent good, he adds that it seems to serve as an alibi for the forgotten fight against economic inequality. As the emphasis on jobs, pay, and labor rights has faded, workers are left with only the right to non-discrimination in a more brutal economy. This context animates the shockingly detailed description of Saturday Night Fever that closes the book, where the iconic (anti-)hero Tony Manero’s struggle to escape serves as a parable for the lessons of the 70s writ large: the era of community is behind us, and you are on your own to seek a fulfilling life in this increasingly cruel world.
Cowie opens with an anthology of sorts, describing a diverse array of labor insurgencies that tried to wrest power from the out-of-touch union bureaucracies that had become an object of widespread disdain. Rather than promote the common good, they maintained the rigid status quo that first secured strong wages for its members in the 60s. Prioritizing loyalty above democracy or inclusion led these once-venerable unions fractured under the weight of youth, women, and minorities clamoring for their rightful spot. Adherence to the status quo, as personified by United Mine Workers leader Tony Boyle, claimed lives in ways both horrifically violent and horrifically mundane. After a mine explosion in Farmington, West Virginia killed 68 coal miners, Boyle walked around the ruins in a suit praising the mining company’s safety record and not speaking to the families; he then planned and executed the assassination of Jock Yablonski, a dissident mine leader trying to unseat him in the coming election. The organization Miners for Democracy was founded in the wake of his assassination, advocating forcefully for black lung compensation that Boyle had ignored and successfully unseating him but quickly fading into the background. Labor unrest in other industries followed this dissonant pattern of forceful outrage but only minor change. In Lordstown, Ohio, General Motors proposed a new plant that would pump out nearly twice as many cars per minute as their standard facilities. Workers voted 98% to strike – not against insufficient wages but against the demeaning nature of such constant, unremitting pressure on the assembly line, reminding me that minimum wage should not be the end-all be-all of modern labor activism; we must also give people a dignified life. This General Motors strike faced the same fate as Miners for Democracy; they got benefits but no control over the system, leaving the organization of production untouched until it was radically reshaped in the Volcker Shock at the end of the decade.
Cowie closes Chapter 1 with the observation that “Despite these insurgencies’ attempts to change the paradigm, the culture and economy began to tilt backwards towards the pre-New Deal status quo: fragmentation, political division, and economic inequality.” He adds that the New Deal may have been a singular political moment rather than a blueprint for future economic reform; the working class may never be united as it was during the Depression.
Stayin’ Alive goes on to probe a number of other fascinating subjects, about which I will be more brief. Cowie investigates George McGovern’s ensemble role in the cast of American history in more detail, revealing the tragedy of America’s Cassandra: a man who passionately understood the struggles of the working class, even publishing a dissertation on a struggle between miners and the brutal National Guard. but was powerless to reach them. Despite a nearly flawless voting record, the AFL-CIO voted not to support him against Nixon, a man who had frozen workers’ wages. Why? Nixon waged a culture war to win the working class without needing to improve their material conditions, and McGovern’s support for New Politics, minorities, and the youth alienated white workers who wanted the spotlight to be them. These voters then prioritized cultural concerns – the feeling of being remembered – over a political platform directed at them. Cowie perfectly integrates the cultural artifacts of the 70s into this tale; country music arose as a backlash to America’s departure from tradition in the 60s, and much of blue-collar America saw themselves as Archie Bunker rather than understanding him to be a mockery of the American man of a bygone era. I came to understand the 70s as one long backlash against the 60s.
Cowie concludes with a description of the new world of rampant individualism that emerged from the ashes of the labor movement. The Campaign Finance Reform act enabled a “Revolution of the Haves,” where business PACs proliferated and business gained exponentially increasing influence over politics just as labor’s power dwindled. To me, the era of collective action seemed to close with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, where injunctions could once again be used to suppress collective action – a hated practice that had hitherto been abolished with the Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932. In its place there was nothing but individualism: every man or woman of all races for themselves. Cowie’s most enduring remark of the book is a comment on the flaws of the modern rights framework: while acknowledging that the struggle for diversity is an inherent good, he adds that it seems to serve as an alibi for the forgotten fight against economic inequality. As the emphasis on jobs, pay, and labor rights has faded, workers are left with only the right to non-discrimination in a more brutal economy. This context animates the shockingly detailed description of Saturday Night Fever that closes the book, where the iconic (anti-)hero Tony Manero’s struggle to escape serves as a parable for the lessons of the 70s writ large: the era of community is behind us, and you are on your own to seek a fulfilling life in this increasingly cruel world.
August 31, 2012
From a labor perspective, this is an incredibly depressing read, as it shows grass-roots risings vastly more powerful than anything we have today being not so much defeated as simply running into the sand. And it does a disservice to American punk by reducing it to the Ramones (apolitical) and a one-sentence nod to the Dead Kennedys (political). But, so far, very informative (just keep the valium handy).
I think the most fundamental question Cowie raises (albeit implicitly) is whether post-New Deal working class power might have been doomed by the brutal fact that even decently paid and secure (i.e. union) working-class jobs/lives still sucks so bad (under capitalism( that the American working class couldn't or wouldn't defend itself against the ruling class's counter-attack in the 70s and 80s. Put another way, it's hard to defend a way of life that you wouldn't choose for your kids (and your kids wouldn't choose for themselves). Put yet another way, the existential crappiness of assembly line work becomes all the more apparent when the pay's alright.
I think the most fundamental question Cowie raises (albeit implicitly) is whether post-New Deal working class power might have been doomed by the brutal fact that even decently paid and secure (i.e. union) working-class jobs/lives still sucks so bad (under capitalism( that the American working class couldn't or wouldn't defend itself against the ruling class's counter-attack in the 70s and 80s. Put another way, it's hard to defend a way of life that you wouldn't choose for your kids (and your kids wouldn't choose for themselves). Put yet another way, the existential crappiness of assembly line work becomes all the more apparent when the pay's alright.
October 17, 2012
This book is a cultural & political history of the working-class American. It goes from the rising incomes & optimism of the New Deal to the political & economic upheavals of the 1970's. It attempts to explain the economic inequalities & depressing expectations of present day working men & women. It is written by a prize-winning historian of labor in American history. I found this book well-researched & highly interesting. I, also, thought it was very depressing as it explained the plight of the working-class today & how this came to be. This is a serious & "thinking" read but I would recommend it to anyone interested in American labor history & its working-class. If one wants to read "fluff" this is not for you. I am glad I read it.
February 13, 2012
This is the most important book I have read in the past year. Cowie connects the many forces – economic, organized labor, political and cultural – that led to our current War on Workers. He documents how class consciousness, starting in the 1960’s, became forgotten, undermined or co-opted. An accurate and compelling history – though a little unbalanced when he addresses the role of punk music – I don’t think Joey Ramone was very representative. In the political realm, it is astounding to consider that Nixon was better for workers than any President that followed, all Democrats included. ….Now more than ever……!
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