The History Book Club discussion

Hello Everyone,

For the weeks of October 21st- October 27th, we are reading Part Two - - 4. Pushing East - "Medjez-el-Bab and Fat Geese on a Pond and Part Two - 5. Primos In Carthago - "Go for the Swine with a Blithe Heart" and "The Dead Salute the Gods" of the book - An Army At Dawn..

The seventh week's reading assignment is:

Week Seven - October 21st - October 27th
Part Two - 4. Pushing East - Medjez-el-Bab and Fat Geese on a Pond and Part Two - 5. Primos In Carthago - "Go for the Swine with a Blithe Heart" and "The Dead Salute the Gods" - pages 178 - 216

We will open up a thread for each week's reading. Please make sure to post in the particular thread dedicated to those specific chapters and page numbers to avoid spoilers. We will also open up supplemental threads as we did for other spotlighted books.

This book was kicked off on September 9th.

We look forward to your participation. Amazon, Barnes and Noble and other noted on line booksellers do have copies of the book and shipment can be expedited. The book can also be obtained easily at your local library, local bookstore or on your Kindle. Make sure to pre-order now if you haven't already. This weekly thread will be opened up on October 21st.

There is no rush and we are thrilled to have you join us. It is never too late to get started and/or to post.

Bentley will be leading this discussion and back-up will be Assisting Moderators Christopher and Jerome.

Welcome,

~Bentley

TO ALWAYS SEE ALL WEEKS' THREADS SELECT VIEW ALL

by Rick Atkinson

REMEMBER NO SPOILERS ON THE WEEKLY NON SPOILER THREADS - ON EACH WEEKLY NON SPOILER THREAD - WE ONLY DISCUSS THE PAGES ASSIGNED OR THE PAGES WHICH WERE COVERED IN PREVIOUS WEEKS. IF YOU GO AHEAD OR WANT TO ENGAGE IN MORE EXPANSIVE DISCUSSION - POST THOSE COMMENTS IN ONE OF THE SPOILER THREADS. THESE CHAPTERS HAVE A LOT OF INFORMATION SO WHEN IN DOUBT CHECK WITH THE CHAPTER OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY TO RECALL WHETHER YOUR COMMENTS ARE ASSIGNMENT SPECIFIC. EXAMPLES OF SPOILER THREADS ARE THE GLOSSARY, THE BIBLIOGRAPHY, THE INTRODUCTION AND THE BOOK AS A WHOLE THREADS.

Notes:

It is always a tremendous help when you quote specifically from the book itself and reference the chapter and page numbers when responding. The text itself helps folks know what you are referencing and makes things clear.

Citations:

If an author or book is mentioned other than the book and author being discussed, citations must be included according to our guidelines. Also, when citing other sources, please provide credit where credit is due and/or the link. There is no need to re-cite the author and the book we are discussing however.

If you need help - here is a thread called the Mechanics of the Board which will show you how:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/2...

Introduction Thread:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

Table of Contents and Syllabus

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

Glossary

Remember there is a glossary thread where ancillary information is placed by the moderator. This is also a thread where additional information can be placed by the group members regarding the subject matter being discussed.

Glossary - Part One - http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/8...

Glossary - Part Two - http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

Glossary - Part Three - http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

Bibliography

There is a Bibliography where books cited in the text are posted with proper citations and reviews. We also post the books that the author used in his research or in his notes. Please also feel free to add to the Bibliography thread any related books, etc with proper citations. No self promotion, please.

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

Book as a Whole and Final Thoughts - SPOILER THREAD

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/1...

by Rick Atkinson

Chapter Overviews and Summaries

Part Two

4. Pushing East

"Medjez-el-Bab"

The Germans were building up strength and moving much more quickly than the
Allies in securing their positions. The Axis troops, estimated by Eisenhower to
number around 12,000 were actually present in numbers more than doubling that
figure. The enemy also had great air superiority due to its control of many close,
well-maintained airfields. Allied planes were located much farther west and mainly
used dirt fields, which proved almost useless as the winter rainy season moved in.

On November 25, the Allies closed in on Medjez-el-Bab to attempt to retake the town. They secured a high ridge before being repelled. Then a group of British soldiers was slaughtered as they wandered into a German ambush while trying to enter the village undetected at night.

The smaller central force included both American and British tanks and was
approaching Bizerte well behind enemy lines. The American tanks were light General Stuart M-3's with 37mm medium guns. The group located a German airfield at Djedeida and caught the enemy by surprise. Soon, the field was blazing with more than 20 German plane wrecks.

Fat Geese on a Pond

The Germans had received incorrect information that the American tanks were only
five miles from Tunis. Kesselring hurriedly pulled troops back from Medjez-el-Bab to regroup, and the Allies moved back in. They waited to take advantage of the situation and slowly advanced.

In late 1942, the Allies threw away a golden opportunity to stop the war in North
Africa quickly by knocking the Germans out of Tunisia before they could build up
significant strength. Allied troops made the mistake of moving slowly toward Tunisia, even though they had the knowledge that every day brought more Axis troops to the area. There was also an occasion where the Germans thought the Allies had advanced much more than they actually had. The Allies were actually in sight of Tunis, and this momentum could have carried them to the brink of success, but instead they waited yet again. If the Allies had made plans to have sufficient air cover to counter the German Stukas and had pooled resources to have units attack in more concentrated strength, it could very well have made the difference in the early skirmishes. It would have shortened the campaign and probably saved many lives on both sides.

Part Two

5. Primos In Carthago

"Go for the Swine with a Blithe Heart"

Eisenhower moved his headquarters from Gibraltar to Algiers in late November 1942. This was meant to be a temporary HQ, until it could be moved closer to the front - some 400 miles to the southeast. Even so, the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) quickly grew to encompass 11 buildings housing a total of 400 officers. The total staff would eventually reach 16,000 personnel. This gave way to the cynical troop expression, "Never were so few commanded by so many from so far." The city of Algiers strained under the weight of the influx. Prices for everything from oranges to beer to prostitution skyrocketed. Troop discipline quickly became a major concern.

Eisenhower was frustrated by the continued lack of Allied air support even as far
as Algiers. German planes still controlled the skies. The "Darlan" issue also worried
him. Still considered a traitor by many, he had imprisoned thousands in camps as
Commissioner. Many of the prisoners had been supporters of the Allies. Darlan had
also refused to strike down the anti-Semitic Vichy laws. Eisenhower refused to deal
with the subject, though, considering it "someone else's business." In spite of this
attitude, the issue did rise to scandalous proportions in the American and British press.

"The Dead Salute the Gods"

Near Tunis, the relentless Luftwaffe attacks were wearing the Allies down. The
Germans had retaken Djedeida airfield and the Stukas were averaging one attack per
hour on some Allied positions. Most road traffic moved at night; troops warily
scanned the skies and frantically dug deeper trenches. A rare Allied sortie over
Medjez-el-Bab had mistakenly opened fire and decimated a company of American
tank destroyers, further lowering morale. "Friendly fire" incidents would become all
too common in the following months; one furious commander ordered his troops to
shoot down anything in the air.

Despite this, the Allies were still moving closer to the contracting German lines. The
advance was still measured and slow, though, allowing the Axis troops more time to
dig in and reinforce. The first tank battle of the war occurred on November 26, when
an American tank company came under fire from enemy tanks of the 190th Panzer
Battalion. Captain Siglin, the Allied commander, ordered defensive actions to buy
time. He quickly found that his Stuart tanks were no match for the MK IV Panzers,
which had massive 75mm guns (previously unknown to the Allies) that ripped through
the lightly armored Stuarts. Even near misses by the large guns caused massive
damage. The Stuart's much smaller gun was ineffective against the Panzers; one hit a
German tank 18 times with no effect. Half of the Stuarts were destroyed in minutes,
but in their zeal, the Germans failed to notice another American unit coming in from
behind. They quickly found that the Panzers were vulnerable from the rear, where
their armor was much thinner. They were also much less maneuverable than the
smaller Stuarts. Seven Panzers were quickly destroyed, and the Germans fled. The
first armored battle of World War II had ended in a dead heat, which did not succeed
in giving the Allies a much needed morale boost.

Make sure that you are familiar with the HBC's rules and guidelines and what is allowed on goodreads and HBC in terms of user content. Also, there is no self promotion, spam or marketing allowed.

Here are the rules and guidelines of the HBC:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/5...

Please on the non spoiler threads: a) Stick to material in the present week's reading.

Also, in terms of all of the threads for discussion here and on the HBC - please be civil.

We want our discussion to be interesting and fun.

Make sure to cite a book using the proper format.

You don't need to cite the Atkinson book, but if you bring another book into the conversation; please cite it accordingly as required but you do not have to cite the author Atkinson either.

Also, to make it easier - here are the special citation rules for this book discussion - if the person is mentioned in the assigned pages for the weekly reading - you do not have to cite that person even if he or she is an author of books or other documents. However, if you cite someone who is not part of the chapter readings - then you must cite him or her and you must always do a proper citation if you are mentioning any other book aside from An Army At Dawn.

Now we can begin week seven.....

Job Performance



We cannot avoid this topic any longer. Let us discuss the "job performance" of the principals thus far "according to Atkinson":

a) Churchill
b) FDR
c) Marshall
d) Ike
e) Patton
f) Hewitt
g) Allen
h) Bennett
i) Ted Roosevelt Jr.
j) the British commanders (any of them can be discussed that have been mentioned thus far)
k) the Germans (any of the commanders can be discussed that have been mentioned thus far)

This is just a partial list - feel free to discuss any element of job performance - strategy, planning, operations, tactics, execution of military missions, handling authority, decision making, commander in chief, allied harmony and politics and the list goes on.

Feel free to open up the discussion on this topic or any other in the assigned reading for this week or any other topic discussed in any of the weeks or assigned pages that came before.

In helping to foster this discussion here is a document on Leadership: the Personality Factor: from the Master in Military Studies:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/...

There is also a section on Military Leadership and Successful World War II Military Leaders. It might be interesting to discuss how the public during this time period may have judged things differently than the military or the president or Churchill.

Here is a site which is very pro Ike and consolidates their view on why Ike was a "great leader" - http://www.artofmanliness.com/2012/05...

Here is a discussion on Eisenhower from the Strategic Studies Institute:

http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army...

and from The Eisenhower Foundation (oddly enough they used the photo we had up here at The History Book Club kicking off Roosevelt's Centurions - it is a great photo)

http://www.dwightdeisenhower.com/the-...

by Joseph E. Persico

I would give Ike a average at this point. He really was inexperienced and so was his subordinates. However, he had a horrible management issue: the French.

To survive intact is pretty good, and one thing Atkinson does not stress is the fact Ike supported the unity of command. He would not negotiate with the French to give up supreme command and I think it was the right choice. There were French proposals to give the French command of the Allied forces. He would rather fight the French than to weaken the command structure by giving control to say, Giraud. Sure, the French could command French troops or ships, but to give up top command was not an option.

Interesting; he would rather fight the French than compromise his own command.

Interesting yes, but the right decision without a doubt. The weight of responsibility would be carried by American troops, on American ships, protected by American air power. Add in the British contribution and history with the French... To let the French have control of all that would have been catastrophic. Not to mention it was the French who chose to fight, not Ike. The French military peaked in the 1800's and was not in a leadership role in 1942.

Also, can't help but notice that the French are conspicuously absent (and rightly so) from Bentley and Atkinson's list of major players to be judged for job performance.

Indeed, Tom, I think we know what to rate the French so far...

It is pretty horrifying to read about the Stuart tanks at St. Joseph's Farm going against the Panzer's 75 mm guns.

Bryan wrote: "It is pretty horrifying to read about the Stuart tanks at St. Joseph's Farm going against the Panzer's 75 mm guns."

Yeah, it's pretty jarring to read about how inferior US tanks were to German ones. Those early tanks were deployed because they could be mass-produced; our only well-armored tanks were probably the Pershings, but those only came out later. In limited numbers, too.

Then again, the Germans produced jet fighters before the Americans, but still couldn't defeat the Americans for the same reason: they couldn't keep up with our production levels.

concerning armor...I wonder about the development philosophy of American armor. Seems that speed of production always outweighed superior armament and protection. The Stuarts were outmatched in 1942 by the Panzers like the Shermans and Tigers in `44. Anybody know more about this?

Good question, Tom, if someone has some insight, let us know.

Bryan wrote: "Good question, Tom, if someone has some insight, let us know."

You design your weapons to match your philosophy of how battles are to fought. As stated somewhere in the book, American tanks were not designed to fight other tanks. The American philosophy was to use them in pursuit and attack on soft components of the enemy. Enemy tanks were to be engaged by specialized "tank destroyers" (more heavily armed but with even less armor). Even the Germans didn't really want to fight tank to tank engagements. They preferred to lure allied tanks into range of their 88 mm anti tank guns and kill them as a safe distance. I think the philosophy has changed or maybe just the weapon systems. Helicopters and standoff missiles are the preferred way to kill tanks now though American tanks seem quite capable of doing that now.

Thanks so much, Patricrk. You actually see this happening in this section with the battle near Jefna. The tanks got close to the Italian anti-tank guns and they opened fire.

The Germans were disciplined and well covered in that attack.

Thanks Patricrk, that makes much more sense.

You really get a sense that intelligence during the Allied campaign (TORCH) was poor, and men got lost or needlessly died or were captured.

My thoughts through this reading was just how poor the communication was. Twice the armies moved forward after the advance was called off. Too many unnecessary lives were lost.

I do not think I would give many of the commanders a passing grade as of yet. Ike has not grown into the commander we think of when we hear his name. He has not yet learned to focus on what is important to get the job done. Here's hoping he will make a quick turnaround.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Patricrk wrote: "Bryan wrote: "Good question, Tom, if someone has some insight, let us know."

You design your weapons to match your philosophy of how battles are to fought. As stated somewhere in the book, Americ..."

With a better understanding of philosophy, I am still somewhat puzzled or amazed by the Army basically sticking with inferior armored vehicles when the Air Force and Navy were improving their equipment daily. So, in this line, what if the Air Corps had just stuck with the pre-war philosophy of airplanes and capabilities of say the P-40. As american pilots were out matched on both fronts, the tactics and equipment had to change. Granted we don't see the Stuarts and Lees as much as the war goes on but the Sherman was outmatched by most tanks it faced in Europe. As Patricrk said, the philosophy and or the systems have changed today. I wonder how much this had to do with armor combat in WWII.
Sorry to keep beating a dead horse, I just find this interesting and hope to hear some insight from this group.

Bryan wrote: "You really get a sense that intelligence during the Allied campaign (TORCH) was poor, and men got lost or needlessly died or were captured."

Agreed Sarah, and without good communication, effective coordination is impossible.

Lastly, I thought this was one of many excellent anecdotes and quotes Atkinson uses to tell the story. After being slammed by the sensors a soldier wrote home:

"After leaving where we were before we left for here, not knowing we were coming here from there, we couldn’t tell whether we had arrived here or not. Nevertheless, we now are here and not there. The weather here is just as it always is at this season. The people here are just like they look. On this page a censor scribbled simply, “Amen.”

It is funny how today sounds a lot like 1942 when you write for the sensors benefit...

Atkinson, Rick (2002-02-22). An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation Trilogy (pp. 196-197). Henry Holt and Co.. Kindle Edition.

Thanks, Tom. Some more thoughts on armor:

1. I think, in part, what the U.S. had in the army was fighting the last war. Those tanks and armored vehicles would have done well fighting in the 1920s based on WWI. It is hard for a bureaucracy to adjust quickly, and now they are fighting an actual war, and they had to adjust.

2. The U.S. was not a super-power then, but I think being a super-power plays a role in what the U.S. builds. The U.S. tries to be ahead of the world, but again, I think mistakes are made and the Pentagon is slow to adjust to the fighting times.

I guess my common thought here is the organizational behavior of the Pentagon: very slow to adapt and put into motion a new line of weapons....unless you see yourself fighting a actual war, then this wakes it up and things do improve...

Thanks Bryan, that does make sense.