Classics and the Western Canon discussion

Preliminary Outpouring/Expectoration

Silentio argues again that to understand Abraham requires an individual effort. There is no inheriting this kind of knowledge, because ironically it operates like Midas' touch: it turns everything to gold, including the bread one needs to sustain life. But it may not even be knowledge that is required. Perhaps what is needed is not knowledge of the story, but to experience the anxiety of Abraham first hand.

How best to recreate that anxiety? How are we to understand Silentio's discussion of the parson who tells the story to an inattentive listener, who then decides to murder his own son? Why do "the comic and tragic touch each other here in absolute infinity" ?

Silentio says that it is necessary to think the "thought whole." The thought seems to be that "the ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he intended to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he intended to sacrifice Isaac. But in this contradiction lies precisely the anxiety that indeed can make a person sleepless, and yet Abraham is not who he is without this anxiety." Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility that "an individual in mental confusion might go and do likewise." Is that a good reason to remain silent on the subject?

Why is Silentio unable to make "the movement of faith'? Do you think he is being ironic or coy here? He seems to be a kind of observer, a poet or a philosopher, a "clever fellow," as he puts it, but not a believer. Does this give him an outsider's advantage, or is this a kind of faux objectivity?

Silentio puts himself, in the capacity of 'tragic hero", in Abraham's shoes. He says he would do all that God commanded, but he would do it as Abraham did in the second version of the "Attunement". Along with Isaac, he would sacrifice all joy. He says he would do it with "immense resignation" and make the "infinite movement". What is this, and what does it mean?

Abraham, on the other hand, makes a double movement when he believes "by virtue of the absurd." By such a movement, he is able to receive Isaac again with even more joy than he did when Isaac was born.

How do finitude, temporality, resignation, and faith play out in the example of Abraham? What does Silentio mean when he says that he can make the leap of infinite resignation, but he can't make the second movement?

Silentio introduces the two knights: this section is very poetic and hard to parse. The knight of resignation is described as having a foreign and noble nature, and a gait that is "airy, bold." The knight of faith, on the other hand, belongs entirely to finitude and resembles a tax collector. He thinks about the delicious roast lamb his wife will have prepared for him, but if it isn't there when he gets home, he's still just as happy. He does everything by virtue of the absurd, and despite the fact that he knows the pain of renouncing everything, he's absurdly happy in the finite, everyday world.

What does Silentio mean when he says "The knights of infinity are dancers and have elevation."? How are we to interpret their movements, their dancing and the slight hesitation when they land?

The Knight of Resignation

Silentio offers an example case: the Lad and the Princess, a story of a broken heart. The lad is in love with the princess to the point that "the whole content of his life consists in this love." But for whatever reason, the relationship is untenable, and his love is a lost cause. Still, he remains passionately committed to her, and in his pain he makes the movement of infinite resignation. In this resignation, he is "reconciled with existence." How is this possible?

Silentio says the lad's love assumes a religious character and is transfigured into an eternal form that no actuality can take from him. What happens in actuality, in the temporal finite world, doesn't matter. Even if the princess marries another man, it doesn't matter. This is enormously romantic, which I suppose is why he calls him a knight.

But how does this work exactly? How is it possible to renounce the whole content of your life as impossible in the "real" world, but still hold onto it and keep it young in the world of spirit?

Can we come up with any examples of knights of resignation in history or literature?

The Knight of Faith

In infinite resignation one becomes transparent to oneself in one's eternal validity. From this position, in which one's defining life commitment is renounced as an actuality, the knight is able to make the movement of faith. Despite the fact that he has renounced his commitment as an actuality, he will get it anyway, by virtue of the absurd. The knight of resignation receives in eternal consciousness the spirit of his love in renouncing the actuality of it, but the movement of faith returns this to him in the finite world as an actuality.

(It is important to note here that the knight may be male or female. It is fascinating to think about the scenario Silentio sets up where two knights of resignation each renounce their love for each other and are reunited, in faith, by virtue of the absurd, in the finite world.)

Can we come up with any examples of knights of faith from history or literature?

For Silentio, faith is not a "childish emotion," no matter how sincere. It is the paradox of human existence. It is "to exist in such a way that my opposition to existence expresses itself at every moment as the most beautiful and most secure harmony with it." It is also a source of montrous anxiety. No wonder Silentio himself cannot make the movement of faith.

Silentio then returns to the problem of the parson preaching the story of Abraham and the inattentive listener who thought he might want to imitate Abraham and murder his own son. But this time the opposite seems to happen -- the story is not taken seriously at all. No miracle happens, and "the whole of life is a trial."

What has happened here?

Thomas wrote: "How best to recreate that anxiety? How are we to understand Silentio's discussion of the parson who tells the story to an inattentive listener, who then decides to murder his own son? Why do "the comic and tragic touch each other here in absolute infinity" ?"

Interestingly, this passage is often used as a critique of Kierkegaard conception of 'leap of faith': that he shows anyone who wants to make that lip may commit any atrocity. However, nothing in the book suggests the possibility of this interpretation, quite contrary, he used the story to show that the man of faith wouldn't behave like this listener.

First thing, from the previous reading we already know, that Abraham wouldn't speak to anyone in his journey to the mount Moria nor before it. So this conversation would be impossible if we dealt with Abraham's situation.

Second, Kierkegaard warned here against misunderstanding from a simplification of Abraham's task, he is the hero, not because he is willing to sacrifice the dearest he has (Isaac for him is much more than this), but because he has faith to retain the Isaac despite his willingness to sacrifice him. In this passage, not the listener is unattentive, but the pastor is ill-prepared for the sermon and had not penetrated in the sense of the story, he wanted to preach. I think this is (at least partially) an attack on the contemporary church of Denmark and its deviation from the true task of the Christian church and, possibly, the teaching of the Reformation.

Third, all people (as far as I know of course), who commit outrages murders or another atrocity with the pretext of 'God's commanded me', do not has the story: 'I do this because God's commanded me', but 'God's commanded me because...'. In their mind, there is no place for absurd, their motives and actions are perfectly logical in the world they lived. Not so with Abraham, he has not created the world in which his action is logical, he has only absurd to believe in, and has no arguments and reasons to justify himself before people.

Thomas wrote: "The Knight of Resignation

Silentio offers an example case: the Lad and the Princess, a story of a broken heart. The lad is in love with the princess to the point that "the whole content of his lif..."

Just some more questions:

'Ridderen den uendelige Resigamation' is Kierkegaard, right? And the princess is Regine? And here he is reflecting on their relationship, how he endured the news of her new engagement - like the knight of resignation. He also told us that he would have her (and not outrageously push her away) if he was the knight of faith and could do the movement of faith, which he certainly cannot. Or any resemblance is purely coincidental?

Thomas wrote: "Silentio then returns to the problem of the parson preaching the story of Abraham and the inattentive listener who thought he might want to imitate Abraham and murder his own son. But this time the opposite seems to happen -- the story is not taken seriously at all. No miracle happens, and "the whole of life is a trial."

What has happened here?"

Kierkegaard revolts against rationalisation of Abraham's paradox and faith in general, against treating it from the position of common sense and worldly wisdom. He warned that if treated like this, it would turn into farce (tragic or comic depending on what sacrifice is made or if it made at all). He thought that there is only one way to talk and think about it, acknowledging that faith is beyond human reason. And not in the way 'God is good--no more question'. It should shake the fundamental assumptions and worldly beliefs, faith goes hand in hand with doubt but surpass it. A lazy preacher would go around the challenges and doubts--a knight of faith would go through them.

Very interesting reading. I think I’m going to read it a couple more times before attempting a thoughtful comment, but I did want to find out one thing:

I’m not sure since it’s a translation, but when SK uses the word “absurd” is he referring to simple logical absurdity or rather the existentialist concept of “the Absurd” treated by Camus and Sartre, among others? I’m inclined to think the latter, but wanted confirmation.

Alexey wrote: "Second, Kierkegaard warned here against misunderstanding from a simplification of Abraham's task, he is the hero, not because he is willing to sacrifice the dearest he has (Isaac for him is much more than this), but because he has faith to retain the Isaac despite his willingness to sacrifice him..."

What seems crucial for Kierkegaard is Abraham's anxiety at the thought of sacrificing Isaac. Without this, Abraham's faith is oversimplified and childish. The parson oversimplifies the story into a simple moral fable, a cliche, and then he gets upset when the sleepy listener misunderstands the story as one he should blindly imitate. Or alternatively, at the end of the Preliminary Outpouring, the listener thinks the lesson is that one should go back to sleep and just wait for the happy ending. Both versions avoid Abraham's suffering, and that is the problem. Kierkegaard seems to think that we have to suffer this anxiety to reach the stage of resignation, and perhaps go on from there to have faith.

I'm having a lot of difficulty following Kierkegaard's ideas. He does seem to be saying that anxiety is necessary to faith. JS says he is not himself able to make the movement of faith (beyond resignation). Faith requires a sort of joyful embrace of the absurd. JS seems to admire Abraham and true faith, but cannot get there himself.

He does make it clear, as Alexey points out, that it is not Abraham's being willing to murder/sacrifice his son by itself that makes him a knight of faith, but his absolute faith in God--i.e, that God would resolve everything in the end (31). But I still don't find this satisfying... what K. seems to be offering is an embrace of paradox and the absurd, and I just don't see how this is a tenable philosophical position. Does this make F&T a text of theology rather than philosophy? (“what is offered me is a paradox", Hong 33).

He says that “faith begins precisely where thought stops” (53). I'm not sure what to do with this. Perhaps what is philosophical about K's text is that he is delineating the limits of the philosophical, but still I find this unsatisfying.

What do we think he means by the “dialectical struggles of faith” (32)? Does he mean a constant struggle between belief and unbelief? Does he have Hegel's dialectic in mind in thinking about the "movements" of faith toward higher levels?

What does he mean by describing faith a "passion" and why is this important (why does it tell us anything)? He also says that irony and humor are passions, which I find puzzling.

I like his stories about the knight of resignation and the knight of faith (I can't help but think of Lancelot and Guinevere, or perhaps Abelard and Heloise). But how could we tell, in real life, the difference between resignation and faith? I do think, as Alexey suggests, that a lot of it is a comment on K's own relationship with his ex-fiancee Regine.

Alexey wrote: "'Ridderen den uendelige Resigamation' is Kierkegaard, right? And the princess is Regine? And here he is reflecting on their relationship, how he endured the news of her new engagement - like the knight of resignation. He also told us that he would have her (and not outrageously push her away) if he was the knight of faith and could do the movement of faith, which he certainly cannot. Or any resemblance is purely coincidental?."

Kierkegaard was obsessed with Regine Olsen all his life, so it's probable that his broken engagement with her was on his mind as he was writing this. But this isn't an autobiographical account, so it's hard to say for sure.

One odd thing though. Let's take his relationship with her as an example, and say that he was able to make the movement of resignation. He renounces his love for her in the finite actual world and internalizes it, makes it an ideal that he holds in his heart. If he had then made the movement of faith, he would not give up that renunciation in the finite world and accept her, like she was waiting for him to change his mind. He doesn't change his mind, because he still loves her infinitely; he has only renounced her in the finite, everyday world. But if he makes the movement of faith, he gets her in the finite world anyway by virtue of the absurd.

This makes no sense, I know, but that's why it happens by virtue of the absurd.

Aiden wrote: "I’m not sure since it’s a translation, but when SK uses the word “absurd” is he referring to simple logical absurdity or rather the existentialist concept of “the Absurd” treated by Camus and Sartre, among others?"

You're looking at the original existentialist concept here; Camus and Sartre and the rest owe it to SK. What it means exactly is a good question. When someone has faith by virtue of the absurd, I think it must be like a passion, like falling in love. There's no explaining it in a rational way.

Thomas wrote: "You're looking at the original existentialist concept here; Camus and Sartre and the rest owe it to SK. What it means exactly is a good question."

Good to know. I find that while I disagree with many existentialist ideas, I do find the logic fascinating and appealing. Studying F&T will be of use when I study Camus more down the road as I had planned.

Ignacio wrote: "What do we think he means by the “dialectical struggles of faith” (32)? Does he mean a constant struggle between belief and unbelief? Does he have Hegel's dialectic in mind in thinking about the "movements" of faith toward higher levels? ."

These are hard questions, but I think they're the right questions to ask. I'm not sure if I have the right answers, but here goes;

Shortly before he writes about the "dialectical struggles of faith" he says about the man who cannot follow through with the sacrifice of Isaac that "It is my conviction that such a man is not repudiated, that he can be blessed with all the others, but not within time."

The dialectical opposites he is concerned with here are eternity/temporality and infinity/finitude. The double movement of faith involves first, the movement of resignation, which is the idealization of the thing being resigned. The finite, temporal reality of the thing is made into an eternal, perfect idea because it is for some reason impossible in the finite, everyday world. The lad's love for the princess becomes concentrated into one single desire, and "he concentrates the conclusion of all his thinking into one act of consciousness." He turns inward and holds this desire/wish/commitment in a way that turns her into a kind of Platonic idea. It is timeless and pure, divorced from actuality (but still real in an ideal sense.) Dante does this with Beatrice, I think. (So does Don Quixote with Dulcinea.)

The movement of faith brings the idea back into time and actuality, the perfect eternal idea is incarnated and returns to the everyday, imperfect, temporal world. Abraham gets Isaac back, not just as an idealized object of his love, but in actuality, in time.

What does he mean by describing faith a "passion" and why is this important (why does it tell us anything)? He also says that irony and humor are passions, which I find puzzling.

Maybe they're passions because they're involuntary. He says he can make the purely philosophical movement of resignation by "starving" himself into submission until he makes the movement. He can do this by himself, because all it takes is "human courage." But something more is needed, something that he cannot will, to make the movement of faith: "a paradoxical and humble courage" to believe by virtue of the absurd. Presumably this is something beyond the merely human.

Thomas wrote: "Alexey wrote: "'Ridderen den uendelige Resigamation' is Kierkegaard, right? And the princess is Regine? And here he is reflecting on their relationship, how he endured the news of her new engagemen..."

I also went through some commentaries, and it said that in Kierkegaard's papers there is a comment to this section roughly (I read it in Russian) like that, if he could make the movement of faith he could be (or stay) with Regine. I understood it as he meant not to break the engagement and marry her, but after reading your post it is clear there are many possible interpretations. Indeed, pondering on this question is fruitless—his actions were absurd (and not in the philosophical sense) and we do not know the motives there are only guesses connecting unknown with unknown.

Alexey wrote: "I understood it as he meant not to break the engagement and marry her, but after reading your post it is clear there are many possible interpretations. Indeed, pondering on this question is fruitless—his actions were absurd (and not in the philosophical sense) and we do not know the motives there are only guesses connecting unknown with unknown."

I don't think we can use SK's personal relationship as a key to understanding the concept of resignation, but we can use it in a general way as an example. He's giving us the same example in the lad and the princess because it's easy to relate to (or so he thinks.), But he also says that "any interest in which one has concentrated the whole reality of actuality, can, if it proves to be unrealizable, prompt the movement of resignation." He doesn't say why his relationship with Regine was unrealizable, but for his purpose here it doesn't matter.

Fools and young people say that everything is possible for a human being. But that is a gross error. Spiritually speaking, everything is possible, but in the finite world there is much that is not possible. Hong, 44

This reminds me of Don Quixote's romance with the idealized Dulcinea. And he suffered for her too, although humorously so.

This made me laugh:

If I had acknowledged as true the judgment that Abraham was a murderer. . .then I would probably have kept silent about it, for one should not initiate others into such thoughts.

So much for not initiating others into such thoughts by publishing those thoughts in a book, Mr. Silentio.

I'll take a shot at resignation without any assistance from reference sources, which means this is mostly guess work. Boy this is scary. I'm not even sure I'm saying anything new. Good luck, Xan. (Look! SK has me already referring to myself in the first person. I'm on my way.)

Resignation is the release of tension between our physical desire for love and our spiritual desire for love. (We are of the physical and of the spiritual.) The tension exists because physical desire and spiritual desire are in opposition to one another. Physical love is finite love; spiritual love is eternal love. By shedding or giving up the physical, the tension releases, the conflict dissolves, and we are now able to transcend to the spiritual to love from afar and forever (eternally). (I'm still not sure how we shed the physical (other than the obvious way.)

So it seems to achieve the eternal, somehow the physical needs to die, at least symbolically or metaphorically.

Resignation before faith. No detours around resignation permitted. I'm not attempting faith today.

(That's my half baked understanding. I kind of feel it more than reason it. Call it FAITH.)

Oh, and as for infinitudes, PLEASE, I have enough trouble with infinity without throwing several "tudes" into the mix.

Lia wrote: "One of the section headings is called “PRELIMINARY EXPECTORATION”, from the Latin, ex , out of, and pecus , the breast."

Thank you for this — I've been puzzled by the word "Expectoration." The only dictionary I referred to that noted this derivation was the OED. The word is the same in the German original and in some English translations. Others translate it as outpouring, which is close but not really the same.

David wrote: “Eternal consciousness here I think means self-awareness; not only is each human aware of his or her self, but humanity has a shared awareness of humanity preserved in memory.”

In the Expectoration, JS defines some of the terms he used earlier. About “eternal consciousness,” he writes:

“… my eternal consciousness is my love to God, and to me this is higher than everything.”

Aiden wrote( in response to JS’s statement that without an eternal consciousness man’s life wold be “empty and devoid of comfort): “Unless I’m reading that wrong, it’s saying that a divine system must exist because it would be horrible for man if it didn’t. That’s unpersuasive reasoning to say the least.”

I think it’s been established that JS does not believe in a divine “system,” but does believe in a personal God; he writes that ”I gaze only at my love, and I keep its virginal flame pure and clear. Faith is convinced that God is concerned about the least things.” (emphasis added)

Enlarging the context, in the previous century Voltaire, as part of his larger argument that the existence of God and/or belief in God are beneficial and necessary for civilized society to function, wrote that “If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him.” He was not being ironic.

The distinction between murder and sacrifice is interesting:

The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he intended to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he intended to sacrifice Isaac.

We have the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." but I think we can all agree there are exceptions. I am not convinced a religious sacrifice is a justifiable exception. What about other religions? While JS does not mention anything about the Aztecs, I suspect he would disagree with their practices.

In thinking of examples from literature for the knight of resignation, I think most immediately of Nikhil, the protagonist in Rabindranath Tagore's Home and the World. While he himself is vehemently opposed to the nationalist Swadesi movement in pre-partition India (a movement that both mirrors and prefigures the current far-right conservative politics in India with the BJP), Nikhil knows that his wife has been getting involved in that movement and is being coaxed and courted by the leader of that movement. But he resigns himself and hangs on to his earlier conviction that his wife is an independent person - a move that would surprise many even a hundred years after the novel's publication.

Batman comes off as another knight of resignation, especially in the second Nolan film. He reconciles himself to being seen as a villain and chased by dogs, even after having saved the city. Because he can take it. What happens in the temporal world matter to him less than the ideals of justice.

In thinking of the knight of faith, I feel that Socrates might be the right example. Even though he knows he is not wrong, and although he is offered a chance to escape his death sentence, he nevertheless cheerily drinks his hemlock and prays for a peaceful transition to the other world. It is this unshakeable conviction in this other world that allows him to do so. He gives up everything because he knows that it will all be made aright. It is not that he doesn't care for the world and for his comrades. He does! In fact, in his last words he asks Crito to pay back the sacrifice of a rooster to Asklepios. He did not give up on the world, but was convinced in, what seemed to his witnesses as, the Absurd.


That said, I didn't really enjoy his discussion of love. For the same reason that I don't enjoy any discussion of love, and in fact I refrain from any such mention. The absurd seems even more ridiculous when clothed in the garb of someone's speech. For the same reason that one cannot simply read Kierkegaard's account of Abraham and have faith, so one cannot listen to his description of love and know what it means.

Also, while reading his said description, I was reminded of Slavoj Žižek who, while a Marxist and a Psycho-analyst, speaks about love like a Romantic (and I use that term somewhat derogatorily)

Thomas wrote: "Maybe they're passions because they're involuntary. He says he can make the purely philosophical movement of resignation by "starving" himself into submission until he makes the movement. He can do this by himself, because all it takes is "human courage." But something more is needed, something that he cannot will, to make the movement of faith: "a paradoxical and humble courage" to believe by virtue of the absurd. Presumably this is something beyond the merely human

Thank you, this is all really helpful. If he's using the word "passion" in its Greek sense of to undergo/suffer something, then that makes sense. If faith is something he cannot will, but that requires something else, that would be consistent with the Christian idea that faith is a gift, or that we require grace.

Thomas wrote: “If his struggle is over and his faith is absolute, then I would think it would not be subject to trial.” Also,“Looked at from different angle, the "test" is not of Abraham, it's for Abraham.”

Alexey wrote: “He just knew, that testing the faith is the rule of the game created by someone who knew better (in absolute.”

The Old Testament God is a jealous god, generous to those who do his will, wrathful and vengeful to those who fail Him. He tests even his faithful.

For gold is tried in the fire, and acceptable men in the furnace of adversity. Ecclesiastes 2:5

Abraham, even though his faith was long and deep, and even though he had a personal relationship with God, was tested. From amongst many other instances, here are three other examples. Adam and Eve too had a personal relationship with God but were tested still and for their failure driven from Eden. Job, another man of faith, was tested, kept the faith, and was rewarded with having everything he had before the test restored — like Abraham. For questioning God’s will that the Israelites, having escaped from Egypt, settle in Canaan, the Israelite people are condemned to forty years wandering in the desert. That God tests his chosen, his faithful, is clearly a theme in the Old Testament. Might Abraham have made his decision to blindly follow God's instructions knowing this was a test of his faith?

Kierkegaard explains in Either/Or part 2 (Hong translation) that Abraham became a knight of faith when he was willing to do what God asked of him, “wishing to be in the wrong is an expression of an infinite relationship, and wanting to be in the right, or finding it painful to be in the wrong, is an expression of a finite relationship!” Since Abraham actually lifted the knife with the intention of doing what God asked of him, he showed he had faith and had to go no further to please God. The intention was far more important than the results. Through the anxiety of being in the wrong but acting and wishing to be in the wrong is how Abraham became a knight of faith. “Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.” (The Concept of Anxiety, Thomte translation)

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "(Look! SK has me already referring to myself in the first person. I'm on my way.)."

Yes! You are the self that relates yourself to yourself. Well done!

So it seems to achieve the eternal, somehow the physical needs to die, at least symbolically or metaphorically.

This is pretty close to the way I read it as well, except that I read specific individual for physical, since I think he is not thinking of physical love only. Abraham's love for Isaac is not of Isaac's physical being, but of Isaac as his son in his whole being, so of course it goes beyond the physical.

Another thing to consider is that he describes the process of resignation as a "transfiguration." The knight of resignation renounces his love, but in doing this his love is transfigured into an ideal. It doesn't die, but it morphs into an airy kind of glorious universal love, while the specific individual love is renounced.

David wrote: "We have the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." but I think we can all agree there are exceptions. I am not convinced a religious sacrifice is a justifiable exception. What about other religions? While JS does not mention anything about the Aztecs, I suspect he would disagree with their practices.."

He picks up this topic more specifically in Problem One. I'm not sure if the problem gets resolved, but you've identifed a Big Problem:

There are exceptions, which means that the commandment is not universal. On what grounds are the exceptions made then? Is this a matter for societies to decide, or can a single individual decide the exception? Which hold more weight: the ethics of a community, or the intention of the individual?

Ali wrote: "In thinking of the knight of faith, I feel that Socrates might be the right example. Even though he knows he is not wrong, and although he is offered a chance to escape his death sentence, he nevertheless cheerily drinks his hemlock and prays for a peaceful transition to the other world."

Socrates is a great example. Diotima's ladder in the Symposium is a recipe for the idealization of love, which is key to resignation. I hadn't thought about his acceptance of death as a movement of resignation, but it makes perfect sense in this context. It always seemed to me he was committing sucide by state, but it really is a kind of resignation. He renounces the world of "becoming," as he calls it, the temporal mundane world, and idealizes it in "being," the world of ideas. In this case the thing he renounces is his own body and the imperfect, unjust world.

Gary wrote: "Might Abraham have made his decision to blindly follow God's instructions knowing this was a test of his faith"

Kierkegaard doesn't think it's possible for a father who loves his son to blindly kill him for any reason. Maybe Abraham would have done it, but it would not have been without tremendous anxiety and suffering. This makes a considerable amount of sense to me.

David wrote: "We have the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." but I think we can all agree there are exceptions. I am not convinced a religious sacrifice is a justifiable exception. What about other religions? While JS does not mention anything about the Aztecs, I suspect he would disagree with their practices."

The concept of faith wary greatly among religions, Kierkegaard definitely refers only to Christianity in his understanding of faith (I dare to say, particularly to Lutheran theological tradition). I doubt that Aztecs would understand 'Sola Fide' and not because of bad Latin.

Religions are very dangerous field for generalisation, they 'work' differently.

Thomas wrote: "David wrote: "There are exceptions, which means that the commandment is not universal. On what grounds are the exceptions made then? Is this a matter for societies to decide, or can a single individual decide the exception? Which hold more weight: the ethics of a community, or the intention of the individual?"

In OT history, all exceptions were sanctioned by God. In the example, we are discussing, the exception is explicitly sanctioned by God, and BTW the commandment would be given half a millennium later.

Thomas wrote: "Ali wrote: "In thinking of the knight of faith, I feel that Socrates might be the right example. Even though he knows he is not wrong, and although he is offered a chance to escape his death senten..."

Socrates is a good example of knight of resignation (and very 'kierkegardian' I think), but I do not see 'movement of faith' in his story. Maybe it is just my blindness, but where did he reclaim finite world? Afaik, he went in one direction - infinity.

The command not to kill was given to Noah after the Flood: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man" (Gen 9:6).

Roger wrote: "The command not to kill was given to Noah after the Flood: "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man" (Gen 9:6)."

Yes, I mean the one which was cited, but this was really my mistake not to mention that it has predecessor. Nevertheless, it was quite clear that the command refers to intentional murder and not, for example, to accidents or killing during war actions. I do not think, that acting on God command to sacrifice Isaac was against this command--it simply did not imply human intention to kill someone.

Mike wrote: "Through the anxiety of being in the wrong but acting and wishing to be in the wrong is how Abraham became a knight of faith. “Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.” (The Concept of Anxiety, Thomte translation."

Ignacio asked earlier if F&T is a a work of philosophy or theology. I would add a third possibility: psychology. Anxiety plays a major role in the Aqeda story. Abraham's personal anxiety is created by a conflict between his love for Isaac and the demand of God. On a more abstract level there is a conflict between the ethical duty not to kill and a religious duty. This anxiety or "tension" (as Xan puts it) can be relieved though an act of resignation, by renouncing one side of the conflict and idealizing the other.

"Wishing to be in the wrong" is complicated, but I think it expresses that conflict, the conflict between two levels of being.

"Being anxious in the right way" is curious though. What happens if Abraham, or a knight of resignation, is anxious in the *wrong* way?

Alexey wrote: "Socrates is a good example of knight of resignation (and very 'kierkegardian' I think), but I do not see 'movement of faith' in his story. Maybe it is just my blindness, but where did he reclaim finite world? Afaik, he went in one direction - infinity.."

I agree. Socrates had no expectation of reclaiming anything through faith. Faith as a "double movement" where the finite is reclaimed comes from the Judeo-Christian tradition, which of course Socrates had no access to. But resignation is all over the place in pagan classics. We could compare the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and the Aqeda to see the difference between the two traditions.

I finished this section yesterday--towards the end, I thought I had a momentary insight into where JdS was leading us, but it was too slippery to hold onto. It may not be anything I'm capable of expounding on anyway. I plan on reading this again over the weekend before going on into the problems.

So...not a comment that really adds to the discussion--more like a wave to the main pack that I'm still following behind.

Bryan "They call me the Doge" wrote: "...before going on into the problems."

A good destination, isn't it?

Following the pack is a lot like procrastination. Everyone says never to do it, but damn it, sometimes it works.

I had problems with the first paragraph. SK starts with a platonic comparison between the inconsistent consequences of idleness of an imperfect (Platonic image?) external world and the consistent consequences of idleness of the perfect (Platonic form?) spirit world.

My questions are many, but I start with these.
1. I don't understand the purpose of these claims in his line of argument. Is it used just to segue into the claim that the story of Abraham is great even when it is only superficially understood and becomes even greater as the effort to understand it increases?

2. In the example, he demonstrates the perfect logical sense of an aspect of a perfect spirit world. If it spirit world is so perfect, and perfect here is perfect by human understanding, why isn't the rest of it as clear cut and understandable as these consequences of idleness? If the spirit world is so perfect, shouldn't it be perfectly and consistently logical, i.e., sensible and understandable?

for what does it mean to tempt God? And yet this is the movement of faith and remains that,

Is faith defined them as believing in god so much that he is induced to make the impossible possible?

Is this what Abraham did by going through the movements of killing Isaac, saddling the horse, gathing the wood, drawing the knife, etc. knowing, by faith, that god would either stop him somewhere along the way, or make things right if he had actually killed Isaac?

But what did Abraham do? He arrived neither too early nor too late. He mounted the ass and rode slowly along the way. During all this time he believed; he believed that God would not demand Isaac of him, while he still was willing to sacrifice him if it was demanded. . . .Let us go further. We let Isaac actually be sacrificed. Abraham believed. He did not believe that he would be blessed one day in the hereafter but that he would become blissfully happy here in the world. God could give him a new Isaac, call the sacrificed one back to life.

I'm not going to be of much help. This is a very hard section for me to make sense out of. I haven't enough experience thinking about such ideas as resignation, absurdity, and faith in religious and philosophical contexts, which is why I appreciate the opportunity to do it here. It's not that it's about God or religion or believing or disbelieving. Heck, I can get irretrievably lost in some philosophy books, and God and religion are nowhere in the texts.

Other sources would be a help, but I'm not doing that until I've read through. But it seems pretty obvious to me that for SK, God and his relationship with Man is not made of the standard fare we hear people talking of or experiencing in churches or even bible studies.

Like SK, says, the preacher isn't going to make the same point about Abraham and Isaac that he is making. SK is on a whole different plane, and it almost has the feel of religious mysticism. So personal, so dependent on faith and revelation. But I'm not sure. There isn't a strong vein of mysticism in Western Christianity like there is in Judaism and Islam or even in Eastern Christianity.

David wrote: "I had problems with the first paragraph. SK starts with a platonic comparison between the inconsistent consequences of idleness of an imperfect (Platonic image?) external world and the consistent c..."

This is an argument against simple-minded and lazy faith. In the external world, possessions often come to those who have not worked for them. They inherit wealth, or they benefit from the interest earned on their wealth, all without lifting a finger. In the spiritual world no one benefits without putting their shoulder to the wheel.

In the lazy version of Abraham's trial, the anxiety is left out. Abraham simply does what God tells him to do without a second thought or feeling (which is really kind of nuts if one takes the story seriously. The man is killing his son!) Working through the anxiety is the hard part, the work, which for SK is crucial to understanding the story. (I think working through the anxiety is also where "fear and trembling" comes in.)

Xan Shadowflutter wrote: "I'm not going to be of much help. This is a very hard section for me to make sense out of. I haven't enough experience thinking about such ideas as resignation, absurdity, and faith in religious an..."

Your comment reminds me of another existentialistic concept—'theological circle'. Though it was introduced by Paul Tillich—a much latter existentialist, I believe it might be relevant in discussing F&T. For one who stands in the circle, the faith is the matter of ultimate concern, for those, who are not in the circle, it is a matter of preliminary concerns. Of course, staying in the circle is not the condition for understanding and discussing the matter, but it gives a different perspective. It looks like Kierkegaard (or JdS) was in the circle and the parson of the chapter was not.

What would Kierkegaard say if someone told him that he is in *theological* circle?

David wrote: "
Is faith defined them as believing in god so much that he is induced to make the impossible possible?
..."

Faith isn''t necessarily about God, though it obviously is in Abraham's case.

Silentio looks for exemplars of the knight of faith in the everyday world and is unable to find one anywhere, but he imagines one. He is an everyday fellow who looks just like a tax collector. He tries to find something ethereal about him, a crack through which the infinite peeps out, and he finds nothing. "He belongs entirely to the world; no bourgeois philistine could belong to it more." He is completely absorbed in his everyday, worldly activities. There is nothing poetic or incommensurable about him. But this "tax collector" imagines that his wife has prepared a gourmet meal for him, and firmly believes that she will have it for him, even though he "does not have four beans." And even if she doesn't have it, he is just as happy. The reason for this is that he has "felt the pain of renouncing everything, the dearest thing he has in the world, and yet the finite tastes every bit as good to him as to someone who never knew anything higher... He resigned everything infinitely and then grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd."

Maybe faith is a way of existing on a different plane of consciousness, a radical way of seeing the world anew. But to do this requires rejecting all the old ways of understanding the world, rejecting the common and the rational in order to grasp a new world by virtue of the absurd. This does seem extraordinarily difficult and fraught with risk.

Thomas wrote: Faith isn''t necessarily about God, though it obviously is in Abraham's case."

I think SK leaves that notion out. It is pretty clear that, for the purposes of this work, that the only faith is the faith in the Christian god, whatever that is. I see no references to other religions which of course always serves to take the absurd up a notch.

Also, SK tells us what is missing from the story is Abraham's anxiety. But does not a faith like Abraham's exclude any anxiety? Isn't anxiety an indicator of a weak spot in faith?

David wrote: "Also, SK tells us what is missing from the story is Abraham's anxiety. But does not a faith like Abraham's exclude any anxiety? Isn't anxiety an indicator of a weak spot in faith?"

Angst is the fear/anxiety of nothingness caused by our finitude and our knowledge about our finitude. According to Kierkegaard, it is a property of all human beings. In his view, Abraham should have one or he did not need faith to do what he did. Faith is the courage to overcome the angst and claim finitude despite knowing that it is finite. We can hide from the angst by ignoring the finite of our existence or by claiming infinite values and resign the finite word, by faith we embrace the angst of the finitude and claimed both finite and infinite.

David wrote: "Thomas wrote: Faith isn''t necessarily about God, though it obviously is in Abraham's case."

I think SK leaves that notion out. It is pretty clear that, for the purposes of this work, that the onl..."

Agree with you, his conception simply does not work with other religions (afaik) and he never shows any interest in them, with some exception for Ancient Greeks but only to compare with Christianity. And his faith only could be the faith in the (very) personal God

I'm now thinking aloud outside F&T, but didn't SK think anxiety was caused by our inability to face death -- our finitude? Because it is too horrible to face, we put it out of our conscious minds, but it lingers in our subconscious rattling around causing anxiety. The only way to rid ourselves of that anxiety is to come to terms with our mortality, and for SK that is achieved by having faith in God.

Alexey wrote: "Your comment reminds me of another existentialistic concept—'theological circle'. Though it was introduced by Paul Tillich—a much latter existentialist"

I have The Courage to Be. It sits on a shelf.

A wonderful book, imho, and much shorter than his Systematic Theology. I have some reservations about his theological system, but like his writing.

Abraham's anxiety redeux
1. We are told of Abraham's great anxiety.
2. We are also told of the peace found by a knight of resignation and a knight of faith..
3. Abraham is considered the best of the knights of resignation and the best of the knights of faith. Therefore Abraham is the one most at peace.

How can Abraham be the one who is the most anxious and the most at peace? Is this just another contradiction that arises in the absurd, or does each event or test require some initial anxiety, then resignation, then faith?

Would Abraham feel anxious or not, if god asked him again, at some later time, to sacrifice Isaac?