The History Book Club discussion

Hello Everyone,

For the week of January 3rd through January 9th, we are reading approximately the first 40 pages of Legacy of Ashes.

This thread will discuss the following Author's Note, Chapters and pages:

Week One - January 3rd – January 9th -> Author’s Note and Chapters ONE, TWO, and THREE p. xiii - 31
Author’s Note and ONE – Intelligence Must Be Global and Totalitarian and TWO – The Logic of Force and THREE – Fight Fire with Fire

We will open up a thread for each week's reading. Please make sure to post in the particular thread dedicated to those specific chapters and page numbers to avoid spoilers. We will also open up supplemental threads as we have done for other spotlighted reads.

We will kick everything off on January 3rd. We look forward to your participation. Amazon, Barnes and Noble and other noted on line booksellers do have copies of the book and shipment can be expedited. The book can also be obtained easily at your local library, on iTunes for the ipad, etc. However, be careful, some audible formats are abridged and not unabridged.

Since we will not be starting this book until January 3rd, there is still a little time remaining to obtain the book and get started.

There is no rush and we are thrilled to have you join us. It is never too late to get started and/or to post.

Welcome,

~Bentley

Week of
 January 3rd (Start)

Week One - January 3rd – January 9th -> Author’s Note and Chapters ONE, TWO, and THREE p. xiii - 31
Author’s Note and ONE – Intelligence Must Be Global and Totalitarian and TWO – The Logic of Force and THREE – Fight Fire with Fire

This is a link to the complete table of contents and syllabus thread:

http://www.goodreads.com/topic/show/4...

We are off to a good beginning.

TO SEE ALL WEEK'S THREADS SELECT VIEW ALL

Tim Weiner

Remember this is a non spoiler thread.

Folks, these are some of the discussion questions to keep in mind while reading this book. Please feel free to begin discussion on any of these that are pertinent to the thread and the specific week's assigned reading and pages.

Some Discussion Questions:

Why has the CIA been such an historically problematic -- or worse, counterproductive -- governmental agency?

What are the chances these problems can ever be effectively corrected?

What influence do the following have on the CIA: The President of the United States? The CIA Director? The Director of National Intelligence? The House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence? The Pentagon? Who ultimately "controls" -- and is responsible for -- CIA policies and actions?

How has the CIA's role changed in the face of post-911 restructuring of the intelligence community?

What problems do national security secrets pose in a transparent democratic society?

How do the intelligence gathering and covert action arms of the CIA interact? What tensions exist between the two?

What moral issues surround CIA attempts to overthrow foreign governments or even assassinate foreign leaders?

How do intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war in 2003 mirror previous intelligence failures over the past 60 years?

Since we are just beginning this book, I thought that I would solicit from all of you what your impressions are/were of the CIA before you begin/began reading Weiner's book.

KICKOFF DISCUSSION QUESTION:

What would you consider some of the strengths or weaknesses of the CIA and is your impression of this organization favorable or unfavorable. I wondered before we started to discuss this book whether folks had preconceived notions and maybe wondered themselves what this organization means to the United States and let us say our being successful in the war on terror. What if the CIA did not exist?

For me the organization has always been cloaked in the air of mystery and intrigue. I always have felt that this was an organization accustomed to danger, spying and subterfuge. It would seem that good intelligence is critical in the war on terror. How many of you are familiar with how the CIA is structured and/or how it operates and/or is staffed? For me, I historically knew very little about the organization and felt that this book might shed some light.

What about the rest of you?

This was a news item just recently honoring the CIA who fell victim to a deadly attack. What were your impressions of this incident at the time that it occurred and have they changed?

Obama honors CIA fallen one year after deadly attack
(AFP) – 3 days ago

HONOLULU, Hawaii — President Barack Obama honored Thursday seven Americans killed in an attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan, saying senior Al-Qaeda leaders were now "under more pressure than ever before."

The CIA operatives were killed a year ago by a Jordanian informant who gained access to one of the Central Intelligence Agency's major field bases and set off explosives rigged to his body.

"As we mark the first anniversary of their sacrifice at Khost, this is the work to which we recommit ourselves today," Obama said in a statement.

"We will ensure that our dedicated intelligence professionals have the training and tools they need to meet the missions we ask of them."

The December 30, 2009 attack on the CIA base in Khost, near the lawless border with Pakistan, was a devastating blow for the spy agency and the second deadliest single assault in CIA history.

"Today, Al-Qaeda's senior leadership is under more pressure than ever before and is hunkered down in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan," Obama insisted.

"We are relentlessly pursuing our mission to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately defeat that terrorist organization."

The bomber, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, was seen by CIA operatives as a valuable contact -- after offering information on Al-Qaeda leadership -- and they had invited him onto the base of the compound without patting him down.

As Balawi was about to undergo a search near a building entrance, he set off his explosive with CIA agents standing nearby.

Balawi was tied to Taliban insurgents battling US-led forces in Afghanistan and had been plotting to attack his CIA handlers, it later emerged.

CIA Director Leon Panetta said after a review released in October that no single individual or group could be assigned blame for the incident, although the internal task force probing the incident concluded the "assailant was not fully vetted and that sufficient security precautions were not taken."

This was an interesting article in the Washington Post.

It discusses this year's activities and the environment within the CIA. What do you think of Jeff Stein's assessment?

2010: CIA ramps way up

Each winter brings hope that next year's crop of talented rookies, matched with maturing veterans, will turn around a baseball franchise. So it might be said of the CIA’s campaign against Islamic extremists across a wide swath of the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.

In 2010, late into its second decade fighting Islamic extremists, the CIA has far more personnel on the battlefield than at any time since the Vietnam War, when 300 pilots alone were supplying a CIA-led force of 40,000 tribesman in Laos.

“Many times more” CIA personnel have been deployed to Afghanistan than the 200 or so who were on the ground in Laos by the early 1970s, said one close CIA observer, voicing the estimate of others.

The agency has raised its own, 3,000-strong Afghan paramilitary force to conduct raids in Pakistan in search of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders. It is also credited with doubling the number of Predator drone strikes in Pakistan in 2010, to about 115 (although a knowledgeable source says many of the missile attacks have been actually carried out by the U.S. Air Force’s far more powerful Reaper drones).

And of course it has its hands full working with -- as well as against -- Afghanistan’s security agencies and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, parts of which are aiding the Taliban.

The agency is doing all this with a talent bank, some agency veterans say, that has not yet fully recovered from budget cuts in human intelligence programs in the 1990s.

Too many erstwhile desk-bound analysts and staff intelligence officers, some agency veterans say, have been dispatched into the field from Washington with inadequate preparation to manage difficult operations in a very complex part of the world.

A former intelligence officer who went into Afghanistan shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and has returned many times since pointed to the calamity in Khost, a year ago this week, where agency managers failed to stop an inexperienced base chief from inviting a source onto a base. That source turned out to be a double agent wired with a suicide vest. Seven Americans were killed.

Khost is not an anomaly, he said. “She was not the only unqualified person leading [a team] in a difficult, dangerous place.”

“The overall problem is as follows,” says Mark Lowenthal, a senior former CIA intelligence official. “The [intelligence community] lost the equivalent of 23,000 positions in the 1990s due to the ‘peace dividend,’ which hit the IC far harder than Defense. Then we had the post-9/11 ramp up. Put those two demographics together -- veterans departing, no fill-in behind them for years followed by an influx of new people -- and we have, arguably, the least experienced intell community since its formal inception in 1947 in both ops and analysis.”

The CIA takes strenuous issue with such views. “Any assertion that CIA officers working on counterterrorism issues are not qualified or experienced is flat wrong,” said Jennifer Youngblood, an agency spokesperson.

“CIA officers who came on board in the last decade arrived with significant outside experience and education,” she added. “They’ve brought fresh thinking and new expertise to bear in the fight against terrorism and many are already leaders in their own right.”

Even skeptical CIA veterans grant that the agency’s paramilitary division has deeply benefited from the influx of former military special operations troops.

Indeed, in 2010 the agency -- and many outside analysts -- embraced the notion that it had essentially won the war with al-Qaeda, at least as led by Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who are considered boxed up in Pakistan’s tribal region and unable to mount a repeat of the Sept. 11 attacks.

But the Obama administration also seems to be betting that the CIA, even more than American military forces, can salvage the U.S. struggle against the various strains of Muslim insurgents in the AfPak region, not to mention in places like Yemen, Somalia and North Africa.

“It is clear statistically that the policymakers are turning more and more to the drone program to carry the war to Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pak border,” says a former senior CIA officer who held top posts in the region. “I actually support this effort as long as we recognize that air attacks will never alone take care of the problem in the region. These attacks can only be truly effectively over the long term when the Pakistanis decide to step up to the plate and take care of the problem.”

Some worry that the drone and paramilitary programs are a drain on the CIA’s central espionage mission, but the former senior officer said such efforts “often provide the agency with its best intelligence and unique, excellent access to the top players…in a country, some of whom become key long-term agents. So on the local level, I doubt that [they have] a negative impact on intelligence collection.”

“The bigger issue is whether our protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have depleted collection capabilities and adequate policy attention in other key areas of the world,” this former official continued. “I believe it has and that it possibly is irrevocably altering how the agency does business, not for the better. The full impact of this will not be felt for years.”

Such criticism obscures the agency’s successes, says Ronald Kessler, whose 2004 book, “The CIA at War: Inside the Secret War Against Terror,” and other writings champion the spy agency.

“There’s always been the complaint” that paramilitary operations are a strain on resources, he says, “but they’re still winning war on terrorists.”

Kessler credited “better intelligence overall….better methods for pinpointing the locations of terrorists…a better focus, more resources…[and] more firepower, including more Predators,” for the CIA’s success.

All of which is being quarterbacked by the unlikeliest of generals, Leon E. Panetta, whose previous intelligence experience was effectively nil when he took the job in 2009.

“I was skeptical, as many were, when he came in,” said Kessler. But by the end of 2010, it was clear that the former congressman “really embraced the mission as his own.” And he not only had the president’s complete backing, Kessler said, he “is smart, he gets it.”

By Jeff Stein | December 30, 2010; 11:54 AM ET

One of my reasons for reading this book is to learn more about the CIA, their structure and work. I have limited knowledge of the agency, but start with a couple of assumptions and general impressions: 1 - intelligence gathering about what is going on in other countries and governments around the world is a necessary task for any modern government, particularly one as powerful as the US. We need to know what others are doing, whether their intentions are hostile or not. 2 - there will always be some level of competing interests that influence an organization like this. Congress appropriates resources for the work of the government as a whole, and that opens the door to political persuasion. 3 - My general impression is a positive one, but I have always wondered if they have enough people who are fluent in language and cultures of the right countries.

Maybe it is indemic to the type of work they perform that the public is not likely to hear about their successes but rather their failures. I mean, if they are effective, it seems that we as a government cannot publicize that fact without compromising future and/or current missions. The big failures - such as the 9/11 attacks - have such horrendous consequences that it highlights everything that is wrong. I don't lay 9/11 at the feet solely of the CIA, but an obvious intelligence failure contributed to it and with little other to go on, well, it leaves me wondering what on earth is going on, who is controlling and directing the work, how are their priorities set, how could something like this happen?

The CIA seems to be having its difficulties in Pakistan. This report is particularly troubling regarding the outing of our intelligence chief in Pakistan. Is this the fault of our CIA or of our foreign policy dealings with Pakistan or something entirely different. So much is going on now that Legacy of Ashes should prove to be very interesting reading.

US-Pakistan rift puts war on terror on fragile footing
by Bruce Loudon

AS a sign of the times in the nominally close American ally Pakistan, it could not be more telling.

First, the US CIA's top clandestine officer in Islamabad, its station chief, was forced to flee the country virtually overnight.

Jonathan Banks was a pivotal figure in the battle against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida, with direct control over the Obama administration's Predator drone attacks on terrorist targets. But his cover was blown in a dirty tricks operation by officials of the notorious Pakistani spy agency, the ISI.

It was a cloak-and-dagger drama and a rare event. Not for many years has the CIA had to bundle its top spy out of any country, least of all one that is a crucial ally and the recipient of billions of dollars in aid.

But the abrupt departure of the CIA station chief is only part of a wider story that reflects souring relations between Washington and Islamabad. Many analysts believe the situation could have dangerous implications for the fight against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida and attempts to deal effectively with Pakistan's role as the epicentre of global terrorism.

Remainder of article:

Source: The Australian

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/...

Alisa wrote: "One of my reasons for reading this book is to learn more about the CIA, their structure and work. I have limited knowledge of the agency, but start with a couple of assumptions and general impress..."

Alisa, you raise some interesting points. I think I feel similarly. It is an important job but does this agency have the right people with the right skills and with the right background. And of course, if their main job is secret in nature; do we really learn about their successes or do we just hear about the big failures which are broadcast through domestic and foreign media.

Folks, please try to respond to the Kickoff Question (message 3). This will help us share what our initial take is on the CIA. This will establish our baseline before we dig into the book in earnest in the following weeks. Why was this book interesting to you and why do you think you want to begin reading it?

Thank you Alisa for your post and your answer (message 6).

I have to say my impressions of the CIA is negative. I read about the screw-ups as I read presidential history. I hope the author does write about the success stories (although I'm not so sure), since I do believe they are out there and the day by day intelligence is very important. I've read parts of Tenet's book for my job:

George Tenet

Bryan, another interesting side read. I think that many of us realize that the CIA is a necessity in this kind of world. But many including myself probably have referred to the CIA as a "necessary evil". Probably not two words that we like to see together when referring to an organization run by the United States. But be that as it may; it seems to me that we need some kind of an organization in today's volatile terrorist world to be able to protect and safeguard all of us from terrorist attacks, etc. However, having said that...I just wish that the CIA had a better track record. But then again, when you are involving yourself in subterfuge, intrigue, spies, and worse...I guess we will have to ask ourselves what do we really expect. I am not sure that this book will be discussing any success stories but I think the journey will be an interesting one. Elsewhere I posted that the CIA itself was very critical of this book.

Bryan many folks share your impressions I am sure; but I think as we begin reading this book; it is great to hear from the group and see how everybody's impressions vary or are similar and what are the reasons why folks felt this would be an interesting read for them.

I think I am in the same boat as you and Alisa in terms of your impressions of the CIA.

Here is the first sentences in the CIA's mission statement:

We are the nation’s first line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go.
(https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-vis...)

You are right, Bentley, I think if this is part of your mission statement, your track record won't be stellar.

Yes, Bryan...I agree with you and the one that I think gets them the most into trouble or potential for trouble is this part (exactly what have they been asked to do?):

Conducting covert action at the direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives.

Do you think their mission dooms them to failure? I also think the idea of covert action makes the majority of the American public very nervous. It is only sexy in a James Bond movie, but as a daily operation I think most people don't want to acknowledge it. Seems to me they will always have the basic mistrust of the general population.

I know that my impressions of the CIA are skewed by media representations. As many spy movies and series as we have all with conflicting views of the CIA leave a lot to be desired as far as truth is concerned. That said, I'm also kind of glad that I don't know exactly how things work simply because, if I know, then everyone knows and that knowledge can be exploited.

I'm also painfully aware of the lack of foreign qualifications that exist in other American organizations (it's a hazard of having studied political science...you hear a lot of gripes along these lines) and I hope that isn't reflected in the CIA. Unfortunately, the vast majority of American policy makers, diplomats and other higher ups do seem to have the kind of attitude that says everyone else should learn our language and culture and it's worthless to learn about theirs.

My first impressions of the book are positive. I sat down in the bookstore to read the first few pages to make sure I was going to enjoy the style and ate up the first chapter.

Maekala, you raise some interesting points. If the CIA's work was public; how much would they really find out and/or how successful would they ever be.

Foreign qualifications I imagine can be hard for some folks to trust in a CIA like organization I imagine. Probably they question the allegiance of the folks involved.; I think that the attitude you describe is changing but probably not soon enough.

I am so glad that you are sailed through the first chapter as quickly as you did.

Alisa wrote: "Do you think their mission dooms them to failure? I also think the idea of covert action makes the majority of the American public very nervous. It is only sexy in a James Bond movie, but as a da..."

On one hand Alisa, maybe the mission statement makes their own mission more difficult or even having a public one. Covert action is what intelligence gathering is all about so it would be suspect to assume (I guess) that intelligence gathering could be done in the open, publicly and not in secret. I think you are right - I think we are all feeling awkward and guilty about it - almost like even the thought of these activities makes us upset and like a ostrich we want to stick our heads in the sand. I think you are right that we will always have a mistrust of something we cannot acknowledge.

I am not sure how other folks are feeling about the plight of the early CIA; but sometimes I really had sympathy for them: no money, no power, no recognition, no clear goals, mixed signals by power hungry Pentagon officials; no mandate from a president, personnel not well trained and never seasoned; asked to do impossible covert operations which they could not even begin to fathom and numerous folks who were promoting their own ideological agenda rather than the agenda and the best interests of the CIA, or the president or the country: resulting in their becoming a political football and caught continuously in a quagmire.

Yeah, they are not exactly getting off to a good start, are they? That much hiring that fast, I don't know how they could be the least bit organized. And if there was any training capability it was surely lost in the crush. Dropping all those agents behind enemy lines, only to have them vanish. Horrible.

Yes, a tragic loss of life for what...some harebrained scheme.

It highlights part of the problem, in a way. This sort of blind ambition/damn the torpedoes approach without the training or knowledge to back it up. I have this image of this organization created out of nepotism and overblown ego thinking they can do it all because they are american and all think they know what they are doing. It's quite grating.

I see your point. I think that some organization was necessary when the Soviets seemed to be out of control and taking over half of Europe; but blindly going in where angels fear to tread is another - only fools do that and there seemed to be a lot of power hungry men bent on foolish and irresponsible behavior. There were some things they did do right and some folks owe their lives to being rescued by the CIA operatives for sure; but some of the other blunders just overshadow these other accomplishments. And from the beginning the CIA had an ignominious start and foundation; the originator of the idea for the organization was not well respected; he angered even FDR; Truman was turned off initially; there was no backing from the legislative branch and folks were feeling awkward and afraid of what an organization of this type was capable of doing to a democratic government. Democracy is so open and yet here we were talking about a secret organization with secret purposes and activities which could not and should not probably be disclosed. Together, the CIA and democracy made an odd couple.

One big thing that sticks out for me is how the OSS/CIA is a textbook example of how a bureaucracy survives. President after president has tried to trim down or cut, and they found it near impossible (and without a Cold War/national security to help the argument).

As Bentley mentions, it was tough since they were axed and cut off financially. However, a core group of individuals from the OSS and Defense saw the need and kept it going, even getting money under the table from Congress. It is pretty impressive and it also shows timing of external events and having good connections help.

Yes, I was amazed at the under the table dealings as well and how having good connections even trumped the president's backing or lack thereof. There are a lot of political maneuverings going on behind closed doors.

Politics is messy and unsightly, particularly when it comes to appropriations. The fact that they had to sneak around to get resources did show some wherewithall, even in the face of presidential opposition. At least they were able to keep *that* from being discovered by their detractors.

I find the internal disagreements at the outset the most alarming. They couldn't agree on the basics of what the agency should be doing so set off on their own courses of action.

Alisa, that was mind-boggling as if this agency was just a personal pet project like a church fund raising supper.

Totally, Alisa. The mandate was not spelled out, nor its authority. I think it technically reported to the National Security Council (NSC), but the NSC did little with it, while other departments like State and Defense constricted it. Crazy, I think it is also another text-book example of power/turf wars in bureaucracies.

Bentley wrote: "I am not sure how other folks are feeling about the plight of the early CIA; but sometimes I really had sympathy for them: no money, no power, no recognition, no clear goals, mixed signals by power..."

I think Truman really didn't care too much about the NSC and CIA when he created them. This shows the problem of presidential inattention, and allowing the CIA to move in other directions without the need for Truman's approval.

My impression of the agency has been strictly created by media impressions and reading. I know very little about it, but I do get concerned with several aspects of the agency.

1. What have then hit accurately, what have they been wrong about.

We all know the failures that the media has harped on a great deal (Failure of Soviet Union, WMD's in Iraq) However, it's an agency where we as the public will rarely see/hear it's victories. That puts them at a disadvantage in explaining the agencies validity.

2. Can an agency this large react quickly enough to deal with threats.

I ask this same question of any large governmental agency.

3. Along those lines, agencies that large become political very quickly in order to maintain funding levels.

I work with a governmental agency. It is amazing to me to see the panic that happens when elections switch parties either way. The mission shift will start, the justification for certain programs, then the mountains of papers and reports. It's counter-productive and totally recant upon who is coming into office.

I'm interested to see if this also appears to be the case at the CIA and is the Nation made weaker because of it.

Rodney,

That is an interesting point. Here are folks who are risking their lives probably every day and we do not hear of their successes; only of their failures.

Also, if an agency is political; around election time is there a certain amount of inertia too; where a bit of paralysis sets in out of fear etc. I never thought about the mountains of papers and reports because of a mission shift.

I never thought about their size being related to their swiftness and their ability to successfully deal with threats; but you may be on to something Rodney.

Bentley wrote: "Since we are just beginning this book, I thought that I would solicit from all of you what your impressions are/were of the CIA before you begin/began reading Weiner's book.

Bentley,

I'm writing this after having read the introduction and first two chapters.


I guess I had always thought of the CIA as involved in a lot of cloak and daggar stuff - the kinds of things you see in the movies. I was surprised by the very title of the book when it was selected for our group read, and disheartened by what I've read in the first two chapters.

I mean, we're the USA! I have this bias towards thinking we are "the best" and so I had naturally assumed that our CIA stacked up favorably against the KGB in terms of tactics and experience. Apparently NOT.

I think it's great that we're reading this. As a general rule, I doubt that many of us really understand the workings of a federal agency. And especially this one, where - as pointed out above - successes and failure are meant to remain secret.

Bryan wrote: "One big thing that sticks out for me is how the OSS/CIA is a textbook example of how a bureaucracy survives. President after president has tried to trim down or cut, and they found it near impossi..."

Bryan, a very good point. Government agencies are a lot like tumors in their natural tendency to just keep growing . . . one can only hope they are benign instead of malignent!

Kay wrote: "Bentley wrote: "Since we are just beginning this book, I thought that I would solicit from all of you what your impressions are/were of the CIA before you begin/began reading Weiner's book.

Bent..."

Kay, I am glad we are reading this too. It is not the kind of book that the group actually usually votes for but this is a very interesting book and I too do not really understand the workings of a federal agency either. I think the successes are secret and then the media only gets wind of the failures and then the entire agency looks like it has one big black mark. Unfortunately, we always want to think about ourselves as the best; but there are areas where we are not and the KGB and even the British with their intelligence agency seem to have fewer leaks than we do.

Apparently better at keeping secrets.

Bentley and all,
My knowledge of the CIA comes from an entirely different perspective. I was the research archivist and conservator for Senator Frank Church collection from 1983-2008 (the signicance of this will be examined in Part IV of the book). I am interested as to other point of view as we read. I also am excited to see if the problems the intelligence people are having in Pakistan are similar or as complex as they were in Greece in the 1950s, Loas in the 1960s, Iran 1970s etc.

Mary

Mary wrote: "Bentley and all,
My knowledge of the CIA comes from an entirely different perspective. I was the research archivist and conservator for Senator Frank Church collection from 1983-2008 (the signican..."

Awesome, Mary, great stuff. Yeah, I hope the book does cover some of the Congressional side and the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.

Hello Mary,

Welcome to the discussion; I am sure that you will be able to add a lot to the conversations as we go along with your background. It seems that the Pakistan issues are deep and serious and if the Pakistani organization is in fact providing a safe haven then that does not bode well at all for our relations with Pakistan and a successful conclusion to the Afghanistan mission.

This weekend on CSPAN 3 there is a presentation on the following which is germane to our discussion regarding this book:

GOVERNMENT SECRETS:

A panel discussion was held on how a democracy balances the public’s right to know against the need for preserving national security. Historians from the State department and National Security Archive participated in the round table, which celebrated the 150th anniversary of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Questions explored included: how much the public needs to know, what should be kept secret, are secrets political, and how long secrecy lasts. Nathaniel Smith chaired. "Open Secrets: The Foreign Relations of the United States Series, Democracy’s 'Need to Know,' and National Security," a session of the 125th annual meeting of the American Historical Association held at the Hynes Convention Center, was co-sponsored by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

11AM January 9th

NOTE: I am sure that this ultimately will also be available on line.

Liz wrote: "My initial impressions of the CIA were generally positive. I have always been interested in code-breaking and the CIA has had some amazing successes in this area. I've also talked with intelligen..."

I wonder if things get better as the CIA matures and hopefully learns from its mistakes. I know Bentley has shared with us the CIA's view of the book and they share the same concerns you do Liz.

Liz, we may be getting the only perspective that is not secret; but even though I am sympathetic to a certain extent; some of the egos of the men involved at the beginning, you would have to admit, were like run away trains resulting in the deaths of many innocent folks.

But like every book; each author has his own slant and perspective. I have to say that I am not sure how I feel about the history of covert funding for example. It is something to ponder for sure.

As I mentioned earlier, the CIA is not pleased with the book and one can see why; is the displeasure because the book does not whitewash what the agency and the people involved have done wrong or is it because it thinks what has been presented is not true or is it simply that the agency does not want folks to know what it has done wrong or right. However, I always find it is interesting to hear what someone says then at the end judge for yourself.

Yes, I understand and maybe that is why the CIA does not like the book; but they cannot have secrecy and then have it both ways. The reason we hear about the failings is probably because of the immense fallout.

You make a good point, Bentley. If we hear about the success stories: let's say we get a pilot out of North Korea...oops now the North Koreans know we do fly-overs...

It is a tough spot to be in.

It is a very tough spot for them; they are damned if they do and damned if they don't.

It does seem like the Soviets, the Chinese and the British and pretty much every other country is better at keeping secrets.

Bryan wrote: "I have to say my impressions of the CIA is negative. I read about the screw-ups as I read presidential history. I hope the author does write about the success stories (although I'm not so sure), ..."

What did you think of his book?

So first I made most of my notes before I read the extensive notes etc that seem to be on the site preceding my reading.

The beginning for me from these few pages – beginning with the intro – is that mostly my casual thoughts/ impressions of the CIA seem to have extremely way off base.

I had always thought the CIA was a smooth transition from the OSS.

The intrigues and personal agendas which I knew are always present I did not realize were so influential in the very beginning of the CIA – nor did I realize the efforts of the military to keep the intelligence initiative to themselves after the war. To keep the information on which their civilian commanders would act subject to their presentation. I knew that eventually the FBI was feeling competitive but didn’t realize that Hoover (but I should have) was aggressive against their success from the very beginning.

I also found it interesting that the OSS covert operations during WWII were almost always failures.

Eisenhower’s assessment of “legacy of ashes” is interesting. This made me remember he was the man who coined the term (I do believe) the “military-industrial complex.”

Regarding the Berlin blockade, my wife a German national, believed the organization of the new West German state was the trigger and did not equate it with the currency. I will have to look into that unless one of you has posted something else on the website.

Overall the cast of characters is large and keeping track is time consuming.

I have also decided I have to finish a section – write my notes – read the comments of others – and then move onto the next to try to understand as much as possible.

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To respond to Bentley’s #3 kickoff discussion question – I have above noted some of my preconceived ideas – I have felt for some time that the CIA was not perfect – back to Bay of Pigs, Iran Contra, Chile etc. I did not have the impression there was really a lot of success outside of novels - I had the impression that too many folks did their “work” not clandestine work but intelligence gathering – putting in their hours with no definitive quality management. I had the impression that we failed to have adequate foreign language speakers/readers and that we have continually paid the price.
Good understanding of long term consequences – like with the Taliban against the Russians when they invaded Afghanistan – seems to have been lacking.
Failure to have good intelligence or the courage to fight questionable intelligence led us to the second Iraq war I think.

Maybe “mystery & intrigue” should be replaced by “mystery and secrecy” for a group that wants to move forward with their own agenda.

Vince wrote: "Bryan wrote: "I have to say my impressions of the CIA is negative. I read about the screw-ups as I read presidential history. I hope the author does write about the success stories (although I'm ..."

I haven't read enough of it to give it a full review, but the parts I read was interesting and it gives a bit of how it felt to be on the inside on that level. One thing he mentioned is that he wanted to get back to the CIA's core mission which included: "espionage, stealing secrets, and 'all-source analysis.'" (p. 22)

George Tenet

These first 3 chapters almost makes me sympathetic to the CIA. Secret monies for secret operations under the code of national security. The vagueness of its creation has necessitated the CIA to establish policies and activities at the whim of its directors and/or the president. Clandestine operations for the survival of an open society is a constant debate but to me that is what makes democracy. The need for a debate the existence of the CIA is as important as the need for the CIA to protect a free society. Maybe other countries are better at secrets because we are better at questioning. (Though after the events of last Sat., it is harder to be positive about an open society. Sorry)

Mary, on all levels, you make some very good points.

We do have the glossary where folks may comment at length about any of the personages involved. There are indeed quite a few.

Yes Amy, the book does make you want to pause and wonder at what is really going on behind closed doors. It certainly does not paint a pretty picture of the CIA's past; I guess we can only hope that its future is better.

You make a very good point about our country being a young nation. However, having said that at the time of George Washington, we seemed to be very adept at intelligence gathering in terms of size of troops, location, etc. However, I think the rub seems to be our ability to conduct covert operations which are actually covert inside the borders of other countries. That is the part that seems to rub most Americans or some of them anyway the wrong way. And probably is the area where we have had the most trouble and where these older, more established countries and operations seem to have the upper hand and the experience. While reading, it came to mind that the concept of America and what it stands for is so alien to all of these activities that this in and of itself could make them fail. We just do not have this kind of mindset. You have to cringe at some of their activities. While others which are rescue operations seem to have fared much better.

I have to ask myself: are these activities ALL making us actually more secure or are some changing the perception that folks in some countries have about our ideals, honor, and mission. I do think we need to keep ourselves secure; as secure as we can in this dangerous world. But think of Al Qaida for example, there are some stories that suggest that the CIA funded Bin Laden and the Afghan mujahideen when the Soviets were in Afghanistan. Some discount these stories so some or all the substance of these allegations is conjecture like anything else. But if this were true, or any part of it; did the CIA in some way provide resources and security training to a personage and group which now has turned its focus from the Soviet Union to the United States. Tragic if that is the case.

Right now with the current global conditions, you are indeed correct that we need a non partisan, fine tuned machine which is always listening and watching to prevent these kind of attacks that seem prevalent around the free world.

Tensions

There are various types of "tensions" that pertain to intelligence activities generally and CIA in particular, some of which have already been noted on this board.

Among these tensions are:

(1) Democracy versus Secrecy. The people cannot control their government without knowing what their government is doing. As Ollie North pointed out in the Iran-Contra investigations, it is difficult to explain things to the U.S. Congress without also telling our adversaries about it. Although CIA often hid operations from the president, presidents have also abused their secret, executive powers, using CIA to spy on anti-war protesters, journalists, and civil rights demonstrators instead of communists and terrorists (Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon).

(2) Secrecy versus Competence. Without skeptical attention and soul searching debate, plans often go astray. The very nature of intelligence prevents critical oversight and partly explains the many failures of CIA. Designed to respond quickly to Cold War threats, CIA frequently acted before it thought things through, spending as much time cleaning up its mistakes as it did conducting espionage against America's adversaries.

(3) Competence versus Relevance. Objective analysis frequently fails to address those issues that interest policy-makers most and thus are ignored. Relevant analysis, on the other hand, is frequently biased, providing policy-makers with what they want to hear rather than what they ought to know. CIA has seldom managed to balance these two objectives very well.

(4) Analysis versus Operations. Related to (3), above, CIA was designed to be an analytical agency and information clearing house, with other executive agencies conducting actual covert operations (Defense, State, Agriculture, Energy). Instead, CIA devoted most of its resources to covert operations, not only putting it in competition with the cabinet departments for funding, but also exacerbating the tension between "competence (objectivity) and relevance (operation-specific analysis).

(5) Intelligence versus Counterintelligence. The two functions are obviously related to each other, except that counterintelligence is a law enforcement activity that requires evidence that can stand up in open court, whereas intelligence does not. The two functions were clearly distinguished in 1947, with the FBI given primary responsibility for investigating illegal spying in the United States. The "wall" between the two was frequently permeable (the Rosenbergs), but after 11 September 2001, the "wall" was demolished entirely. The result is Camp X (Guantánamo) and detainees who can be neither freed nor prosecuted.