The Sword and Laser discussion

10 Futuristic Technologies That Will Never Exist

Check out this article if you would like your dreams of light sabers and personal force fields dashed.

I will leave you with Arthur C. Clarke's First Law-

When a distinguished but elderly scientist* states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong.

*and I am pretty sure the author of this article isn't even a scientist, so... grain of salt.

io9 is quality thought.

5. Generation ships

Any ship carrying colonists to another planet would have to be extremely sensitive to resource and material constraints, thus making suspended animation a much more reasonable solution for a large group of colonists.

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8. Reanimation from cryonic suspension

And the whole thing about continuity of consciousness is bunk -- every one of us experiences a discontinuity each morning, but we have no trouble accepting that we're the same person who went to be the previous night. And too, they leave out the Ship of Theseus possibility in which we don't digitize the brain in one step but gradually augment it with electronics until all the processes of consciousness occur on silicon chips instead of neurons.

I didn't really like the article. The author seems to believe that at the moment we know all there is to know about the universe, quantum physics, etc. and that we couldn't learn and find more which would fundamentally change our thinking and technology.

What would be better is to say all those things are not possible at our current level. I wouldn't say those things would never exist.

Sean wrote: "And the whole thing about continuity of consciousness is bunk -- every one of us experiences a discontinuity each morning, but we have no trouble accepting that we're the same person who went to be the previous night"

True, but we are the same person or consciousness when we wake as when we fell asleep. A copy or clone of ourselves however will still be a "separate" person or consciousness, or biological machine." The copy may hypothetically retain all memories of all past experiences of the original. But the original still does not share an awareness with the copy. If the original dies, it still ceases to be aware and having a copy does not grant the original immortality.

I suppose those left behind will still experience the copy as if it were the original because all shared experiences have been uploaded. So they would effectively feel like they have the same person. But this doesn't benefit the original in any way. The original person will still be unaware when they die ie they will not be aware through their copy.

So the copy will get all the benefit - but the original won't benefit or extend their lives or awareness a single day. Or that's how I understand the argument anyway.

Kim wrote: "What would be better is to say all those things are not possible at our current level. I wouldn't say those things would never exist."

The problem with some of these ideas, not all, is that the math might work out hypothetically, but still have no real world interpretation. For example it is useful in maths to include infinity to get around certain obstacles - but you can't actually have an infinite number of physical things. For example, hypothetically you could say that there are an infinite number of points on a line from start to finish. Or that you can hypothetically divide a line an infinite number of times. But in reality you can't. You can attempt to divide a line an infinite number of times, but you would be doing so forever and never actually be able to stop to have infinity number of lines. How long is an infinitely small line? More than zero? and less than infinity? And whatever that length is could you multiply it?
I think this is the nature of some of the limitations involved with things like light speed travel and time travel.
But I think that other things like light sabers and generation ships are only limited by current technology and logistics.

So I agree with you on some of those points.

"Never" is a long time.

I agree that light sabers and time travel are pretty unlikely. But to dismiss the idea of a generation ship because suspended animation makes more sense...buzzah? Did I miss the part where "suspended animation" exists as a viable technology? Does this guy think people in medically induced comas don't metabolize?

I guess we could just freeze potential colonists, except no, apparently cryonics are impossible too. So since we can never develop the technology for suspended animation, looks like our only option is a generation ship. BUT WAIT! And so on.

I have never understood why science is presented as fact. It is constantly disproving itself, so how can the author be certain about anything? The generation ship argument wasn't based in any sort of fact anyway, it was just his opinion that anyone creating one wouldn't effectively take resource and material constraints into account. And what are the "ethics" of raising a family on a star ship? What does that even mean? Grrr...science...

David Sven wrote: "True, but we are the same person or consciousness when we wake as when we fell asleep."

You're assuming facts that are not in evidence. When I go to sleep at night, my consciousness ends. When I wake up in the morning a new consciousness begins. I feel that this new consciousness is connected to the previous one because of my memories, but there is no direct continuity.

A copy or clone of ourselves however will still be a "separate" person or consciousness, or biological machine." The copy may hypothetically retain all memories of all past experiences of the original. But the original still does not share an awareness with the copy. If the original dies, it still ceases to be aware and having a copy does not grant the original immortality.

Yes, if you manage to create a digital copy of your mind without destroying your brain, both the consciousness that wakes up in your body and the one on a machine will have the same subjective experience of being a continuation of the previous day's consciousness -- and both are equally legitimate. That one is in the same physical body as the previous day's does not privilege it or mean that it is more "you" than the other.

Now if tonight when I go to sleep, someone performs a destructive brain scan to digitize my mind, and tomorrow my consciousness is implemented in a virtual environment, that new consciousness will be as connected to today's as today's to yesterday's.

Sean wrote: "That one is in the same physical body as the previous day's does not privilege it or mean that it is more "you" than the other"

Agreed

Now if tonight when I go to sleep, someone performs a destructive brain scan to digitize my mind, and tomorrow my consciousness is implemented in a virtual environment, that new consciousness will be as connected to today's as today's to yesterday's.

Also agreed but misses the point. The new you is still a new you. He won't be aware that he is a new you. He will feel exactly like the old you and will feel as connected to the past as the original making it virtually indistinguishable from the original you.
But the actual original you will still not experience awareness through a new version of yourself. The original still ceases to be aware - and gains nothing from the copy.

For example. Just say we do the copy and keep both versions alive. The two will be totally convinced they are the original you. Now lets separate them before one kills the other. Send one to Africa and one to Europe. We then tell each copy that they were in fact the original and the copy has been killed. Each copy then goes on their merry way blissfully unaware that the other is alive. We don't even have to go this far to realise that while both share a common past, they do not share experiences after the copying. They are two distinct persons - no less so if one is actually dead. If one dies, he will not continue to live on in the twins consciousness. He will be as mortal as he was before.

A third party however will experience the continuity of one copy to the other if the original is disposed of and could hypothetically keep making copies and have a meaningful contiguous relationship from one copy to the other. But this still doesn't benefit the original. The original's consciousness does not experience awareness through it's copies.