For years I have studied the Vietnam War with a growing emphasis on the advisory effort, and as of late I have been studying the advisory efforts in Iraq prior to the advent of ISIS/ISIL. The inescapable conclusion I have reached is that both efforts encountered the same problems, and both failed to achieve their intended goals.

The US doctrine in Vietnam was sound, and in three parts: 1) use US military force to hammer down the invasion of North Vietnamese regular forces coming south while suppressing the indigenous Veit Cong. While this was going on, 2) the existing advisory effort would build up ARVN (the South Vietnamese Army) and the associated forces to a point where they could exert government control on their own. And 3), civilian advisory would help the South Vietnamese government institutions mature and earn popular support.

The VC were utterly destroyed by 1968 (it helped that the Soviet-trained North Vietnamese was not unhappy to see them go, as having experienced indigenous guerrillas around was not conducive to a calm absorption of the target nation; the Soviets used similar tactics with the Polish Home Army in 1944). The NVA were fought to a standstill. When Nixon brought the bombing campaign back, the North Vietnamese went to the peace table.

This should have had a happy ending, except that the advisory campaigns wre by and large complete failures.

The concept of the advisory effort was sound: experienced US personnel would integrate at every level of the army and civilian government and help their Vietnamese counterparts absorb the lessons, training, and experience that an instant nation created from an abruptly freed colony lacked. They would also help the Vietnamese absorb the military and civil aid being pumped into the country. Key Vietnamese personnel would be sent to the USA for advanced and technical training. North of the DMZ, the Soviets and Chinese were doing the same thing.

On the technical side, the US effort was an unqualified success; by the time the US ground forces withdrew in accordance with the peace agreement, the South Vietnamese had, and could operate/maintain, everything from long-range radio systems to combat jets.

On the Human side, the US effort was a complete failure. Corruption was epidemic in both military and civilian organizations. Promotions were issued on the basis of political reliability, and the US utterly failed to convince the majority of ARVN and civil leaders that the USA would actually pull out and go home.

The advisory effort failed to build a military where professionalism and competence were routinely valued and rewarded, and where the organization was valued and served as an institution.

John Paul Vann, the shining star of the advisory effort, observed that after 12 years of advisory effort, the Vietnamese had ‘one year of advise repeated 12 times’. While the South Vietnamese were capable of fighting as well and hard as their northern counterparts, their military lacked the technical and organization values of an well-grounded system, so consistent performance was impossible.

Advisers rotated out every year, and with each rotation a new team had to struggle with language and cultural barriers while trying to incorporate organizational change while lacking any real authority. There was no cumulative effect of years of advisory effort: each new set of advisers rotated in and found the clock was set back to near the starting point.

When the NVA invaded south in 1975, using more tanks than Patton had ever commanded, many ARVN units stood and fought well, while an equal number simply collapsed and fled. Coupled with the decision by Congress to not honor our treaty obligations to provide military munitions, supplies, and air support, South Vietnam was doomed.

How it could have turned out differently is amply demonstrated by two examples. The first is the Army of North Vietnam: the Soviets and Chinese sent advisers in even as WW2 was waning, but instead of offering advice, they were empowered to give orders. Locals who did not cooperate or perform to desired standards were sacked, and often jailed. The result was a professional, modern military.

The second example was the Special Forces/CIA controlled MIKE Forces, which were battalions of various ethnic minorities and Cambodian volunteers who were commanded, trained, and paid by US forces, and which uniformly performed as well as any combatants in the conflict.

Ironically, these methods mirror that of the birth of the US Army, in which Baron von Stuben, a German professional soldier, was made a flag officer of the Continental Army and charged with training the US forces to a professional standard.

Fast forward to Iraq. The US handily toppled Saddam Hussain’s regime, and then undertook to build a democratic nation in its place.

To do so, we applied a three-part strategy: 1) the US military would defeat the various insurgent/loyalist factions, 2) military and contract advisers would organize and train a new army and revamp the existing police forces, while 3) civilian advisers would build a new government.

Part 1 went well; the US/Coalition military crushed the opposition, and stability extended control over the nation (over time, but we are talking in strategic terms).

Parts 2 and 3 were more rocky; once again, the technical aspect went well. Pilots, mechanics, and the like were trained and the force was equipped with suitable gear, a mix of US gear and legacy equipment from the Saddam regime. But the Human aspect failed miserably: corruption was rife, and the differences between muslim faiths, and tribal groups, and the Kurds/Iraqis were never significantly addressed. Team after team arrived, struggled with language and cultural barriers, and attempted to persuade the local leaders to follow new doctrines, only to rotate home on shedule as new teams arrived.

The job basically done, the US/Coalition forces withdrew, and once they were safely out, ISIS/ISIL, with solid foreign backing, hit the Iraqis. Once again, some units stayed loyal and fought well, while others simply folded.

I firmly believe that the lessons are inescapable: advising does not work. Either send in personnel on multi-year tours with the authority to command, or do not try at all.