Although overshadowed by major conflicts and political change, significant developments regarding the Arctic recently took place in Russia and Central Asia. At the sixth “Arctic: territory of the dialogue” forum on March 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s new Arctic strategic vision to further develop the Northern Sea Route’s (NSR) transport and logistical capabilities. Notably, Putin outlined the necessity for developing Russia’s great inland rivers through port and facility investments, with the ultimate goal to increase riverine connectivity with the Arctic Ocean. Most important of Russia’s inland waterways is the Ob-Irtysh river system, which runs through the three nations of China, Kazakhstan, and Russia. Plans are already underway, with a trilateral meeting between Russia, China and Kazakhstan planned to discuss cross-border transportation along the Ob-Irtysh system. Furthermore, both Russia and Kazakhstan have begun formulating programs to have the Ob-Irtysh transport corridor fully-functional by 2030. If completed, the south-north Irtysh corridor will not only bring considerable economic benefits to Central Asia and Russia’s underdeveloped Siberian regions, but will have major geopolitical ramifications, as theorized by British geopolitician Mackinder.

Sir Halford J. Mackinder was a British geographer and politician, but most widely recognized for his seminal 1904 work “The Geographical Pivot of History”. Mackinder’s analysis of contemporary geopolitics and his Heartland Theory cemented him as one of the founding fathers of geopolitics. Mackinder hypothesized that the Russian Empire’s control over the “pivot area/heartland,” roughly comprising Central Asia and Siberia, would enable land-power domination over the world, bankrolled by the vast continental resources of Eurasia and exported by a network of railways. Mackinder theorized on the assumption that railways would triumph over sea-lanes for faster and less expensive trans-continental trade, fearing the marginalization of Britain’s thalassocratic empire.

Mackinder’s vision was nevertheless flawed due to his mistaken belief that railways would become superior transportation means to rivers and oceans. Mackinder’s assumptions were rebuffed by contemporary Alfred T. Mahan in his 1900 collection of essays titled “The Problem of Asia.” Mahan correctly articulated how maritime transport far exceeded the possibilities of railways, as greater geographical obstacles were imposed on all-forms of ground transportation and further compounded by the added expenses needed to build infrastructure. Moreover, railroads competed “in vain” with rivers or the sea, as rail had limited cargo capacity, while water traffic had larger capacities and could steadily deliver goods over extended periods. The geographical remoteness of the heartland from any open sea meant that the region was in a disadvantageous position to accumulate wealth. Furthermore, the heartland’s plentiful resources were incapable of reaching Russian ports and the sea unless bridged by land transport, by which point the main benefits of maritime commerce – its greater ease of transportation, abundant traffic, and economic gains – were nullified.

Indeed, within the inheritor of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, railways transported up to 90% of the nation’s goods and required subsidized freight rates as the heartland’s low-value energy and raw material products were highly sensitive to transport costs. These price controls and subsidies would eventually prove to be unsustainable, as the Soviet economy and the union itself would eventually collapse from an excess money supply that was out of proportion to the state’s real productive capabilities amongst myriads of other problems. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 appeared to demonstrate that Mackinder’s confidence in the heartland’s global dominance was ultimately misplaced.

Nevertheless, physical geography itself has experienced changes in relation to recent environmental developments. Since the late-70s, Arctic temperatures have risen rapidly, resulting in ever-increasing reductions of sea ice, with estimations that the NSR could be fully operational by 2030 and possibly ice free all-year. Similarly, river-ice durations in the polar regions have and are projected to continue decreasing as global temperatures rise, accompanied by a reduction in ice-cover thickness. The northern flank of the heartland, which Mackinder christened as the “Icy Sea” and its previously frozen waterways, may no longer reflect the unconnected frozen wilderness it was previously. The inevitable traversability and viability of Arctic shipping combined with increasing accessibility of Eurasia’s inland waterways, some flowing from Central Asia to the Arctic, presents the very real possibility of an oceanic frontage unlocking the heartland. Mackinder’s prophecy of the heartland’s geopolitical rise may become true in conjunction with the thawing Arctic.

A February 2025 paper from the Eurasian Development Bank, a Russo-Kazakh state-run institution, reported that a preliminary project for creating a Russia–Kazakhstan–China multimodal transport corridor utilizing the Ob-Irtysh had been developed. The Ob-Irtysh is hydrographically well-suited for maritime commerce and navigable in its entirety from Lake Zaysan to the Kara Sea, while the Ob River portion is navigable by ocean-going ships. The 5,140 km long river is projected to serve as a link between the NSR and the Middle Corridor. This new facet of trans-continental trade could prove to be a cheaper alternative to the pre-existing overland trade routes as water transport is reportedly three times cheaper than rail and five times cheaper than road. Further benefits include lower fuel consumption and reduced voyage times, resulting in decreased labor, as well as the shipment of cargo that were previously impossible or financially inefficient to transport overland. The full integration of the Ob-Irtysh corridor with the Middle Corridor and the NSR appears to bring massive economic benefits by facilitating maritime access to the heartland’s resources and augmenting trans-continental trade.

Indeed, limited small-scale operations have been relatively encouraging. In July 2016, a Dutch ship carried two 600-ton chemical reactors from South Korea to Russia’s Arctic estuarine port of Sabetta via the NSR, with the equipment then transferred to Irtysh Shipping Company barges which navigated the Ob-Irtysh upstream to the Pavlodar oil refinery in Kazakhstan. While this experimentary 39-day travel time was slightly longer than rail-based alternatives (20–30 days on this route), the ability to transport the reactors in one piece provided ample savings, underlining the particular viability of the route for otherwise difficultly transportable cargo.

With growing conflict around the world, traditional supply chains have been put to the test, with increases in cost and ever growing delays creating demand for alternatives.  Since the start of the Russo-Ukraine War, EU-China shipping through Russia has decreased by 35%. When combined with continuous attacks on merchant shipments by Houthi rebels, alternatives to traditional EU-China trade routes have grown in high demand. These were precisely the factors that led to the Middle Corridor becoming a growing hub for investment and increased reliance by Europe.

In response to these rising costs and continued instability, the Middle Corridor has seen exponential growth in its carrying capacity through renewed technological and diplomatic efforts. In 2024, it saw a 63% increase in tonnage from the previous year and is projected to achieve a yearly tonnage of up to 10 million tons by 2030. Bypassing Russia, and seen as a viable alternative, the Middle Corridor has attracted growing investments from the West. Nevertheless, the route does have its limitations. With an average of 16-20 days travel estimates and average costs 3,500-4,500 USD, it remains the most costly alternative for EU-China corridors. These costs and travel times have been projected to decrease significantly with continuous investments in infrastructure and system optimization, but the costs and travel times have increased on the contrary. For the current Middle Corridor to remain cost efficient, it is necessary for states involved to develop greater cooperation and increased amounts of investments in eradicating transnational border crossing costs (up to 300% increase from 2011 to 2020).

Nonetheless, even with all of these benefits, the Middle Corridor’s cargo capacity is comparatively much smaller than traditional and established EU-China routes, such as the Northern Corridor, International North–South Transport Corridor, or the NSR. “The Corridor’s current capacity represents only a fraction (at most 5%) of that of the Northern Route.” The potential growth of the Middle Corridor is comparatively smaller and encompasses many more challenges than its competing alternatives.

An expanded Irtysh River route would thus solve many of the Middle Corridor’s current issues, with much of the needed infrastructure for large-scale operations already in place. Indeed, the river system is already a major cargo and passenger artery in the region, with 6 million tons of goods and over a million people transported in 2018. During the Soviet era, upwards of 9-12 million tons of cargo transited through the system every year. The infrastructure needed for expanded activity is thus mostly already existent. For instance, Sabetta has already developed into the largest port on the NSR, with cargo volume exceeding 17 million tons in 2022, while LNG continues to flow through the port from the Yamal peninsula to Europe. On the Kazakh end, the Pavlodar River Port has a handling capacity of up to 650,000 tons, while the region’s ten smaller berths can accommodate an additional 10,000 tons of cargo each. Ninety-five vessels currently operate full-time in the river’s cargo fleet, with an operating window of 192 days spanning from April to November.

In January 2025, Kazakhstan approved a roadmap for the comprehensive development of shipping on the Irtysh River, underlining the economic viability of the route. This includes the construction of a new river port in Tugyl on Lake Zaysan, the modernization of existing berths, the opening of the Urlitobe river crossing point on the border with Russia, and the creation of logistics and multimodal hubs. Noting that river transport in the region is 2-3 times cheaper than rail, the government is also studying mixed rail-river transit as a means of lengthening the route’s operating window.

While assessing the economic viability of the route is challenging, there are clear signs of increased interest, investment, and transit along the river. As the Middle Corridor continues to face particularly high import and export costs along traditional routes, the Ob-Irtysh’s promise of a cheaper and facilitated access to global markets is understandably proving attractive.

The rapid growth of overland trans-Eurasian trade and transport expansion in Central Asia echoes Mackinder’s predictions of the heartland being “covered with a network of railways” and the birth of “a vast economic world.” This combined with the development of the Ob-Irtysh River corridor reveals that it may be just a matter of time until the heartland gains an “oceanic frontage” and all the benefits which derive from nautical commerce – a facet which Mackinder theorized would further advantage the heartland. Both Russia and Kazakhstan are expecting Chinese cooperation to enable their visions of Eurasian riverine connectivity. In May, transport ministers of China and Kazakhstan discussed the creation of new transport corridors using the Ili and Irtysh rivers to increase cargo turnover. Earlier in November 2024, the Russian Ministry of Transport stated its intentions of creating a bidirectional logistics route via the Ob-Irtysh to connect China to the Arctic while also connecting Russia’s Siberian industries directly to the BRI. These designs echo the days of intense riverine trade and resource extraction that occurred on the Irtysh between Soviet Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang province in the 1930s-40s, but on a far greater scale with serious implications.

What would this mean for the U.S. and its allies? One may theorize that such a development would not help Europe in reducing its dependence on Russia. Continuing conflict in the Middle East and growing tensions between China and the U.S. makes the Ob-Irtysh to NSR route an alluring alternative for Eurasian trade. Breaking free of the Malacca Strait has been core to China’s ambitions, while continued Houthi activity in the Red Sea has pushed shipping costs to record highs. However, it would also give Russia yet another card to hang over the necks of NATO allies, while multinational shipping companies remain wary of nationalization and sanction risks linked to the Ukraine conflict.

Although China and Russia have historically distrusted each other, external pressures have increasingly aligned the interests of both nations, potentially opening the door to cooperation. Sino-Russian cooperation has already encompassed economic and military alignment, such as joint development projects in the Russian Far East to increase Sino-Russian  energy integration or the joint strategic bomber patrol near Alaska. With Central Asia and the Arctic residing within the national security interests of both nations, Sino-Russian collaboration to enable riverine connectivity between the Middle Corridor and the NSR could serve to increase the economic power and influence of Moscow and Beijing over Eurasia. Such developments would further erode U.S. and European footprints in the region, confining Central Asia to Chinese and Russian economic domains.

Both Russia and China have continuously increased their economic, infrastructural and security investments, tightening their grasp over Central Asia. Should greater Chinese or Russian strategic investments provide either with preponderance over Central Asia’s existing or new critical transport routes, Washington can expect even greater influence and lobbying from Beijing or Moscow. An even tighter grip over Central Asia could mean that the region’s abundant energy and strategic minerals would be denied to Western markets. Strategic access to Central Asia’s vast reserves of critical minerals can provide the U.S. and its allies diversification of critical supply chains away from China, which controls 90% of global rare earth minerals. Failure for the U.S. to penetrate Central Asia could prove harmful to the ongoing technology rivalry with Beijing short term, while the completion of an Arctic multimodal corridor under total Russian or Chinese influence would foreclose future Central Asian business and security opportunities for America. This year, China has surged BRI investment into Central Asia’s critical minerals sector as a preliminary move to hedge against U.S. tariffs. Further Chinese and Russian ascendance in Central Asia would alleviate their strategic vulnerabilities, while endangering the geopolitical position of the U.S. and its allies.

The U.S. has not stood idly by, as the newly acquired 99-year lease over the South Caucasus Zangezur Corridor can create a direct link between Europe and Central Asia, blunting Russian and Iranian influence, while creating an alternate route bypassing Chinese infrastructure projects. Nevertheless, the U.S. should take greater measures in reducing Central Asia’s isolation to global markets by promoting trade and investment to increase American competitiveness in the region. Such initiatives would prevent the consolidation of Russian or Chinese holds by offering alternative trade routes and development opportunities.

Maximilien Hachiya is a is a War Studies scholar at King’s College London.

Paul Audoin is a senior at Columbia University and Sciences Po Paris, majoring in Political Science and Economics. He is a student scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Ulysse Oliveira Baptista is a Political Science student at Concordia University Montréal. He is an associate researcher at the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies.