A rather unintentionally unserious conversation on another thread (the gentleman seemed to be arguing that that were my legal and social inferiors with no right to argue with me — a somewhat elliptical point of view to take) nonetheless intentionally brought up a deeply serious point, which I would like to address here.

I apologize for the inadequacy of my thought here, but we are now treading in deep philosophical waters. Regard this, dear reader, rather as a starting point for cogitation, rather than a settled and well articulated theory.

Someone asked me what is meant by freedom?

The context concerned political freedom only; of other type or other nuances of the word, I do not address.

Most philosopher define freedom either in terms of what most and best satisfied the inner nature of man reaching for completeness, or defines freedom by the external nature of the constraints imposed by coercion upon him. I think both definitions inadequate, and propose an approach not often seen: to define freedom by the duties it allows one to carry out.

The nature of the topic requires a description rather than a definition.

Freedom is the condition when a man’s ability to carry out his natural duties to his civilization are not curtailed by the coercion of the state, nor by the violence of invasion, nor by the trespass or fraud by his fellows.

Freedom is when the laws permit and encourage him to carry out those natural duties rather than the reverse.

Natural duties are those which are his merely by being a rational creature possessed of free will. They can be excused or curtailed by incapacity, or as just punishment in retaliation for a crime.

Artificial duties are those assumed by contract or covenant, as joining the army or getting married.

For example: the health and wellbeing of civilization imposes a duty that men go armed, to protect themselves from invasion, trespass, and tyranny.

Indeed, it is primarily (albeit not solely) for this reason civil societies are justified at all. They are justified primarily for our mutual protection, albeit justified more profoundly thereafter for our mutual good, that each might encourage his neighbor to virtue. Men come together to preserve their lives and protect the fruits of their labor, they stay together for the sake of the good life, love of neighbor, and the joys of mutual society.

When a government seeks to deprive its citizens generally of their arms, and not just a rebellious province, it become destructive of the very ends for which it was formed: this is an imposition on liberty.

The touchstone of monarchy is the inequality of the ranks of society, as a class or caste system. If the class system is real and not merely nominal (which it is, for example, in Modern England. They are no more a monarchy than we are a republic) then the nobles enjoy a sole right to bear arms.

The inequality is the prime imposition on the civic duties of the lower classes, for it deprives them of the ability to carry out the duties of seeing to the common good which is the natural duty of anyone living in a commonwealth: a disarmed common class is grossly hindered in the efforts, as individuals, of fending off or killing criminals, and as a group in fending off or killing tyrants.

Hence, for example, the right to bear arms is a liberty, for without it the duty to use force to uphold the social order, which is incumbent on every individual, his hindered by fear of retaliation from the government, allegedly the organ given primary charge of upholding the social order.

A similar example is the freedom of speech and assembly or the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. These, obviously, are dead letter without the right to bear arms, for then they are exercised only at the sufferance of the magistrate.

If this description of liberty is unclear, please ask, and I will answer as best I may.

Originally published at John C. Wright's Journal. Please leave any comments there.