Five questions about the crisis

by Alaa El Aswany

Question 1: What is the basis of the military council's legitimacy in governing Egypt during the transitional period?

On February 11 Omar Suleiman came out to announce that Hosni Mubarak had stepped down and had transferred his presidential powers to the military council. There is a strange contradiction here. After being deposed, the deposed president does not have the right to give his powers to anyone. That's like a company manager being dismissed, going home and then signing an order appointing new employees in the company. The appointments would not be legitimate because a manager who has been dismissed cannot appoint anyone, so the deposed Mubarak likewise could not appoint the military council because he himself had lost his legitimacy and hence could not give it to someone else. From a constitutional point of view, the 1971 constitution does not allow the military council to rule Egypt, because it stipulates that if the head of state is unable to perform his official duties, the head of the supreme constitutional court should assume power. Neither the constitution nor Mubarak after his deposition can be valid sources of legitimacy for the military council. So where did the council acquire its legitimacy? The military council's only legitimacy is the Egyptian revolution. On February 11 there were 20 million Egyptian revolutionaries on the streets who had succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak, and if that day they had rejected government by the military council they would definitely have had their way. It was the revolutionaries who trusted the military council, gave it legitimacy and mandated the council to carry out the objectives of the revolution. The military council acquired its legitimacy from the revolution and when it loses the trust of the revolutionaries it also loses the sole basis of its legitimacy. That's why the military council is calling for a referendum so that it can stay in power. It is seeking a new legitimacy separate from the legitimacy of the revolution, exploiting Egyptians' trust in the army in order to obtain their consent to the council continuing as a political authority that has undermined and obstructed the course of the revolution and brought it to this crisis. This is a mistake that must be corrected. The revolutionaries who want to deprive the military council of its political role do not mean to push aside the armed forces. On the contrary they respect and cherish the armed forces and want them to be free to carry out their national duties. 

Question 2: Did the military council protect the Egyptian revolution?

The military council refused to open fire on demonstrators and this is a position for which it deserves credit, but what happened after that? Over nine months the military council did not protect the revolution at all; in fact the opposite is true. The military council thought that overthrowing Mubarak and putting him on trial was the most the revolution could obtain, and then it preserved the Mubarak regime in power as it was, so instead of the complete change for which the revolution was launched only the person of the president was changed. The Mubarak regime is still ruling Egypt, from State Security, which has resumed its criminal activities at full capacity, to the senior police officers loyal to former Interior Minister Habib el-Adly, who run the interior ministry and continue to kill demonstrators and violate their humanity, to the prosecutor general, who was forced to make innumerable political compromises in the Mubarak era, to the sycophantic journalists who work on behalf of State Security, to the senior officials throughout the civil service. The scene in Egypt is unprecedented: there was a revolution to overthrow the Mubarak regime but the military council saved the regime and kept it in power. The outcome has been unfortunate and predictable. The Mubarak regime has contained the revolution and aborted it through carefully measured steps, from the deliberate breakdown in law and order, the release of thugs and violent convicts to terrorise people, the failure of the police, with the consent of the military council, to perform their duty, the deliberate price rises and the strikes by interest groups, which the authorities deliberately ignore so that the demonstrators turn to vandalism and blocking roads, the misleading media campaigns to convince people that the revolution is the reason for all these crises, and then the creation of sectarian conflicts, in which State Security officials specialise, and setting fire to churches in full view of security forces and military police, who look on without intervening. With all these artificial crises, a massive media campaign is launched to tarnish the image of the young revolutionaries (who represent what is noblest in Egypt). The intention is to frighten the people who supported the revolution and wear them down with crises until they abandon the revolutionaries and leave them alone. The old regime will then pounce on them and crush them, to finish off the revolution once and for all. The final blow against the revolutionaries was timed for Saturday, November 19, a week before elections, to remove them finally from the electoral scene. The barbaric attack by security forces on those who were injured in the revolution and who were staging a sit-in in Tahrir Square was meant to drag the young revolutionaries into an unequal battle in which they would be crushed. Security personnel and military police attacked those injured in the revolution and then viciously assaulted the demonstrators who came to defend them. After the demonstrators were cleared from the square, the military police opened it again so that the revolutionaries would pour in and be crushed again. All that was carefully planned by creating a crisis in Mohamed Mahmoud Street (which does not lead to the Interior Ministry), in order to convince public opinion that the demonstrators were being killed to defend the ministry and prevent the revolutionaries from storming it. But the people spoiled the plan when they went out into squares across Egypt in support of the revolutionaries. This surprise confused the Mubarak regime, which committed more barbaric crimes against peaceful unarmed demonstrators. Security personnel sponsored by the military police (according to the testimony of the forensic department) killed demonstrators with live ammunition, aimed shotguns at their eyes and then released poisonous gases at them. When the regime realized that the revolutionaries were determined to stay whatever the sacrifices, it had to make a few concessions, so it dismissed the Sharaf government and asked Kamal el-Ganzouri to form a new one, confirming that the military council disregards the will of the revolution and insists on monopolizing power and on defending the Mubarak regime to the very end. 

Question 3: Why don't we leave the military council in power until the country can be handed over to an elected president?

Because the military council is the Mubarak regime, no more and no less. Should we expect the Mubarak regime to help us overthrow it? Should we expect the Interior Ministry officials loyal to Mubarak to help us restore law and order so that we can dismiss them and put them on trial? Should we expect the bank chiefs appointed by Gamal Mubarak to contribute to stimulating the economy until an elected government comes and dismisses them and maybe puts them on trial on corruption charges?   There's a video of a police officer aiming a shotgun at the eyes of a demonstrator and then being congratulated by his colleagues for blinding an innocent person in one eye. This incident, recorded in full, is significant: it means that the Mubarak regime after the revolution treats Egyptians in the same way as before. The public prosecutor has asked to question the police officer but the Interior Ministry has refused to hand him over and his colleagues are up in arms in solidarity with him. Of course, an officer can't carry out his commander's orders to shoot demonstrators in the eye and then be put on trial because he obeyed orders. The continuation of the military council as a political authority means  putting an end to the revolution. The only way to save the revolution is to form a revolutionary consensus government with presidential powers and not subordinate to the military council, a government that can purge the police and judiciary, restore law and order and conduct fair trials for all those who have committed crimes against Egyptians. The military council knows that the formation of an independent government will bring an end to the Mubarak regime, which the council is defending to the death, and so it is manoeuvring, negotiating and calling for endless discussions with the political forces and inviting them to form advisory councils that no one will consult. The military council wants to gain time so that elections start and people are busy with them, while Ganzouri is imposed on the Egyptian people so that his government can kill off what's left of the revolution.

Question 4: Why does the military council insist on holding elections despite the deterioration in the security situation, the incompetence of the agencies responsible and the chaotic nature of the political scene?

The reason is that the military council is fed up with the revolution and its demands and wants to put them behind it. And because the revolution provides the council's only legitimacy, it is looking for a new legitimacy that a cooperative parliament will provide. The military council has done everything it can to exclude the revolutionaries from the People's Assembly, refusing to disqualify members of the old National Democratic Party and allowing them to form ten new parties so that they can use the money they plundered from the people to buy votes and get into parliament. The elections have been planned with one very clear aim: to have a parliament made up of ex-NDP members and the Muslim Brothers, in whom the military  council has found a reliable and obedient partner that is ready to do everything asked of it in return for seats in government.

Question 5: What's to be done?

Circumstances have forced the Egyptian revolution to fight on two fronts: it has to continue peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins so that the council responds to the will of the revolution, dismisses Ganzouri and forms an independent government led by someone associated with the revolution. We are not interested at this stage in the political affiliation of the prime minister: what matters most is how loyal he is to the principles of the revolution. Whether it is Mohamed ElBaradei the liberal or Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh the Islamist or anyone else who is equally credible, only a revolutionary prime minister can protect the revolution and put it on the right track. This is the demand on which we must unite and to achieve which we must press with all our strength, but we must also take part in the elections. In my opinion, the revolutionaries have a duty to take part fully in the elections. If the elections are conducted without any rigging, a number of revolutionaries will get into parliament. If the elections are rigged, the revolutionaries will be witnesses to the betrayal of trust and the rigged elections will be cancelled through the will of the people. No one will be able to falsify the will of the people, who were able, through their courage and sacrifice, to force Mubarak to step down. 

    The Egyptian revolution is going through a critical stage because the military council has preserved the Mubarak regime, which has regained its power and is lashing out at the revolution in order to abort it, but it is the people who made the revolution who will protect it until it triumphs, God willing.

    Democracy is the solution.

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